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ABSTRACT	Title	retention	functionally	serves	as	a	security	device	for	ensuring	the	payment	of	the	purchase	price	in	a	sales	contract,	but	not	all	jurisdictions	recognize	it	as	a	security	interest.	The	research	aims	to	compare	the	recognition	and	treatment	of	title	 retention	 in	 Vietnam,	 England,	 France,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Australia.	 It	examines	 the	 issues	 arising	 in	 Vietnam	 concerning	 the	 existing	 law	 of	 title	retention	and	the	prospect	of	a	reform	that	possibly	involves	the	importation	of	the	 Article	 9	 model.	 The	 research	 is	 conducted	 using	 the	 doctrinal	 and	comparative	analysis	methods	with	the	aid	of	a	critical	outlook	and	a	discussion	on	the	legal	transplant.		It	 is	 found	 that	 English	 law	 insists	 on	 the	 formalism	 approach	 that	 does	 not	accept	 title	 retention	 to	 the	 original	 goods	 as	 a	 security	 interest.	 It	 raises	 the	unexpected	impact	on	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	after	the	FG	Wilson	(Engineering)	Ltd	
v	 John	 Holt	 &	 Co	 (Liverpool)	 Ltd1	and	 PST	 Energy	 7	 Shipping	 LLC	 v	 OW	 Bunker	
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CHAPTER	1 INTRODUCTION	
1.1 The	issue	It	is	not	unusual	in	the	context	of	business	transactions	that	sellers	supply	goods	to	buyers	on	 credit	or	ship	 the	goods	prior	 to	payment	and	 then	 they	bear	 the	risk	of	non–payment	by	the	buyer.	Retention	of	title	is	a	model	that	is	frequently	copied	 in	order	 to	 induce	buyers	 to	make	 full	payment	 in	exchange	 for	 the	 full	ownership.	 	 This	 clause	 reads	 in	 the	 simple	 form	 that	 the	 seller	 retains	 the	property	in	the	goods	until	the	full	payment	of	the	purchase	price	is	made	by	the	buyer.		The	requirement	 for	passing	of	property	diverges,	and	 it	 is	mostly	divided	 into	two	principles,	namely	of	consent	and	of	delivery.	The	former	requires	title	to	be	passed	when	 a	 sale	 contract	 is	 concluded.	Meanwhile,	 the	 latter	 rule	 provides	that	passing	of	property	occurs	at	the	time	the	goods	are	delivered	to	a	buyer.		A	common	feature	of	the	two	principles	is	that	the	passing	of	title	in	the	goods	does	not	 depend	 on	 full	 payment	 of	 the	 purchase	 price.	 Despite	 the	 default	 rule	 as	aforementioned,	many	national	laws	respect	the	principle	of	party	autonomy	that	allows	 parties	 to	 tailor	 the	 transportation	 of	 title.	 Sellers	 insist	 on	 retention	of	title	because	they	aim	at	escaping	 from	the	default	rule	of	 title	 transfer	and	the	requirement	 of	 registration.	 Until	 the	 buyer	 makes	 full	 payment,	 the	 seller	remains	the	owner	of	the	goods	to	prevent	them	from	joining	the	buyer’s	assets	to	be	distributed	to	other	creditors	in	case	of	insolvency.	However,	what	happens	in	practice	does	not	meet	 the	expectation	of	 title-retaining	sellers.	Retention	of	title	often	involves	personal	property,	particularly	consumer,	workable	goods	or	stocks-in-trade.	 Thus,	 possession,	 both	 physical	 and	 documentary,	 can	 place	possessing	buyers	 in	a	good	position	to	make	the	goods	at	hand	manufactured,	mixed,	fixed	or	resold.	In	the	event	of	buyers'	insolvency,	sellers	find	themselves	in	 dispute	 with	 other	 creditors	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 rank	 them	 above	 even	 secured	creditors.	 Therefore,	 many	 varieties	 of	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 are	 drafted	 to	anticipate	difficulties	faced	by	non-possessing	sellers1.		
																																																								1	See	Davies	I,	Effective	Retention	of	Title	(Fourmat	Publishing	1991)	at	pp.	32-3	
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(1)	 A	 simple	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 provides	 that	 the	 seller	 will	 retain	 the	ownership	 in	 goods	 until	 the	 buyer	 has	 paid	 the	 purchase	 price2.	 	 This	 clause	does	not	sufficiently	allow	sellers	to	trace	into	the	proceeds	of	sub-sale.	(2)	An	all	monies	(or	current	account)	clause	provides	the	seller	a	possibility	to	retain	the	title	 to	 the	 goods	 until	 they	 have	 recovered	 all	 outstanding	 debts	 arising	 from	past,	present	and	future	transactions	with	the	buyer3.	(3)	A	proceeds	of	sale	(or	“tracing”	or	“prolonged”)	clause	will	entitle	the	seller	to	any	proceeds	generating	from	a	sub-sale	 to	a	 third	party4.	This	clause	 frequently	authorizes	the	buyer	to	sell	 the	 goods	 and	 even	 the	 manufactured	 goods	 incorporating	 the	 goods	supplied	 to	a	 third	party	 in	 the	normal	 course	of	her	business	upon	conditions	that	the	buyer’s	rights	against	a	third	party	will	pass	to	the	seller,	or	the	proceeds	will	be	held	 in	 trust	 for	 the	 seller.	 (4)	A	manufacturing	 (or	aggregation)	 clause	provides	that	if	the	goods	at	hand	are	mixed	or	manufactured	with	other	goods,	the	seller	will	retain	the	title	 in	 the	whole	of	 the	newly	manufactured	goods5.	A	title	 retention	 clause	 may	 be	 drafted	 to	 cover	 both	 the	 proceeds	 and	 newly	manufactured	products	and	concurrently	encompassing	all	debts	of	the	buyer	to	the	seller.	A	sale	on	credit	is	undoubtedly	an	important	financing	device.	A	buyer	can	obtain	credit	 from	 a	 seller	 and	 retention	 of	 title	 is	 consequently	 a	 method	 to	 secure	payment.	Title	retention	has	the	 function	of	a	security	device	aimed	at	 the	 first	priority	to	the	goods	supplied,	their	proceeds	or	new	products.	The	demand	for	free	 flow	 of	 commerce	 has	 raised	 a	 significant	 question	 how	 a	 title	 retention	clause	is	capable	of	protecting	an	unpaid	seller	without	restraining	a	buyer	from	doing	the	ordinary	course	of	business.		The	ultimate	goal	of	financing	is	to	benefit	both	creditors	and	debtors,	that	is	to	say,	 debtors	 have	 access	 to	 secured	 debts	 to	 operate	 their	 business	 while	creditors	gain	profit	 through	their	capital.	However,	 title	retention	by	nature	 is	not	 qualified	 to	 create	 a	 security	 interest.	 It	 makes	 no	 sense	 that	 the	 seller	ensures	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 buyer's	 obligation	 by	 his	 asset	 instead	 of																																																									2	See	Parris	J,	Effective	Retention	of	Title	Clauses	(Collins	1986)	at	pp.	44-6	3	ibid,	at	pp.	47-8	4	ibid,	at	pp.	49-52	
5	ibid,	at	pp.	52-3	
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following	 the	 asset	 of	 the	 buyer	 or	 someone	 else.	 However,	 the	 buyer	 cannot	charge	 what	 has	 not	 yet	 belonged	 to	 her.	 Retention	 of	 title	 is	 a	 contractual	arrangement	regarding	the	passing	of	property,	but	it	has	an	impact	upon	third	parties	by	its	function.	It	results	in	the	diversity	of	title	retention	treatments.	English	 law	 treats	 title	 retention	 as	 the	 seller’s	 absolute	 proprietary	 right	 that	allows	 the	 recovery	of	 the	goods	when	a	buyer	 fails	 to	pay	 the	purchase	price.	
Romalpa 6 	is	 a	 striking	 case	 in	 this	 field	 since	 it	 recognized	 title	 retention	extending	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub-sale	 by	 introducing	 fiduciary	 concepts	 into	commercial	law.	 	However,	courts	have	distinguished	their	cases	 from	Romalpa	to	dismiss	the	validity	of	the	proceeds	clause	by	the	argument	that	this	clause	is	equivalent	 to	 a	 void	 registrable	 charge.	 Similarly,	 English	 courts	 do	 not	acknowledge	 the	 first	 priority	 of	 title	 retention	 regarding	 newly	manufactured	products	 and	 their	 proceeds.	 In	 recent	 days,	 title	 retention	 has	 an	 expected	impact	on	the	sale	of	goods	law	under	the	Bunkers’	ruling	to	the	extent	that	the	sale	of	consumable	or	workable	goods	subject	to	title	retention	is	not	a	contract	of	sale	within	the	scope	of	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1979.	Article	9	of	 the	 American	Uniform	Commercial	Code	brings	 title	 retention	 into	the	scope	of	secured	transactions	in	personal	property	under	functionalism.	It	is	considered	 as	 “the	 most	 innovated	 part	 of	 the	 Uniform	 Commercial	 Code”7.	 A	security	 interest	 is	defined	as	 “an	interest	in	personal	property	or	fixtures	which	
secures	 payment	 or	 performance	 of	 an	 obligation”8.	 Security	 interests	 comprise	any	device	that	has	a	function	to	secure	performance	of	obligation,	regardless	of	the	form	of	transaction,	the	type	of	collateral	or	the	status	of	the	debtor/secured	party9.	All	security	 interests	subject	 to	 the	Article	9	receive	the	same	treatment	regarding	 attachment,	 perfection,	priority,	 default	 and	 enforcement.	 Under	 this	Article	9,	title	retention	or	conditional	sales	can	be	recognized	and	registered	as	a																																																									6	Aluminium	Industrie	Vaassen	B.V.	v	Romalpa	Aluminium	Ltd.	[1976]	1	WLR	676,	at	pp.	690,	693,	694	7	Warren	WD	and	Walt	SD,	Secured	Transactions	in	Personal	Property	(8th	edn,	Foundation	Press	2011),	at	p.	9	8	U.C.C	§	1-201(35)		9	Nguyen	X-T	and	Nguyen	BT,	Transplanting	Secured	Transactions	Law:	Trapped	in	the	Civil	Code	
for	Emerging	Economy	Countries	 (2014)	 (Legal	 Studies	Research	Paper	No.	 2014-39,	 Robert	H.	McKinney	School	of	Law,	Indiana	University),	at	pp.	8-9	
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purchase-money	 security	 interest.	 The	 concept	 of	 purchase-money	 security	interests	is	broad	enough	to	cover	all	kinds	of	title	retention	clause	except	for	the	all	monies	one.	Title-retaining	sellers	by	timely	perfecting	their	security	interest	may	gain	the	first	in	line	of	priority	as	they	have	expected.		Article	9	of	the	American	Uniform	Commercial	Code	is	noticeable	to	set	a	model	that	 is	 transplanted	 in	 many	 jurisdictions.	 The	 Australian	 Personal	 Property	Securities	Act	(PPSA)	brought	into	force	in	2009	has	put	an	end	to	the	advantage	of	the	Romalpa	clause	that	was	utilized	with	the	expectation	to	create	a	device	to	secure	payment	without	registration.	The	PPSA	is	a	good	lesson	of	transplanting	Article	9	into	the	domestic	law	of	secured	transactions	in	personal	property.	In	 Vietnam,	 sale	 and	 purchase	 transactions	 are	 mostly	 regulated	 by	 simple	usages	and	practices,	and	the	contract	of	sale	is	not	often	reviewed	by	a	lawyer.	The	transfer	of	the	goods	is	considered	to	be	the	transfer	of	property,	especially	with	regard	to	personal	property	that	is	not	required	a	certificate	of	title.	Sellers	hesitate	 to	 control	 or	 administer	 the	 goods	 delivered	 to	 the	 buyer,	 bearing	 in	mind	 that	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 identify	 particular	 items.	 To	 some	 extent,	 personal	property	 is	 not	 the	 valuable	 and	 popular	 collateral	 comparable	 with	 real	property.	Therefore,	 title	retention	has	not	attracted	attention	 in	Vietnam	up	to	now.	The	title	retention	clause	is	inserted	in	a	contract	of	sale	but	few	disputes	in	this	 area	 are	 brought	 to	 court.	 Practitioners	 and	 academics	 have	 long	 viewed	retention	of	 title	 as	a	 contractual	 arrangement	 rather	 than	concentrating	on	 its	function	as	a	secured	transaction.	Only	those	who	have	researched	foreign	laws	perceive	the	function	of	title	retention,	and	Civil	Code	drafters	are	among	them.	In	2015,	a	revised	Civil	Code	was	enacted,	and	retention	of	title	is	categorized	as	a	secured	transaction.	It	adopts	the	French	approach	that	treats	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	and	does	not	mention	the	concept	of	purchase-money	security	interest	recommended	in	Article	9.	Briefly,	 title	 retention	 is	 increasingly	 receiving	 great	 attention	 in	 many	jurisdictions.	Article	9	undoubtedly	has	a	great	 influence	on	 the	 law	of	secured	transactions	in	personal	property	that	treat	title	retention	as	a	purchase-money	security	interest	under	the	functionalism	approach.	Many	common	law	countries	
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have	 adopted	 the	 Article	 9	 model.	 The	 influence	 of	 this	 model	 is	 likely	 to	 be	expanded	 since	 the	 UNCITRAL	 issued	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Secured	Transactions	in	2009	that	reflects	the	“tone	and	spirit”	of	the	American	model10.	It	 leads	 to	 the	 tendency	 of	 legal	 transplant	 of	 the	 Article	 9	 in	 general	 and	 the	concept	of	purchase-money	security	interest	in	particular.	




1.3 Research	method	This	 is	 a	 comparative	 study	 of	 title	 retention;	 thus,	 the	 author	will	 employ	 the	doctrinal	and	comparative	analysis	with	the	aid	of	a	critical	approach.	A	doctrinal	research	approach	is	defined	as	one	“which	provides	a	systematic	exposition	of	the	
rules	 governing	 a	 particular	 legal	 category,	 analyses	 the	 relationship	 between	
rules,	 explains	 areas	 of	 difficulty	 and,	 perhaps,	 predicts	 future	 development”11.	 In	brief,	a	doctrinal	research	answers	the	question	what	the	law	is	in	a	certain	area	by	 collecting,	 analyzing	 and	 synthesizing	 relevant	 case	 law	 and	 legislation12.																																																									10	McCormack	G,	‘American	Private	Law	Writ	Large?	The	UNCITRAL	Secured	Transactions	Guide’	(2011)	60			International	&	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	597,	at	p.	598	11	Definition	by	Pearce	Committee	cited	in	Hutchingson	T,	‘Doctrinal	Research’	in	Watkins	D	and	Burton	M	(eds),	Research	methods	in	law	(Routledge	2013),	at	p.	10	12	Dobinson	 I	 and	 John	 F,	 ‘Quantitative	 Legal	 Research’	 in	 McConville	 M	 and	 Chui	 WH	 (eds),	
Research	methods	for	law	(Edinburgh	University	Press	2007),	at	pp.	18-9	
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Academics	 conduct	a	doctrinal	 research	 for	not	only	problem–	solving	but	also	uncovering	the	status	of	the	law	in	question	as	being	coherent	and	consistent	or	not.	At	this	level,	secondary	sources	like	scholarly	commentaries	and	writing	are	studied	 to	 give	 in–depth	 discussion.	 A	 doctrinal	 analysis	 cannot	 be	 considered	merely	 as	 the	 legal	 research	 that	 aims	 at	 finding	 the	 law	 for	 particular	 cases.	Doctrinal	researchers	are	required	to	reflect	on	the	law	to	gain	new	insights13.	The	doctrinal	method	 is	criticized	 for	 isolating	rules	of	 law	from	the	context	or	from	 the	 purpose	 that	 they	 are	 going	 to	 serve.	 The	 social,	 political,	 economic,	moral	and	the	like	factors	are	not	considered	as	the	underpinning	or	examined	to	evaluate	the	effect	of	law14.	Despite	the	said	criticism,	a	doctrinal	analysis	is	still	a	principal	 and	dominant	method	 in	 law	 in	 the	sense	 that,	no	matter	what	other	legal	research	methods	are	adopted,	a	researcher	must	answer	the	question	what	law	 is	 at	 first	 glance15.	 Bearing	 in	 mind	 this	 debate,	 the	 present	 author	 will	conduct	a	doctrinal	analysis	as	the	core	method	of	this	study	to	explore	the	law	of	title	retention	in	various	jurisdictions	within	the	scope	of	the	research.	Comparative	 analysis	 is	 the	 second	 method	 of	 research	 in	 this	 study.	Comparative	 law	can	be	defined	simply	as	 “the	comparison	of	the	different	legal	
system	of	the	world”16,	but	denotes	more	than	a	method	of	study	or	research17.	It	has	the	substantive	feature	to	be	regarded	as	an	academic	discipline,	where	law	is	examined	in	a	new	perspective18.	One	or	more	systems	or	a	particular	area	of	one	 or	 more	 systems	 are	 studied	 in	 relationship	 with	 others	 to	 gain	 new	
																																																								13	Pendleton	 M,	 ‘Non-empirical	 Discovery	 in	 Legal	 Scholarship	 -	 Choosing,	 Researching	 and	Writing	a	Traditional	Scholarly	Article’	in	McConville	M	and	Chui	WH	(eds),	Research	Methods	for	
Law	(Edinburgh	University	Press	2007),	at	pp.	162	-	3	14	Hutchingson	T,	‘Doctrinal	Research’	in	Watkins	D	and	Burton	M	(eds),	Research	methods	in	law	(Routledge	2013),	at	p.	16	15	Ibid,	at	pp.	17,	28	16	Zweigert	 K,	 Introduction	 to	 Comparative	 Law	 (Kötz	 H	 ed,	 3rd	 rev.	 ed.	 edn,	 Clarendon	 Press;	Oxford	University	Press	1998),	at	p.	2	17	Watson	A,	Legal	Transplants:	An	Approach	to	Comparative	Law	(2nd	edn,	University	of	Georgia	Press	 1993),	 at	 pp.	 1–2;	 Legrand	 P,	 ‘Comparative	 Legal	 Studies	 and	 Commitment	 to	 Theory’	(1995)	58	The	Modern	Law	Review	262,	at	p.	264	18	Watson	A,	Legal	Transplants:	An	Approach	to	Comparative	Law	(2nd	edn,	University	of	Georgia	Press	1993),	at	p.	9;	Legrand	P,	 ‘Comparative	Legal	Studies	and	Commitment	to	Theory’	(1995)	58	The	Modern	Law	Review	262,	at	pp.	264-5,		
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knowledge19.	A	comparative	study	of	law,	therefore,	provides	its	own	outlook	for	the	 subject-matter	 in	 question	 as	 opposed	 to	 other	 outlooks	 such	 as	 feminist	legal	study,	social	legal	study	or	economic	analysis	of	law.		As	a	 research	method	 in	 law,	 the	 crucial	question	 is	how	 to	 compare.	 It	would	make	sense	to	put	the	home	law	on	one	side	and	other	foreign	laws	in	the	other	side.	 It	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 identify	 a	 study	 as	 the	 macro-comparison	 or	 micro-comparison.	The	former	is	the	comparison	of	different	legal	systems	as	a	whole	to	learn	about	the	legal	style,	culture,	thinking,	and	procedure,	whereas	the	latter	deals	with	a	particular	area	of	 law20.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	micro-comparison	starts	 with	 the	 presumption	 of	 similarity	 to	 seek	 best	 solutions,	 namely	 the	harmonization	 in	 a	 specific	 area	 of	 law;	 in	 contrast,	 the	 macro-comparison	involves	 the	 presumption	 of	 difference	 that	 identifies	 the	 legal	 mentality	 of	compared	legal	systems21.	The	functional	method	of	comparison	which	looks	for	various	solutions	to	the	same	problem22	could	be	a	good	start	where	the	research	question	 is	 dealing	with	 a	 specific	 legal	 issue.	 This	method	 runs	 in	 line	with	 a	doctrinal	analysis	in	the	sense	that	both	of	them	isolate	a	set	of	rules	from	their	context	 or	 purposes	 to	 study.	 However,	 the	 consequence	 of	 functional	comparison	 does	 not	 always	 result	 in	 harmonization	 of	 law.	 Although	 starting	with	 the	 presumption	 that	 the	 law	 in	 a	 specific	 area	 in	 different	 jurisdictions	serve	 the	 same	 function,	 comparatists	 have	 inspiration	 from	 witnessing	 the	difference	 in	solutions	at	 the	outset	 to	proceed	on	a	comparative	research.	The	functional	method	reveals	many	solutions	for	the	same	problem	and	the	question	of	 harmonization	 can	 only	 be	 satisfactorily	 answered	 through	 in-depth																																																									19 	Frankenberg	 G,	 ‘Critical	 Comparisons:	 Re-thinking	 Comparative	 Law’	 (1985)	 26	 Havard	International	 Law	 Journal	 411,	 at	 pp.	 413-4;	 Watson	 A,	 Legal	 Transplants:	 An	 Approach	 to	
Comparative	Law	(2nd	edn,	University	of	Georgia	Press	1993),	at	p.	9	20	Zweigert	 K,	 Introduction	 to	 Comparative	 Law	 (Kötz	 H	 ed,	 3rd	 rev.	 ed.	 edn,	 Clarendon	 Press;	Oxford	University	Press	1998),	at	p.	2,	at	pp.	4-5;	Samuel	G,	An	Introduction	to	Comparative	Law	
Theory	and	Method	(Hart	Publishing	2014),	at	p.	50	21	See	 more	 discussion	 on	 two	 approaches	 in	 Samuel	 G,	 An	 Introduction	 to	 Comparative	 Law	
Theory	 and	Method	 (Hart	 Publishing	 2014),	 at	 pp.	 53-7.	 Zweigert	 K,	 in	 his	 leading	 text	 book,	
Introduction	to	Comparative	Law,	propose	the	presumption	of	similarity	(Zweigert	K,	supra,	at	p.	40).	Legrand	argues	that	comparatists	should	acknowledge	difference	that	emphasizes	on	socio-historical	or	socio-cultural	context	underpinning	judicial	decisions	and	legislation	(See	Legrand	P,	‘Comparative	Legal	Studies	and	Commitment	to	Theory’	(1995)	58	The	Modern	Law	Review	262,	at	pp.	239-240)	22	See	n.	16,	at	pp.	34-40	
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discussion.	 Accordingly,	 the	 difference	 in	 solutions	 should	 be	 explained	 in	 the	light	of	their	context.		A	comparative	research	approach	offers	the	chance	to	explore	a	concrete	area	of	law	 in	 different	 contexts	 that	 expose	 deficiencies,	 contradictions	 or	 competing	visions23.	 A	 critical	 approach	 is	 suggested	 to	 fix	 the	weakness	 of	 the	 functional	method24.	A	critical	approach	also	helps	to	avoid	hegemonic	thinking	and	cultural	biases.	 A	 comparative	 researcher	 may	 be	 an	 expert	 in	 her	 home	 law	 but	 a	stranger	 to	 the	 foreign	 law.	 Therefore,	 her	 viewpoint	 on	 foreign	 laws	 cannot	depart	 from	her	 legal	 and	 cultural	 education;	 in	 other	words,	 foreign	 laws	 are	looked	 from	 the	 certain	 bias	 of	 the	 comparatist25.	 Instead	 of	 pretending	 to	 be	neutral	 or	 objective,	 comparatists	 should	 keep	 a	 distance	 from	 their	 home	jurisdictions	to	critique	their	own	rules	mindful	of	the	foreign	law.	Comparative	law	should	not	look	at	law	as	a	set	of	rules	isolated	from	their	surroundings	but	rather	a	component	of	social	practices,	accordingly,	foreign	law	would	be	viewed	with	 respect	 and	 appreciation	 for	 its	 legal	 culture	 as	 the	 underlying	 cognitive	framework26.		Legal	culture	is	defined	as	“a	specific	way	in	which	values,	practices	and	concepts	
are	 integrated	 into	 the	 operation	 of	 legal	 institutions	 and	 the	 interpretation	 of	
legal	texts”27.	The	question	is	raised	whether	comparative	law	must	involve	other	research	like	social	or	economic	research	to	see	all	factors	having	influences	on	the	 set	 of	 rules	 of	 each	 jurisdiction	 in	 question.	 Hoecke	 recommends	 the	paradigm	of	legal	culture	used	as	a	tool	for	comparative	law	that	is	composed	of	six	elements:	(1)	concept	of	law,	(2)	theory	of	legal	sources,	(3)	methodology	of																																																									23	Frankenberg	 G,	 ‘Critical	 Comparisons:	 Re	 -	 thinking	 Comparative	 Law’	 (1985)	 26	 Havard	International	Law	Journal	411,	at	p.	448	24	See	more	discussion	in	Frankenberg	G,	supra,	at	pp.	445-8	25	Legrand	P,	‘Comparative	Legal	Studies	and	Commitment	to	Theory’	(1995)	58	The	Modern	Law	Review	262,	at	pp.	266-7.	See	more	discussion	on	new	approach	to	comparative	law	that	law	is	considered	as	culture	in	Van	Hoecke	M	and	Warrington	M,	‘Legal	Cultures,	Legal	Paradigms	and	Legal	 Doctrine:	 Towards	 a	 New	 Model	 for	 Comparative	 Law’	 (1998)	 47	 International	 and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	495,	at	pp.	491-513 26	See	more	 discussion	 on	 how	 civilians	 research	 the	 common	 law	 in	 Legrand	P,	 ‘Comparative	Legal	Studies	and	Commitment	to	Theory’	(1995)	58	The	Modern	Law	Review	262,	at	pp.	237-8	27	Bell	G,	‘English	Law	and	French	Law	-	Not	So	Different?’	(1995)	C.L.P.	69	cited	in	Van	Hoecke	M	and	Warrington	M,	 ‘Legal	Cultures,	Legal	Paradigms	and	Legal	Doctrine:	Towards	a	New	Model	for	Comparative	Law’	(1998)	47	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	495 
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law,	(4)	theory	of	argumentation,	(5)	theory	of	legitimation	of	law,	and	(6)	basic	ideology.	 Element	 (6)	 is	 the	 most	 important	 one	 that	 decides	 the	 level	 of	comparison	as	the	deepest	whereas	other	elements	are	at	intermediate	level,	and	the	comparison	of	legal	rule	and	concepts	is	of	surface.	This	new	perspective	of	comparative	law	is	valuable	particularly	with	regard	to	the	scope	of	this	research	where	the	Vietnamese	law	of	title	retention	is	compared	with	the	law	in	this	area	in	 selected	western	 jurisdictions.	 Although	Vietnamese	 law	has	 been	 rooted	 in	the	Asian	legal	system	and	deeply	been	influenced	by	the	socialist	legal	system	in	the	 modern	 time,	 it	 borrows	 rules,	 concepts	 and	 even	 techniques	 from	 many	western	jurisdictions	including	France	and	the	USA	to	build	its	legal	framework	of	 the	market	economy	 in	 the	 context	of	 globalization,	 economic	 transition	and	integration.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 Vietnamese	 law	 is	 approaching	closer	 to	 the	 international	 or	 widely-recognized	 standards,	 or	 the	 set	 of	 rules	imported	 can	 survive	 identically	 in	 the	 Vietnamese	 legal	 and	 economic	environment.	 A	 deep	 comparison	may	 reveal	 both	 similarities	 and	 differences	with	regard	to	legal	transplant.	The	case	of	Vietnam	illustrates	a	phenomenon	that	comparatists	may	notice,	the	process	of	legal	transplants,	that	is	to	say,	“the	moving	of	a	rule	or	a	system	of	law	
from	 one	 country	 to	 another”28.	 Watson	 in	 his	 classic	 work	 proves	 that	 the	considerable	source	of	legal	change	in	most	jurisdictions	is	legal	transplants,	and	transplanting	 is	 not	 only	 common	 but	 also	 socially	 easy29.	 His	 argument	 is	challenged	whether	the	 legal	 transplant	effectively	occurs.	Legrand	asserts	 that	the	rule	comprises	propositional	statement	and	invested	meaning,	the	former	of	which	 is	what	Watson	mentions	 in	his	work	and	the	 latter	of	which	 is	changed	through	 interpretation	 affected	 by	 the	 host	 jurisdiction’s	 language	 and	 other	cultural	 elements	 including	 socio-legal	 culture30.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 rule	 once	transplanted	 is	 not	 the	 original	 rule,	 thus	 legal	 transplant	 does	 not	 happen	 in	reality.	Both	Watson	and	Legrand	go	 to	opposite	extremes.	Borrowing	a	model	
																																																								28	Watson	A,	Legal	Transplants:	An	Approach	to	Comparative	Law	(2nd	edn,	University	of	Georgia	Press	1993),	at	p.	21	29	ibid,	at	pp.	94-5	30	Legrand	P,	 ‘The	Impossibility	of	 'Legal	Transplants'’	(1997)	4	Maastricht	Journal	of	European	and	Comparative	Law	111,	at	pp.	116-7,	120-1	
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from	foreign	law	is	broadly	agreed	as	a	source	of	legal	reform,	and	law	is	rarely	original.	Legrand	even	accepts	that	borrowing	is	the	practice	of	law	reformers	for	convenience31.	Transplant	could	be	seen	as	a	metaphor	for	the	legal	phenomenon	in	discussion.	The	term	“transplant”	is	attacked	because	it	has	misled	us	that	a	set	of	legal	rules	as	an	organ	is	removed	and	implanted	into	another	legal	system	–	a	new	organism	and,	after	all,	remains	identical.	Many	terms	have	been	suggested	to	have	a	more	appropriate	meaning	such	as	legal	transposition	or	legal	irritant.	Örücü	 advocates	 the	 term	 “transposition”	 as	 being	 used	 in	music	 to	 emphasize	that	 imported	 legal	 rules	 will	 be	 adjusted	 to	 suit	 new	 conditions 32 .	 Legal	transplant	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 moving	 of	 a	 legal	 system	 or	 legal	 rules	 across	national	boundaries,	rather	the	process	involving	the	adaption	to	the	socio-legal	culture	and	demand	of	the	host	country.	Teubner	goes	further	by	using	the	term	“irritant”	to	insist	that	legal	borrowing	will	stimulate	the	recipient	to	have	active	responses.	Transformed	rules	irritate	the	legal	culture	of	the	host	country,	that	is	to	say,	the	recipient	legal	culture	will	also	undergo	significant	change,	but	still	be	different	 from	 the	 original	 jurisdiction	 one	33.	 Despite	 the	 terminology	 debate,	legal	 transplant	 becomes	 a	 generic	 word,	 at	 least,	 to	 describe	 what	 Watson	mentions:	“the	moving	of	a	rule	or	a	system	of	law	from	one	country	to	another”.	Studying	 law	 from	 comparative	 perspective	 is	 not	 only	 an	 attempt	 to	 seek	 for	similarities	 or	 differences,	 but	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 legal	 transplant,	comparatists	should	answer	the	following	questions:	- How	is	the	transplanted	set	of	rules	changed	to	suit	the	legal	system	and	legal	culture	of	the	host	country?	- Is	the	role	of	the	transplanted	set	of	rules	changed	in	this	process?	- In	turn,	do	the	legal	system	and	legal	culture	undergo	any	change	to	suit	the	transplanted	set	of	rules?	Today,	 the	 trend	 of	 economic	 transition,	 integration	 and	 globalization	 has	promoted	the	legal	harmonization	in	which	legal	transplant	plays	a	vital	role.	As																																																									31	ibid,	at	p.	121	32	Örücü	E,	‘Law	as	Transposition’	(2002)	51	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	205,	at	p.	207	33	Teubner	G,	 ‘Legal	 Irritants:	Good	Faith	 in	British	Law	or	How	Unifying	Law	Ends	Up	 in	New	Divergencies’	(1998)	61	Modern	Law	Review	11,	at	p.	20	
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1.4 Contribution	to	knowledge	The	 research	 is	 intended	 to	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 current	 literature	 and	knowledge	 relating	 to	 retention	 of	 title	 in	 a	 comparative	 perspective	 in	which	Vietnam	 is	 the	 home	 country.	 The	 comparative	 study	 emphasizing	 on	 home	jurisdiction	and	other	compared	jurisdictions	is	conducted	without	limitation	to	functional	 method	 that	 merely	 answers	 the	 question	 whether	 jurisdictions	 in	discuss	 has	 similar	 results	 for	 the	 same	 legal	 problems	 regardless	 of	 different	solutions.	The	present	author	argues	that	some	aspects	of	legal	culture	to	some	extent	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 differentiating	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 each	compared	 jurisdiction	although	 they	may	share	 certain	 similarities	with	 regard	to	 the	 legal	 consequences.	 In	 other	words,	 legal	 rules	will	 be	 analyzed	 in	 their	context	to	look	into	differences	among	jurisdictions.	The	 research	 contributes	 to	 the	 scholarship	of	 title	 retention	by	offering	a	new	standpoint	 from	 the	 angle	 of	 legal	 transplant.	 Legal	 transplant	 has	 been	 long	regarded	 as	 the	 pragmatic	 device	 to	 renovate	 the	 particular	 set	 of	 rules	or	 the	legal	 system.	Article	9	has	been	a	model	 for	 the	 law	of	 secured	 transactions	 in	personal	property	including	the	treatment	of	title	retention	or	a	conditional	sale	as	 a	 purchase-money	 security	 interest.	However,	 the	 reception	 of	 the	Article	 9	model	has	many	levels.	The	author	argues	that	although	the	unitary	approach	of	the	 Article	 9	 is	 a	 great	 achievement	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 provides	 a	comprehensive	set	of	rules,	it	does	not	make	the	law	of	secured	transaction	less	complicated,	 at	 least	 regarding	 purchase-money	 security	 interests.	 The	perfection	 and	 priority	 rules	 still	 depend	 on	 the	 classification	 of	 collaterals	 or	secured	 assets	 into	 inventory,	 capital	 equipment,	 farm	 products,	 serial-numbered	 property	 and	 consumer	goods.	 The	 set	 of	 rules	 for	 purchase-money	security	interests	is	relatively	independent	of	the	whole	scheme	of	the	Article	9,	thus,	it	 is	not	essential	 to	 import	 the	 full	Article	9,	but	 it	 is	possible	 to	consider	the	idea	of	purchase-money	security	interests	only.	
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The	research	also	has	sought	to	make	the	contribution	particularly	to	Vietnamese	law	with	regards	to	title	retention	and	the	legal	transplant	experience.	Although	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	and	a	purchase-money	security	interest	are	not	 familiar	concepts	 to	both	 legal	practitioners	and	academics	 in	Vietnam,	 it	 is	vital	 to	 import	 them	 into	 Vietnamese	 law	 to	 meet	 the	 requirement	 of	international	 trade	 and	 business	 that	 Vietnamese	 companies	 have	 increasingly	taken	 part	 in.	 The	 author	 will	 look	 into	 many	mainstream	 legal	 concepts	 and	theories	 that	 affect	 the	 process	 of	 making	 law	 in	 Vietnam	 in	 the	 case	 of	 title	retention.	
1.5 Structure	of	thesis	The	thesis	has	six	chapters	including	Chapter	1	on	introduction	and	Chapter	6	on	 conclusion.	 Chapter	 2	 discusses	 the	 recognition	 and	 treatment	 of	 title	retention	 in	 England.	 This	 chapter	 analyzes	 the	 orthodox	 approach	 to	 security	interests	that	denies	the	treatment	of	simple	title	retention	as	a	security	interest.	Meanwhile,	title	retention	in	the	proceeds	and	new	products	can	be	held	to	be	a	charge	that	is	in	practice	void	due	to	lack	of	registration.	The	said	approach	also	determines	the	priority	rules	regarding	all	kinds	of	 title	retention.	This	chapter	also	 discusses	 unexpected	 outcome	of	 title	 retention	 on	 the	 sale	of	 goods	 laws	that	surprisingly	urges	the	legal	reform	of	title	retention	law.	Chapter	3	explores	the	rules	of	purchase-money	security	interests	in	the	framework	of	the	Article	9	of	 the	 American	 Uniform	 Commercial	 Code	 under	 formalism,	 the	 unitary	approach	and	the	notice	filing	system.	Chapter	4	examines	how	Australia	moves	from	the	orthodox	approach	inherited	from	English	law	to	the	renovated	scheme	of	Article	9.	Chapter	 5	 explores	 the	 status	of	 title	 retention	 in	Vietnamese	 law	where	the	law	of	title	retention	has	been	transplanted	from	the	French	approach.	The	French	law	will	be	discussed	with	regard	to	its	treatment	of	title	retention	as	a	 security	 interest.	 The	main	 arguments	 lie	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	 addresses	 the	issue	of	 the	 legal	 transplant	with	 regard	 to	 the	Vietnamese	 current	 law	of	 title	retention	and	the	possibility	of	receiving	Article	9.	The	author	considers	whether	the	 Article	 9	model	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 essential	 element	 to	 reform	 the	 law	 of	 title	retention	by	importing	the	concept	of	purchase-money	security	interest,	or	such	
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recognition	 can	 stand	 separately	 and	 independently	 from	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	Article	9	model.	
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CHAPTER	2 HOW	 IS	 RETENTION	 OF	 TITLE	 TREATED	
IN	ENGLISH	LAW?	
2.1 Overview	Retention	of	title	in	English	law	is	likely	to	develop	into	three	stages	in	which	the	
Romalpa	case1	is	apparently	a	milestone.	After	Romalpa,	there	is	a	booming	use	of	title	 retention	 clause	 in	 the	 contract	 of	 sale.	 Prior	 to	Romalpa,	 there	were	 few	reported	 cases	 on	 title	 retention,	 although	 the	 concept	 of	 separation	 of	ownership	from	possession	was	not	unfamiliar.	McEntire	v	Crossley	Brothers	Ltd2	is	noteworthy	 for	highlighting	the	possibility	of	a	conditional	sale.	Even	though	the	 concerned	agreement	did	not	 contain	a	 title	 retention	clause,	 the	 condition	for	the	passing	of	property	had	the	similar	effect.	It	was	held	that	the	purchaser	could	not	create	a	charge	on	the	machine	supplied	because	the	property	had	not	passed;	that	is	to	say,	the	supplier	still	retained	the	title	of	the	concerned	goods.	Although	it	is	widely	known	that	modern	Irish	law	is	rooted	in	English	law,	title	retention	 surprisingly	 seemed	 to	 be	 recognized	 in	 Ireland	 before	 Romalpa.	
McEntire	 v	 Crossley	 Brothers	 Ltd	 in	 1895,	 which	 approved	 the	 supplier’s	 title	retention	to	the	goods	 in	a	conditional	sale,	 is	indeed	an	Irish	case	going	to	the	House	 of	 Lords.	 	 Another	 Irish	 case,	 Re	 Interview3,	 dealing	 with	 the	 proceeds	clause	was	reported	one	year	earlier	than	Romalpa4.		Title	 retention	was	upheld	 in	English	 law	 for	 the	very	 first	 time	 in	Romalpa5	in	1975.	Due	 to	 title	 retention	 and	 implied	 authority	 to	 sub–sell,	 the	 buyer	 owed	fiduciary	 duties	 to	 the	 seller	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 latter’s	 tracing	 right	 to	 the	proceeds	of	sub	–	sale.	The	judgment	is	astonishing	to	the	extent	that	the	tracing	
																																																								1	Aluminium	Industrie	Vaassen	B.V.	v	Romalpa	Aluminium	Ltd.	[1976]	1	WLR	676	2	[1895]	AC	457	3	[1975]	IR	382	4	In	fact,	the	judgment	date	of	Romalpa	in	the	court	of	first	instance	(the	Queen’s	Bench	Division)	was	11	February	1975,	almost	one	month	earlier	than	Re	Interview	 in	the	Irish	High	Court	 in	7	March	1975.	Romalpa	 then	went	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	and	the	judgment	date	was	16	January	1976.	5	Davies	I,	Effective	Retention	of	Title	(Fourmat	Publishing	1991),	at	p.	11	
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right	arises	not	under	an	unauthorized	but	also	authorized	 sale6.	However,	 the	critical	point	is	that	the	unpaid	seller	is	not	in	the	position	of	unsecured	creditors,	but	her	proprietary	claim	over	the	asset	 that	 is	supposed	to	be	the	property	of	the	buyer	is	invisible	to	the	rest	of	the	world.	Since	Romalpa,	the	title	retention	clause	has	been	drafted	elaborately	and	complicatedly	to	cover	all	derivatives	of	the	 original	 goods,	 namely	 their	 proceeds	 and	 products	 or	 to	 extend	 to	 all	indebtedness	 owed	 to	 the	 seller.	 A	 Romalpa	 clause	 becomes	 an	 alternative	generic	term	to	a	title	retention	clause.	The	number	of	title	retention	cases	from	
Romalpa	 to	 early	 1990s	 has	 established	 the	 case	 law	 in	 this	 field.	 The	 great	variety	of	Romalpa	clauses	and	concerned	disputed	issues	make	the	relevant	law	“a	maze	 if	 not	 a	minefield”	 –	 as	 in	 a	 frequently	 cited	 remark	 of	 Staughton	 J	 in	
Hendy	 Lennox	 (Industrial	 Engines)	 Ltd	 v	 Grahame	 Puttick	 Ltd	 7 .	 After	 the	establishment	of	case	law	in	title	retention,	new	issues	still	arise,	revealing	that	not	 only	 the	 status	 of	 title	 retention	 but	 also	 the	 conflicts	 between	 a	 title-retaining	 seller	 and	 a	 bona	 fide	 sub-purchaser	 are	 problematic8.	 Recent	 years	have	 shown	 unexpected	 influences	 of	 title	 retention	 treatment	 on	 the	 sale	 of	goods	law	that	urge	the	question	of	a	reconceptualization	of	title	retention.	
2.2 Validity	under	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1979	






Further,	 the	 Sale	 of	 Goods	 Act	 1979	 section	 19(1)	 explicitly	 stipulates	 the	reservation	of	the	right	of	disposal	that	probably	covers	retention	of	title9:	
“Where	 there	 is	 a	 contract	 for	 the	 sale	 of	 specific	 goods	 or	 where	 goods	 are	
subsequently	 appropriated	 to	 the	 contract,	 the	 seller	 may,	 by	 the	 terms	 of	 the	
contract	or	appropriation,	 reserve	 the	 right	of	disposal	of	 the	goods	until	 certain	
conditions	are	fulfilled	[.]”	Parties	 to	 a	 contract	 of	 sale	 are	 unequivocally	 at	 their	 discretion	 permitted	 to	tailor	 when	 and	 how	 the	 property	 in	 the	 goods	 is	 passed10.	 Title	 retention	legitimately	 imposes	 conditions	 for	 the	 transfer	 of	 property.	 Even	 when	 the	passing	of	risk	is	agreed	to	be	at	the	time	the	delivery	is	made,	title	retention	is	still	 valid.	 The	 transfer	 of	 risk	 accompanied	 by	 the	 transfer	 of	 property	 is	 a	default	rule	that	can	be	contracted	out11.		Basically,	when	the	buyer	 is	 in	 insolvency,	by	 invoking	title	retention,	 the	seller	can	 claim	 to	 repossess	 the	 goods	 that	 are	 at	 least	 identifiable	 in	 the	 former’s	possession	and	not	fully	paid.	The	claim	is	likely	to	be	allowed,	except	for	special	situations	 involving	 the	 wording	 of	 a	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 that	 will	 be	discussed	 in	 the	 subsequent	 part12.	 At	 present,	 receivers,	 administrators	 or	liquidators	 are	 likely	 to	 respect	 any	 title	 retention	 claim	 on	 the	 unpaid	 goods	strictly	and	return	them	to	the	unpaid	seller13,	otherwise	pay	the	purchase	price	to	keep	the	on-going	business.	Nevertheless,	in	Blue	Monkey	Gaming	Ltd	v	David	
Hudson,	Graham	Bushby,	Simon	Bower, the	burden	of	proof	is	on	the	seller	who	is	
																																																								9	McCormack	G,	Reservation	of	Title	(Sweet	&	Maxwell	1995)	at	p.16	10	Borden	(UK)	Ltd	v	Scottish	Timber	Products	Ltd	[1981]	Ch.	25	at	p.	30,	Re	Andrabell	[1984]	BCLC	522	at	p.	526,	Hendy	Lennox	(Industrial	Engines)	Ltd	v	Grahame	Puttick	Ltd	[1984]	1	WLR	485	at	p.	492,	Clough	Mill	Ltd	v	Martin	[1985]	1	WLR	111	at	pp.	121	-	2	11	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1979	section	20	12	“equitable	 and	 beneficial	 ownership	 shall	 remain	with”	 the	 seller.	 See	 In	 Re	 Bond	Worth	 Ltd.	[1980]	Ch	228	13	Compaq	 Computer	 Ltd	 v	 Abercorn	 Group	 Ltd	 &	 Ors	 [1991]	 BCC	 484	 at	 p.	 488,	 Re	Weldtech	
Equipment	Ltd	[1991]	BCC	16	at	p.17	
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asserting	a	 retention	of	 title	 claim,	 and	 she	should	 identify	 the	 stock	 subject	 to	her	claim	clearly14.		However,	 the	 seller’s	 entitlement	 to	 repossess	 the	 goods	 unpaid	 as	 an	 owner	retaining	 title	 is	 challengeable.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 buyer	 has	 possession	 of	 the	goods	 itself	 could	be	a	misrepresentation	of	who	 is	 the	owner	of	 the	goods.	 In	many	 cases,	 it	 is	 expressly	 or	 impliedly	 in	 the	 contract	 that	 the	 buyer	 has	discretionary	 power	 to	 resell	 the	 goods	 to	 sub–purchasers	 or	 use	 them	 in	 the	course	 of	 processing	 or	 manufacture	 to	 make	 new	 products 15 .	 Buyers	 of	inventory	 such	 as	 raw	materials	 or	 stock	 in	 trade	 are	 usually	 not	 expected	 to	keep	 the	 purchased	 goods	 in	 their	 original	 status	 or	 refrain	 from	 reselling.	Buyers	 of	 capital	 equipment	 are	 expected	 to	 exploit	 the	 utility	 of	 the	 goods	 in	their	 daily	 operation	 right	 after	 taking	 delivery.	 Thus,	 notwithstanding	 the	retention	 of	 title	 clause,	 the	 buyer	 is	 given	 rights	 to	 treat	 the	 goods	 as	 if	 they	were	 her	 property16.	 It	 goes	 without	 saying	 that	 the	 property	 in	 the	 goods	nominally	remains	with	the	seller,	and	it	is	activated	only	in	the	event	of	default	of	 payment,	 particularly	 in	 the	 buyer’s	 insolvency.	 In	 this	 sense,	 title	 retention	operates	 as	 a	 security	 device17 .	 The	 seller’s	 ranking	 position	 against	 other	creditors	 in	 the	goods	may	be	 remarkably	affected	by	 the	determination	of	 the	seller’s	 interests	 in	 the	goods	unpaid	under	 title	 retention,	 that	 is,	 the	absolute	ownership	or	a	lesser	proprietary	interest	arising	by	way	of	security.	It	may	lead	to	a	 significant	 legal	 consequence	 since	a	 security	 interest	 is	basically	enforced	against	 third	 parties	 only	 when	 it	 has	 been	 registered.	 	 Registration	 of	 a	 title	
																																																								14	2014	WL	4355075.	See	more	discussion	in Stephens	E,	‘Clarification	for	administrators	dealing	with	 ROT	 claims:	Blue	Gaming	Monkey	 v	Hudson	and	 others’	 -	 (2014)	 5	 Corporate	 Rescue	 and	Insolvency	207,	at	p.	207	15	Aluminium	 Industrie	 Vaassen	 B.V.	 v	 Romalpa	 Aluminium	 Ltd. [1976]	 1	 WLR	 676	 at	 p.	 679,	
Borden	(UK)	Ltd	v	Scottish	Timber	Products	Ltd	 [1981]	Ch.	25	at	p.	32,	Clough	Mill	Ltd	v	Martin	[1985]	1	WLR	111	at	p.	113,	Re	Peachdart	Ltd	 [1984]	Ch	131	at	p.	138,	E	Pfeiffer	Weinkellerei-
Weineinkauf	GmbH	&	Co	v	Arbuthnot	Factors	Ltd	[1988]	1	WLR	150	at	pp.	154–5,	Tatung	(UK)	Ltd	
v	Galex	Telesure	Ltd (1989)	5	BCC	325	at	p.	328, Re	Weldtech	Equipment	Ltd	[1991]	BCC	16	at	pp.	16	–	7,	Compaq	Computer	Ltd	v	Abercorn	Group	Ltd	&	Ors [1991]	BCC	484	at	p.	491 16	Bradgate	JR,	‘Reservation	of	Title	Ten	Years	On’	[1988]	Conveyancer	and	Property	Lawyer	434	at	p.	438 17	Davies	I,	see	n.5	at	p.	8;	McCormack	G,	see	n.	9	at	pp.	2–3;	Worthington	S,	Proprietary	Interests	
in	Commercial	Transactions	(New	York:	Clarendon	Press	1996)	at	p.	11	
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retention	clause	makes	it	less	attractive	to	sellers	who	seek	security	for	payment	of	the	purchase	price.	The	debate	on	simple	title	retention	as	a	registrable	charge	has	been	impractical	since	Hendy	Lennox	and Clough	Mill	established	the	rule.	Under	the	retention	of	title	 clause,	 an	 unpaid	 seller	 has	 an	 ownership	 interest	 rather	 than	 a	 security	interest	on	the	unused	and	identifiable	goods	in	the	buyer’s	possession	until	and	unless	 the	 purchase	 price	 is	 paid	 in	 full.	 The	 characteristic	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 a	security	interest18	is	found	not	to	exist	in	title	retention.	It	is	directly	figured	out	that	a	buyer	cannot	grant	a	security	interest	on	a	seller	in	the	goods	that	have	not	become	 her	 property	 yet	19.	 The	 full	 ownership	 of	 the	 goods	 remains	with	 the	seller	subject	to	contractual	terms,	particularly	of	the	passing	of	title20.		The	Hendy	Lennox	and Clough	Mill	cases	strictly	follow	formalism,	which	is	one	of	the	keystones	of	English	 law	on	secured	 transactions.	The	 form	of	 transactions	depending	on	party	autonomy	will	determine	whether	a	transaction	is	a	sale	or	a	charge.	Therefore,	despite	its	widely-recognized	security	function,	title	retention	is	a	contractual	arrangement	to	pass	the	property	in	the	goods	in	the	scheme	of	a	sale	 contract,	 rather	 than	an	agreement	where	 the	buyer	 confers	a	 charge	or	a	mortgage	on	the	goods	subject	to	her	own	property.	On	the	other	hand,	it	cannot	be	said	that	 the	English	law	on	secured	transactions	 is	a	“form	over	substance”	one.	 The	 extended	 title	 retention	 clause,	 which	 covers	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sale	 or	products	 incorporated	 the	 original	 goods,	 is	 found	 to	 be	 a	 disguised	 charge	irrespective	of	an	arrangement	within	a	sale	contract	scheme21.	The	crucial	point	is,	 of	 course,	 the	 sharp	 distinction	 between	 ownership	 and	 lesser	 proprietary	interests	 under	 English	 common	 law.	 Extended	 title	 retention	 does	 not	 have	 a	strong	 legal	 foundation	like	section	17	and	19(1)	of	 the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1979	which	both	support	a	simple	title	retention	clause.	
																																																								18	A	 security	 interest	has	 five	characteristics.	See	Goode RM, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit 
and Security (Fourth edition. edn, 2009),	at	p.	11 19	Clough	Mill	Ltd	v	Martin	[1985]	1	WLR	111,	at	pp.	119	C-E,	122	B-C,	123	B-D,	125	B-D.		20	Hendy	Lennox,	see	n.	7,	at	p.	492	C-E	21	See	discussion	in	detail	in	sub-section	2.3.3.1		
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The	 functional	 approach	 that	 realizes	 the	 simple	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 as	 a	security	interest	was	not	adopted	in	Clough	Mill	due	to	the	argument	that	it	was	not	 the	 buyer	 conferring	 but	 the	 seller	 retaining	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 property22.	However,	 in	 Re	 Bond	 Worth	 Ltd.,	 a	 case	 suggested	 a	 functional	 approach	 to	security	 transactions,	 it	 has	 prompted	 a	 fundamental	 right	 of	 a	 debtor	 in	 a	security	 transaction,	 namely	 the	 equitable	 right	 to	 redeem	 the	 property	 that	 a	buyer	 subject	 to	 retention	 of	 title	 may	 have23.	 It	 enables	 a	 debtor	 to	 redeem	interests	in	the	property	conferred	on	a	creditor	to	secure	the	former’s	obligation	whenever	 this	 obligation	 is	 discharged.	 	 It	 seems	 that	 generally	 a	 seller	 has	proprietary	 interest	 in	 the	goods	by	 retaining	 title	pending	 the	 full	payment	of	purchase	 price.	 This	 argument	 is	 challenged	 by	 a	 critical	 question	 under	 the	formalism	perspective:	who	has	ownership	of	the	goods?	 If	 it	 is	satisfied	that	 it	should	be	the	seller,	the	buyer	does	not	arguably	redeem	an	interest	but	rather	than	 gaining	 a	 new	 interest	 as	 a	 result	 of	 full	 payment,	 that	 is,	 the	 title	 to	 the	goods	previously	retained	by	the	seller	24.	The	present	author	is	not	satisfied	with	the	notion	of	new	interest	in	this	context	because	it	is	likely	to	ignore	a	bundle	of	immense	 rights	 that	 the	 buyer	 has	 over	 the	 goods	 currently	 remaining	 in	 her	possession.	 The	 buyer	 indeed	 has	 proprietary	 interests	 in	 the	 goods,	 among	which	is	possessory	interest25.	Subject	to	an	agreement,	implied	or	explicitly,	the	goods	are	put	into	the	flow	of	commerce	or	manufacturing	operation	without	any	restraint	from	the	seller.	Such	interest	probably	constitutes	to	a	great	extent	the	property	in	the	goods	that	the	buyer	expects	to	gain	from	a	contract	of	sale.	It	is	argued	 that	 the	 buyer’s	 dominion	 over	 the	 goods	 is	 not	 equivalent	 to	 the	property	 to	 the	 goods	 because	 she	 gains	 such	 discretionary	 power	 with	 the	consent	 of	 the	 seller	who	 is	 currently	 retaining	 title	 to	 the	 goods26.	 It	 is	 not	 a	proprietary	 but	 contractual	 interest	 against	 the	 seller	 respecting	 the	 use	 and	
																																																								22	Clough	Mill,	see	n.	19,	at	p.	119	C-E	23	[1980]	Ch	228,	at	p.	248	24	Worthington	S,	Proprietary	Interests	 in	Commercial	Transactions	 (New	York:	Clarendon	Press	1996),	at	p.	18	25	Goode RM, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Fourth edition. edn, 2009),	at	p.	4;	Gough	WJ,	Company	Charges	(2nd	ed.	edn,	Butterworths	1996),	at	p.	549 26	Clough	Mill,	see	n.	19,	at	pp.	116	G-H,	124	E-G.	For	further	discussion,	see	Worthington	S,	see	n.	
24,	at	pp.	12	–	6	
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disposition	 of	 the	 goods27.	 This	 argument	 is	 questionable.	 Like	 the	 absolute	ownership,	other	 lesser	proprietary	 interests	can	be	acquired	by	an	agreement	and	have	effect	against	the	rest	of	the	world	with	regard	to	the	subject	matter	of	the	interest	at	hand.	The	 buyer’s	 dominion	over	 the	goods	 subject	 to	 retention	 of	 title,	 even	 though	lacking	full	ownership	certainly	manifests	on	its	face	an	absolute	proprietary	title	to	the	eyes	of	third	parties.	The	functional	approach	does	not	limit	to	the	security	function,	 but	 it	 also	 addresses	 the	 problem	 of	 ownership	 and	 possession	separation.	 In	 the	context	of	 title	retention,	under	the	theory	of	new	value,	 it	 is	persuasive	 that	 title	 retention	does	not	has	a	negative	 impact	on	 the	economic	position	of	previously	secured	parties28.	In	other	words,	the	title-retaining	seller	does	not	claim	anything	from	the	existing	pool	of	assets	subject	to	the	interest	of	previously	 secured	 parties	 other	 than	 the	 goods	 supplied.	 However,	 she	 has	 a	secret	 bite	 against	 subsequent	 buyers,	 secured	 parties	 and	 other	 creditors.	Unlike	a	security	interest,	it	is	a	whole	bite	that	does	not	leave	any	surplus	value	if	any	to	the	buyer/debtor,	preferential	and	unsecured	creditors.	However,	 it	 is	not	likely	that	the	value	of	the	goods	increases	at	the	time	of	repossession29.	It	is	demonstrated	that	the	position	of	title-retaining	seller	is	not	as	attractive	as	it	is	supposed	 to	 be.	 The	 rapid	 depreciation	 of	 capital	 equipment	 and	 the	 short	business	life	of	inventory	are	unsatisfactory	to	the	title-retaining	seller30,	and	the	extended	title	retention	clause	to	the	proceeds	of	sale	or	new	products	does	not	improve	her	position	as	discussed	subsequently	elsewhere	in	this	chapter.	From	the	 standpoint	 of	 secured	 parties,	 preferential	 and	 unsecured	 creditors,	 title	retention	does	not	practically	 impose	a	 serious	 threat31.	The	widespread	use	of	title	 retention	 clause	 may	 alert	 existing	 would-be	 creditors	 of	 all	 kinds	 and	buyers	 without	 the	 requirement	 of	 registration32.	 Therefore,	 the	 problematic	
																																																								27	Gough	WJ,	Company	Charges	(2nd	ed.	edn,	Butterworths	1996),	at	p.	549 28 Gullifer	L,	‘Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	A	Question	of	Balance’	in	Burrows	AS	and	Peel	E	(eds),	
Contract	Terms	(Oxford	University	Press	2007),	at	pp.	287-9	29 Gullifer	L,	‘"Sales"	on	Retention	of	Title	Terms:	Is	the	English	Law	Analysis	Broken?’	(2017)	Apr	(133)	Law	Quarterly	Review	244,	at	p.	247 30 Bridge	MG	and	others,	‘Formalism,	Functionalism,	and	Understanding	the	Law	of	Secured	Transactions’	(1999)	44	McGill	Law	Journal	567,	at	pp.	638-640 31	ibid,	at	p.	640	 	32	Gullifer	L,	see	n.	29,	at	p.	247	
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and	beneficial	ownership	shall	remain…”,	did	not	advance	 the	 seller	 in	 this	 case.	Slade	 J	 started	 his	 argument	 by	 finding	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 charge	 as	 a	 legal	consequence	of	the	said	retention	of	title	clause34.		
“In	my	judgment,	any	contract	which,	by	way	of	security	for	the	payment	of	a	debt,	




beneficiary	relationship.”	The	affirmative	answer	then	led	him	to	the	question	how	the	charge	was	created,	that	 is,	 by	 “remain”	 with	 the	 seller	 or	 “grant”	 by	 the	 buyer35.	 Although	 his	functional	approach	has	not	been	welcomed	in	respect	of	the	simple	retention	of	title	 clause36,	 Slade	 J	 did	 not	 deviate	 from	 orthodox	 reasoning	 respecting	 the	passing	of	ownership.	His	finding	was	strongly	based	on	the	assumption	that	the																																																									33	See	section	2.2.1	of	this	thesis	34	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	pp.	248-250	35	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	pp.	250-6	36	See	section	2.2.1	of	this	thesis	
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legal	title	of	the	goods	had	transferred	to	the	buyer.	He	argued	that	retention	of	equitable	and	beneficial	ownership	implied	a	transfer	of	legal	title	that	had	taken	place	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 delivery	 of	 the	 goods37 .	 He	 probably	 negated	 the	reservation	of	equitable	and	beneficial	ownership	and	adopted	a	grant	and	grant	–	back	mechanism.		The	 operation	 of	 a	 grant	 and	 grant	 –	 back	 mechanism	 in	Re	Bond	Worth	 was	described	as	“the	entire	property	in	the	Acrilan	[the	goods]	passes	to	Bond	Worth	
[the	 buyer]	 followed	 by	 a	 security,	 eo	 instanti,	 given	 back	 by	 Bond	 Worth	 [the	
buyer]	to	the	vendor,	Monsanto”38.	It	means	the	buyer	at	a	certain	moment	had	full	ownership	of	the	goods,	thus	it	could	grant	a	charge	on	the	goods	in	the	seller’s	favour.	This	finding	relied	on	the	doctrine	of	scintilla	emporis	established	by	the	decision	in	Church	of	England	Building	Society	v.	Piskor39	and	followed	by	Capital	
Finance	 Co.	 Ltd.	 v.	 Stokes40.	 The	 latter	 is	 the	 case	 Slade	 J	 referred	 to	 in	 the	concerned	 argument.	 However,	 the	 grant	 and	 grant	 –	 back	 mechanism	 was	challenged	 by	 an	 argument	 of	 the	 respondent	 relying	 on	Re	Connolly	Bros.	 Ltd	
(No.	 2)41.	 Accordingly,	 the	 buyer	 only	 gained	 equity	 of	 redemption	 when	 it	acquired	 the	 goods42.	 	 The	 challenge	 has	 been	 raised	 again	 after	 the	 House	 of	Lords’	decision	 in	Abbey	National	Building	Society	v.	Cann43.	The	abolishment	of	
scintilla	emporis	doctrine	by	Abbey	has	placed	the	Re	Bond	Worth	judgment	in	an	unsteady	 position.	 Re	 Connolly	 and	 Abbey	 are	 analogical	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 a	buyer	 obtained	 a	 credit	 to	 finance	 the	 purchase	 of	 a	 property	 and	 secured	 the	payment	 by	 a	 charge	 or	 mortgage	 on	 that	 property	 prior	 to	 obtaining	 the	property	 at	 hand.	 The	 former	 case	 found	 that	 the	 buyer	 had	 never	 acquired	absolute	ownership	of	the	property	other	than	the	equity	of	redemption	subject	to	 the	 financier’s	 charge44.	The	 latter	held	 that	 the	 transaction	of	 acquiring	 the	property	and	granting	the	charge	was	one	indivisible	transaction	that	the	buyer	
																																																								37	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	p.	245	38	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	p.	256	39	[1954]	Ch.	553	40	[1969]	1	Ch.	261	41	[1912]	2	Ch.	25	42	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	p.	252	43	[1991]	1	A.C.	56	(HL)	44	Re	Connolly,	see	n.	41,	at	p.	31	
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never	acquired	anything	but	 the	equity	of	redemption45.	Re	Connolly	and	Abbey,	also	Piskor	and	Capital	Finance	are	cases	dealt	with	real	property,	the	principles,	particularly	of	the	first	two	cases	can	be	transplanted	to	give	a	secured	party	in	personal	property	a	shelter46.	Generally,	 in	a	context	of	 title	retention,	 the	buyer	will	not	obtain	the	goods	on	credit	 unless	 she	 agrees	 with	 the	 title	 retention	 clause47 .	 Under	 the	 “one	
indivisible	transaction”	principle	in	the	Abbey	case,	it	seems	that	the	buyer	in	Re	
Bond	 Worth	 acquired	 only	 the	 equity	 of	 redemption48.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	
Stroud	 Architectural	 Services	 Ltd	 v	 John	 Laing	 Construction	 Ltd49		 following	 Re	
Bond	 Worth,	 it	 was	 held	 that	 the	 retention	 of	 “equitable	 and	 beneficial	ownership”,	 which	was	 similar	 to	 the	 corresponding	 clause	 in	Re	Bond	Worth,	created	a	charge	granted	by	the	buyer	to	 the	seller.	The	court	at	hand	read	the	grant	 and	 grant	 –	 back	 mechanism	 in	 Re	 Bond	 Worth	 as	 occurring	simultaneously50.	In	this	sense,	Abbey	did	not	defeat,	otherwise	strengthened	the	grant	and	grant–back	analysis51.		The	 two	 opposite	 perspectives	 on	 the	 decisions	 in	Re	Bond	Worth	and	 Stroud	
Architectural	 though	 uniquely	 demonstrate	 a	 critical	 question:	 Did	 the	 buyer	obtain	a	full	title	to	the	property	at	any	time?	The	affirmative	answer	should	lead	to	a	registrable	charge	in	favour	of	the	seller	subordinate	to	any	previous	charge	on	 after-acquired	 property.	 If	 conversely,	 the	 equity	 of	 redemption	 other	 than	the	full	title	is	only	sufficient	to	create	a	charge	that	takes	priority	subsequent	to	the	charge	conferred	upon	the	seller.	Although	Abbey	answered	the	question	of	priority	 while	 the	 two	 title	 retention	 cases	 mentioned	 above	 dealt	 with	 the																																																									45	Abbey,	see	n.	43,	at	pp.	92	–	3	46 de Lacy	J,	‘The	Purchase	Money	Security	Interest:	A	Company	Charge	Conundrum?’	(1991)	Lloyd's	Maritime	and	Commercial	Law	Quarterly	531,	at	p.	533 47	McCormack	G,	‘Charges	and	Priorities	-	the	Death	of	the	Scintilla	Temporis	Doctrine’	(1991)	12	Company	Lawyer	11	at	p.	13 48	More	discussion	on	the	impact	of	Abbey	on	the	decision	in	Re	Bond	Worth	Ltd.	in	the	sense	of	reconsideration	of	the	latter,	can	be	found	in	Davies	I,	see	n.5	at	pp.	117-120;	Gregory	R,	‘Romalpa	Clauses	as	Unregistered	Charges	-	A	Fundamental	Shift?’	(1990)	106	Law	Quarterly	Review	550; McCormack	 G,	 see	 n.	 47,	 at	 p.	 13;	 Hicks	 A,	 ‘Retention	 of	 Title	 -	 Latest	 Developments’	 [1992]	Journal	of	Business	Law	398,	at	pp.	405-7	49	[1994]	BCC	18	50	ibid,	at	p.	23	51	Worthington	S,	see	n.	24,	at	p.	22	
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nature	of	the	seller’s	interest	in	the	goods	delivered	to	the	buyer	subject	to	title	retention52,	the	reasoning	of	Lord	Oliver	in	Abbey	has	caught	my	attention	to	the	issue	of	in	what	manner	the	charge	is	created53.	His	reasoning	suggests	that	it	is	not	the	sequence	of	interests	involved	to	determine	whether	a	security	interest	is	created	to	be	in	line	with	the	orthodox	legal	theory.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	likely	to	be	requisite	that	a	debtor	must	have	a	legal	estate	in	advance	to	grant	a	charge	on	 it.	 It	 is	 acceptable	 that	 the	 acquiring	of	 a	 legal	 estate	and	granting	a	 charge	should	 be	 bound	 together.	 The	 argument	 is	 very	 close	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 a	purchase-money	security	interest,	that	is	the	tight	relationship	between	the	fund	supplied	 and	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	 estate.	 Indeed,	 Re	 Connolly	 and	 Abbey	 are	considered	to	bring	the	concept	of	purchase-money	security	interest	into	English	law54.	It	is	arguable	that	the	negation	of	scintilla	temporis	doctrine	and	adoption	of	“one	
indivisible	transaction”	principle	aim	at	resolving	the	question	of	priority.	After	a	single	 transaction,	 technically	 and	 in	 theory,	 the	 debtor/buyer	 is	 left	 with	 the	equity	of	 redemption	 that	may	 restrain	 the	property	at	hand	 from	attaching	 to	other	interests	ranking	superior	or	equally	to	the	charge	in	the	creditor/seller’s	favour.	Re	Connolly	and	Abbey	do	not	 indicate	 the	underlying	policy	of	 the	 first	priority	granting	to	the	financer	advancing	money	to	acquire	the	new	property.	Prior	chargees	cannot	rely	on	her	prior	charge	to	gain	windfall	benefit	because	the	 property	 was	 not	 acquired	 by	 her	 advance	 or	 the	 debtor’s	 money.	 This	argument	is	at	the	heart	of	the	concept	of	purchase-money	security	interest	and	justifies	the	first	priority	of	purchase-money	financers,	nevertheless	the	doctrine	of	“one	single	transaction”	contribute	another	considerable	justification.	It	should	be	emphasized	the	parallel	between	the	financing	scenario	in	Abbey	as	Lord	 Oliver	 discussed	 and	 the	 scenario	 of	 title	 retention.	 A	 sale	 on	 credit	 is	agreed	upon	a	 title	retention	arrangement,	and	 it	 is	obviously	a	credit	enabling	the	buyer	to	acquire	the	goods.		It	raises	the	question	why	title	retention	can	or																																																									52	de	 Lacy	 J,	 ‘Retention	 of	 Title,	 Company	 Charges	 and	 the	 Scintilla	 Temporis	 Doctrine’	 (1994)	Conveyancer	and	Property	Lawyer	242,	at	p.	245	53	Abbey,	see	n.	43,	at	p.	92	54	de	Lacy	 J	 in	his	 footnote	said	 that	Abbey	 introduced	 the	concept	of	purchase	money	security	interest	into	English	law	for	the	first	time.	See	de	Lacy	J,	see	n.	52,	at	p.	247	
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cannot	 fall	 within	 this	 concept	 of	 security	 interest.	 It	 deserves	 an	 elaborate	clarification,	and	the	acceptance	would	be	a	 landmark	for	 the	treatment	of	 title	retention.		
2.2.3 Title	retention:	A	boomerang	returning	to	the	sale	of	goods	law	Simple	 title	 retention	 has	 a	 firm	 legal	 ground	 of	 the	 SGA	 1979	 to	 be	 effective	against	the	buyer’s	liquidators,	administrators	and	creditors	in	the	same	goods.	In	recent	years,	title	retention,	in	turn,	has	unexpected	impacts	on	the	SGA	1979.	
2.2.3.1 Buyers	in	possession	and	authority	to	sell	Under	title	retention,	a	seller	releases	the	possession	of	 the	goods	to	the	buyer	but	does	not	transfer	the	property	in	the	goods	to	the	latter	pending	full	payment	of	the	purchase	price.	When	the	buyer	makes	a	disposition	of	the	goods	to	a	bona	
fide	disponee,	the	seller	has	found	her	in	a	dispute	with	a	third	party.	She	asserts	a	 claim	 against	 the	 third	 party	 for	 repossession	 of	 the	 goods,	 or	 the	 purchase	price	as	damages	by	conversion.	Meanwhile,	a	buyer	in	possession,	even	though	does	not	have	full	ownership,	may	transfer	a	good	title	to	the	disponee	under	the	SGA	 1979	 section	 25(1).	 It	 is	 a	 scenario	 of	 conflicting	 titles	 involving	 two	innocent	parties,	a	title-retaining	seller	and	a	bona	fide	third-party	purchaser.	Basically,	property	 law	has	strongly	adopted	 the	nemo	dat	quod	non	habet	rule,	that	is	to	say,	no	one	can	transfer	what	she	does	not	have.	This	rule	is	replicated	in	the	first	part	of	the	SGA	1979	section	21(1)	and	the	Factors	Act	1889	section	9:	
“…where	goods	are	sold	by	a	person	who	is	not	their	owner,	and	who	does	not	sell	
them	under	the	authority	or	with	the	consent	of	the	owner,	the	buyer	acquires	no	
better	title	to	the	goods	than	the	seller	had,…”55.	The	application	of	those	sections	includes	a	situation	where	a	buyer/sub–seller,	possessing	 the	 goods	 but	 not	 yet	 obtaining	 the	 absolute	 title	 to	 them,	makes	 a	disposition	thereof56.	The	claim	of	good	title	by	 the	disponee	must	satisfy	 three																																																									55	SGA	1979	section	21	(1)	56	Battersby	G	and	Preston	AD.	 	 ,	 ‘The	Concept	of	 	 “	Property",	”Title”	and	 “Owner”	Used	in	 the		Sale	of	Goods	Act	1893’	(1972)	35	Modern	Law	Review	268	at	p.	282 
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requirements:	 (1)	 the	 buyer/sub–seller	 having	 bought	 or	 agreed	 to	 buy	 the	goods	 must	 possess	 the	 said	 goods	 with	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 seller;	 (2)	 the	buyer/sub–seller	 must	 deliver	 or	 transfer	 the	 goods	 under	 any	 sale	 or	disposition	 thereof	 to	 any	 person	 receiving	 the	 goods	 in	 good	 faith,	 without	notice	 of	 any	 right	 of	 the	 original	 seller	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 goods;	 and	 (3)	 if	 the	abovementioned	requirements	are	satisfied,	the	delivery	or	transfer	will	have	the	same	effect	as	if	the	buyer/sub–seller	making	it	was	a	mercantile	agent	in	respect	of	 the	 goods	 with	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 owner57.	 The	 last	 requirement	 is	 usually	interpreted	as	the	delivery	made	by	the	buyer/sub–seller	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business58.	The	effect	of	the	sub–sale	transaction	has	a	reference	to	the	Factors	Act	1889	section	2(1)	that	allows	a	good	title	conferred	on	a	bona	fide	purchaser	without	notice.	A	detailed	discussion	on	every	 condition	 is	beyond	 the	ambit	of	 the	 thesis,	but	some	disputed	conditions	may	shed	light	on	the	position	of	the	seller,	the	buyer	and	 other	 relevant	 participants	 in	 the	 context	 of	 title	 retention.	 A	 simple	retention	of	title	clause	is	a	good	device	to	protect	an	unpaid	seller	so	long	as	the	goods	are	 in	possession	of	 the	buyer,	but	 the	 former	 is	not	 in	an	advantageous	position	to	control	the	goods.		A	title-retaining	seller	is	exposed	to	risk	when	an	innocent	 third	party	 relies	 on	 these	 exceptions	 to	 the	nemo	dat	 rule.	However,	section	25(1)	of	 the	SGA	1979,	 together	with	section	9	of	 the	Factors	Act	1889	reflect	a	need	to	ensure	the	flow	of	commerce.	A	purchaser	in	good	faith	buying	from	 the	 seller	 selling	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 does	 not	 necessarily	investigate	the	title	to	the	goods	concerned.	This	rule	allows	the	transfer	of	good	title	even	though	the	transferor	has	a	lesser	title.	
																																																								57	Archivent	Sales	&	Developments	Ltd	v	Strathclyde	RC	1985	SLT	154	at	p.	156.	The	requirements	can	 be	 split	 into	 many	 conditions,	 namely	 “Bought	 or	 agreed	 to	 buy”,	 Possession	 of	 buyer”,	“Consent	of	seller”,	“Deliver	or	transfer”,	“Sale,	pledge	or	other	disposition”,	“Effect	of	delivery	or	transfer”	and	“Good	faith	and	notice”,	see	Bridge	MG	and	Benjamin	JP,	Benjamin's	Sale	of	Goods	(8th	ed.	/	[gen.	ed.	:	M.	Bridge].	edn,	London:	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2010),	at	pp.	382	-	393	58	Bridge	MG	and	Benjamin	JP,	Benjamin's	Sale	of	Goods	(8th	ed.	/	[gen.	ed.:	M.	Bridge].		London:	Sweet	&	Maxwell	 2010),	at	 pp.	 390	 –	 391,	Archivent	Sales	&	Developments	Ltd	v	Strathclyde	RC	1985	 SLT	 154	 at	 p.	 157,	 Forsythe	 International	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 Silver	 Shipping	 Co	 Ltd	 (The	 Saetta)	[1994]	1	WLR	1334,	at	p.	1351	
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The	free	flow	of	commerce	policy	underlying	section	25(1)	of	the	SGA	1979	may	productively	 support	 a	 third-party	 buyer	 having	 a	 title	 conflict	 with	 a	 title-retaining	seller.	However,	Re	Highway	Foods	International	Ltd	(In	Administrative	
Receivership)59,	 in	 which	 all	 the	 transactions	 were	 subject	 to	 title	 retention,	possibly	and	unexpectedly	exposes	an	 innocent	disponee	 to	 the	risk	of	 losing	a	good	title	relying	on	section	25(1).	 	One	of	the	conditions	for	the	sub-purchaser	to	have	a	good	title	under	section	25(1)	is	that	the	delivery	of	the	goods	to	a	third	party	 “under	 any	 sale,	 pledge,	 or	 other	 disposition”.	 Therefore,	 a	 transaction	between	 a	 buyer/sub-seller	 and	 a	 sub-purchaser	 must	 be	 a	 sale,	 not	 an	agreement	 to	 sell.	 However,	 according	 to	 section	 9	 of	 the	 Factors	 Act	 1889,	 it	could	 be	 made	 “under	 any	 agreement	 for	 sale,	 pledge	 or	 other	 disposition”.	 A	contract	of	sale	bearing	a	title	retention	clause	is	no	more	than	an	agreement	for	sale,	 thus,	 does	 not	 satisfy	 the	 requirement	 of	 section	 25(1).	 The	 Re	 Highway	
Foods	court	held	that	section	9	of	the	Factors	Act	1889	covering	an	agreement	for	sale	did	not	suffice	to	confer	a	good	title	on	a	sub–purchaser	until	she	makes	the	full	payment	by	referring	to	section	2	of	 the	same	Act60.	 It	 is	noticeable	that	Re	
Highway	 Foods	 is	 the	 case	 in	 favour	 of	 both	 the	 original	 seller	 and	 the	 sub-purchaser,	 who	 set	 aside	 a	 middleman	 to	 directly	 deal	 with	 each	 other.	 The	question	is	whether	the	title	passed	to	the	sub-purchaser	under	section	25(1)	of	the	 SGA	 1979	 or	 section	 9	 of	 the	 Factors	 Act	 1889	 to	 prevent	 the	 seller	 from	repossessing	the	goods	and	then	selling	directly	to	the	sub-purchaser61.	Beyond	the	context	of	Re	Highway	Foods,	if	the	ruling	at	hand	is	widely	followed,	the	 extensive	 use	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 sale	 transactions	 is	 leading	 to	 a	 scenario	jeopardizing	 the	 position	 of	 an	 innocent	 disponee	 in	 a	 title	 conflict62.	 Until	 the	sub-purchaser	pays	in	full,	it	entitles	the	original	seller	to	repossess	the	goods	or	seek	 damages	 for	 conversion,	 even	when	 the	 goods	 concerned	 is	 no	 longer	 in	
																																																								59	[1995]	BCC	271,	at	p.	276	60	Re	Highway	Foods,	see	n.	59,		at	p.	276	61	See	a	good	case	briefing	of	Re	Highway	Foods	in	Thomas	S,	‘The	Role	of	Authorization	in	Title	Conflicts	Involving	Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	Some	American	Lessons’	(2014)	43	Common	Law	World	Review	29,	at	p.	32	62	Thomas	 S,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Authorization	 in	 Title	 Conflicts	 Involving	 Retention	 of	 Title	 Clauses:	Some	American	Lessons’	(2014)	43	Common	Law	World	Review	29,	at	p.	34.		
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possession	of	the	buyer,	and	the	sub-purchaser	is	in	good	faith	dealing	with	the	buyer/sub-seller	in	the	latter’s	ordinary	course	of	business.		The	Highway	Foods	 decision	 is	 correct,	 but	 it	 reveals	 that	 the	 English	 common	law	 of	 title	 retention	 is	 not	 satisfactory	 in	 the	 context	 of	 title	 conflicts.	 The	treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 has	 an	 unexpected	 influence	 on	 the	 application	 of	section	25(1)	of	the	SGA	1979,	which	is	supposed	to	protect	innocent	third	party	dealing	with	a	seller	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business.		It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 shortcoming	 could	 be	 improved	 if	 English	 law	 had	 a	strong,	 clear	 rule	 providing	 for	 the	 role	 of	 authority	 to	 sell	 to	 solve	 the	 title	conflicts	of	that	kind.	The	respondents	in	Re	Highway	Foods	did	not	contend	the	authority	 to	 sell,	 thus	 it	 is	 unfortunate	 that	 the	 issue	was	 not	 discussed	 in	 the	judgment.	Nonetheless,	if	the	authority	to	sell	had	been	asserted	successfully	to	transfer	a	good	title	to	a	sub-purchaser	as	discussed	below,	title	retention	clause	in	 the	 sub–sale	 contract	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 resolve	 the	 title	 conflict	 between	 the	seller	 and	 the	 sub–purchaser63.	 The	 sale	 by	 a	 buyer	 in	 possession	 stipulated	 in	the	SGA	1979	section	25(1)	and	the	authority	to	sell	demonstrate	two	different	resolutions	 for	 title	disputes	with	regard	to	retention	of	 title,	 to	 the	extent	 that	this	clause	is	incorporated	in	every	transaction	of	the	chain.	It	cannot	be	said	that	English	 law	 is	 inconsistent	 in	 this	 issue	 because	 the	 two	 resolutions	 have	different	 postures.	 The	 SGA	 1979	 section	 25(1)	 has	 its	 application	 in	 case	 the	buyer	in	possession	does	not	have	authority	to	sell	to	effect	the	sub–sale	“as	valid	
as	 if	 he	 were	 expressly	 authorized	 by	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 goods”64.	 However,	 the	defendant	may	rely	on	both	to	be	protected	against	 the	conversion	claim	of	 the	seller65.	When	reliance	upon	the	nemo	dat	 rule	 fails,	 the	disponee	may	contend	that	 the	buyer	 in	possession	 is	authorized	by	the	seller	 to	sell	 the	goods,	 thus	confers	a	good	title	on	the	disponee.	Authority	to	sell	at	the	outset	seems	inconsistent	with																																																									63	Thomas	S,	ibid,	at	pp.	42,	46	64	Factors	Act	1889	section	2(1)	65	The	defendant/sub–purchaser	in	Fairfax	Gerrard	Holdings	Ltd	v	Capital	Bank	Plc	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	1226	relied	on	the	buyer’s	authority	to	sell	and	section	25(1)	of	the	SGA	1979.	It	succeeded	on	the	first	proposition	but	failed	the	second	because	it	could	not	prove	that	 it	was	a	purchaser	in	good	faith.	
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title	retention	that	contemplates	 the	title	 to	 the	goods	to	remain	with	the	seller	when	 the	 possession	 is	 transferred	 to	 the	 buyer	 pending	 full	 payment.	 Both	parties	 in	 commerce	are	not	 likely	 to	block	 the	goods	 from	business	operation,	particularly	when	they	are	inventory.	Otherwise,	it	does	not	benefit	any	of	them	since	the	buyer	cannot	exploit	the	economic	value	of	the	purchase,	at	least	until	the	 full	 payment	 is	 made,	 to	 generate	 money	 for	 payment	 of	 the	 goods.	 The	retention	of	title	clause	is	broadly	accepted	not	to	aim	at	restricting	the	sub–sale,	and	 in	 fact,	 usually	 accompanied	 by	 express	 or	 implied	 authority	 to	 resell66.	Roskill	LJ	remarked	in	Romalpa,	 if	 it	were	hold	that	there	was	no	implication	of	the	power	to	sell,	it	would	impede	the	business	purpose	of	the	transaction67.	The	argument	 seems	persuasive	 from	 the	 business	 perspective,	 but	 an	 authority	 to	sell	cannot	automatically	be	an	inherent	part	of	a	simple	retention	of	title	clause.	Furthermore,	the	authority	to	sell	is	not	incompatible	with	the	retention	of	title	clause	 if	 the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	are	taking	the	place	of	 the	goods,	or	 the	title	remains	with	the	original	seller	irrespective	of	the	sub-sale,	or	both.	Without	an	expressed	authority	to	sell,	a	question	is	whether	the	implication	of	authority	to	sell	can	be	read	from	the	retention	of	title	clause	itself.	It	is	also	doubtful	whether	an	authority	to	sell,	expressed	or	implied,	without	stipulating	the	passing	of	title,	is	equivalent	to	a	transfer	of	a	clear	title	to	the	sub-purchaser.	In	this	respect,	it	should	be	a	common	understanding	of	both	parties	before	the	court68.	Alternatively,	the	commercial	demand	should	be	inferred	from	the	facts.	In	Four	
Point	Garage	Ltd	v	Carter,	the	implication	of	authority	to	sell	was	found	because	the	transaction	is	between	two	commercial	garages,	although	there	was	a	simple	retention	 of	 title	 clause	 and	 from	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 seller,	 the	 buyer	 was	engaging	only	in	leasing	and	hiring,	not	retailing69.	In	Fairfax	Gerrard	Holdings	Ltd	
v	 Capital	 Bank	 Plc70,	 an	 implication	 of	 authority	 to	 sell	 was	 established	 by	 the	combination	 of	 a	 finance	 agreement	 and	 trust	 receipts.	 The	 finance	 agreement	having	a	term	of	title	retention	required	the	buyer	to	assign	the	debt	arising	from																																																									66	Atiyah	PS,	Atiyah'	s	Sale	of	Goods	(Adams	J	and	Macqueen	HL	eds,	12th	ed.	/	P.S.	Atiyah,	John	N.	Adams;	with	sections	on	Scots	law	by	Hector	MacQueen.	edn,	London	:	Longman	2010),	at	p.	471	67	Romalpa,	at	p.	689	68	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	pp.	689,	691,	693	69	[1985]	3	All	ER	12,	at	p.	16 70	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	1226;	[2008]	1	All	E.RS	(Comm)	632	
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the	sale	 to	customers	to	 the	seller,	whereas,	under	the	trust	receipts,	 the	buyer	committed	to	keeping	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	on	trust	for	the	seller.	Despite	the	argument	on	the	inconsistency	of	the	two	documents	treating	the	proceeds,	both	were	 held	 to	 carry	 an	 implied	 authority	 to	 sell,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 pass	 a	good	title	to	customers71.	It	is	argued	that	nothing	in	the	finance	agreement	and	trust	 receipts	 in	 Fairfax	 contained	 an	 authority	 to	 transfer	 a	 good	 title	 to	customers,	 and	 nothing	 could	 prevent	 an	 arrangement	 from	 stipulating	 an	authority	 to	 sell	 subject	 to	 the	 original	 seller’s	 title	 retention	 pending	 the	 full	payment72.	This	argument	seems	correct	because	an	authority	to	sell	itself	should	be	read	in	line	with	title	retention,	that	is,	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	should	take	the	place	of	the	goods,	or	the	title	remains	with	the	original	seller	irrespective	of	the	 sub-sale,	 or	 both.	 Furthermore,	 the	 sub-purchaser,	 who	 fails	 to	 rely	 on	purchasing	from	a	buyer	in	possession	under	section	25(1),	should	keep	in	mind	to	check	not	only	the	authority	to	sell	but	also	the	scope	thereof.	It	also	underlies	a	policy	question	who	deserves	 to	be	protected.	This	argument	 is	 criticized	 for	standing	in	the	shoes	of	financiers	setting	up	control	over	a	chain	of	transactions,	and,	in	Fairfax,	the	seller	would	have	had	a	windfall	from	poor	contracting,	that	is	not	 setting	 up	 the	 scope	 of	 authority	 if	 the	 judgment	 had	 been	 given	 in	 its	favour73.	It	 is	 worth	 briefly	 discussing	 the	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Uniform	Commercial	 Code	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 conflict	 between	 a	 secured	 party	 and	 a	buyer	of	the	collateral,	even	though	it	is	not	entirely	equivalent	to	English	law	in	the	 sense	 that	 title-retaining	 seller	 is	 not	 treated	 as	 a	 secured	 party.	 Title	retention	under	Article	9	 is	 limited	 to	a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	goods	 supplied	and	 may	 grant	 the	 secured	 party	 the	 first	 position	 if	 she	 fulfils	 the	 statutory	requirements	of	perfection.	The	purchaser	 can	have	a	 clear	 title	of	 the	security	interest	when	 she	 is	 a	 buyer	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business,	which	 indeed	requires	the	sale	to	the	purchaser	has	been	taken	place74.	Title	retention	having	the	 effect	 of	 reserving	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 condition	 to	 transfer																																																									71	ibid,	at	pp.	905-6	72 Loi	KCF,	‘Retention	of	Title	and	Implied	Authority	to	Pass	Title	to	Sub-Buyers’	[2008]	Lloyd's	Maritime	and	Commercial	Law	Quarterly	427,	at	p.	431	73	Thomas	S,	see	n.	62,	at	p.	37	74	UCC	§9-320(a).	See	more	discussion	in	sub-section	3.4.3	of	this	thesis	
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property	 in	 the	goods	 to	 the	 purchaser.	 Thus,	 title	 retention	 in	 the	 transaction	with	 a	 sub-purchaser	 cannot	 prevent	 the	 sub-purchaser	 in	 good	 faith	 dealing	with	 the	 seller	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 to	 have	 a	 clear	 and	 free	 title.	Beyond	 the	 requirement	 of	 buyer	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business,	 Article	 9	also	 stipulates	 that	 a	 secured	 creditor	 can	 follow	 the	 collateral	 in	 the	 hand	 of	third	parties	unless	she	authorizes	a	disposition	“free	of	the	security	interest”75.	The	former	Article	9	did	not	include	the	phrase	“free	of	the	security	interest”	that	needed	 clarification	 in	 the	 PEB	 Commentary76	and	 possibly	 raised	 a	 series	 of	concerned	 disputes	 brought	 to	 court77 .	 Entitlement	 to	 the	 proceeds	 under	statutory	provisions	or	under	an	agreement	does	not	manifest	a	transfer	of	good	title	to	a	sub-purchaser	despite	the	fact	that	it	is	a	good	evidence	of	authority	to	sell78.	The	authority	to	sell	provision	in	Article	9	does	not	effectively	solve	the	like	-	 Re	 Highway	 Foods	 dispute	 in	 a	 sense	 to	 “protect”	 the	 sub-purchaser.	Furthermore,	 it	 does	 not	 help	much	 the	 Fairfax	 decision,	 if	 Article	 9	 model	 is	introduced	into	English	law,	to	have	a	solid	justificatory	ground	as	suggested79	if	the	authority	to	sell	if	any	in	the	two	above-mentioned	cases	is	not	accompanied	by	 the	 condition	 “free	 of	 the	 security	 interest”.	 Importantly,	 to	 protect	 a	 sub-purchaser	 buying	 subject	 to	 title	 retention,	 title	 retention	 should	 not	 be	interpreted	as	an	arrangement	to	 transfer	 the	 title	 to	 the	goods	supplied,	but	a	security	interest	as	recommended	in	Article	9.	The	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 a	 sale	 transaction	 under	English	law	in	the	context	of	title	conflicts	leads	two	undesirable	outcomes.	First,	English	law	should	clarify	whether	an	authority	to	sell	itself,	express	or	implied	can	confer	a	good	title	to	sub-purchasers.	Secondly,	title	retention	may	spoil	the	law	of	buyer	in	possession,	namely	section	25(1)	of	the	SGA	1979	and	section	9	of	 the	FA	1889,	which	 is	aiming	at	promoting	a	 free	 flow	of	commerce,	when	 it	increasingly	becomes	a	widespread	phenomenon	in	the	sale	transaction.	
																																																								75	UCC	§9-315(a).	See	more	discussion	in	sub-section	3.4.3	of	this	thesis	76	PEB	Commentary	No.	3	Section	9-306(2)	and	9-402(7)	77	See	 more	 discussion	 with	 regard	 to	 express	 and	 unconditional;	 conditional;	 and	 implied	authorization	in	Thomas	S,	see	n.	62,	at	pp.	47-59	78	See	detailed	argument	in	sub-section	3.4.3	of	this	thesis	79	Thomas	S,	see	n.	62,	at	p.	43	
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2.2.3.2 Bunkers	 case:	 How	 title	 retention	 converts	 a	 sale	 into	 a	 non-sale	
transaction	When	the	buyer	fails	to	pay	in	full,	the	seller	has	the	right	to	sue	for	the	price	of	goods.	Title	retention	equips	the	seller	an	alternative	to	following	the	goods	that	promotes	her	from	the	position	of	unsecured	creditors	particularly	in	the	buyer’s	insolvency.	However,	repossession	of	the	goods	is	not	preferable	or	practical,	for	instances	with	regard	to	the	working	or	consumable	goods	that	no	longer	exist	at	the	 time	 of	 dispute	 as	 in	 PST	 Energy	 7	 Shipping	 LLC	 v	 OW	 Bunker	 Malta	 Ltd	
(Bunkers)80	or	the	goods	resold	oversea	as	 in	FG	Wilson	(Engineering)	Ltd	v	John	
Holt	&	Co	(Liverpool)	Ltd	(Caterpillar)81.	 It	has	been	witnessed	that	 the	nature	of	title	retention	transaction	has	been	no	longer	problematic,	but	the	effect	of	 this	clause	on	sale	transactions	has	caused	a	lot	of	of	concerns	and	debates	in	recent	years.	In	Caterpillar,	it	was	possibly	the	first	time	the	seller	is	exposed	to	the	negative	side	of	title	retention	clause.	It	was	held	that	under	the	concerned	title	retention	arrangement,	the	buyer	had	sold	the	goods	as	the	seller’s	agent	before	paying	in	full.	Thus,	the	property	had	not	passed	to	the	buyer	at	any	time.	The	seller	could	not	 claim	 for	 the	 price	 according	 to	 section	 49(1)	 of	 the	 SGA	 1979.	 The	
Caterpillar	case	is	criticized	severely	for	the	agency	construction	that	is	argued	to	be	at	odds	with	business	 common	sense82.	The	problem	of	 agency	 construction	would	be	discussed	in	the	next	sub-section	of	this	thesis.	The	other	criticism	is	on	the	court’s	view	that	section	49	 is	 the	only	situation	giving	rise	 to	an	action	 for	the	price83.	The	unexpected	consequence	of	Caterpillar	 is	the	exclusion	of	action	for	 the	 price	 and	 the	 limitation	 of	 actions	 against	 a	 buyer	 for	 non-payment	 to	repossession	of	the	goods	or	following	the	proceeds	of	sale	if	the	title	retention	clause	 is	 a	 proceeds	 clause	 when	 the	 property	 is	 not	 passed.	 The	 point	 that	section	49	exclusively	provides	for	situations	giving	rise	to	an	action	for	the	price	
																																																								80	[2016]	UKSC	23;	[2016]	AC	1034	81	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	1232,	[2014]	1	WLR	2365 82	Gullifer	L,	‘The	Interpretation	of	Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	Some	Difficulties’	(2014)	4	Lloyds	Maritime	and	Commercial	Law	Quarterly	564,	at	pp.	567-572 83	Caterpillar,	see	n.	81,	at	[41].	See	discussion	in	detail	in	Gullifer	L,	ibid,	at	pp.	575-9	
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is,	 fortunately,	 overruled	 in	Bunkers84.	 The	Bunkers	ruling	 has	 drawn	 attention	not	only	 to	 the	 insolvency	 of	one	 of	 the	world	 largest	 suppliers	 in	 the	 bunker-supply	market	but	also	to	its	controversial	decision	respective	to	a	supposed-to-be	 common	notion	 of	 a	 sale	 contract.	Bunkers	 involved	 a	 chain	 of	 transactions	where	 bunkers	 were	 sold	 down,	 the	 seller-buyer	 transaction	 and	 one	 of	 the	supplier-supplier	 transactions	 of	 which	 had	 a	 title	 retention	 clause.	 	 The	 end-buyer/ship-owner,	 was	 concerned	 about	 paying	 twice,	 once	 to	 the	 immediate	seller	and	once	to	a	supplier	in	the	chain	under	title	retention	or	maritime	lien85.	The	 end-buyer	 sought	 to	 apply	 section	 49(1)	 to	 avoid	 the	 immediate	 seller’s	action	 for	 the	 price.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 upheld	 the	 previous	 decisions	considering	the	concerned	contract	was	not	a	contract	of	sale.	Bunkers	(fuel	oil)	as	consumable	goods	are	likely	to	be	consumed	before	the	end	of	a	credit	term.	In	other	 words,	 where	 title	 retention	 restrains	 the	 passing	 of	 title	 pending	 full	payment,	 bunkers	 probably	 no	 longer	 exist	 at	 the	 time	 the	 price	 is	 paid,	 or	 a	claim	for	 the	price	 is	brought	 into	court.	The	court	reasoned	that	 the	supply	of	bunkers	 is	 widely	 known	 to	 have	 a	 long	 credit	 term	 combined	 with	 title	retention,	 and	 the	 express	 authority	 to	 use	 in	propulsion	 is	 usually	 inserted	 in	the	 contract.	 	Therefore,	 the	nature	of	 the	 contract	of	 this	kind	 is	 the	 liberty	 to	use	the	bunkers	 for	propulsion	prior	 to	payment	combined	with	the	agreement	to	sell	any	remaining	bunkers	at	the	date	of	payment86,	rather	than	the	passing	of	property	in	the	bunkers,	which	is	the	nature	of	sale	contract.	Once	the	bunker	is	delivered,	 the	buyer	 is	bound	 to	pay	 the	agreed	price87.	The	 failure	 to	pass	 the	property	in	the	bunkers	does	not	release	the	buyer	from	such	obligation.		It	would	be	good	news	on	its	face	to	any	title-retaining	seller	that	the	right	to	sue	for	the	price	remains	with	them,	and	section	49,	even	obiter,	is	held	to	be	not	the	only	authority	 for	an	action	 for	 the	price88.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	not	at	 the	heart	of	this	decision	the	right	to	sue	for	the	price	but	that	the	contract	of	that	kind	is	not	a	 contract	 of	 sale	 possibly	 has	 a	 global	 impact	 on	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 SGA	
																																																								84	Bunkers,	see	n.	80,	at	[58],	p.	1080 85	ibid,	at	[2],	p.	1060	 	86	ibid,	at	[33]	of	p.	1048,	[27]	of	p.	1069	87	ibid,	at	[34]	of	p.	1049,	[44]	of	p.	1051,	[37]	of	p.	1072	88	ibid,	at	[58],	at	pp.	1080-1	
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197989.	Title	retention	has	been	broadly	used	in	combination	with	a	substantially	long-term	 of	 credit	 in	 sale	 and	 purchase	 transaction	 including	 the	 sale	 and	purchase	 of	 consumable	 or	working	 goods,	 which	 are	 supposedly	 put	 into	 the	course	of	consuming	or	processing	respectively	right	after	taking	delivery90.	The	impossibility	of	 transferring	 the	 title	 in	 the	goods	when	 they	no	 longer	exist	 at	the	time	of	payment,	due	to	the	point	on	this	matter	in	the	highest	authority	case,	
Bunkers,	would	convert	a	used-to-be	sale	contract	into	a	non-sale	contract.	Out	of	the	 title	 retention	 context,	 it	 further	 leads	 to	 the	 reconceptualization	 of	 CIF	contract	in	which	the	passing	of	risk	is	preceding	the	passing	of	property	in	the	goods91.	It	could	be	listed	at	least	other	five	categories	of	other	supply	contracts	out	of	the	title	retention	context	would	be	challenged	under	the	Bunker	ruling92.	It	 cannot	 be	 denied	 the	 decisive	 role	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 this	 reasoning	 to	 the	extent	 that	without	 such	 arrangement,	 the	 property	 in	 the	 bunkers	 is	 likely	 to	pass	elsewhere	before	the	consumption.	Contracts	for	the	supply	of	bunkers	are	unexpectedly	characterized	into	two	different	categories,	one,	possibly	a	contract	of	 sale,	 for	 supply	 without	 extending	 credit	 or	 on	 credit	 but	 without	 title	retention,	and	the	other,	a	sui	generis	contract,	for	supply	on	credit	and	subject	to	title	retention93.	 	Again,	 it	raises	a	question	on	the	essence	of	 title	retention:	 for	the	 security	 of	 purchase	 price	 or	 an	 arrangement	 to	 pass	 the	 property	 in	 the	goods.	Functionalism	does	not	treat	title	retention	as	an	arrangement	to	transfer	ownership;	 instead,	 it	 considers	 title	 retention	 to	 have	 the	 effect	 limited	 to	 a	security	 interest.	 If	 functionalism	 had	 applied	 into	 the	 context	 of	 Bunkers,	 it	would	have	never	been	a	 question	whether	 it	were	a	 contract	of	 sale	 since	 the	property	 constructively	 passed	 upon	 delivery	 or	 other	 events	 before	 the																																																									89	See	detailed	discussion	on	how	the	Bunker	decisions	matters	to	the	SGA	1979	in	Gullifer	L,	see	n.	 29,	 at	 pp.	 257-8;	 Bridge	 M,	 ‘The	 UK	 Supreme	 Court	 Decision	 in	 the	 Res	 Cogitans	 and	 the	Cardinal	Role	of	Property	in	Sales	Law’	(2017)		Singapore	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	345,	at	pp.	356-9	90 Gullifer	L,	see	n.	29; Bridge	M,	‘The	UK	Supreme	Court	Decision	in	the	Res	Cogitans	and	the	Cardinal	Role	of	Property	in	Sales	Law’	(2017)		Singapore	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	345,	at	p.	356;	Tettenborn	A,	‘Of	Bunkers	and	Retention	of	Title:	When	is	A	Sale	Not	A	Sale?’	[2016]		Lloyd's	Maritime	and	Commercial	Law	Quarterly	24,	at	p.	26	91	Tettenborn	A,	‘Of	Bunkers	and	Retention	of	Title:	When	is	A	Sale	Not	A	Sale?’	[2016]		Lloyd's	Maritime	and	Commercial	Law	Quarterly	24,	at	p.	28 92	Low	KFK	and	Loi	KCF,	‘Bunkers	in	Wonderland:	A	Tale	of	How	the	Growth	of	Romalpa	Clauses	Shrank	the	English	Law	of	Sales’	[2018]		Journal	of	Business	Law	229,	at	p.	248	93	Gullifer	L,	see	n.	29,	at	p.	257 
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consumption	or	manufacture	of	the	goods.	It	is	suggested	that	title	retention	over	inventory	 should	 be	 re-characterized	 as	 “a	 retention	 of	 title	 floating	 charge”94.	However,	 it	 would	 lead	 to	 onerous	 inconsistency	 in	 interpretation	 of	 title	retention	 because	 this	 suggestion	 is	 limited	 to	 title	 retention	 in	 inventory	including	consumable,	working	goods	or	merchandise.	Another	recommendation	is	the	application	of	scintilla	temporis	doctrine	created	under	the	Re	Bond	Worth	case95.	Accordingly,	at	the	time	the	original	goods	are	transferred	to	a	third	party	or	 put	 into	 the	 manufacturing	 process,	 the	 title	 to	 the	 goods	 is	 passed	 to	 the	buyer	 immediately96.	 It	 sounds	 on	 its	 face	 parallel	 with	 reasoning	 in	 a	 line	 of	cases	with	regard	to	manufactured	title	retention	clause	(discussed	later),	that	is,	the	title	 in	 the	original	goods	 is	extinguished	at	 the	time	the	goods	are	put	 into	the	 manufacturing	 process.	 The	 problem	 is	 the	 court,	 if	 following	 the	 scintilla	
temporis	 doctrine,	 would	 do	 violence	 on	 party	 autonomy	 concerning	 to	 the	passing	 of	 title.	 It	 is	 worth	 repeating	 that	 from	 the	 formalism	 perspective,	functionalism	does	not	respect	the	freedom	of	contract	by	turning	a	contractual	arrangement	 of	 title	 transfer	 into	 a	 statutory	 security	 interest.	 	 Therefore,	acceptance	 of	 scintilla	 temporis	 doctrine	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 not	well	 justified	 and	raises	 the	 question	 of	 recognition	 of	 title	 retention	 under	 the	 functionalism	approach	as	a	whole.	




following	or	distinguishing	 the	Romalpa	 decision	and,	 combined	with	Romalpa,	contributing	to	the	law	of	title	retention	in	England.	
2.3.1 Romalpa	model	The	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 in	 Romalpa	 was	 elaborate	 and	 complicated	 but	showing	the	imbalance	of	two	parts,	namely	between	the	all-monies	part	and	the	manufactured	part.	In	the	first	all-monies	part,	there	was	an	additional	obligation	imposing	on	the	buyer	to	keep	the	goods	ascertained	as	the	property	of	the	seller.	This	part	expressly	stipulated	neither	the	authority	of	the	buyer	to	sell	the	goods	nor	 the	 seller’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub–sale.	 Meanwhile,	 the	manufactured	 part	 allowed	 the	 buyer	 to	 manufacture	 new	 products	 from	 the	goods	and	sell	 them	 to	a	 third	party.	Then,	 the	 seller	was	explicitly	 called	as	a	fiduciary	 owner	 of	 new	products	 and	 entitled	 to	 any	 claim	 that	 the	 buyer	 had	against	the	sub–purchaser	arising	from	the	sub–sale	transaction.	The	imbalance	between	two	parts	was	explained	that	the	problem	dealt	in	the	second	part	was	more	 complicated	 than	 that	of	 the	 first	part97.	 Ironically,	 the	dispute	 came	 into	being	within	the	framework	of	the	first	part	when	the	plaintiff	tried	to	submit	the	proprietary	claim	on	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	of	the	goods.	It	is	astonishing	that	the	seller	was	entitled	to	the	proceeds	without	any	agreement	on	the	sub-sale	of	the	original	goods	and	the	proceeds	thereof,	and	the	tracing	right	is	applied	to	an	authorized	 sale.	The	 second	part	 contained	 the	wording	 indicating	somewhat	a	fiduciary	relationship	between	parties	with	regard	to	the	manufactured	products	from	 the	 original	 goods.	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 concluded	 that	 the	 second	 part	implied	 the	 same	relationship	between	 the	 seller	and	 the	buyer	with	 regard	 to	the	proceeds	of	sale98.	The	main	authority	cited	in	Romalpa	is	Re		Hallett’s	Estate99	providing	for	the	establishment	of	the	fiduciary	relationship	as	a	prerequisite	for	the	right	of	tracing.		That	 the	buyer	had	an	authority	 to	sell	was	the	common	ground	 in	this	case100.	Thus,	 the	 question	 presented	 was	 whether	 there	 was	 a	 fiduciary	 relationship																																																									97	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	688	98	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	pp.	690,		692-3	99	(1880)	13	Ch	D	696	100	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.680	[F-G]	
	 45	
entitling	 the	 seller	 to	 trace	 the	proceeds	of	sub-sale.	The	 judge	of	 first	 instance	and	the	judges	of	the	Court	of	Appeal,	in	this	case,	had	different	findings	on	the	fiduciary	relationship.	The	 judge	of	 first	 instance	relied	heavily	on	the	bailment	created	between	the	defendant	and	the	plaintiff	to	conclude	that	it	should	be	the	fiduciary	 relationship	 beyond	 the	 plain	 creditor/debtor	 one	 between	 the	 seller	and	 the	 buyer	 at	 hand101.	 Roskill	 LJ	 in	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 complemented	 the	agency	 relationship	 that	 required	 the	 defendant	 to	 be	 bound	 by	 the	 fiduciary	obligation	towards	the	plaintiff102.	Meanwhile,	Goff	LJ	and	Megaw	LJ	did	not	make	any	 effort	 to	 label	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship	 between	 the	 plaintiff	 and	 the	defendant	 as	 sources	 of	 fiduciary	 obligations103.	 Although	 they	 inevitably	 had	different	constructions	of	the	retention	of	title	clause	in	hand,	they	came	up	with	the	 same	 holding	 that	 a	 fiduciary	 relationship	 was	 established	 between	 the	plaintiff	and	the	defendant	to	uphold	the	tracing	remedy	in	favour	of	the	former.		Therefore,	 it	 raises	 a	 question	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship	between	 the	 seller	 and	 the	 buyer	 found	 in	 Romalpa.	 So	 far,	 the	 fiduciary	relationship	 does	 not	 have	 a	 general	 definition 104 	and	 categories	 of	 this	relationship	 is	 not	 exhaustive.	 Categories	 of	 fiduciary	 relationships	 are	 also	suggested	not	to	have	the	same	rules105.	It	is	likely	another	kind	of	fiduciary	relationship	if	we	are	satisfied	with	the	fact	that	an	authority	to	sell	must	be	accompanied	with	the	duty	to	account	imposed	upon	 the	 buyer	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 proceeds	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 whole	purpose	of	the	clause.	The	property	of	the	goods	had	never	passed	to	the	buyer	until	the	sub-sale	occurred.	Thus,	the	seller’s	interest	in	the	proceeds	was	rooted	in	the	original	goods.	 In	other	words,	 the	beneficial	 interest	vested	 in	the	seller	with	 respect	 to	 the	proceeds	was	original.	Therefore,	 it	 can	be	 argued	 that	 the	
																																																								101	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	pp.680	E-F,	682	C-G	 	102	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	690	C-	F	103	Ulph	 J,	 ‘Equitable	 Proprietary	 Rights	 in	 Insolvency:	 The	 Ebbing	 Tide?’	 [1996]	 Journal	 of	Business	Law	482,	at	p.	498	104	Finn	P,	‘Contract	and	the	Fiduciary	Principle’	(1989)	12		UNSW	Law	Journal	76,	at	p.	85,	Sealy	LS,	‘Fiduciary	Relationships’	(1962)	20	CLJ	69	at	p.	73,	Weinrib	EJ,	‘The	Fiduciary	Obligation’	(1975)	25	The	University	of	Toronto	Law	Journal	1,	at	p.	7	105	Sealy	LS,	‘Fiduciary	Relationships’	(1962)	20	CLJ	69	at	pp.	73-4 
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duty	 to	 account	 for	 the	 proceeds	 to	 the	 seller	 was	 undoubtedly	 a	 fiduciary	obligation	allowing	the	seller	to	have	the	right	of	tracing.		Construction	of	a	fiduciary	relationship	is	problematic	because	the	obligation	to	account	 for	 the	proceeds	 is	not	accompanied	by	the	obligation	to	segregate	the	proceeds	for	the	seller	as	trust	money.	 	In	Romalpa,	the	retention	of	title	clause	did	not	provide	for	the	obligation	to	keep	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	in	a	separate	account.	The	second	part	of	the	concerned	title	retention	clause	expressly	dealing	with	 the	 sale	 of	manufactured	 goods	 only	 enabled	 the	 seller	 to	 any	 claim	 the	buyer	had	arising	from	the	sub–sale	transaction.	It	is	widely	acknowledged	that	the	obligation	to	segregate	the	proceeds	would	spoil	the	benefit	of	credit	term	as	the	 submission	 of	 the	 defendant	 in	 Romalpa106.	 Thus,	 the	 buyer	 can	 use	 the	proceeds	at	his	discretion	during	the	credit	 term.	The	Court	of	Appeal	accepted	that,	 in	 practice,	 the	 buyer	was	 not	 restrained	 from	 using	 the	 proceeds	 for	 its	own	business	during	the	credit	period107,	but	had	a	strong	response	that	it	could	reconcile	well	with	the	fiduciary	relationship.		“No	 doubt	 in	 practice,	 so	 long	 as	 all	 went	 well	 the	 plaintiffs	 would	 allow	 the	
defendants	 to	use	 the	proceeds	of	sale	 in	 their	business,	as	 I	understand	they	did;	
but	things	ceased	to	go	well,	and	now	one	has	to	determine	the	strict	rights	of	the	
parties…”108	Dr.	de	Lacy	analyzed	it	as	a	doctrine	of	waiver109.	It	is	suggested	that	the	duty	to	account	to	the	seller	is	not	a	strict	fiduciary	relationship	in	the	sense	that	it	can	be	 waived	 in	 the	 buyer’s	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 and	 reactivated	 in	 the	buyer’s	 insolvency110.	Therefore,	 the	obligation	 to	account	 is	not	equated	 to	 the	obligation	to	segregate	the	money	received.	It	was	suggested	to	be	a	concession	from	 the	 seller	 when	 it	 could	 not	 control	 the	 proceeds	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	buyer111.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 practice,	 sellers	 usually	 do	 not	 concern	 the	 source	 of																																																									106	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	689	F-G	107	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	692	E-F	108	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	692	E-F	109	de	Lacy	J,	‘Romalpa	Theory	and	Practice	under	Retention	of	Title	in	the	Sale	of	Goods’	(1995)		Anglo-American	Law	Review	327,	at	p.	347	110	ibid,	at	pp.	335-9,	for	further	discussion	on	doctrine	of	waiver	in	retention	of	title		111	Goodhart	W	and	Jones	G,	‘The	Infiltration	of	Equitable	Doctrine	into	English	Commercial	Law’	
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money,	even	trust	money,	received	from	buyers112.	The	Court	of	Appeal	precisely	indicated	the	situation	when	title	retention	would	efficiently	operate,	namely,	in	the	 buyer’s	 insolvency.	 The	 doctrine	 of	 waiver	 suggested	 for	 the	 fiduciary	obligation	of	this	kind	is	somewhat	reasonable	and	justified.	It	provides	answers	for	 arguments	 against	 the	 construction	 of	 agency	 at	 least	 two	 points113:	 the	absence	of	 a	duty	 to	 segregate	 the	money	 received	 for	 the	 seller’s	 account	and	that	the	tracing	right	is	not	due	right	at	the	time	of	sub-sale	but	subject	to	a	quite	long	credit	term,	for	instances	the	fixing	of	75	days	in	Romalpa.		However,	the	whole	argument	on	the	agency	construction	is	confusing.	Whatever	categories	 the	 concerned	 fiduciary	 relationship	 belongs,	 a	 line	 of	 critical	questions	 remain:	What	 is	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 duty	 to	 account?	 Must	 the	 buyer	account	 for	 the	whole	 proceeds	 to	 the	 seller?	 If	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 proceeds	 is	exceeding	the	amount	of	outstanding	debts,	does	the	buyer	account	only	for	the	value	of	all	outstanding	debts	and	enjoy	the	surplus?	And	what	if	the	amount	of	the	proceeds	is	not	enough	to	discharge	all	indebtedness?	The	affirmative	answer	to	 the	 second	 question	 is	 probably	 within	 the	 concept	 of	 fiduciary	 obligation.	However,	in	the	commercial	context,	it	is	considered	a	windfall	for	the	seller,	and	it	 is	 not	 both	 parties’	 intents.	 Romalpa	 courts	 were	 silent	 on	 this	 matter.	
Caterpillar	 is	the	case	following	Romalpa	 in	constructing	an	agency	relationship	when	 the	 goods	 were	 sub-sold	 before	 the	 buyer	 paid	 in	 full.	 The	 wording	 in	
Caterpillar	 title	retention	clause	expressly	required	the	buyer	to	hold	the	goods	as	a	fiduciary	agent	and	allowed	the	sub-sale	of	the	goods	in	the	ordinary	course	of	 business	 conditioned	 upon	 the	 account	 to	 the	 seller	 for	 the	 proceeds.	 The	concerned	court	 interpreted	 the	obligation	 to	account	equivalent	 to	accounting	for	the	whole	proceeds	of	sale.	Interestingly,	the	Irish	case	Re	Interview114	dealing	with	the	proceeds	of	sub-sale	subject	 to	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 had	 a	 security	 interest	 approach.	 This	 case	even	 earlier	 was	 neither	 mentioned	 before	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	 Romalpa.																																																																																																																																																																(1980)	43	The	Modern	Law	Review	489,	at	p.	507	112	de	Lacy	J,	see	n.	109,	at	pp.	337-8	113	See	more	discussion	on	criticisms	on	agency	construction	of	title	retention	in	Gullifer	L,	see	82,	at	pp.	567-572	114	[1975]	IR	382	
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Disputes	in	both	cases	were	on	the	proceeds	of	sub	–	sale,	but	the	two	relevant	title	 retention	 clauses	were	 drafted	 differently.	 The	 title	 retention	 clause	 in	Re	
Interview	was	a	“proceeds”	one	that	expressly	stipulated	the	seller’s	entitlement	to	all	debts	arising	from	the	sub–sale	by	way	of	security115.	The	wording	“by	way	
of	security”	invited	the	court	to	accept	the	submission	of	the	Companies	Act	1963	section	99(1)	and	(2)(e)	as	the	authority	in	favour	of	the	receiver	of	the	buyer116.	These	sections	can	be	said	to	be	equivalent	 to	 the	English	Companies	Act	1948	section	 95(1)	 and	 (2)(e)	 respectively	 that	 requires	 any	 charge	 created	 by	 a	company,	 including	a	 charge	on	book	debts	 to	be	 registered	duly,	otherwise,	 it	would	 be	 void	 against	 liquidators	 and	 creditors	 of	 the	 company.	Romalpa	 was	quite	 a	 different	 situation	 since	 the	 relevant	 title	 retention	 clause	 did	 not	mention	 the	proceeds	of	 sub–sale	but	 contained	 the	manufacturing	 clause.	The	whole	clause	in	Romalpa	had	wording	closely	relating	to	fiduciary	notion	such	as	the	duty	to	store	the	original	goods	and	the	newly	manufactured	products,	and	the	status	as	“fiduciary	owner”	of	the	seller	with	regard	to	new	products.	It	seems	that	the	wording	is	a	decisive	feature	in	determining	the	nature	of	title	retention.	However,	 after	 Re	 Interview,	 the	 Irish	 courts	 adopted	 Romalpa	 argument	 and	even	 broadened	 its	 application.	 Retention	 of	 title	 in	 Sugar	 Distributors	 Ltd	 v.	
Monaghan	Cash	and	Carry	Ltd	117	is	plainly	a	simple	clause,	and	the	judgment	was	delivered	for	the	plaintiff	to	trace	the	proceeds	of	sub	–	sale.	The	judge	followed	and	cited	the	interpretation	of	Romalpa	in	other	Irish	cases,	namely	Re	Stokes	and	
McKiernan	Limited118.	Accordingly,	the	right	to	trace	in	the	context	of	simple	title	retention	was	 based	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 property	 of	 the	 goods	 remained	with	 the	seller,	and	the	purchaser	sold	on	behalf	of	the	seller	and	accounted	to	the	latter	for	proceeds.	In	Re	Hickey	(WJ)	Ltd	119,	retention	of	title	incorporating	an	express	trust	regarding	 the	goods	and	 the	proceeds	 together	with	 the	duty	 to	keep	 the	trust	money	in	a	separate	account	entitled	the	seller	to	trace	the	proceeds120.	The																																																									115	ibid,	at	p.	388	116	ibid,	at	p.	396	117	[1982]	ILRM	399,	[1981]	IEHC	2 118	Re	Stokes	and	McKiernan,	unreported,	High	Court,	12	December	1978	119	[1988]	I.R.	126	120	de	 Lacy	 J,	 ‘Irish	Retention	 of	 Title:	 The	Trust	Dimension’	 (1990)	Conveyancer	 and	Property	Lawyer	128,	at	pp.	130–1.	In	this	article,	the	author	remarks	the	trust	dimension	in	Irish	case	law	
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influence	of	Romalpa	on	Irish	case	law	is	relatively	significant	to	the	extent	that	its	 approach	 has	 been	 adopted	 many	 times.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 a	 recent	 case,	
Unitherm	Heating	Systems	Ltd	-v-	Wallace	as	official	liquidator	of	BHT	Group	Ltd	
(In	Liquidation),	the	proceeds	clause	was	drafted	to	authorize	the	sub–sale	in	the	normal	course	of	the	buyer’s	business	and	assign	all	claims	arising	from	sub–sale	to	the	seller121.	It	also	stipulated	that	the	buyer	would	hold	the	proceeds	on	trust	for	 the	 seller122.	 The	 judge	 of	 first	 instance	 held	 that	 the	 proceeds	 were	 trust	monies	allowing	 the	 seller	 to	 trace.	The	Court	of	Appeal	 reserved	 the	decision,	using	 three	 English	 cases,	 E	 Pfeiffer	 Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf	 GmbH	 &	 Co	 v	
Arbuthnot	Factors	Ltd123,	Compaq	Computer	Ltd	v	Abercorn	Group	Ltd	&	Ors124	and	
Re	Andrabell125	as	guidance.	The	 holding	 in	 Romalpa	 is	 striking	 because	 the	 argument	 on	 the	 fiduciary	relationship	between	the	seller	and	the	buyer	 is	formidable.	It	is	supposedly	an	importation	 of	 equitable	 doctrines	 into	 commercial	 law	 that	 enables	 a	 title-retaining	 seller	 to	 bring	 a	 super–ranked	 proprietary	 claim	 in	 the	 buyer’s	insolvency.	 However,	 a	 new	 notion	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 accept	 since	 it	 significantly	opposes	 the	 commercial	practice	and	 the	parties’	 intent	 in	a	 sale	and	purchase	transaction.	More	 importantly,	 it	 considerably	affects	other	 interests,	 like	 those	of	 secured,	 preferential	 and	 unsecured	 creditors.	 Upholding	 the	 validity	 of	 the	retention	of	title	clause,	in	this	case,	has	brought	up	a	demanding	consideration	upon	 competing	 interests	 in	 insolvency	 and	 the	 need	 for	 transparency	 in	retention	of	title	transaction.	As	discussed	later,	the	Romalpa	approach	does	not	merit	the	application	of	subsequent	line	of	cases	with	regard	to	the	title	retention	claim	 for	 the	 sub-sale	 proceeds,	 but	 this	 case	 has	 never	 been	 reversed	 or	overruled.	The	Irish	experience	and	the	recent	case	Caterpillar	demonstrate	the	
																																																																																																																																																															regarding	title	retention.	121	[2015]	IECA	191	122	ibid,	at	para.	16	123	[1988]	1	WLR	150	124	[1991]	BCC	484	125	[1984]	BCLC	522	
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survival	 of	 Romalpa	 rule	 and	 the	 effort	 to	 draft	 a	 perfect	 “fiduciary”	 title	retention	clause	leading	to	inconsistency	in	the	interpretation	of	title	retention126.	
2.3.2 Negation	of	Romalpa	principle	
Romalpa	 is	 among	 the	 leading	 cases	 introducing	 equitable	 doctrines	 into	commercial	 law 127 	by	 recognizing	 the	 tracing	 right	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	 an	authorized	 sub–sale	 subject	 to	 a	 retention	 of	 title	 clause.	 If	 it	 were	 widely	accepted,	 sellers	would	have	 retention	of	 title	 as	 a	 device	 to	 escape	 the	 line	 of	unsecured	 creditors	 and	 jump	 to	 the	 super-priority	 position	 in	 the	 buyer’s	insolvency.	 Unlike	 secured	 creditors,	 they	 are	 not	 required	 to	 register	 their	proprietary	 interest.	Although	 its	name	has	become	another	generic	name	of	 a	retention	of	title	clause,	namely,	Romalpa	clause,	its	approach	and	theory	do	not	merit	the	application	in	many	subsequent	cases.	The	line	of	post–Romalpa	cases	can	be	sorted	into	three	groups:	(1)	dealing	with	the	 claim	 on	 the	 goods	 supplied;	 (2)	 dealing	 with	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub–sale	including	assignment	of	claims	against	the	sub–purchaser;	(3)	dealing	with	new	products	 deriving	 from	 the	 goods	 supplied.	Negation	 of	Romalpa	 principle	 has	occurred	mostly	 in	 the	 second	group	because	 the	 legal	 issue	 in	Romalpa	 is	 the	nature	 of	 the	 seller’s	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sale.	 There	 are	 a	 remarkable	number	of	cases	concerned	with	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale.	In	Hendy	Lennox	and	
Re	 Andrabell,	 the	 title	 retention	 clause	 was	 drafted	 simply	 and	 loosely	 that	neither	mentioned	any	term	relating	to	bailment	or	fiduciary	nor	did	it	cover	the	proceeds	or	new	products.	These	cases	were	distinguished	from	Romalpa	on	that	ground128.	 In	E	Pfeiffer	Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf,	Phillips	 J,	 in	order	 to	hold	 that	the	 defendant	 was	 authorized	 to	 sell	 for	 his	 own	 account,	 remarked	 that	 the	fiduciary	 relationship	 in	Romalpa	was	based	on	 the	 “particular	wording”	 of	 the	clause	and	on	the	concession	that	there	was	a	bailment	between	the	plaintiff	and																																																									126	Low	KFK	and	Loi	KCF,	see	n.	92,	at	p.	238	127	The	other	case	is	Quistclose	Investment	Ltd.	v.	Rolls	Razor	Ltd.	[1970]	AC	567.	More	discussion	can	be	found	in	Goodhart	W	and	Jones	G,	‘The	Infiltration	of	Equitable	Doctrine	into	English	Commercial	Law’	(1980)	43	The	Modern	Law	Review	489;	Priestley	LJ,	‘The	Romalpa	Clause	and	the	Quisclose	Trust’	in	Finn	P	(ed),	Equity	and	Commercial	Relationship	(The	Law	Book	Company	Limited	1987);	Ulph	J,	‘Equitable	Proprietary	Rights	in	Insolvency:	The	Ebbing	Tide?’	[1996]	Journal	of	Business	Law	482 128	Hendy	Lennox,	see	n.	7,	at	p.	499	A-B	
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the	defendant129.	As	discussed	above,	the	problematic	Romalpa	decision	is	that	a	label	 like	 bailment	or	agency	 stuck	on	 title	 retention	 is	not	a	must	 to	 come	up	with	 a	 fiduciary	 relationship.	 Furthermore,	 the	 present	 author	 does	 not	 think	that	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	 Romalpa	 solely	 relied	 on	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	concerned	title	retention	clause	to	imply	the	buyer’s	fiduciary	obligation	towards	the	 unpaid	 seller,	 as	 the	 argument	 of	 Gibson	 J	 in	 Andrabell130.	 The	 fiduciary	obligation	 is	constructed	upon	the	purpose	of	title	retention,	which	 is	 to	secure	the	 seller	 in	 the	 buyer’s	 insolvency.	 The	 purpose	 can	 serve	 any	 form	 of	 this	clause,	and	 it	helps	to	understand	the	 implication,	 if	any,	by	the	clause.	 Indeed,	Roskill	LJ’	s	argument,	then	agreed	by	Goff	LJ,	was	based	on	the	whole	purpose	of	the	clause	to	limit	the	authority	to	sell.	
“When,	 therefore,	one	is	considering	what,	if	any,	additional	 implication	has	to	be	
made	to	the	undoubted	implied	power	of	sale	in	the	first	part	of	clause	13,	one	must	
ask	what,	 if	any,	additional	 implication	 is	necessary	to	make	effective	the	obvious	
purpose	of	giving	the	requisite	security	to	the	plaintiffs?”	The	precise	role	of	the	second	part	in	Romalpa	is	to	clarify	and	illustrate	how	the	purpose	of	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	works	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 respective	part.		
“…for	it	would	be	strange	if	the	first	part	were	to	afford	no	relevant	security	when	
the	second	part	is	(as	I	think)	elaborately	drawn	to	give	such	security	in	relation	to	
manufactured	or	mixed	goods.”131	That	being	 so,	 if	 there	 is	 an	authority	 to	 sell,	 implied	or	express,	 regarding	 the	goods	in	original	status	or	new	products,	it	should	be	in	line	with	the	purpose	of	retention	of	title132.	In	Hendy	Lennox	and	Andrabell,	the	common	ground	was	the	authority	of	the	buyer	to	sell	the	goods133.	
																																																								129	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	159	C-D	130	Re	Andrabell,	see	n.	125,	at	p.	528	131	Romalpa,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	690	B-C	132	de	Lacy	J,	see	n.	109,	at	pp.	344-5	for	more	discussion	on	the	importance	of	the	authority	to	sell	on	the	construction	of	fiduciary	relationship	respecting	retention	of	title.	133	See	Hendy	Lennox,	see	n.	7,	at	p.	491G-H;	Re	Andrabell,	see	n.	125,	at	p.	527	
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The	 lesson	 of	 simple	 retention	 of	 title	 clause	 in	 Hendy	 Lennox	 and	 Andrabell	might	 be	 well	 studied.	 Title	 retention	 clause	 since	 then	 has	 been	comprehensively	drafted.	The	 terms	 relating	 to	agency,	bailment,	 and	 fiduciary	have	 been	 expressly	 incorporated	 to	 establish	 a	 fiduciary	 relationship	 by	retention	 of	 title,	 but	 the	 judge	 in	 Tatung	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 Galex	 Telesure	 Ltd134	distinguished	 his	 case	 from	 Romalpa.	 Accordingly,	 title	 retention	 in	 Tatung	expressly	stipulated	the	plaintiff’s	interest	 in	 the	proceeds	as	a	contractual	one,	whereas	the	title	retention	clause	in	Romalpa	did	not	mention	the	proceeds,	and	the	 interest	 of	 the	 plaintiff	 arose	 by	 operation	 of	 law 135 .	 In	 Re	 Weldtech	
Equipment,	the	case	following	Tatung,	the	retention	of	title	clause	stipulated	the	assignment	 of	 any	 claim	 that	 the	 buyer	 has	 against	 the	 sub–purchaser	 to	 the	seller.	The	situation	of	the	seller	with	regard	to	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	seems	to	be	“no-win”136.	The	Re	Andrabell,	Tatung	and	Re	Weldtech	Equipment	courts	were	not	willing	to	read	the	fiduciary	relationship	in	Romalpa.	The	buyer	was	placed	in	the	position	of	a	fiduciary	towards	the	seller	because	the	former	had	the	authority	to	sell	the	original	goods	subject	to	the	latter’s	title	retention	to	the	goods	supplied.	Relying	upon	 the	 principle	 in	Re	Hallett’s	Estate,	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship	 of	 this	 kind	that	is	rooted	in	the	seller’s	proprietary	interests	in	the	original	goods	results	in	the	 right	 to	 trace	 into	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub–sale.	 The	 existence	 of	 the	 plaintiff’s	interest	in	the	proceeds	of	sale	in	a	contract	does	not	prevent	the	title	retention	clause	 from	establishing	a	 fiduciary	relationship	to	be	 in	 line	with	the	Romalpa	principle.	Despite	 the	 efforts	 of	 drafters	 to	 expressly	 state	 the	 buyer’s	 obligations	 as	 a	bailee,	an	agent	or	a	 fiduciary,	the	holdings	were	disappointing	since	the	courts	found	 the	 obligations	 were	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship137.	 In	
Hendy	 Lennox	 and	 Andrabell,	 the	 existence	 of	 credit	 term	 and	 the	 lack	 of																																																									134	(1989)	5	BCC	325	135	ibid,	at	pp.	334-5	136	See	 de	 Lacy	 J,	 ‘Reservation	 of	 Title	 and	 Charges	 on	 Company	 Book	 Debts:	 The	 Death	 of	Romalpa?’	(1991)	54	Modern	Law	Review	736,	at	pp.	737-8;	Hicks	A,	‘Retention	of	Title	-	Latest	Developments’	[1992]		Journal	of	Business	Law	398,	at	p.	409.	137	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	160	E-H,	161	A-B,	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	333;	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	496;	Re	Weldtech	Equipment	Ltd	[1991]	BCC	16,	at	p.	17	
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obligation	to	keep	the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	in	separate	account	were	significant	features	to	negate	the	Romalpa	principle138.	The	latter	case	even	went	further	to	interpret	 the	obligation	to	account	as	“obligation	not	to	mix	the	moneys	received	
by	 the	 fiduciary	 with	 any	 other	 moneys” 139 .	 Another	 feature	 found	 to	 be	inconsistent	with	the	nature	of	fiduciary	of	relationship	is	the	seller’s	interest	in	the	defeasibility	upon	 the	payment	of	 the	outstanding	debts.	 It	 is	 the	equitable	right	to	redeem	the	title	of	the	goods	and	their	proceeds	that	the	buyer	is	entitled	to	 enjoy	 when	 all	 debts	 are	 discharged.	 The	 judges	 in	 Tatung140	and	 Compaq	
Computer141	relied	 on	 a	 frequently	 quoted	 finding	 in	 Re	 Bond	 Worth	 Ltd.	 to	construct	a	charge	with	regard	to	the	proceeds	of	sub	–	sale.	
“…any	 contract	 which,	 by	 way	 of	 security	 for	 the	 payment	 of	 a	 debt,	 confers	 an	
interest	 in	 property	 defeasible	 or	 destructible	 upon	 payment	 of	 such	 debt,	 or	
appropriates	 such	 property	 for	 the	 discharge	 of	 the	 debt,	 must	 necessarily	 be	
regarded	as	creating	a	mortgage	or	charge,	as	the	case	may	be.	The	existence	of	the	
equity	 of	 redemption	 is	 quite	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 bare	 trustee-
beneficiary	relationship.”142	This	 is	 precisely	what	 the	 present	 author	 has	 quoted	 to	 discuss	 the	 purposive	approach	 in	the	context	of	simple	title	retention.	This	approach	did	not	help	to	construct	a	simple	clause	to	be	the	creation	of	a	charge	upon	the	goods	supplied.	Irrespective	 of	 simple	 title	 retention	 or	 proceeds	 title	 retention,	 it	 is	 no	 doubt	that	 the	seller’s	 interest	 in	 the	property	 in	any	case	will	be	defeasible	upon	the	payment	 of	 the	 debts.	 The	 doctrine	 of	waiver	again	 could	 throw	 a	 light	on	 the	defeasibility	 of	 the	 seller’s	 interest	 in	 the	 goods	 to	 see	 whether	 it	 could	 be	reconciled	 with	 the	 fiduciary	 obligation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 title	 retention.	 The	discharge	of	the	debt,	out	of	the	event	of	the	buyer’s	insolvency,	does	not	require	the	buyer	to	perform	his	fiduciary	obligation	strictly.	The	seller	does	not	concern	whether	or	not	the	money	is	really	the	proceeds	of	sale.	
																																																								138	See	Hendy	Lennox,	see	n.	7,	at	p.	499	C-G;	Re	Andrabell,	see	n.	125,	at	pp.	532-3	139	Re	Andrabell,	see	n.	125,	at	p.	530	140	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	333	141	Compaq,	see	n.	124	,	at	p.	495	142	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	p.	248	
	 54	
The	strongest	argument	against	 the	construction	of	 fiduciary	relationship	 is	 the	finding	 that	 the	 buyer	 is	 obliged	 to	 account	 for	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub–sale	amounting	 to	 the	 sum	of	outstanding	debts.	 This	 argument	 is	 challenged	 to	 be	contractual	rather	than	proprietary	one.	In	E	Pfeiffer,	the	plaintiff	alleged	that	it	was	 the	duty	 to	account	 for	all	 the	proceeds,	but	 the	defendant	was	entitled	 to	the	surplus,	if	any,	under	the	contract.	In	this	sense,	the	buyer	does	not	have	any	equity	of	redemption	in	the	balance	of	the	fund	but	a	personal	claim	against	the	seller143.		
2.3.3 Construction	of	charges	It	is	unanimously	accepted	that	a	simple	retention	of	title	clause	does	not	amount	to	a	registrable	charge	created	by	the	buyer	on	the	goods	supplied.	It	is	not	the	case	involving	the	sale	proceeds	or	new	products	manufactured	from	the	goods	that	are	the	subject	matter	of	a	sale	contract.	The	nature	of	the	interest	that	the	seller	 has	 on	 the	 proceeds	 or	 new	 products,	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 title	 retention	disputes.	To	reply	the	absolute	proprietary	 interest	claimed	by	the	plaintiff,	 the	defendant	 is	 likely	 to	propose	the	accessory	 interest	by	way	of	security.	Courts	deal	 with	 the	 question	 of	 a	 charge	 first	 and	 then	 proceed	 to	 the	 question	 of	priority.	It	is	a	clear	approach	adopted	in	Compaq	Computer.		The	headings	of	the	following	 sub-sections	 are	 named	 after	 the	 title	 of	 two	 questions	 presented	before	the	said	judge.	
2.3.3.1 Charge	issue	Slade	 J	 introduced	 the	 purposive	 approach	 to	 retention	 of	 title	 in	 Re	 Bond	
Worth144.	In	his	frequently	quoted	statement,	Slade	J	indicated	that	an	interest	by	way	of	 security	 in	property	must	have	at	 least	 two	 features	with	 regard	 to	 the	debtor,	namely,	(1)	the	defeasibility	of	the	interest	in	property	upon	payment	or	realization	 of	 the	 property	 for	 the	 discharge	 of	 the	 debt	 and	 (2)	 the	 equity	 of	redemption.	 Slade	 J	 strengthened	 his	 finding	 by	 relying	 on	 the	 judgment	 of	Romer	 LJ	 in	 Re	 George	 Inglefield	 Ltd.145 	about	 essential	 characteristics	 of	 a																																																									143	de	Lacy	J,	see	n.	109,	at	p.	350	144	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	p.	248	145	[1933]	Ch.	1	
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mortgage:	the	feature	of	equity	of	redemption,	the	equitable	right	to	redeem	the	property	upon	the	discharge	of	the	debts,	and	when	the	value	of	the	property	is	not	 sufficient	 to	 pay	 the	 debts,	 the	 mortgagee	 is	 still	 entitled	 to	 the	 balance	recovered	from	the	mortgagor.		Despite	 the	 fact	 that	drafters	have	 learned	the	 lesson	of	wording	 from	previous	cases,	 it	 is	not	a	difficult	 task	to	 figure	out	 the	characteristics	of	security	 in	any	retention	of	title	extended	to	the	proceeds	of	sale	or	newly	manufactured	goods.	The	 buyer	will	 undoubtedly	 have	 the	property	 in	 the	 subject	matter	 by	 paying	the	purchase	price	to	 the	 seller.	Retention	of	 title	will	be	destructible	upon	 the	discharge	of	all	debts	owed	to	the	seller146.	It	is	also	commonly	accepted	that	in	a	case	where	the	subject	matter	is	realised	to	make	the	payment	and	the	sum	is	not	sufficient	to	cover	the	debts,	the	buyer	still	owes	the	balance	to	the	seller.		With	regard	to	the	proceeds	clause,	the	equity	of	redemption	has	been	found	as	an	 important	element	to	establish	a	charge.	When	the	amount	 is	more	than	the	debts,	it	is	suggested	that	the	buyer	has	an	interest	in	the	subject	matter	by	way	of	 equity	 of	 redemption.	 The	 wording	 of	 some	 retention	 of	 title	 clauses	 has	invited	 judges	 to	 read	 the	 proprietary	 residuary	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 to	 be	vested	 in	 the	 buyer/debtor.	 In	E	Pfeiffer,	 the	 clause	 stipulated	 that	 book	 debts	arising	from	the	goods	supplied	“amounting	to”	the	buyer’s	obligation	would	be	passed	 on	 the	 seller.	 Relying	 exactly	 on	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 contract,	 the	concerned	judge	constructed	that	the	assignment	is	“only	up	to	the	amount	of	[the	
buyer]’s	outstanding	debt”147.	It	can	be	inferred	that	the	buyer	was	entitled	to	the	balance	 if	 the	 sum	 of	 book	 debts	 is	 more	 than	 the	 value	 of	 the	 secured	obligations.	 However,	 many	 clauses	 have	 expressly	 provided	 that	 the	 buyer	would	 account	 to	 the	 seller	 for	 the	 full	 proceeds	 of	 sale	 or	 assign	 all	 rights	including	 those	 relating	 to	 the	 payment	 of	 purchase	 price	 of	 the	 sub–sale148.	Heavily	relying	on	the	wording	of	the	contract,	plaintiffs	submitted	that	they	had	
																																																								146	See	Re	Bond	Worth,	see	n.	23,	at	p.	249;	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	161	B-C;	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	333;	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	495	147	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	160	D-G	148	See	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	154	C-D;	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	328;	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	491;	Re	Weldtech	Equipment	Ltd	[1991]	BCC	16,	at	pp.	16-7	
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an	absolute	beneficial	 interest	 in	 the	sale	proceeds149.	However,	careful	drafting	did	 not	 help.	 The	 interest	 of	 this	 kind	 was	 found	 inconsistent	 with	 other	obligations	in	E	Pfeiffer,	that	is,	the	seller’s	interest	in	book	debts	was	stipulated	to	be	amounting	to	 the	outstanding	obligation	whereas	the	buyer	must	account	to	her	all	 the	proceeds150.	 In	Tatung	 and	Compaq,	 it	was	 the	defeasibility	of	 the	seller’s	 interest	 upon	 payment	 of	 the	 debt	 leading	 to	 the	 implication	 of	 the	buyer’s	 residuary	 claim	 in	 the	 proceeds 151 .	 In	 Re	 Weldtech	 Equipment,	 the	extraordinarily	 brief	 judgment	 following	 the	Tatung	 case	 relied	 upon	 only	 the	phrase	“for	securing	our	claim”	to	reach	a	conclusion	152.		The	seller’s	entitlement	to	a	sum	more	than	the	debts	owed	to	her	is	considered	to	have	a	windfall	profit	at	 the	expense	of	 the	buyer	and	her	other	creditors153.	This	is	the	reason	to	read	the	contract	irrespective	of	the	wording	referring	to	an	absolute	 beneficial	 interest.	 It	 is	 acceptable	 that	 the	 buyer	 is	 entitled	 to	 the	surplus	after	discharging	the	outstanding	debts	by	the	money	generated	from	a	sub-sale	 to	avoid	 the	windfall	profit	 at	 the	expense	of	 the	buyer	 and	her	other	creditors.	However,	 the	question	 is	whether	it	is	a	proprietary	right.	The	entire	fund	recovered	from	the	sub–sale	including	the	profit	must	be	used	to	discharge	all	 outstanding	 debts	 first.	 The	 buyer’s	 right	 to	 the	 surplus	 of	 the	 fund	 after	paying	all	 the	debts	 is	 argued	to	be	a	personal	 claim	as	a	 counterweight	 to	 the	obligation	to	pay	the	balance	against	 the	deficiency	of	 the	 fund,	rather	than	the	equity	of	redemption	to	the	proceeds154.	The	windfall	may	also	occur	if	the	seller	repossesses	the	original	goods,	the	market	price	of	which	has	been	increased	at	that	time.	The	buyer	undoubtedly	cannot	claim	for	the	surplus	value.	The	buyer	in	this	situation	may	not	incur	any	expense	on	the	rise	of	the	economic	value	of																																																									149	See	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	155	H,	156	A-B;	Tatung,	see	n.	134,		at	p.	333;	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	494	150	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	160	E-H,	161	A-B	151	See	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	333;	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	496	152	[1991]	BCC	16,	at	p.	17. 153	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	333	154	Dr.	John	de	Lacy	has	produced	a	series	of	research	papers	on	the	nature	of	Romalpa	principle	where	he	insists	on	the	nature	of	the	buyer’s	right	to	the	surplus	is	personal,	not	proprietary	as	equity	of	redemption.	See	de	Lacy	J,	‘Proceed	with	Care’	(1989)	10	Company	Lawyer	188,	at	p.	189;	de	Lacy	J,	‘When	is	a	Romalpa	Clause	not	a	Romalpa	Clause?	When	It	is	a	Charge	on	Book	Debts’	(1992)	13	Company	Lawyer	164,	at	p.167;	de	Lacy	J,	‘Romalpa	Theory	and	Practice	under	Retention	of	Title	in	the	Sale	of	Goods’	(1995)	24(3)		Anglo-American	Law	Review	327,	at	pp.	340-1,	350	
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the	goods,	but	even	so,	the	most	important	contention	is	that	the	seller	still	has	an	absolute	interest	as	a	legal	and	beneficial	owner.		The	 functional	 approach	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 identify	 retention	 of	 title	 as	conferring	a	registrable	charge	on	the	proceeds	in	the	context	of	title	retention	in	England.	 The	 wording	 of	 the	 contract	 to	 some	 extent	 constituting	 the	 seller’s	absolute	 interest	 in	 the	proceeds	or	setting	up	a	 fiduciary	relationship,	 in	some	cases	like	Romalpa	or	Caterpillar	to	confer	upon	the	seller	an	absolute	interest	in	the	 proceeds,	 but	 in	 some	 cases,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 was	 utterly	 failed	 in	 this	submission.	Construction	of	the	equity	of	redemption	irrespective	of	the	wording	is	likely	to	be	a	violent	interference	that	only	reflects	the	judges’	intention.		The	 issue	 is	 always	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 seller’s	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds:	 an	absolute	beneficial	interest	or	by	way	of	security.	It	is	critical	to	find	out	whether	at	any	time	that	the	buyer	has	an	absolute	interest	in	the	goods	and	the	proceeds	to	comply	with	the	orthodox	that	requires	a	person	to	create	a	security	interest	upon	her	own	property.	Noticeably,	the	question	of	who	initially	has	the	property	in	the	proceeds	has	not	been	well	addressed.	Simple	title	retention	itself	does	not	confer	upon	the	seller	any	interest	in	the	proceeds	of	sale155.	In	E	Pfeiffer,	Phillips	J	relied	on	the	wording	of	the	retention	of	title	clause,	that	is	“claims…	[the	buyer]	
gets…	 including	 his	 profits”,	 to	 come	 up	 with	 the	 conclusion	 that	 it	 was	 the	assignment	of	 the	 rights	belonging	 to	 the	buyer156.	 In	 response	 to	 the	proceeds	title	retention	clause,	courts	have	focused	on	the	issue	of	the	defeasibility	of	the	interest	upon	 the	debt	discharge	and	 the	equity	of	 redemption.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	negating	 fiduciary	 relationship	 between	 the	 seller	 and	 the	 buyer	 is	 the	way	 to	vest	 the	 property	of	 the	proceeds	 in	 buyer	 as	 the	 judge’s	 argument	 in	Compaq	
Computer157.		The	concerned	judge	figured	out	that	the	security	purpose	was	not	sufficient	for	a	registrable	charge,	but	it	was	whether	the	title	had	passed	to	the	buyer	in	order	to	create	a	charge	upon	the	seller158.	However,	he	did	not	proceed																																																									155	Simple	retention	of	title	 in	Hendy	Lennox	and	Re	Andrabell	case	only	dealt	with	the	question	whether	 the	 seller’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	 proceeds	 is	 the	 absolute	 beneficial	 interest.	 Security	interest	was	not	the	question	presented	before	the	court.	156	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	160	157	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	496	158	See	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	493;	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	p.	546 
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with	this	matter.	Similarly,	the	Tatung	judge	did	not	give	any	effort	to	clarify	why	the	 debtor	 had	 property	 in	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sale,	 and	 simply	 considered	 it	“unquestionably	 vested	 in	 the	 defendants”159.	 It	 is	 a	 somewhat	 inappropriate	approach.	The	core	question	to	determine	the	seller’s	interest	in	the	proceeds	is	whether	it	is	original	or	granted	by	the	buyer160.	The	proper	analysis	should	be,	like	the	argument	of	the	dissenting	judge	in	Caterpillar,	that	the	property	in	the	original	goods	passes	to	the	buyer	at	the	time	of	the	sub-sale	as	an	implication	for	the	authority	to	sell.		Therefore,	the	buyer	has	the	original	title	to	the	proceeds	to	create	a	charge	in	the	seller’s	favour.	This	analysis	would	reverse	the	findings	in	
In	Re	Highway	Food,	Caterpillar	and	Bunkers	case	as	discussed	elsewhere	above.	With	 regard	 to	 new	 products,	 Borden	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 Scottish	 Timber	 Products	 Ltd	demonstrates	that	simple	title	retention	does	not	give	the	plaintiff	any	interest	in	new	products	manufactured	from	the	goods	supplied161.	Simple	retention	of	title	is	still	effective	 in	some	cases	that	 the	goods	were	under	process.	 It	is	better	 to	assert	a	claim	in	the	goods	supplied,	rather	than	the	new	products	incorporated	the	 original	 goods	 by	 some	 plain	 manipulation,	 that	 is,	 the	 goods	 can	 be	reconverted	 into	 their	 delivered	 state162.	 Retention	 of	 title	 is	 operated	 on	 the	original	goods,	like	engines	supplied	by	the	seller	incorporated	in	generators	sets	in	Hendy	Lennox.	Simple	retention	of	title	can	extend	to	processed	goods	that	are	not	lost	the	identity	of	the	original	goods,	like	steel	sheet	cut	from	steel	strip	in	the	 Armour	 v	 Thyssen	 Edelstahlwerke	 AG case163.	 It	 is	 inferred	 from	 these	 two	cases	 that	 the	 goods	 even	 being	 processed	 but	 not	 losing	 their	 identity	 of	originals	goods	can	be	repossessed	under	the	effect	of	title	retention.	Newly	manufactured	products	in	the	context	of	title	retention	are	unequivocally	the	 combination	 at	 least	 of	 materials	 supplied	 by	 the	 seller	 and	 the	 buyer’s	workforce.	 The	 classic	 specificatio	 principle 164 	vests	 the	 ownership	 to	 the																																																									159	Tatung,	see	n.	134,	at	p.	335	160	Worthington	S,	see	n.	24,	at	p.39	161	[1981]	Ch	25,	at	p.	47	C-D	162	Hendy	Lennox,	see	n.	7,	at	p.	493	G-H,	494	D-G	163	[1991]	2	A.C.	339;	[1990]	3	W.L.R.	810	164	In	case	of	manufacturing,	the	rule	of	acquisition	of	ownership	is	classified	into	accessio	and	
specificatio.	Accessio	occurs	when	a	subordinate	thing	is	joined	to	a	dominant	one,	accordingly	the	owner	of	the	dominant	thing	will	acquire	the	ownership	of	the	whole.	Specificatio	is	the	case	that	
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manufacturer	who	is	responsible	for	the	owner	of	materials	for	damages,	except	for	 the	 materials	 capable	 of	 being	 reconverted	 into	 its	 delivered	 status.	 This	principle	 does	 not	 cause	 a	 severe	 problem	 when	 materials	 ceased	 to	 exist	 or	destroyed	in	manufacturing	process	like	yarn	processed	into	carpet	or	resin	into	chipboard165.	It	is	a	more	challenging	task	to	deal	with	the	case	where	the	original	goods,	although	they	cannot	be	reconverted	once	processed,	are	capable	of	being	identified.	 In	Chaigley	Farms	Ltd	v	Crawford	Kaye	&	Grayshire	Ltd	(t/a	Leylands),	the	plaintiff	proposed	that	“meat	is	meat,	live	or	dead”	to	extend	simple	retention	of	 title	 to	 livestock	 to	 carcasses166.	 	 In	Re	 Peachdart167,	 it	 is	 submitted	 that	 the	supplied	material,	leather,	was	possibly	identified	in	each	handbag	made	from	it.	Thus,	 the	buyer	was	still	a	bailee	of	handbags	and	an	agent	 for	 the	seller	when	selling	 them168.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 figure	 out	 whether	 the	 goods	 undergoing	process	 or	 manufacture	 are	 lost	 their	 original	 identity.	 When	 the	 course	 of	manufacture	 starts,	 the	 original	 goods	 have	 undergone	 a	 transformation	 to	 be	new	products	of	separate	 identity,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	original	goods	were	not	completely	extinguished	or	consumed169.	Then	the	title	is	destroyed	because	the	goods	are	 losing	 their	 identity	as	 raw	material	 at	 the	very	beginning	of	 the	manufacture	 operation.	 This	 proposition	 is	 logical	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 parallel	with	 the	 international	 trade	 law.	 For	 determining	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 of	imported	goods,	the	tariff	shift	rule	is	applied	when	all	the	constituent	materials	of	the	goods	are	from	many	countries.	Accordingly,	the	country	of	origin	is	where	the	finished	goods	undergo	a	change	in	tariff	classification.		The	 extinction	 of	 title	 of	 the	 original	 goods	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 manufacturing	process	does	not	resolve	the	issue	with	regard	to	the	plaintiff’s	interest	in	newly	manufactured	products.	Who	has	 the	 first	 title	of	new	products?	The	matter	of	the	first	title	is	of	importance	because	the	seller	will	have	an	absolute	interest	in	new	 products	 if	 the	 answer	 is	 on	 him.	 Otherwise,	 the	 buyer	 will	 have	 a	 title																																																																																																																																																																a	person	transforms	raw	materials	belonging	to	the	other	into	a	new	thing.	See	more	discussion	in	Bridge	M	and	others,	The	Law	of	Personal	Property	(London	:	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2013) 165	See	Borden,	see	n.	161,	at	pp.	41	E-F,	44	E-F,	Clough	Mill,	see	n.	19	,	at	p.	125	E-G	166	[1996]	BCC	957,	at	p.	962 167	[1984]	Ch	131	168	ibid,	at	p.	141	F-G	169	ibid,	 at	p.	142	E-H;	Chaigley	Farms,	 see	n.	166,	at	p.	963,	Modelboard	Ltd	v	Outer	Box	Ltd	(In	
Liquidation)	[1992]	B.C.C.	945;	[1993]	B.C.L.C.	623,	at	p.	953	
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sufficient	to	confer	a	security	interest	on	the	seller.	The	buyer	is	in	the	position	of	a	manufacturer	who	can	take	advantage	of	the	specificatio	principle,	in	the	other	hand,	the	contract	of	sale	stipulates	that	the	seller	generally	has	retained	the	title	to	manufactured	goods.	 If	manufactured	 title	 retention	can	confer	 the	 absolute	interest	upon	the	seller	with	regard	to	new	products,	it	is	suggested	that	the	first	title	 could	 be	 obtained	 by	 a	 contractual	 arrangement.	 Thus,	 retention	 of	 title	would	be	a	device	to	contract	out	of	rules	of	property	law170.	Oliver	LJ	in	Clough	
Mill	was	 likely	 to	support	 this	proposition171.	However,	Goff	LJ	 in	 the	same	case	and	other	courts	did	not	echo	it.	If	the	seller	has	the	first	title	in	new	products,	he	will	 be	 entitled	 to	 the	 windfall	 benefit	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 buyer	 who	incorporates	not	only	his	materials	but	also	his	labour172.	New	products	certainly	have	value	added	by	incorporation	of	other	materials	belonging	to	the	buyer	or	by	her	design	or	her	workforce.	It	is	likely	a	weak	proposition	if	the	value	added	is	relatively	minor	in	comparison	with	the	goods	supplied	by	the	seller.	Dealing	with	 the	matter	of	 this	kind,	 the	 judge	 in	Modelboard	 did	not	 take	 into	account	the	 value-added	matter	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 evidence.	 He	 asserted	 that	 the	 windfall	benefit	in	respecting	new	products	was	akin	to	the	situation	that	the	seller	retook	the	possession	of	the	original	goods173.	He	raised	two	characteristics	of	a	charge:	(1)	 The	 title	 of	new	products	would	 be	 vested	 in	 the	 buyer	 by	 payment	 of	 the	purchase	price	of	original	goods,	and	(2)	The	sum	owed	to	the	seller	was	not	the	price	 payable	 in	 connection	with	 the	 sale	 of	 new174.	 	 Above	 all,	 the	 specificatio	principle	in	most	cases	may	be	impliedly	applied	by	the	argument	that	when	the	title	 in	original	 goods	 ceases	 to	exist	 at	 the	 start	of	 the	manufacturing	process,	the	 title	 of	 new	 products	 will	 be	 vested	 in	 the	 buyer 175 .	 A	 contractual	arrangement	cannot	be	effective	to	contract	out	property	law	in	order	to	confer	property	 in	 new	 products	 on	 the	 seller,	 simply	 because	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	anyone	 to	 confer	 ownership	 on	 the	 other	 in	what	 he	 has	 no	 title	 at	 all176.	 The																																																									170	Webb	D,	‘Title	and	Transformation:	Who	Owns	Manufactured	Goods?’	[2000]		Journal	of	Business	Law,	at	p.	531	171	Borden,	see	n.	161,	at	p.	124	B-C	172	Borden,	see	n.	161,	at	p.	119	G-H,	120	A-E	173	Modelboard	Ltd	v	Outer	Box	Ltd	(In	Liquidation)	[1992]	BCC	945,	at	pp.	952-3	174	Modelboard	Ltd	v	Outer	Box	Ltd	(In	Liquidation)	[1992]	BCC	945;	[1993]	BCLC	623,	at	p.	953	175	See	Borden,	see	n.	161,	at	p.	44	E-F	by	Templeman	LJ,	46	E-F	by	Buckley	LJ;	Re	Peachdart,	see	n.	167,	at	p.	142	G-H;	Clough	Mill,	see	n.	19,	at	p.	125	F-H	by	Sir	Donaldson	M.R.	176	Webb	D,	see	n.	170,	at	p.	534	
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plaintiff’s	 interest	 in	 newly	 manufactured	 products	 under	 manufactured	retention	of	title	should	be	of	a	chargee.	
2.3.3.2 Priority	issue	Priority	can	be	considered	as	 the	ordering	of	priority	of	successive	charges	and	absolute	interests	if	any	over	the	same	asset	177.	It	is	the	ranking	to	distribute	the	company	asset	in	winding	up	in	which	holders	of	floating	charges	compete	with	preferential	creditors	and	unsecured	creditors178.	Registration	does	not	affect	the	priority	ranking	of	successive	charges	to	the	extent	that	the	order	of	registration	does	not	play	a	role	in	the	ranking	process.	Otherwise,	it	determines	the	validity	of	charges	created	by	a	company	chargor	against	other	creditors	in	the	ambit	of	Companies	 Act	 2006	 section	 859(H)179.	 Registration	 as	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 the	validity	 of	 company	 charges	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 priority	 ranking	 of	 a	 particular	charge	in	competition	with	other	successive	charges	and	absolute	interests180.	In	a	 substantial	 number	 of	 court	 decisions,	 retention	 of	 title	 extended	 to	 the	proceeds	of	sub–sale	and	manufactured	goods	is	found	to	be	a	registrable	charge	created	by	a	company	chargor.	This	kind	of	charge	falls	within	the	requirement	of	registration	to	be	effective.	In	almost	all	title	retention	cases,	the	extended	clause	is	 void	 against	 receivers,	 administrators,	 liquidators	 or	 other	 creditors	 due	 to	want	 of	 registration.	 It	 is	 a	 non–complying	 registrable	 charge	 taking	 priority	subsequent	 to	a	 registered	charge	 irrespective	 that	 the	 former	 is	previously	or	subsequently	 created181.	 It	 should	 be	 noticed	 that	 the	 Insolvency	 Act	 1986	recognizes	 the	 first	 priority	 position	 of	 the	 title-retaining	 seller	 respecting	 not	only	the	goods	supplied	but	also	“any	property	presenting	the	goods”182.	However,	extended	 title	 retention	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 retention	 of	 title	 agreement	 within	 the	scope	of	the	Insolvency	Act	1986	because	it	has	been	long	considered	as	creating	
																																																								177	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	p.741	178	Goode	RM,	Principles	of	Corporate	Insolvency	Law	(4th	ed.,	Student	ed.	,	London	:	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2011),	at	p.	275	179	The	former	rules	are	found	in	Companies	Act	1985	section	395(1)	and	Companies	Act	1948	section	95(1)	180	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	p.	899	181	See	the	rule	in	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	p.	903,	932;	McCormack	G,	see	n.	9,	at	p.	132	182	Insolvency	Act	1986	Section	251	
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disguised	 charges 183 .	 Therefore,	 the	 bank’s	 fixed	 or	 floating	 charge	 is	 less	vulnerable	 to	 retention	 of	 title	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub–sale	 or	manufactured	products184.	A	title–retaining	seller,	in	general,	seeks	for	the	first	priority	to	other	creditors	to	the	extent	that	the	goods	and	their	derivatives	do	not	make	up	the	buyer’s	assets.	Retention	of	title	is	likely	to	be	a	smart	device	aiming	at	coping	with	the	fact	that	unsecured	 sellers	 are	 not	 in	 the	 advantageous	 position	 to	 compete	 with	 bank	chargees	 over	 the	 same	property.	 If	 extended	 title	 retention	 is	 amounting	 to	 a	registrable	 charge,	 a	 question	 is	 raised	 whether	 it	 is	 attractive	 or	 practical	 to	submit	a	registration	for	the	purpose	of	ranking.	The	registration	system	in	England	 is	 transaction-based.	The	recent	Companies	Act	2006	(Amendment	of	Part	25)	Regulations	2013	introduce	a	new	regime	for	registration	 of	 a	 company	 charge,	 but	 it	 still	 rejects	 a	 notice	 filing	 system.	Registration	requires	a	submission	to	the	registrar	of	 the	company	a	particular	and	 a	 certified	 copy	 of	 a	 charge.	 In	 comparison	 with	 a	 notice	 filing	 system	 in	which	 a	 financial	 statement	 is	 the	 only	 document	 to	 submit,	 covering	multiple	security	 agreements	 and	 having	 a	 capacity	 to	 be	 filed	 in	 advance,	 registration	under	a	transaction	system	is	relatively	burdensome	and	costly185.	With	regard	to	any	 seller	having	a	practice	of	 selling	on	 title	 retention	and	maintaining	a	 long	trading	 relationship	 with	 buyers,	 she	 would	 be	 loaded	 with	 hard	 work	 of	registration	for	every	sale	transaction,	but	the	benefit	may	not	outweigh	the	cost.		The	 existing	 priority	 rules	 do	 not	 support	 the	 seller’s	 first	 priority	 to	 the	proceeds	and	manufactured	goods.	The	priority	rules	in	England,	which	are	not	based	on	the	order	of	registration,	are	relatively	complicated186.	Some	rules	may	be	relevant	in	the	context	of	extended	title	retention.		The	most	 important	 one	 is	 the	 rule	 governing	 competition	 between	 complying	and	 non–complying	 charges.	 Accordingly,	 a	 registrable	 company	 charge	 but																																																									183	Insolvency	Act	1986	section	251	184	See	more	discussion	in	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	pp.	930	-1	185	See	more	comparison	between	notice	filing	and	transaction	system	in	McCormack	G,	Secured	
Credit	under	English	and	American	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press	2004),	at	pp.	138-149 186	See	Goode RM,	see	n.	25,	at	p.	187;	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	pp.	900	-1	
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charges.	On	the	other	hand,	in	E	Pfeiffer	and	Tatung,	the	proceeds	of	sale	and	the	assignment	of	claims	arising	from	or	connecting	to	the	sub–sale	were	subject	to	a	charge	 on	 book	 debts.	 In	 respect	 of	 newly	 manufactured	 products,	 in	 Borden,	judges	came	to	different	conclusions.	Templeman	LJ	and	Buckley	LJ	considered	it	as	a	company	bill	of	sale	whereas	Bridge	LJ	argued	that	it	was	a	floating	charge	on	the	converted	products.	The	nature	of	a	charge	as	fixed	or	floating	one	does	not	depend	on	the	form	but	the	 true	 intention	 of	 the	 parties192.	 In	 other	 words,	 despite	 the	 label	 of	 fixed	charge	stuck	on	the	security	interest,	judges	are	likely	to	look	to	the	substance	of	contractual	obligations.	Clearly,	in	the	context	of	title	retention	the	parties	do	not	intend	 to	 name	 the	 interest	 conferred	 upon	 the	 seller	 because	 the	 latter	 is	seeking	for	a	better	position	than	of	the	chargor.	It	is	emphasized	that	to	carry	on	the	task	determining	the	category	of	the	constructed	charge,	judges	are	expected	to	look	to	the	substance	of	transaction.	In	practice,	the	nature	of	a	charge	created	under	 extended	 title	 retention	 is	 not	 of	 concern	 since	 both	 fixed	 and	 floating	charge	cannot	grant	a	title-retaining	seller	the	expected	first	priority.	The	 question	 of	 priority	 is	 raised	 out	 of	 the	 context	 of	 insolvency	 where	 the	proceeds	 in	 the	 form	of	 book	 debts	 subject	 to	 title	 retention	 compete	with	 an	assignment	of	book	debts	 to	 third	parties.	E	Pfeiffer	and	Compaq	 are	 two	cases	dealing	 with	 competing	 interests	 of	 the	 title-retaining	 seller	 and	 the	 assignee	over	book	debts.	Even	though	a	void	charge	was	found	due	to	lack	of	registration,	the	learned	judges	in	both	cases	still	proceeded	with	priority	point.	The	assignee	was	 not	 amounting	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 creditors	 in	 the	 ambit	 of	 Companies	 Act	1948	section	95	or	Companies	Act	1985	section	395,	but	a	purchaser	of	choses	in	action193.	 A	 charge	 is	 valid	 against	 purchasers	 of	 all	 kinds	 irrespective	 of	 being	registered	or	not.	There	are	three	approaches	to	the	issue:	(1)	the	basic	rule,	the	first	in	time	prevails,	which	is	one	that	favours	the	seller;	(2)	the	doctrine	that	a	
bona	 fide	 purchaser	 for	 value	 of	 legal	 interest	 without	 notice,	 which	 gives	advantage	to	the	assignee;	(3)	the	Dearle	v	Hall	rule	which	grant	the	first	priority																																																									192	See	Agnew	and	another	v.	Commissioner	of	Inland	Revenue	[2001]	UKPC	28,	at	p.	725	F-H.	See	Gough	WJ,	see	n.	27,	at	pp.	601,	604-5;	Gullifer	L	(ed),	see	n.	25,	at	p.	129	193	Oditah	F,	‘Priorities:	Equitable	versus	Legal	Assignments	of	Book	Debts’	(1989)	9	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	513,	at	pp.	519-520 
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to	the	party	giving	first	notice	of	her	interests	to	the	debtor	without	notice	of	the	prior	assignment	of	the	same	subject	matter194.		Although	 the	 two	 latter	 rules	 may	 on	 its	 face	 have	 the	 same	 result,	 the	 two	approaches	 are	 different.	 The	 bona	 fide	 purchaser	 rule	 applies	 to	 resolve	 the	conflict	 between	 an	 equitable	 and	 a	 subsequent	 legal	 assignment,	whereas	 the	
Dearle	 v	 Hall	 rule	 applies	 to	 competing	 equitable	 assignments	 of	 choses	 in	action 195 .	 The	 seller’s	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 of	 sub–sale	 is	 undoubtedly	equitable,	but	the	nature	of	the	assignee’s	interest	is	debatable.	The	decision	of	E	
Pfeiffer,	then	followed	by	Compaq,	relied	on	the	Law	of	Property	Act	1925	section	136(1)	 to	 conclude	 that	 assignment	 of	 debt	was	 an	 equitable	 assignment	with	regard	to	priorities	despite	that	the	assignee	could	enjoy	procedural	advantages	of	a	legal	title	196.	The	learned	judge	applied	the	Dearle	v	Hall	rule	giving	judgment	for	the	assignee	who	was	the	only	party	giving	notice	to	the	debtor.	Dearle	v	Hall	rule	 requires	 giving	 the	 notice	 to	 attach	 and	 perfect	 interests	 arising	 from	 an	assignment	of	choses	in	action197.	The	argument	of	Phillips	J	is	criticized	because	he	 refused	 the	nature	of	 the	 relevant	assignment	as	a	 legal	 interest198.	Dearle	v	
Hall	rule	is	unjust	for	the	seller	who	is	not	in	good	position	in	comparison	with	the	assignee	to	give	notice	to	the	debtor.	The	seller	may	not	have	information	of	the	sub–sale	transaction.	If	the	seller’s	interest	is	an	equitable	assignment	by	way	of	floating	charge,	she	is	prevented	from	any	contact	with	the	sub–purchaser	so	long	as	the	transaction	is	conducted	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business.	It	is	not	the	case	involving	the	doctrine	of	a	bona	fide	purchaser	in	which	an	assignment	by	 way	 of	 charge	 can	 be	 registered	 so	 that	 the	 subsequent	 legal	 purchaser	 is	placed	 into	 the	 position	 of	 having	 constructive	 notice.	 Furthermore,	 bona	 fide	purchaser	rule	applicable	in	this	context	can	run	parallel	to	priority	rules	in	the	insolvency	context	in	the	sense	that	lack	of	registration	causes	the	seller	to	lose	the	priority.																																																									194	See	Compaq,	see	n.	124,	at	p.	497;	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	p.	161	E-H	195	McGhee	J,	Bridge	S	and	Snell	EHT,	Snell'	s	Equity	(32nd	ed.	/	general	editor,	John	McGhee	;	contributors,	Stuart	Bridge	...	[et	al.].		London	:	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2010),	at	p.	;	Oditah	F,	see	n.	193,	at	pp.	529	-	531	196	See	E	Pfeiffer,	see	n.	123,	at	pp.	161	H,	162	A-C,	H,	163	A-B.		197	de	Lacy	J,	‘The	Priority	Rule	of	Dearle	v.	Hall	Restated’	(1999)		Conveyancer	and	Property	Lawyer	311,	at	p.		312 198	Oditah	F,	see	n.	193,	at	pp.	519	-	520	
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The	 priority	 system	 in	 English	 law	 is	 not	 unitary	 but	 a	 scattered	 set	 of	intersecting	rules	deriving	from	statues	and	the	common	law.	Lacking	a	uniform	statutory	 system	 of	 priority	 rules,	 a	 priority	 dispute	 could	 be	 challenged	 by	judicial	 decisions	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 latter	 could	 declare	 the	 former	 to	 be	false199.	Title	 retention	 is	not	 considered	as	a	 security	 interest	but	 its	 extended	form	 to	 the	 proceeds	 or	 the	 new	 products	 could	 be	 classified	 as	 a	 charge	 and	enjoy	the	existing	priority	rules.	The	nature	of	competing	interests,	the	order	of	creation,	 and	 registration	 are	 among	 factors	 determining	 priority	 ranking,	 but	the	 order	 of	 registration	 does	 not	 play	 any	 role.	 An	 English	 transaction	 filing	system	requires	every	transaction	to	be	registered.	Registration	of	extended	title	retention	to	validate	a	charge	on	the	proceeds	or	newly	manufactured	goods	 is	not	appealing	and	encouraging	because	the	burdensome	and	costly	registration	is	 not	 compensated	 by	 the	 first	 priority	 irrespective	 of	 at	 least	 the	 order	 of	creation	 or	 registration.	 A	 registered	 charge	 if	 any	 on	 the	 proceeds	 or	 new	products	is	likely	to	be	subordinate	to	other	charges,	fixed	or	floating,	previously	created	 by	 long-term	blanket	 financiers.	 	 Furthermore,	 under	 the	Dearle	v	Hall	rule,	the	seller’s	interest	is	again	subordinate	in	the	conflict	between	the	claim	for	the	 proceeds	 under	 title	 retention	 and	 the	 right	 of	 an	 outright	 purchaser	 of	receivables200.	
2.4 	Concluding	remarks	The	 law	of	 title	 retention	 in	England	 at	 the	 time	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	common	 law,	 lacking	 specific	 statutory	 rules,	 and	 is	 depending	 entirely	 on	 the	general	rules	on	the	sale	of	goods,	fiduciary	obligations	and	company	charges.		The	 formalism	 approach	 does	 not	 support	 title	 retention	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	security	 interest	 although	 it	 is	 broadly	 accepted	 and	 practically	 used	 to	 secure	the	payment	of	purchase	price.	Title	retention	has	a	firm	legal	ground	of	the	SGA	1979	to	enforce	the	seller’s	right	particularly	in	the	insolvency	context	where	the	administrator	 is	 refrained	 from	 treating	 the	 unpaid	 goods	 subject	 to	 title																																																									199	See	 the	 discussion	 on	 the	 change	 of	 judicial	 opinions	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 conflict	 between	liquidation	expenses	and	a	claim	secured	by	a	floating	charge	in	Rajak	H,	 ‘Liquidation	Expenses	Versus	a	Claim	Secured	by	a	Floating	Charge’	(2005)	7	Insolvency	Intelligence	97	200	See	more	discussion	in	Gullifer	L,	see	n.	28,	at	pp.	292-3 
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3.1 Overview	The	 United	 States	 Uniform	 Commercial	 Code	 (UCC)	 is	 not	 a	 work	 of	 the	legislative	 process,	 instead	 it	 is	 a	 product	 drafted	 by	 the	 Permanent	 Editorial	Board,	 which	 is	 composed	 of	 the	 American	 Law	 Institute	 and	 the	 National	Conference	of	Commissioners	on	Uniform	State	Law1.	It	was	first	promulgated	in	1952	 with	 the	 objective	 to	 “make	 uniform	 the	 law	 among	 the	 various	




3.2 Concept	of	purchase	money	security	interest	Article	 9	 introduces	 the	 unitary	 approach	 and	 functionalism	 to	 the	 law	 on	secured	transactions	in	personal	property.	The	enactment	of	Article	9	put	an	end	to	 the	 pre-Code	 situation	 where	 the	 law	 was	 divided	 into	 several	 segments	governing	 various	 security	 devices.	 The	 “comprehensive	 and	 systematic”	 set	 of	rules	treating	the	issue	of	priority	is	probably	the	most	innovated	part	of	Article	9	8.	A	new	concept	of	PMSI	(PMSI),	which	was	previously	an	interest	arising	from	conditional	 sales	 or	 title	 retention	 sales,	 is	 recognized	 to	 have	 a	 super-ranking	priority	as	an	exception	to	the	basic	first-to-file-or-perfect	rule.	A	PMSI	must	be	a	security	interest	for	the	purpose	of	Article	9	first.	
3.2.1 Security	interest:	Functionalism	and	unitary	approach	in	Article	9	
3.2.1.1 Functionalism	The	 distinction	 among	 various	 security	 devices	 in	 personal	 property	 is	 now	extinguished	 under	 the	 formalism	 approach.	 All	 kinds	 of	 security	 devices	 are	reduced	to	the	one	and	the	only	concept:	a	security	interest.	A	security	interest	is	defined	in	Article	1	of	the	Code	as	follows.		
“Security	interest”	means	an	interest	in	personal	property	or	fixtures	which	secures	
payment	or	performance	of	an	obligation”9.	The	above	concept	has	a	relatively	narrow	meaning	since	the	Bankruptcy	Code	defines	it	as	a	“lien	created	by	an	agreement”10	in	which	lien	is	“charge	against	or	
interest	in	property	to	secure	payment	of	a	debt	or	performance	of	an	obligation”11.	Security	 interests	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Bankruptcy	 Code	 include	 real	 estate	
																																																								7	See	n.	1	8	Jackson	 TH	 and	 Kronman	 AT,	 ‘Secured	 Financing	 and	 Priorities	 among	 Creditors’	 (1979)	 88		Yale	Law	Journal	1143,	at	p.	1144	9	UCC	§1-201(35)	10	11	U.S.	Code	§101(51)	11	11	U.S.	Code	§101(37)	
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mortgages,	deed	of	trusts	and	security	interests	in	personal	property	within	the	scope	of	Article	9.		Article	 9	 dealing	 with	 secured	 transactions	 has	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 to	 “a	
transaction,	 regardless	 its	 form,	 that	 creates	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 personal	
property	 and	 fixtures	 by	 contract”12.	 Thus,	 a	 contractual	 creation	 of	 a	 security	interest	within	the	abovementioned	definition	leads	to	the	application	of	Article	9,	 notwithstanding	 the	 form	 of	 the	 transaction	 or	 the	 name	 labeled,	 or	 the	intention	given	by	the	parties13.	The	substance	of	a	transaction	as	a	determinative	feature	of	 a	 security	 interest	makes	 the	 cover	of	Article	9	as	broad	as	possible.	Giving	 the	 definition	 a	 general,	 all-embracing	 meaning	 together	 with	 a	 list	 of	exceptions14	is	a	technique	aiming	at	prohibiting	the	creation	of	new	devices15.		Prior	to	the	enactment	of	the	UCC,	the	functional	approach	was	adopted	in	many	laws	dealing	with	different	security	devices	 in	order	to	set	up	a	requirement	of	registration	 to	 validate	 the	 transaction	 against	 third	 parties.	 Non-possessory	security	interests	were	in	high	demand	in	the	nineteenth	century	because	of	the	rise	of	manufacturing	industry,	railroad,	civil	and	industrial	construction,	and	the	increase	of	sale	on	credit	for	consumer	goods16.	New	financing	devices	other	than	a	chattel	mortgage	were	drafted	including	a	trust	receipt17,	a	factor’s	lien18	and	a	
																																																								12	UCC	§9-109(a)(1).	 	Article	9	 is	also	applied	 to	an	agricultural	 lien,	a	 sale	of	accounts,	 chattel	paper,	 payment	 intangibles,	 or	 promissory	 notes,	 a	 consignment	 and	 other	 security	 interests	arising	under	other	sections	of	the	UCC,	see	UCC	§9-109(a)(2),	(3),	(4),	(5),	(6).	13	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-109(a)(1),	see	Official	Comments	at	p.	839	14	UCC	§9-109(d)	15	Gilmore	G,	Security	interests	in	personal	property	(Little,	Brown	and	Company	1965),	at	pp.	295-7	16	ibid,	at	p.	25	17	The	trust	receipt	is	a	document	created	by	the	buyer,	called	trustee,	to	effect	the	arrangement	in	which	 the	 financier,	 called	 entruster,	will	 advance	 the	 purchase	money	 to	 the	 seller	 of	 the	goods.	 The	 financer	 honours	 the	 draft	 submitted	 by	 the	 seller	 in	 the	exchange	 of	 document	 of	title,	 usually	 the	 bill	 of	 lading	 that	 consigns	 the	 goods	 to	 the	 latter	 and	 then	 endorses	 to	 the	former	 or	 the	 former	 is	 the	 consignee	 itself.	 Until	 the	 trustee	 tenders	 purchase	 price	 to	 the	entruster,	the	latter	has	the	title	to	the	goods	by	retaining	the	document	of	title	and	the	former	possesses	 the	goods	 in	 trust	 for	 the	purpose	of	 security	 for	 the	repayment	and	usually	has	 the	right	 to	 sell	 the	goods	at	hand.	The	 trust	 receipt	has	an	advantage	 to	shift	 the	security	interest	from	the	goods	to	the	proceeds	of	sale.	See	R.	C.	N.	J,	‘The	Uniform	Trust	Receipts	Act’	(1934)	20	Virginia	Law	Review	689,	at	p.	690	
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conditional	 sale19.	 The	 purpose	 at	 first	 was	 to	 seek	 a	 judicial	 recognition	 and	ultimately	evade	the	law	of	chattel	mortgage	and	its	filing	system,	but	it	resulted	in	 new	 sets	 of	 rules	 and	 even	 new	 filing	 procedures20.	 The	 common	 feature	 of	those	transactions	was	that	a	creditor	of	each	type	expected	to	realize	the	asset	at	hand	to	discharge	the	debt	when	a	debtor	defaulted	or	went	to	bankruptcy.	All	gave	 rise	 to	 an	 ostensible	 ownership	 situation,	 that	 is	 the	 separation	 of	ownership	 and	 possession,	 where	 third-party	 creditors	 were	 misled	 by	 the	debtor’s	possession	to	consider	the	latter’s	specific	asset	as	unencumbered.	To	resolve	the	ostensible	ownership	problem,	registration	or	filing	is	the	perfect	replacement	 for	 possession	 as	 a	method	 to	 have	 the	 first	 priority	 claim	 in	 the	debtor’s	particular	asset.	In	the	past,	a	transfer	for	security	purpose	in	which	the	debtor/transferor	continuingly	possesses	the	collateral	was	treated	as	fraud	and	thus	held	to	be	void.	Common-law	courts	relied	on	an	English	statute	called	the	Statute	of	13	Elizabeth	I	providing	that	any	transfer	made	with	“intent	[	]	to	delay,	
hinder	or	defraud	creditors	and	others”	were	void21.	This	statutory	provision	took	the	form	of	s.	172	of	the	Law	of	Property	Act	1925	and	now	appears	as	s.	423	of	the	 Insolvency	 Act	 1986	 in	 England.	 This	 statute	 demonstrates	 two	 types	 of	 a	fraud	 concerning	 retention	 of	 possession.	 It	may	 be	 a	 sham	 transaction	 in	 the	best-known	 Twyne’s	 Case	 where	 the	 donor	 retained	 possession	 after	 the	conveyance	 and	 acted	 as	 if	 it	 was	 his	 own.	 Therefore,	 the	 donor	 deceived	creditors	about	the	status	of	the	asset	that	he	owned	them	free	and	clear.	In	other	words,	the	donor	conveyed	his	asset	to	the	donee	to	secretly	secure	the	payment	of	the	previous	debt	he	had	owed	the	donee.	Possession,	in	this	sense,	manifests	the	 ownership	 regardless	 of	 the	 secret	 conveyance.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 non-possessory	secured	transaction	 that	does	not	 involve	a	 transfer	of	property	 for																																																																																																																																																																18	A	factor’s	lien	is	frequently	used	to	finance	a	manufacturing	business	by	creating	a	security	on	inventory	including	raw	materials,	finished	products	and	account	receivables	relating	to	the	sale	thereof.	19	See	 more	 discussion	 in	 Glenn	 G,	 ‘The	 Chattel	 Mortgage	 as	 a	 Statutory	 Security’	 (1939)	 25	Virginia	 Law	 Review	 316;	 R.	 C.	N.	 J,	 ‘The	 Uniform	 Trust	 Receipts	 Act’	 (1934)	 20	 Virginia	 Law	Review	689;	V.	M.	G.	J,	‘The	Factors	Lien	Act:	Virginia'	s	New	Security	Device’	(1951)	37	Virginia	Law	Review	1023;	Glenn	G,	 ‘The	Conditional	Sale	at	Common	Law	and	as	a	Statutory	Security’	(1939)	25	Virginia	Law	Review	559	20	Gilmore	G.,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	296	21	Twyne's	Case,	3	Co.Rep.	80b,	76	Eng.Rep.	809	(1601)	
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security	purpose	raises	a	question	of	ostensible	ownership	where	the	debtor	may	deceive	 creditors	 that	 he	owns	 an	 item	of	 asset	 unencumbered22.	 Giving	 public	notice	of	a	security	interest	to	make	it	effective	against	third	parties	is	a	solution	for	 the	 ostensible	 ownership	 problem.	 Prospective	 creditors	 are	 required	 to	carry	due	diligence	to	explore	the	public	record	of	security	 interests	when	they	enter	 the	 transaction	of	 this	kind.	The	historical	background	of	American	 filing	system	shows	that	public	 filing	 is	a	surrogate	 for	possession	of	 the	collateral	 to	bring	a	priority	claim23.		The	American	 law	on	secured	transactions	 in	personal	property	mostly	 focuses	on	solving	the	ostensible	ownership	problem	rather	than	the	classic	requirement	of	nemo	dat	quod	non	habet.	The	nemo	dat	principle	raises	the	question	whether	the	 debtor	 has	 sufficient	 rights	 or	 title	 to	 tender	 a	 transfer	 of	 property.	 The	following	example	demonstrates	the	primary	differences	between	American	law,	which	favours	the	ostensible	ownership	approach	and	English	law,	which	strictly	follows	the	nemo	dat	principle.	Example:	The	debtor	as	a	true	owner	of	a	machine	creates	a	security	interest	in	favour	 of	 the	 lender	 and	 then	 disposes	 the	 same	 asset	 to	 the	 purchaser.	 The	debtor	 defaults	 against	 the	 lender.	 The	 lender	 claims	 the	 machine	 from	 the	purchaser24.		For	 both	 jurisdictions,	 the	 question	 presented	 would	 be	 whether	 the	 security	interest	 survives	 the	 sale.	 Under	 the	 Article	 9,	 it	 is	 crucial	 first	 to	 determine	whether	the	lender	filed	a	financing	statement	covering	the	machine	at	hand	or	whether	 she	 filed	 prior	 to	 the	 time	 the	 purchaser	 gives	 value	 and	 receives	
																																																								22	See	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	Security	Interests	in	Personal	Property:	Cases,	Problems,	and	
Materials	(6th	edn,	Foundation	Press	2016),	at	pp.	162-7	for	more	discussion	on	retention	of	possession,	fraudulent	conveyance	and	ostensible	ownership	to	explore	the	historical	background	of	the	filing	system			23	Before	Article	9,	many	security	interest	statutes	provided	for	a	filing	or	recording	in	a	public	office	in	order	to	recognize	non-possessory	security	interests.	Article	9	is	a	descendant	of	these	statutes.	 See	 See	 Harris	 S	 and	 Mooney	 C,	 Jr.,	 Security	 Interests	 in	 Personal	 Property:	 Cases,	
Problems,	and	Materials	(6th	edn,	Foundation	Press	2016),	at	p.	166	24	This	example	is	adapted	from	the	example	stated	in	Davies	I,	‘The	reform	of	English	personal	property	security	law:	functionalism	and	Article	9	of	the	Uniform	Commercial	Code’	(2004)	24	Legal	Studies	295,	at	p.	301	
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delivery	without	knowledge	of	the	given	security	interest25.	Otherwise,	she	loses	the	 machine	 to	 the	 purchaser.	 If	 the	 security	 interest	 is	 perfected	 timely,	 her	claim	is	subject	to	whether	she	previously	authorizes	the	debtor	to	transfer	the	collateral	free	of	the	security	interest	to	third	parties26,	or	whether	the	purchaser	is	 a	 buyer	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business27.	 Under	 English	 law,	 it	 depends	 on	whether	the	debtor	has	sufficient	rights	to	transfer	good	title	to	the	purchaser.	In	the	context	of	title	retention,	the	good	faith	purchaser	theory	adopted	in	section	25(1)	of	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1979	is	a	counter-weight	of	the	nemo	dat	principle	to	resolve	the	dispute	between	innocent	parties	upon	the	same	asset28.	If	 Article	 9	 public	 filing	 scheme	 is	 deemed	 as	 a	 must-have	 solution	 for	 the	ostensible	 ownership	 problem,	 not	 every	 transaction	 creating	 ostensible	ownership	 is	brought	within	 this	 requirement.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 capacity	of	third	 parties	 to	 easily	 and	 accurately	 observe	 the	 separation	 of	ownership	 and	possession	 is	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 general	 principle.	 In	 this	 sense,	 how	 parties	arrange	their	right	and	obligations	is	irrelevant29.	Accordingly,	many	transactions	could	be	excluded	from	the	Article	9’s	scope	of	application,	one	of	which	is	when	the	ostensible	ownership	problem	is	solved	by	another	filing	regime30.		However,	 Article	 9	 is	 criticized	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 fails	 to	 give	 a	 sound	explanation	why	 a	 true	 lease	 and	 a	 true	 bailment	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 scope	although	 both	 transactions	 raise	 the	 serious	 ostensible	 ownership	 problem31.	Both	 for-	 and	 against-functionalism	 commentators	 agree	 that	 the	 title	 analysis	
																																																								25	UCC	§	9-317(b)	26	UCC	§	9-315(a)	27	UCC	§	9-320(a)	28	Davies	I,	‘The	Reform	of	English	Personal	Property	Security	Law:	Functionalism	and	Article	9	of	the	Uniform	Commercial	Code’	(2004)	24	Legal	Studies	295,	at	pp.	301-2	29	Baird	DG	and	Jackson	TH,	‘Possession	and	Ownership:	An	Examination	of	the	Scope	of	Article	9’	(1983)	35	Stanford	Law	Review	175,	at	pp.	179,	190	30	ibid,	 at	 p.	 190.	 Baird	and	 Jackson	 in	 their	 classic	article	 figure	 out	many	 situations	 excluded	from	Article	9’s	rule:	certificates	of	title	regime	which	records	security	interest	on	automobiles,	widespread	 knowledge	 that	 possessor	 of	 an	 asset	 is	 not	 the	 owner,	 short-time	 ostensible	ownership	situations	like	when	a	person	lends	a	lawnmower	to	a	neighbour	or	filing	requirement	inconsistent	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 negotiability	 as	 essential	 characteristic	 of	 money	 or	 bearer	instrument.		31	See	more	discussion	in	Baird	DG	and	Jackson	TH,	see	n.	29,	at	pp.	197-201	
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still	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	determining	 the	 application	 of	 Article	 932.	 Courts	 have	given	a	great	effort	to	distinguish	security	lease	and	bailment	from	true	lease	and	bailment.	The	bailment	for	processing	gives	a	good	example	in	this	respect.	The	bailment	 for	 procession	 is	 the	 case	 where	 the	 bailee	 processes	 the	 material	supplied	by	the	bailor	and	returns	products	in	exchange	for	the	service	fee.	In	In	
Re	Medomak	Canning	Co.33,	the	court	looked	into	the	nature	of	the	transaction	to	find	 that	 it	 did	 not	 require	 a	 sale	 and	 purchase	 of	 the	 material	 to	 serve	 the	interests	 of	 both	 parties,	 and	 the	 bailee	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 acquire	 title	 to	 the	material.	 Thus,	 the	 court	 rejected	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 PMSI	 in	 favour	 of	 the	bailor	which	was	 submitted	 to	be	void	against	 the	holder	of	perfected	 security	interest	 in	 after-acquired	 property	 and	 upheld	 the	 status	 of	 a	 mere	 bailment.	Instead	of	relying	on	the	allocation	of	title	as	in	In	Re	Medomak	Canning	Co.,	the	
Kinetics	court	emphasized	on	the	Article	9	purpose	that	“[promotes]	certainty	in	
commercial	 loan	 transaction”34.	 The	 court	 assumingly	 implied	 the	 ostensible	ownership	problem	when	indicating	that	when	“any	agreement	giving	the	debtor	
authority	 to	 exercise	 any	 outward	 indicia	 or	 manifestations	 of	 ownership	 or	
control,	 a	would-be	 creditor	 could	 easily	 be	misled	 into	making	 a	 loan	 under	 an	
effective	security	agreement”35.	The	court	ignored	the	title	 issue	to	conclude	that	the	bailee	has	“rights	in	the	collateral”	with	regard	to	the	material	supplied	by	the	bailor	to	attach	a	security	interest	for	the	third	party’s	favour	36.	The	 two	 foregoing	 decisions	 demonstrate	 that	 a	 title	 allocation	 and	 ostensible	ownership	approach	can	bring	different	outcomes.	It	leads	to	inconsistency	and	uncertainty	in	the	treatment	of	lease	and	bailment	transactions	under	American	personal	property	law.		From	a	functionalism	perspective,	it	results	from	the	fact	that	 Article	 9	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 true	 lease	 and	 bailment37.	 From	 a	 formalism	perspective,	 it	 is	 the	 failure	 of	 Article	 9	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ownership	 and	
																																																								32	Bridge	MG	and	others,	‘Formalism,	Functionalism,	and	Understanding	the	Law	of	Secured	Transactions’	(1999)	44	McGill	Law	Journal	567,	at	p.	599;	Baird	DG	and	Jackson	TH,	see	n.	29,	at	pp.	197-8	33	25	UCC	Rep.Serv.437	(1977)	34	Kinetics	Technology	Intern.	Corp.	v.	Fourth	Nat.	Bank	of	Tulsa,	705	F.	2d	396	(C.A.10(Okl.),	1983)	35	ibid,	at	p.	399	36	ibid,	at	p.	400	37	Baird	DG	and	Jackson	TH,	see	n.	29,	at	pp.	200-1	
	 76	
security	as	different	concepts	because	Article	9	stresses	on	ostensible	ownership	problem	and	de-emphasizes	“ownership	as	a	characteristic	of	solving	disputes”38.	However,	 functionalism	does	not	prevent	American	courts	 from	responding	the	question	 of	 title	 allocation	 to	 deal	with	Article	 9	 priority	 dispute.	 In	Evergreen	
Marine	Corp.	v.	Six	Consignments	of	Frozen	Scallops	39,	 the	debtor	who	had	 taken	the	cargoes	from	the	ocean	carrier	without	presenting	the	original	bill	of	lading	was	held	to	have	a	temporary	entrustment	of	possession	that	did	not	suffice	the	requirement	of	“rights	 in	 the	collateral”	 to	create	a	security	 interest.	The	ocean	carrier	 was	 found	 to	 be	 a	 bailee,	 not	 an	 owner	 of	 the	 cargo;	 therefore,	 the	transaction	between	the	carrier	and	the	debtor	is	not	a	sale	and	purchase	one40.	The	decision	manifested	that	other	 laws,	such	as	Article	2	on	the	sale	of	goods,	bill	 of	 lading	 or	 general	 property	 law	 could	 interfere	with	 the	 priority	 dispute	with	regard	to	the	question	of	title	allocation.	Article	 9	 and	 functionalism	 are	 possibly	 indifferent	 to	 title	 and	 ownership	allocation,	but	the	problem	of	title	allocation	can	be	supplemented	by	other	laws.	The	most	 criticised	 characteristic	 of	 Article	 9	 could	 be	 that	 party	 autonomy	 is	severely	ignored	so	that	almost	all	arrangements	having	a	function	of	a	security	interest	 are	 brought	 in	 the	 scheme	 of	 Article	 9	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 filing	 and	priority	ranking.	It	artificially	broadens	the	concept	of	security	interest	to	cover	in-substance	 secured	 transactions	 irrespective	 of	 the	 form	 that	 the	 parties	intentionally	 arrange	 for.	 The	 switch	 from	 formalism	 to	 functionalism	 is	 a	considerable	change	in	terms	of	the	ideology	and	approach,	that	is,	changing	the	focus	from	the	allocation	of	title	to	third	parties’	concern.	Functionalism	aims	at	ensuring	 that	 any	 contractual	 arrangement	 affecting	 existing	 or	 potential	 third	parties’	rights,	 interests	or	claims	 in	the	same	asset	must	be	transparent	 to	 the	rest	 of	 the	world.	 The	 party	who	 creates	 the	 ostensible	 ownership	 problem	 to	competing	secured	creditors	and	claimants	over	the	same	asset	bears	the	burden	to	 correct	 the	 situation	by	either	getting	possession	of	 the	asset	or	making	 the	public	filing.																																																										38	Davies	I,	see	n.	28,	at	pp.	303-4 39	4	F3d	90,	21	UCC	Rep.	2d	502	(1st	Cir.	1993)	40	See	more	discussion	on	this	case	in	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	The	Law	of	Secured	Transactions	under	
the	Uniform	Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	p.	2-54,	2-55	
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3.2.1.2 Unitary	approach	As	mentioned	 above,	 prior	 to	 the	 UCC,	 many	 devices	 having	 the	 function	 of	 a	security	 interest	 were	 created	 to	 meet	 the	 increasing	 demand	 of	 financing	business	transactions	of	all	kinds,	and	to	avoid	the	requirement	of	filing	and	rigid	treatment	 under	 the	 law	of	 chattel	mortgage.	 It	 resulted	 in	 the	 enactment	 of	 a	new	 statute	 to	 correspond	 to	 a	 newly-created	 device.	 The	Uniform	Conditional	Sales	 Act	 1919,	 the	 Trust	 Receipts	 Act	 1933	 and	 the	 Factor’s	 Lien	 Act	 were	typical	 examples.	 It	 resulted	 in	 various	 statutes	 accompanied	 by	 various	 filing	systems	 corresponding	 to	 various	 security	 devices.	 Furthermore,	 under	 the	federalist	 system,	 the	 law	of	 secured	 transactions	which	was	not	a	 federal,	but	state	law	varied	from	state	to	state,	reflecting	somewhat	“local	and	regional	tastes	
and	styles	in	drafting”41.	Therefore,	before	the	publication	of	the	UCC,	 the	 law	of	secured	transactions	in	personal	property	was	segmental	and	complicated.	This	context	gave	rise	to	the	uncertainty	and	costly	expense	to	determine	the	status	of	a	 security	 device	 and	 choose	 the	 appropriate	 applicable	 law.	 The	 existence	 of	different	and	separate	filing	systems	did	not	facilitate	a	thorough	credit	checking,	and	they	also	incurred	substantial	expense42.		The	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 law	 on	 secured	 transactions	 in	 personal	 property	unequivocally	motivated	a	unitary	approach	 in	drafting	Article	9.	A	 transaction	irrespective	of	its	form	as	a	chattel	mortgage,	a	conditional	sale	or	a	trust	receipt,	is	 simpler	 than	 it	 appears	 because	 it	 serves	 the	 same	 function	 of	 securing	payment	or	performance	of	other	obligations43.	Functionalism	 other	 than	 formalism	 is	 employed	 to	 restrain	 the	 distinction	among	 types	 of	 financing,	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 devices,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	several	separate	corresponding	statutes.	However,	functionalism	was	not	a	new-born	 idea	 of	 Article	 9;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 the	 pre-code	 security	 interest	 laws	 in	personal	property	had	 long	adopted	this	approach,	 the	most	 typical	of	which	 is	the	Uniform	Conditional	 Sales	Act.	 On	 the	one	 hand,	 in	 the	American	 pre-Code	context,	whenever	a	new	security	interest	was	recognized	by	its	function,	a	new																																																									41	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	141	42	ibid,	at	p.	463	43	ibid,	at	p.	289	
	 78	
statute	was	enacted	 to	 coincide	with	a	new	security	device.	On	 the	other	hand,	functionalism	 adopted	 in	 various	 statutes	 produced	 the	 fundamental	 similarity	among	those	devices.	Therefore,	 the	statutory	distinction	among	different	 filing	systems	and	treatment	became	cumbersome	and	unnecessary.	It	was	an	intense	motivation	 to	 integrate	 the	 law	 in	 this	 area.	 Article	 9	 unitarily	 treats	 different	security	devices	but	carrying	the	same	function	in	the	one	and	the	only	regime	of	a	 sole	 concept	 of	 security	 interest.	 However,	 Article	 9	 fails	 to	 create	 a	 unique	filing	 system	 for	 the	 country.	 Subject	 to	 the	 constitution,	 the	 commercial	 law	remains	state	law;	therefore,	each	state	maintains	a	separate	filing	system.	
3.2.2 Conditional	sale:	Statutory	secured	transaction	under	functionalism	The	 conditional	 sale	 is	 defined	 as	 “a	 sale	 in	 which	 the	 buyer	 gains	 immediate	
possession,	 but	 the	 seller	 retains	 title	 until	 the	 buyer	 performs	 a	 condition,	 esp.	
payment	of	the	full	purchase	price”44.	It	is	a	relatively	popular	term	in	the	United	States,	 interchangeably	 used	 with	 the	 term	 “retention	 of	 title”	 and	 the	 like.	Despite	 the	 difference	 in	 terminology	 among	 jurisdictions,	 a	 conditional	 sale	 is	ultimately	a	transaction	based	on	an	arrangement	that	the	seller	retains	the	title	to	 the	 goods	 supplied	 until	 and	 unless	 the	 buyer	 discharges	 the	 full	 purchase	price45.	In	the	first	place,	the	conditional	sale	and	the	chattel	mortgage	were	in	discrete	and	distinct	areas,	contract	law	and	secured	credit	 law	respectively46.	American	common	 law	 did	 not	 use	 to	 treat	 a	 conditional	 sale	 as	 a	 security	 interest.	However,	a	conditional	sale	has	operated	beyond	a	conventional	arrangement	for	payment	of	 contract	price,	 enabling	a	 seller	 to	 reserve	 the	goods	 supplied	as	a	means	 of	 payment	 when	 a	 buyer	 defaults.	 A	 conditional	 sale	 was	 considered	stronger	 than	 any	 popular	 security	 devices	 as	 a	 pledge	 or	 mortgage.	 To	 this	extent,	the	goods	were	free	of	the	debtor’s	assets	subject	to	any	chattel	mortgage,	and	 the	 title-retaining	 seller	 could	 avoid	 the	 requirement	 of	 filing	 and	 the																																																									44	Black’s	Law	Dictionary	(9th	edn,	2009),	at	p.	1454	45	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	67	46	See	more	 discussion	 in	 Gilmore	 G,	 see	 n.	 15,	 at	 pp.	 66-8;	 Glenn	 G,	 ‘The	 Conditional	 Sale	 at	Common	Law	and	as	a	Statutory	Security’	 (1939)	25	Virginia	Law	Review	559,	at	pp.	569-570,	578-585.	
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complicated	 procedure	 of	 foreclosure	 under	 the	 chattel	 mortgage	 law47.	 The	conditional	sale	or	the	title	retention	transaction	creates	an	ostensible	ownership	situation	 to	 not	 only	 subsequent	 secured	 creditors	 but	 also	 earlier	 secured	creditors	 who	 may	 have	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 debtor’s	 after-acquired	property.	 The	 earlier	 secured	 creditor	may	 suppose	 the	 goods	 in	 the	 debtor’s	possession	 but	 secretly	 subject	 to	 title	 retention	 to	 be	 free	 or	 at	 least	encumbered	 by	 only	 subsequent	 claims.	 The	 apparent	 security	 function	 of	 a	conditional	sale	has	caused	a	great	deal	of	concern	to	third	parties.	This	context	was	leading	to	the	judicial	and	legislative	reaction	that	the	conditional	sale,	once	used	to	secure	payment,	should	be	treated	as	a	chattel	mortgage48.	It	is	suggested	that	 the	 title-retaining	 seller	who	 creates	 the	ostensible	ownership	 problem	 to	both	earlier	and	subsequent	secured	creditors	should	have	the	burden	to	cure	it,	in	other	words,	to	publicize	his	interest	and	notify	the	earlier	parties49.	The	Uniform	Conditional	Sales	Act	enacted	in	1922	had	a	functional	approach	to	the	 extent	 that	 they	 defined	 the	 conditional	 sale	 as	 a	 secured	 transaction.	Therefore,	 the	 ostensible	 ownership	 created	 by	 these	 transactions	 could	 be	resolved	by	the	requirement	of	registration,	but	registration	had	a	limited	effect	to	the	extent	that	it	was	needed	to	validate	the	sale	against	bona	fide	purchasers	and	 lien	 creditors	 who	 levied	 prior	 to	 the	 recordation 50 .	 A	 non-recorded	conditional	sale	remained	good	against	the	creditors	of	the	buyer.		Article	 9	 replacing	 the	 Uniform	 Conditional	 Sales	 Act	 continues	 to	 treat	 a	conditional	 sale	 as	 a	 security	 interest.	 It	 converts	 a	 conditional	 sale	 or	 title	retention	from	a	contractual	arrangement	to	a	security	device	within	the	scope	of	this	 article.	 In	 the	 same	 section	 defining	 a	 security	 interest,	 it	 expressly	 states	that:	 “The	 retention	 or	 reservation	 of	 title	 by	 a	 seller	 of	 goods	 notwithstanding	
shipment	 or	 delivery	 to	 the	 buyer	 […]	 is	 limited	 in	 effect	 to	 a	 reservation	 of	 a	
"security	interest."”51.	This	treatment	is	re-emphasized	in	Article	2	on	sales52.	The																																																									47	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	pp.	67-8	48	ibid,	at	p.	68	 	49	Baird	DG	and	Jackson	TH,	see	n.	29,	at	p.	189	50	Glenn	G,	‘The	Conditional	Sale	at	Common	Law	and	as	a	Statutory	Security’	(1939)	25	Virginia	Law	Review	559,	at	pp.	579-585	51	UCC	§1-201(35)	
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wording	of	 these	sections	 is	somewhat	unclear	about	how	a	security	 interest	 is	created	under	a	conditional	sale.	“Reservation	of	a	security	interest”	indicates	that	it	is	seemingly	not	amounting	to	an	outright	sale	with	the	grant-back	of	a	security	interest	to	the	seller.	Despite	the	above	confusing	wording,	the	title	is	transferred	to	the	buyer	under	the	further	Article	2	wording:	“title	passes	to	the	buyer	at	the	
time	and	place	at	which	the	seller	completes	his	performance	with	reference	to	the	
physical	 delivery	 of	 the	 goods,	 despite	 any	 reservation	 of	 a	 security	 interest”53.	Therefore,	 it	 can	 be	 inferred	 that	 title	 retention	 is	 statutorily	 no	 longer	 a	contractual	arrangement	for	the	passing	of	title.		Statutory	 reconceptualization	of	 title	 retention	or	 conditional	 sale	as	a	 secured	transaction	 is	 considered	 to	 extremely	 interfere	 with	 party	 autonomy	 on	 the	passing	 of	 title	 conditional	 upon	 payment	 of	 full	 purchase	 price54.	 It	 is	 also	inconsistent	with	the	common	law	principle	preserving	private	property	“against	
alienation	 except	 by	 free	 consent”55.	 However,	 the	 development	 of	 conditional	sales	 in	 the	American	common	law	and	 in	practice	has	probably	contributed	to	and	supported	the	 functional	approach.	The	popularity	of	conditional	sales	was	parallel	 with	 increasingly	 using	 after-acquired	 property	 secured	 transactions,	particularly	 in	 financing	 industrial	 equipment56.	 Whenever	 the	 buyer	 acquired	the	goods	supplied	by	 the	 seller,	 the	 concerned	goods	were	possibly	 caught	by	the	 after-acquired	 property	 arrangement	 between	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	 prior	secured	party	to	secure	the	pre-existing	debt.	Even	though	the	seller	was	the	one	who	advanced	the	full	value	of	the	new	asset	to	the	buyer	under	a	sale	on	credit,	she	 was	 left	 with	 the	 position	 of	 an	 unsecured	 creditor	 for	 the	 price57.	 A	conditional	 sale	 or	 title	 retention,	 therefore,	 was	 designed	 to	 avoid	 the	undesirable	 position	 and	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 after-acquired	 property	 security																																																																																																																																																																52	UCC	§2-401(1).	“Any	retention	or	reservation	by	the	seller	of	the	title	(property)	in	goods	shipped	
or	delivered	to	the	buyer	is	limited	in	effect	to	a	reservation	of	a	security	interest.”	53	UCC	§2-401(2)	54	Bridge	MG,	‘Form,	substance	and	innovation	in	personal	property	security	law’	[1992]		Journal	of	Business	Law,	at	p.	590	55	ibid	56 	Wessman	 MB,	 ‘Purchase	 Money	 Inventory	 Financing:	 The	 Case	 for	 Limited	 Cross-Collateralization’	(1990)	51	Ohio	State	Law	Journal	1283,	at	pp.	1292-3	57	Gilmore	G,	 see	 n.	 15,	 at	 p.	 64-5;	 Lloyd	 RM,	 ‘Refinancing	 Purchase	Money	 Security	 Interests’	(1985)	53	Tennessee	Law	Review	1,	at	pp.	4-5	
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interest.	The	American	common	law	quickly	recognized	the	utility	of	conditional	sale	or	title	retention	and	adjusted	to	adapt	to	the	new	situation.		Article	 9	 successfully	 brings	 a	 conditional	 sale	 into	 the	 ambit	 of	 a	 security	interest	irrespective	of	the	form	the	parties	opt	for	to	uncover	it	publicly.	It	is	the	debtor’s	possession	of	 the	goods,	 rather	 than	 the	 contractual	 allocation	of	 title,	under	a	conditional	sale	causing	the	risk	to	other	competing	interests	in	the	same	asset58.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 a	 persuasive	 argument	 and	 a	 good	 justification	 to	treat	a	conditional	sale	or	 title	retention	as	a	security	 interest.	The	 justification	for	 the	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	may	 not	 theoretically	defeat	the	argument	based	on	party	autonomy	and	formalism,	which	regards	the	buyer	as	having	only	possessory	interest	and	the	seller	as	remaining	an	absolute	owner.	 Nevertheless,	 functionalism	 regarding	 conditional	 sale	 in	 the	 American	context	is	a	pragmatic	approach	in	the	sense	that	it	focuses	on	the	benefit	of	all	related	parties;	thus,	it	outweighs	any	theoretical	considerations.	
3.2.3 Purchase-money	security	interest	A	PMSI	is	taking	place	a	title	retention	arrangement	to	protect	the	unpaid	seller	from	payment	default.	The	unpaid	seller,	from	now	on	called	a	secured	creditor,	has	 a	 purchase-money	 priority	 which	 prevails	 over	 both	 other	 earlier	 and	subsequent	 security	 interests.	To	be	a	PMSI,	 a	 security	 interest	must	be	within	the	UCC	§9-103	definition	that	refers	to	not	only	a	single	but	a	trio	of	definitions,	namely	 PMSI,	 purchase-money	 collateral,	 and	 purchase-money	 obligation.	 A	PMSI	 is	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 goods	 “to	 the	extent	 that	 the	goods	are	 purchase-






acquire	rights	in	or	the	use	of	the	collateral	if	the	value	is	in	fact	so	used.”61		In	brief,	a	PMSI	occurs	when	the	purchase-money	collateral	secures	a	purchase-money	obligation.	 In	other	words,	 the	goods,	which	are	 the	subject	matter	of	 a	sale	contract	and	not	 the	debtor’s	pre-existing	asset,	are	the	collateral	securing	payment	of	their	purchase	price.	The	purchase-money	status	depends	on	neither	an	express	indication	of	a	PMSI	nor	a	description	of	its	natures	in	a	security	agreement	or	a	financing	statement,	and	 it	 does	 not	 require	 a	 separate	 security	 agreement,	 or	 a	 separate	 financing	statement	created	uniquely	for	the	purchase-money	collateral62.		The	scope	of	a	PMSI	 is	broader	than	title	retention.	The	definition	of	purchase-money	obligation	categorizes	a	PMSI	 into	a	seller	PMSI	and	a	 lender	PMSI.	The	seller	PMSI	is	the	most	equivalent	to	the	concept	of	title	retention	or	conditional	sale	since	the	obligation	of	an	obligor/buyer	is	the	payment	of	“all	or	part	of	the	
price	of	 the	collateral”,	 that	 is	 the	purchase	price	of	 the	goods	 supplied.	On	 the	other	hand,	to	have	a	lender	PMSI,	a	creditor	who	is	a	third	party	gives	value	to	a	debtor/buyer	 to	 acquire	 the	 collateral.	 It	 is	 relatively	 straightforward	 to	 prove	that	 the	 goods	 subject	 to	 the	 sale	 contract	 are	 the	 collateral	 securing	 the	respective	purchase	price	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	 seller	PMSI.	 It	 is	not	 the	 case	of	 a	PMSI	lender	who	must	prove	the	purpose	of	the	loan:	the	advance	was	made	to	let	the	debtor	acquire	the	collateral,	and	this	advance	was	“in	fact	so	used”63.		Purchase-money	 collateral	 and	 purchase-money	 obligation	 are	 considered	essential	elements	to	describe	how	to	establish	a	PMSI64,	but	the	determination	of	a	 purchase-money	 obligation	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role65.	 Although	 the	 definition	 of	purchase-money	 obligation	 seemingly	 places	PMSIs	 into	 two	 categories,	 that	 is	“the	 price	 of	 collateral”	 referring	 to	 seller	 PMSI	 and	 “value	 given	 to	 enable”																																																									61	UCC	§9-103(a)(2)	62	In	re	Saxe,	491	B.R.	244	(Bankr.	W.D.	Wis.,	2013),	at	p.	249	63	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	781	64	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-103,	see	Official	Comments	at	pp.	829-30	65	In	re	Price,	562	F.	3d	618(4th	Cir.,	2009),	at	p.	624	
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referring	to	lender	PMSI,	the	Official	Comment	does	not	try	to	distinguish	them.	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-103	provides	a	list	of	expenses	that	can	be	included	in	both	 categories,	 namely	 “obligations	 for	 expenses	 incurred	 in	 connection	 with	
acquiring	rights	in	the	collateral,	sale	taxes,	duties,	finance	charges,	interest,	freight	
charges,	costs	of	storage	in	transit,	demurrage,	administrative	charges,	expenses	of	
collection	and	enforcement,	attorney’s	fees,	and	other	similar	obligations”66.	 It	can	be	inferred	from	this	list	that	the	term	“price”	cannot	be	understood	in	common	sense67.	Since	this	list	is	not	exhaustive,	any	expense	that	shares	similar	features	of	all	listed	expenses	can	be	added.	It	is	not	limited	to	transaction	costs	like	sale	taxes,	duties	and	finance	charges	that	may	enhance	or	add	value	to	the	collateral,	but	also	any	incurred	in	connection	with	the	acquisition	of	collateral68.		Comment	 3	 stating	 “a	 close	 nexus	 between	 the	 acquisition	 of	 collateral	 and	 the	
secured	obligation”	figures	out	a	circumstance	when	a	security	interest	does	not	qualify	a	purchase-money	status69.	When	the	collateral	is	obtained	on	unsecured	credit,	 and	 subsequently,	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 created	 to	 secure	 the	 purchase	price,	it	is	not	a	PMSI70.		In	this	sense,	the	wording	with	regard	to	a	lender	PMSI	provision,	 that	 is	 “value	given	to	enable	the	debtor	to	acquire	rights”	may	lead	to	the	 assumption	 on	 the	 sequence	 of	 the	 loan	 and	 the	 acquisition	 of	 collateral.	Accordingly,	 the	 loan	 comes	 first	 and	 then	 acquisition,	 or	 at	 least	 they	simultaneously	occur71.	Courts	have	dealt	with	several	cases	where	the	loan	was	advanced	 after	 the	 possession	 and	 even	 the	 acquisition	 of	 property.	 In	North	
Platte	 State	 Bank	 v.	 Production	 Credit	 Ass’n	 of	 North	 Platte	72,	 the	 debtor/buyer	had	 physical	 possession	 of	 the	 goods	 before	 the	 execution	 of	 the	 security	agreement	with	the	lender	who	honoured	the	cheque	directly	to	the	seller	for	the	purchase	price	and	then	claimed	a	PMSI	in	the	goods.	The	given	court	held	that	the	 debtor/buyer	had	 both	 possession	 and	 title	 in	 the	 goods	 before	 the	 lender	extended	credit,	therefore,	even	though	the	money	advanced	to	pay	the	purchase																																																									66	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-103,	see	Official	Comments,	at	p.	830	67	In	re	Price,	see	n.	65,	at	p.	626,	In	re	Graupner,	356	B.R.	907	(Bankr.	M.	D.	Ga.,	2006),	at	p.	912,	919	68	In	re	Price,	see	n.	65,	at	p.	562	69	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-103,	see	Official	Comments,	at	p.	830	70	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-103,	see	Official	Comments,	at	p.	830	71	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	784	72	200	N.	W.	2d	1,	189	Neb.	44	(Neb.,	1972),	at	pp.	46-8	
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price,	it	did	not	help	the	debtor	to	acquire	any	right	in	the	collateral	because	he	had	already	had	 all73.	The	distinction	between	 the	money	advancing	 to	acquire	the	collateral	from	the	money	paying	the	purchase	price	is	vital,	only	the	former	of	 which	 qualifies	 to	 be	 a	 PMSI.	 It	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 have	 a	 purchase-money	status	 if	 the	 lender	 has	 a	written	 security	 agreement	 covering	 the	 collateral	 in	question	and	advances	money	to	pay	the	purchase	price	74.	In	In	re	Cunningham,	it	clarifies	that	a	PMSI	is	not	qualified	if	the	lender	advances	money	to	finance	a	pre-existing	obligation75.		In	 contrast,	 the	 Spartan	 Motors	 court76	discussed	 whether	 the	 after-advanced	funds	may	qualify	the	purchase-money	status,	considering	mainly	the	issue	that	possession	and	title	of	 the	goods	had	passed	before	the	 loan	 is	advanced77.	The	given	court	relied	on	Gilmore’s	commentary	that	induced	a	court	to	find	whether	“the	loan	transaction	appear[ed]	to	be	closely	allied	to	the	purchase	transaction”78.	Gilmore	emphasized	that	“rigid	adherence	to	particular	formalities	and	sequences	
should	not	be	 required”79.	 It	 was	 held	 that	 a	 transaction	was	 sufficiently	 closely	
allied	 where	 the	 negotiation	 for	 a	 sale	 and	 purchase	 is	 conditional	 upon	 the	availability	 of	 the	 loan	 and/or	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 sale,	 the	 lender	 committed	 to	extending	 amount	 required	 to	 pay	 the	 purchase	 price80.	 	 The	 Spartan	 Motors	court	does	not	negate	the	finding	of	the	North	Platte	State	Bank	court;	rather,	it	clarifies	North	Platte	State	Bank	 case	 by	 stating	 that	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 the	 loan	was	 not	 a	 factor	 for	 negotiating	 the	 sale	 and	 purchase,	 and	 the	 lender	 did	 not	commit	 to	 giving	 value	 enabling	 the	 debtor	 to	 pay	 the	 purchase	 price81.	 Under	
Spartan	Motors	court’s	view,	possession	and	title	are	elements,	important	but	not	dispositive,	 in	 the	 “closely	 allied”	 test82.	 The	 sequence	 of	 the	 loan	 and	 the	acquisition	of	property	is	narrow	and	inflexible	to	determine	a	PMSI.	The	Spartan																																																									73	ibid,	at	p.	52	74	ibid		75	(Bankr.	W.D.N.C.,	2012),	at	pp.	7-9	76	General	Elec.	Capital	Commercial	Auto.	Fin.,	Inc.	v.	Spartan	Motors,	Ltd.,	675	N.Y.S.2d	626,	246	A.D.2d	41	(N.Y.A.D.	2	Dept.,	1998)	77	ibid,	at	p.	631	78	ibid.		79	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	p.782	80	Spartan	Motors,	see	n.	76,		at	p.	632	81	Spartan	Motors,	see	n.	76,	at	p.	633	82	Spartan	Motors,	see	n.	76,	at	p.	633	
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Motors	court’s	ruling	is	persuasive	because	the	“closely	allied”	test	demonstrates	the	interrelation	between	the	advance	and	the	acquisition	of	new	assets	beyond	the	sequence	of	happening.	The	 common	 law	has	 shed	 light	on	 the	 relatedness	 between	 the	 PMSI	 and	 the	underlying	contract.	The	core	characteristic	of	a	PMSI	is	that	the	parties	engage	in	 the	given	 transaction	bearing	 in	mind	 that	 the	 secured	creditor	 finances	 the	transaction	of	 acquiring	new	assets,	 in	other	words,	 the	up-coming	asset	other	than	pre-existing	one	secures	the	 loan	advancing	to	acquire	 it.	 It	makes	a	PMSI	different	 from	 ordinary	 security	 interests	 and	 distinguishes	 a	 purchase-money	transaction	from	other	secured	transactions	for	general	business	purposes.	
3.3 Establishment	of	purchase-money	security	interest	The	requisite	for	claiming	priority	is	that	a	PMSI	must	be	enforceable	against	the	debtor	and	third	parties;	 in	other	words,	 it	should	be	attached	to	the	 collateral	and	perfected.	The	establishment	of	a	PMSI	must	comply	with	the	general	rules	of	a	security	interest	that	require	attachment	and	perfection.		
3.3.1 Attachment	Attachment	plays	a	dispositive	role	 to	determine	the	effectiveness	of	a	security	interest	 not	 only	 against	 a	 debtor	 but	 also	 subsequent	 purchasers	 and	 other	secured	and	non-secured	creditors.	A	security	 interest	 cannot	be	perfected	 if	 it	does	not	attach	to	any	collateral83.	Unless	otherwise	prescribed,	 the	attachment	occurs	when	 a	 security	 interest	 “[becomes]	 enforceable	 against	 the	 debtor	with	





The	first	requirement	is	that	“value	has	been	given”86.	This	requirement	is	usually	undisputed	because	the	extension	of	credit	is	usually	clear87.	The	second	requirement	 is	 that	 the	debtor	must	have	“rights	in	the	collateral	or	
the	power	to	transfer	rights	in	the	collateral	to	a	secured	party”88.	It	manifests	the	idea	 of	 functionalism	 that	 is	 not	 strictly	 requires	 full	 ownership	 to	 create	 a	security	 interest.	 Under	 the	 principle	 of	nemo	dat	quod	non	habet	 (no	 one	 can	transfer	what	she	does	not	have)89,	a	security	interest	only	attaches	to	the	extent	of	rights	that	a	debtor	has90.	A	debtor	cannot	grant	a	security	interest	more	than	what	she	has91.	 In	 this	sense,	 for	example,	 the	security	 interest	only	attaches	to	25%	undivided	interest	in	an	item	of	equipment	if	the	debtor	only	co-owns	this	item	to	this	portion.		
“Rights	 in	 the	 collateral”	 has	 been	 construed	 under	 the	 concept	 of	 other	 laws,	particularly	Article	2	on	the	sale	of	goods,	showing	that	mere	possession	 is	not	qualified92.	Evergreen	Marine	Corp.	 is	a	good	case	to	see	how	the	title	allocation	plays	a	vital	 role	 in	defining	 “rights	 in	 the	collateral”	 as	discussed	elsewhere	 in	the	 thesis93.	 The	 debtor	 can	 acquire	 “rights	 in	 the	 collateral”	 by	 estoppel	 for	 a	security	 interest	 to	 attach.	 In	 First	National	 Bank	 of	 Omaha	 v.	 Pleasant	Hollow	
Farm,	Inc94,	A	and	B	had	a	production	agreement	where	A	owned	the	crop	and	B	planted	and	grew	the	crop	by	its	equipment	and	employees.	A	bank	advanced	a	loan	 to	B	 secured	 by	 the	 crop	 upon	 the	 physical	 inspection	 of	 the	 land.	 At	 the	time	of	inspection,	the	officer	of	A	did	not	make	clear	that	A	owned	the	crop.	The	court	 ruled	 that	 A	 could	 not	 be	 estopped	 to	 deny	 that	 B	 has	 “rights	 in	 the	




collateral”	 to	 attach	 a	 security	 interest95.	 The	 debtor	 is	 also	 deemed	 to	 have	
“rights	in	the	collateral”	if	it	does	not	have	a	formal	title	but	the	control	over	the	asset	and	bearing	a	risk	of	loss96.	“Rights	in	the	collateral”	may	be	examined	under	the	ostensible	ownership	theory	where	the	debtor	can	mispresent	the	potential	creditors	by	the	control	or	possession	of	the	collateral	as	in	the	case	Kinetics97.	However,	Article	9	is	considered	as	an	exception	of	the	nemo	dat	rule.	It	allows	a	debtor	to	create	a	security	interest	that	attaches	to	greater	rights	than	the	debtor	has	in	some	cases98.	To	enforce	a	security	interest,	other	than	“having	rights	in	the	
collateral”,	a	debtor	alternatively	is	required	to	have	“the	power	to	transfer	rights	
in	 the	 collateral”.	 This	 requirement	 reflects	 an	 exception	 to	 the	nemo	dat	 rule.	According	 to	 the	 nemo	 dat	 rule,	 when	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 created	 on	 the	collateral,	 a	 debtor	 only	 has	 residual	 rights	 in	 this	 property	 to	 create	 a	subsequent	security	interest.	Strictly	speaking,	the	nemo	dat	rule	grants	the	first	priority	 to	 the	 first-in-time	 attached	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 same	 collateral.	However,	the	first-to-file-or-perfect	rule	and	the	pre-filing	ability,	which	are	not	in	line	with	the	nemo	dat	rule,	give	rise	to	a	typical	situation	that	a	prior	attached	is	 subordinate	 to	 a	 later-in-time	 attached	 security	 interest.	 The	 competition	 of	conflicting	 security	 interests	 in	 the	 same	 collateral	 is	 solved	 by	 the	 ranking	relying	on	the	order	of	 filing	rather	than	the	order	of	attachment99.	The	time	of	filing	 is	dipositive	even	though	at	 that	moment	the	 first-to-file	security	 interest	has	 not	 yet	 attached	 to	 the	 collateral,	 and	 the	 latter-to	 file	 competing	 security	interest	 is	 perfected	 earlier 100 .	 The	 notice	 filing	 system	 enables	 filing	 of	 a	financing	 statement	 to	 be	 done	 prior	 to	 the	 attachment	 and	 perfection	 of	 a																																																									95	See	more	discussion	on	this	case	in	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	The	Law	of	Secured	Transactions	under	
the	Uniform	Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	p.	2-59,	2-60	96	Chambersburg	Trust	Co.	v.	Eichelberger,	588	A2d	549,	15	UCC	Rep	2d	1080	(Pa.	Super.	Ct.	1991)	97	See	sub-section	3.2.1.1	of	this	thesis	98 	Comment	 6	 to	 the	 UCC	 §9-203,	 see	 Official	 Comment,	 at	 p.	 848.	 See	 more	 discussion,	particularly	examples	of	this	situation	in	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	‘Using	First	Principles	of	UCC	Article	 9	 to	 Solve	 Statutory	Puzzles	 in	 Receivables	 Financing’	 (2010)	 46	Gonzaga	 Law	 Review	297,	at	pp.	301-2,	Plank	T,	‘Article	9	of	the	UCC:	Reconciling	Fundamental	Property	Principles	and	Plain	Language’	(2013)	68	The	Business	Lawyer	439,	at	pp.	456-9	99	See	Example	2	in	Plank	T,	 ‘Article	9	of	the	UCC:	Reconciling	Fundamental	Property	Principles	and	Plain	Language’	(2013)	68	The	Business	Lawyer	439,	at	pp.	456-7	100	See	Example	3	in	Plank	T,	‘Article	9	of	the	UCC:	Reconciling	Fundamental	Property	Principles	and	Plain	Language’	(2013)	68	The	Business	Lawyer	439,	at	pp.	457-9	
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security	interest.	Thus,	filing	is	a	method	of	perfection,	but	in	some	certain	cases,	filing	 does	 not	 guarantee	 a	 perfected	 security	 interest	 because	 the	 security	interest	 has	 not	 yet	 attached	 to	 the	 collateral.	 Therefore,	 the	 priority	 rules	 of	Article	9,	irrespective	of	the	debtor	only	has	residual	rights	in	the	collateral,	place	the	creditor	having	subsequently-attached	security	interest	but	first-to-file	in	the	first	 priority	 position.	 It	 is	 considered	 “the	 power	 to	 transfer	 rights	 in	 the	




adequately	 describes	 the	 collateral,	 carries	 the	 signature	 of	 the	 debtor,	 and	
establishes	that	in	fact	a	security	interest	was	agreed	upon,	would	satisfy	both	the	
formal	requirements	of	 the	statute	and	the	policies	behind	 it”105.	 Today,	 the	 term	“authenticate”	 and	 “authenticated”	 are	 aiming	 at	 replacing	 “sign”	 and	 “signed”	respectively106.	Therefore,	evidence	of	a	security	interest	agreement	is	broadened	beyond	the	requirement	of	the	signed	writing	to	encompass	authentication	of	all	records.	 The	 debtor’s	 authentication	 requirement	 is	 deemed	 to	 suit	 two	purposes:	 One	 is	 an	 evidentiary	 base	 to	 prevent	 disputes	 over	 the	 type	 of	collateral	subject	to	the	security	interest,	and	the	second	is	to	serve	as	a	Statute	of	Frauds107.		The	content	of	a	security	agreement	must	have	the	description	of	collateral,	the	purpose	 of	 which	 is	 evidentiary108 .	 The	 standard	 of	 description	 is	 that	 “it	
reasonably	 identifies	 what	 is	 described”109	.	 It	 does	 not	 require	 the	 exact	 and	detailed	description110.	The	UCC	suggests	several	ways	to	suffice	the	description	test111,	 the	 most	 noticeable	 of	 which	 is	 identifying	 the	 collateral	 by	 a	 type	 of	collateral	 defined	 in	 the	 Code112.	 Generally,	 there	 are	 four	 primary	 types	 of	collateral,	namely	consumer	goods,	equipment,	 farm	products,	and	 inventory113.	However,	in	a	consumer	goods	transaction,	identifying	collateral	by	the	category	of	 consumer	 goods	 is	 not	 sufficiently	 described	 unless	 it	 has	 descriptive	components	 beyond	 the	 type 114 .	 Although	 generic	 terms	 like	 equipment,																																																									105	ibid,	at	p.	1331.	See	more	in	Baystate	Drywall,	Inc	v.	Chicopee	Sav.	Bank,	429	N.E	2d	1138,	385	Mass.	17,	32	U.C.C	Rep.	Serv.	1315	(Mass.,	1982),	at	p.	1141,	In	re	Jojo’s	10	Rest.	Llc,	455	B.R.	321,	74	UCC	Rep.	Serv.	2d441	(Bankr.	Mass.,	2011),	at	p.	326	106	The	former	UCC	requires	a	proper	security	agreement	signed	by	the	debtor.	The	revised	UCC	§9-102(a)(7)	 defines	 “authenticate”	 to	 encompass	 “sign”	 and	 “attach	or	 logically	associate	with	
the	 record	an	electronic	 sound,	 symbol,	or	process”.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 requirement	 of	 security	agreement	as	a	condition	for	enforceability,	the	former	and	the	revised	UCC	are	different	only	in	the	requirement	of	signature	and	authentication	respectively	(See	In	re	Rowe,	369	B.R.	73	(Bankr.	Mass.,	2007,	note	2,	at	p.	80)	107	Comment	 3	 to	 the	UCC	 §9-203(a)(3),	 see	Official	Comment,	at	 pp.	 847-8.	 See	 In	 re	Numeric	
Corp.	see	n.	104,	at	p.	1331	108	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-108(a),	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	837	109	UCC	§9-108(a)	110	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-108,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	837	111	UCC	§9-108(b)	112	UCC	§9-108(b)(3)	113	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-102,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	817	114	UCC	§9-108(e)	and	Comment	5	to	the	UCC	§9-108,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	837	
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inventory	or	 farm	products	are	deemed	 to	be	good	description	 for	attachment,	super-generic	description	is	not	sufficient.	Collateral	described	as	“all	the	debtor’s	
asset”	or	“all	the	debtor’s	personal	property”	or	the	like	wording	does	not	meet	the	requirement	 of	 description115 .	 The	 underlying	 policy	 of	 these	 provisions	 is	suggested	 that	 debtors	 and	 creditors	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 appropriate	consideration	in	drafting	the	collateral	description	other	than	making	use	of	the	boilerplate	of	“all	assets”,	and	the	likely	result	is	that	some	property	of	the	debtor	would	be	unencumbered116.		A	financing	statement,	meanwhile,	expands	the	sufficient	indication	of	collateral	beyond	 the	 description	 under	 the	 section	 9-108	 to	 embrace	 “all	assets”	 or	 “all	
property” 117 .	 Attachment	 and	 filing	 clearly	 serve	 different	 purposes,	 and	description	 might	 suffice	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 filing	 but	 not	 necessarily	 for	 the	purpose	 of	 attachment118.	 In	 some	 situations	 where	 there	 are	 gaps	 between	 a	security	agreement	and	a	financing	statement	with	respect	to	the	description	of	collateral,	 the	description	 in	 the	 former	prevails	 since	attachment	has	a	 role	of	attaching	 the	 security	 interest	 to	 the	 specific	 collateral.	Meanwhile,	 a	 financing	statement	 serves	 as	 giving	 notice	 to	 third	 parties	 and	 determining	 of	 priority	between	competing	interests	in	the	same	collateral.	It	does	not	make	the	status	of	collateral	 effective	 unless	 the	 security	 interest	 attaches	 to	 the	 concerned	collateral.	In	In	re	Nightway	Transp.	Co.,	Inc119,	after	considering	the	function	of	a	security	agreement	and	a	financing	statement,	the	court	concluded	that	it	was	the	security	agreement	governing	the	extent	of	the	creditor’s	security	interest.	Any	wording	like	“all	equipment”	may	raise	the	question	whether	it	encompasses	after-acquired	 items	 since	 after-acquired	 collateral	 and	 future	 advances	 are	allowed	under	the	UCC120.	When	the	description	of	collateral	does	not	expressly	provide	for	the	after-acquired	property,	it	is	the	intention	of	parties	determining	
																																																								115	UCC	§9-108(c)	116	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	see	n.	87,	at	p.	150	117	UCC	§9-504	118	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-504,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	981	119	96	B.R.	854	(Bankr.	N.D.	Ill.,	1989),	at	p.	857	120	UCC	§9-204(a)(c)	
	 91	
the	 issue	 rather	 than	 statutory	 rules121.	 With	 regard	 to	 some	 collateral	 like	inventory	and	receivables	that	are	constantly	turning	over	in	the	ordinary	course	of	certain	businesses,	courts	may	hold	that	 the	given	 inventory	and	receivables	include	 not	 only	 items	 at	 the	 date	 of	 the	 security	 agreement	 but	 also	 after-acquired	ones122.	Attachment	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 American	 law	 on	 secured	 transactions	 in	personal	 property.	 A	 security	 interest	 is	 not	 effective,	 in	 other	 words,	 a	 debt	remains	unsecured,	until	and	unless	it	attaches	to	the	collateral	irrespective	of	a	financing	statement	may	be	previously	submitted.	
3.3.2 Perfection:	Filing	a	financing	statement	The	term	“perfection”,	“perfect”	or	“perfected”	in	Article	9	refers	to	a	legal	step	to	establish	 priority	 over	 other	 interests	 in	 the	 collateral.	 A	 perfected	 security	interest	 is	 the	 one	 that	 has	 attached,	 and	 all	 statutory	 requirements	 are	fulfilled123.	Different	methods	of	perfection	are	recognized	to	suit	different	types	of	 collateral124.	 There	 may	 be	 more	 than	 one	 method	 available	 to	 a	 type	 of	collateral 125 ,	 for	 instance,	 the	 goods	 can	 be	 perfected	 by	 either	 filing	 or	possession.	 	It	is	noticeable	that	filing	a	financing	statement	is	the	most	popular	method	 applying	 to	 almost	 all	 types	 of	 collateral,	 except	 deposit	 accounts	 and	letter-of-credit	rights	and	money	taken	as	the	original	collateral126.	Perfection	by	filing	constitutes	a	central	part	of	Article	9	since	“a	financing	statement	must	be	




Washington	Trust	Co.	of	Westerly,	the	court	verified	that	filing	additionally	carried	the	 function	 of	 guaranteeing	 that	 third	 parties	 will	 have	 notice	 of	 existing	security	 interests	 in	 collateral135,	 or	 to	 be	 exact,	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 perfected	security	interest.		Article	9	does	not	strictly	require	any	legal	step	of	establishing	a	security	interest	to	be	done	chronologically.	A	security	interest	can	attach	after	the	financing	statement	is	filed.	For	instance,	even	though	a	financing	statement	is	 filed	with	 regard	 to	 the	 after-acquired	 collateral,	 a	 security	 interest	 attaches	and	is	perfected	only	when	the	debtor	acquires	rights	in	the	concerned	collateral.	The	American	filing	system	is	one	of	notice	filing.	A	financing	statement	with	the	limited	amount	of	information,	instead	of	a	security	agreement,	is	filed	in	order	to	 notify	 prospective	 creditors	 about	 a	 security	 interest	 possibly	 attaching	 to	particular	assets	of	the	debtor.	Sufficient	information	for	a	financing	statement	is:	(1)	the	name	of	the	debtor,	(2)	the	name	of	the	secured	party	or	a	representative	of	the	secured	party	and	(3)	the	collateral136.	The	secured	party’s	name	does	not	play	 any	 role	 in	 the	 searching	 system,	 and	 any	 change	 in	 the	 secured	 party’s	name	does	not	cause	seriously	misleading.	Meanwhile,	the	debtor’s	name	plays	a	crucial	 role	 because	 the	 index	 for	 filing	 and	 searching	 is	 built	 upon	 it137.	 The	significance	of	the	debtor’s	name	in	filing	and	searching	leads	to	many	revisions	of	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 Article	 9.	 The	 success	 of	 the	 notice	 filing	 name-based	system	 depends	 substantially	 on	 how	 convenient	 and	 correct	 that	 the	 filing	record	 or	 the	 search	 logic	 can	 reveal	 a	 financing	 statement	 containing	 the	prospective	debtor’s	name.	
																																																								131	UCC	§9-310(b)(1),	(5),	(9)	132	UCC	§9-310(b)(3)	133	UCC	§9-310(b)(10)	134	UCC	§9-310(b)(4),	(5),	(6),	(7),	(8)	135	386	A.2d	1096,	120	R.I.	197	(R.I.,	1978),	at	p.	1099	136	UCC	§9-502(a)			137	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-503(a),	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	978	
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There	are	 two	 “safe	harbours”	 to	 indicate	 the	 collateral	 covered	by	a	 financing	statement.	 The	 description	 can	 pursue	 the	 requirement	 of	 Section	 9-108.	Accordingly,	 a	 sufficient	 description	 should	 reasonably	 identify	 what	 is	described138.	 Specific	 listing	 and	 describing	 by	 categories	 are	 among	 the	 list	 of	examples	 of	 reasonable	 identification139.	 A	 financing	 statement	 otherwise	 can	indicate	that	it	covers	all	assets	or	all	personal	property140.	The	latter	indication	is	likely	 to	 be	 inconsistent	 with	 sub-section	 9-108(c)	 that	 denies	 super-generic	description.	However,	 the	 requirement	of	 identification	of	 collateral	 in	 security	agreement	 as	 a	 requisite	 for	 attachment	 and	 identification	 of	 collateral	 in	 a	financing	 statement	 have	 different	 roles.	 Identification	 of	 collateral	 as	 “all	 the	
debtor’s	 assets”	 or	 “all	 the	 debtor’s	 personal	 property”	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for	 the	purpose	of	a	security	agreement,	but	still	good	for	the	purpose	of	filing141.	A	 financing	 statement	 does	 not	 require	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 filer	 since	 the	 given	identity	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	 search	 system142,	 but	 the	 filer	 must	 obtain	 an	authenticated	 authorization	 from	 the	 debtor 143 ,	 including	 the	 ipso	 facto	authorization.	 An	 authenticated	 security	 agreement	 suffices	 the	 ipso	 factor	authorization;	thus,	the	filer	does	not	need	a	separate	authorization144.		Filing	 of	 a	 financing	 statement	 is	 not	 effective	 to	 perfect	 a	 security	 interest	subject	to	other	state	or	federal	filing	system145	or	state	certificate-of-title	law146.	State	certification-of-title	laws	require	consensual	security	interests	to	be	noted	on	 the	 certificate	 of	 title.	 Automobiles,	 the	 popular	 collateral	 is	 covered	 by	certificate-of-title	 laws.	 In	 Pet	 Food	 Experts,	 Inc.	 v.	 Alpha	Nutrition,	 Inc.147,	both	competing	secured	creditors	failed	to	be	listed	as	a	lienholder	on	the	Title	of	the																																																									138	UCC	§9-504(1)	and	UCC	§9-108(a)	139	UCC	§9-108(b)	140	UCC	§9-504(2)	141	See	discussion	in	sub-section	3.3.1	on	attachment	of	this	thesis	142	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-509,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	989	143	UCC	§9-509(a)(1)	144	UCC	§9-509(b)	and	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-509,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	989	145	UCC	 §9-311(a)(1).	 See	 Comment	 2	 to	 the	 UCC	 §9-311,	 see	 Official	 Comment,	 at	 p.	 881.	Documented	 ship,	 civil	 aircraft,	 railroad	 rolling	 stock,	 patents,	 copyrights	 and	 trademarks	 are	among	the	list.	See	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	The	Law	of	Secured	Transactions	under	the	Uniform	Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	2-97	and	2-98.	146	UCC	§9-311(a)(2)	147	(R.I.	Super,	2016)	
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vehicle,	 even	 though	 one	 of	 them	 did	 file	 an	 appropriate	 financing	 statement	validly	 indicating	the	collateral	as	all	of	debtor’s	“presently	owned	and	hereafter	
acquired	equipment”148.	The	foregoing	security	interests	were	held	unperfected149.	The	 interplay	 between	 certificate-of-title	 law	 and	 Article	 9	 is	 discussed	 in	
Sovereign	 Bank	 v.	 Hepner	 (In	 re	 Roser)150.	 The	 certificate-of-title	 law	 replaces	Article	 9	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 procedural	 matters	 that	 includes	 filing,	 recording,	releasing,	 renewing,	 or	 extending	 liens151.	 In	 turn,	 Article	 9	 governs	 priority	between	a	security	interest	filed	under	the	certificate-of-title	law	and	the	rights	of	a	lien	creditor	arising	from	Article	9	in	light	of	perfection	date	recorded	in	the	Certificate	of	Title152.		The	 notice	 filing	 system	does	 not	 provide	much	 information.	 The	 filing	 record	does	not	reveal	other	interests	that	may	attach	to	the	collateral	including	tax	and	other	statutory	liens153.	The	whole	purpose	of	notice	filing	system	is	to	give	public	notice	that	the	collateral	indicated	is	possibly	subject	to	the	claim	of	the	secured	party	of	record154,	but	 it	 is	a	possibility	rather	than	a	confirmation	of	a	security	interest.	Anyone	having	an	 interest	 is	charged	with	the	burden	to	make	further	inquiry	to	“disclose	the	complete	state	of	affairs”155.	Under	the	In	re	Oak	Rock	Fin.	
LLC	ruling156,	diligent	interested	parties	would	discover	the	status	of	collateral	by	searching	the	public	record	and	take	appropriate	action,	otherwise	suffered	the	consequences157.	The	notice	filing	system	supports	the	first-to-file	creditor	to	gain	the	competitive	advantage	over	the	later-to-file	creditor.	The	requisite	information	in	a	financing																																																									148	ibid,	at	p.	13	149	ibid	150	613	F.3d	1240	(10th	Cir.,	2010)	151	ibid,	at	p.	1245	152	ibid		153	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	see	n.	87,	at	p.	167	154	Comment	 2	 to	 the	UCC	 §9-502,	 see	Official	Comment,	at	 p.	 973;	Courts	 have	 reaffirmed	 the	foregoing	 purpose;	 see	 In	 re	 Comprehensive	 Review	 Technology,	 Inc.,	 138	 B.R.	 195	 (Bankr.	S.D.Ohio,	1992),	at	p.	200	reviewing	a	number	of	cases	stating	the	purpose	of	notice	filing	system;	see	In	re	Oak	Rock	Fin.,	LLC,	527	B.R.	105	(Bankr.	E.D.N.Y.,	2015),	at	p.	115	155	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-502	and	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-322,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	973	and	910	respectively	156	527	B.R.	105	(Bankr.	E.D.N.Y.,	2015)	157	ibid	
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statement	does	not	 include	 the	amount	of	 secured	obligations.	The	 later-to-file	creditor	cannot	know	the	value	of	the	prevailing	claim	in	advance	except	that	the	first-to	file	creditor	will	have	the	first	priority	against	the	collateral	of	record	to	secure	even	an	obligation	 incurred	later	 than	her	 interests.	Therefore,	 the	 first-to-file	creditor	can	competitively	bid	on	subsequent	 loans	against	 the	collateral	of	 record	 that	 is	 currently	 in	 the	 debtor’s	 asset	 and	 not	 qualified	 to	 grant	 a	prevailing	PMSI	to	the	later-to-file	creditor158.			Limited	information	supplied	for	filing	is	said	to	have	some	benefit.	It	reduces	the	cost	 of	 filing,	 searching	 and	 filing	 administration159.	 It	 supports	 the	 grant	 of	 a	security	 interest	 on	 inventory	 and	 receivables 160 	.The	 asset	 of	 this	 kind	 is	frequently	turning	over	in	the	ordinary	course	of	the	debtor’s	business.	Inventory	or	 account	 financing	 is	 also	 done	 periodically	 or	 involved	 series	 of	 loans.	 An	inventory	 or	 account	 financier	 files	 an	 initial	 financing	 statement	 and	 renews	every	 five	 years	 to	 cover	 such	 categories	 of	 collateral	 rather	 than	 refiling	whenever	an	advance	is	made.	The	filing	notice	system,	therefore,	matches	well	with	 the	 first-to-file-or-perfect	 rule.	 A	 debtor	 in	 this	 context	who	 has	 repeated	transactions	with	the	same	secured	creditor	does	not	incur	more	transaction	cost	to	finance	every	purchase	of	inventory161.		However,	 the	 filing	notice	system	does	not	support	a	debtor	who	would	 like	to	grant	 many	 security	 interests	 in	 the	 equipment	 collateral	 to	 different	 secured	creditors.	The	 later-to-file	creditor	 is	not	willing	to	extend	secured	credit	when	her	 interest	 is	 lower-ranking,	and	the	prevailing	claim	cannot	be	determined	 in	advance.	 In	 this	 sense,	 a	 transaction-based	 registration	 system	 is	 relatively	attractive.	This	system	provides	sufficient	information	the	later-to-file	creditor	to	decide,	and	each	registration	is	corresponding	to	the	discrete	amount	of	secured	obligation	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 future	 advance	 clause.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 relatively	open	 to	 a	 debtor	who	would	 like	 to	 take	 out	 loans	 against	 the	 same	 collateral	from	different	creditors.																																																									158	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	1180	159	Baird	DG,	 ‘Notice	Filing	and	the	Problem	of	Ostensible	Ownership’	(1983)	12	The	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	53,	at	p.	59	160	ibid,	at	p.	59;	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	1180	161	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	1180	
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3.4 Purchase-money	security	interest	priority		
3.4.1 Overview	One	 of	 the	most	 striking	 achievements	 of	 Article	 9	 is	 the	 first-to-file-or-perfect	rule.	Priority	ranking	no	 longer	depends	on	the	order	that	secured	transactions	are	 created.	 The	 order	 of	 filing	 or	 perfection	 has	 become	 the	 primary	 rule	resolving	conflicting	secured	claims	on	the	collateral.	Nevertheless,	a	valid	PMSI	has	its	priority	out	of	the	first-to-file-or-perfect	rule.	As	an	exception	to	the	first-to-file-or-perfect	 rule,	 the	 PMSI	 priority	 is	 non-temporal162	allowing	 the	 first	ranking	over	earlier	filed	security	interests	in	the	same	collateral.		The	 first	 priority	 of	 a	 PMSI	 would	 not	 be	 questionable	 if	 the	 after-acquired	property	 interest	 holder	 were	 required	 to	 accomplish	 some	 new	 act	 of	perfection;	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 after-acquired	 property	 interest	 was	 not	perfected	 automatically	 upon	 the	 debtor’s	 acquisition	 of	 property,	 therefore	could	not	be	ranked	according	to	the	earlier	time	of	filing.	In	this	sense,	the	PMSI	holder	had	the	advantage	to	 file	her	 interest	before	the	after-acquired	property	interest	 holder	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 debtor	 acquired	 new	 property	 or	 took	appropriate	action	to	protect	her	interest.	However,	the	Article	9’s	recognition	of	after-acquired	property	security	interest	to	be	automatically	perfected	whenever	the	debtor	acquires	the	concerned	collateral	raises	the	question	whether	a	PMSI	deserves	the	first	priority	irrespective	of	the	time	of	filing	or	perfection163.	The	 first	 priority	 of	 PMSI	 can	 be	 justified	 under	 the	 “situational	 monopoly”	theory.	 The	 after-acquired	 property	 clause	 creates	 a	 “situational	 monopoly”	enabling	 a	 first-to-file	 secured	 lender	 to	 have	 a	 special	 competitive	 advantage	over	other	lenders	in	dealing	all	subsequent	loans	to	a	debtor164.		The	recognition	of	 PMSI	 can	 blunt	 the	 situational	 monopoly	 created	 by	 the	 after-acquired	property	 clause	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 a	 debtor	 can	 obtain	 new	 loans	 on	 nearly	competitive	 terms	whether	 from	 an	 after-acquired	 property	 interest	 holder	 or	
																																																								162	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	919	163	See	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15,	at	pp.	743-8,	777;	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	1165	164	Jackson	 TH	 and	 Kronman	 AT,	 see	 n.	 8,	 at	 pp.	 1167-1172	 for	 more	 discussion	 on	 how	 the	situational	monopoly	is	created		
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other	creditors165.	The	 first	priority	of	PMSI	 is	relatively	persuasive	because	the	debtor	 has	 more	 opportunities	 to	 access	 to	 credit	 than	 under	 the	 “situational	monopoly”	situation.	The	 “new	 money”	 theory	 can	 additionally	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 first	 priority	 of	 a	PMSI166.	 The	 purchase-money	 financing	 is	 extended	 to	 acquire	 discrete	 assets	that	 are	 not	 previously	 owned	 by	 the	 debtor,	 and	 the	 purchase-money	 loan	 is	secured	by	the	new	assets.	Article	9	strictly	defines	a	PMSI	to	cover	this	type	of	transaction	only	in	order	to	distinguish	a	purchase-money	loan	from	any	funding	for	general	business	purposes167.	The	new	assets	acquired	under	 the	purchase-money	loan	can	contribute	value	to	the	debtor’s	whole	assets,	then	benefit	other	creditors	 to	 some	 extent.	 Furthermore,	 the	 PMSI	 does	 not	 touch	 or	 shrink	 the	debtor’s	 pool	 of	 assets	 subject	 to	 earlier-perfected	 security	 interests.	 The	purchase-money	loan,	therefore,	does	not	threaten	earlier-secured	loan,	and	it	is	not	 the	 matter	 of	 concern	 to	 earlier	 creditors	 except	 that	 an	 earlier	 creditor	would	like	to	extend	credit	against	the	up-coming	assets168.	Competitors	with	a	PMSI	holder	can	be	classified	into	three	types	for	the	purpose	of	 this	 present	 thesis:	 (1)	 unsecured	 creditors	 including	 lien	 creditors	 and	 the	debtor’s	 trustee	 in	 insolvency,	 (2)	 sub-purchasers,	 (3)	 secured	 creditors169.	 A	PMSI	must	comply	with	the	general	rules	of	priority	since	it	is	at	first	a	security	interest.	Article	9	provides	some	specific	priority	rules	for	a	PMSI	to	make	it	an	exception	to	general	security	interests.	
																																																								165	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	1172	166	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	pp.	1175-8	for	more	discussion	on	the	new	money	theory	and	the	tracing	requirement	with	regard	to	a	PMSI	167	UCC	 §9-103;	 	 Jackson	 TH	 and	 Kronman	 AT,	 see	 n.	 8,	 at	 p.	 1175;	 Keith	 GM,	 ‘A	 Primer	 on	Purchase	Money	 Security	 Interests	 Under	 Revised	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 Uniform	 Commercial	 Code’	(2001)	50	University	of	Kansas	Law	Review	143,	at	p.	166;	See	more	discussion	on	the	concept	of	PMSI	in	sub-section	3.2.3	of	this	thesis	168	Keith	GM,	‘A	Primer	on	Purchase	Money	Security	Interests	Under	Revised	Article	9	of	the	Uniform	Commercial	Code’	(2001)	50	University	of	Kansas	Law	Review	143,	at	p.	166;	Jackson	TH	and	Kronman	AT,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	1177	169	This	 classification	 is	 based	 on	and	 adapted	 to	 the	classification	 of	 competitors	with	 general	secured	 creditors	 by	 Clark	 B	 and	 Clark	 B,	The	 Law	of	Secured	Transactions	 under	 the	Uniform	
Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	3-1	
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3.4.2 Purchase-money	secured	creditor	vs.	unsecured	creditors	Fundamentally,	a	debtor	is	bound	by	a	security	agreement	even	though	it	is	not	perfected.	Article	9	distinguishes	the	attachment	and	the	perfection	of	a	security	interest	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	 former	deals	with	 the	effectiveness	of	 a	 security	interest	 and	 the	 latter	 determines	 the	 priority	 ranking.	 A	 perfected	 security	interest	does	not	 strengthen	 the	 secured	creditor’s	position	against	 the	debtor;	on	the	other	hand,	failure	to	perfect	does	not	change	the	parties’	relationship170.		When	a	security	interest	fulfills	the	requirement	of	attachment,	it	is	enforceable	against	 not	 only	 the	 debtor	 but	 also	 third	 parties	 including	 purchasers	 and	creditors171.	This	general	rule	is	subject	to	many	exceptions	stipulated	in	Article	9.	For	examples,	an	unperfected	security	interest	is	subordinate	to	the	interest	of	lien	 creditors	 and	 certain	 buyers 172 ,	 or	 an	 unperfected	 security	 interest	 is	subordinate	 to	 a	 perfected	 security	 interest173.	 A	 general	 unsecured	 creditor	cannot	defeat	the	priority	of	a	secured	creditor	over	the	collateral	on	the	ground	that	the	security	interests	is	not	perfected174.	There	is	no	exception	with	regard	to	general	unsecured	creditors	unless	they	claim	the	collateral	in	the	status	of	lien	creditors	or	through	a	trustee	in	the	debtor’s	insolvency.		Lien	 creditors	 are	 protected	 against	 an	 unperfected	 security	 interest.	 A	 lien	creditor	 is	 defined	 as	 (1)	 “a	 creditor	 that	 has	 acquired	 a	 lien	 on	 the	 property	
involved	by	attachment,	levy,	or	the	 like”;	 (2)	 “an	assignee	for	benefit	of	creditors	
from	the	time	of	an	assignment”;	(3)	“a	trustee	in	bankruptcy	from	the	date	of	the	
filing	of	the	petition”;	or	(4)	“a	receiver	in	equity	from	the	time	of	appointment”175.	When	 the	 rights	 of	 a	 lien	 creditor	 intervene	 between	 the	 attachment	 and	 the	perfection	of	 a	 security	 interest,	 or	at	 the	 time	 the	 security	 interest	 is	 filed	but	unattached,	the	secured	creditor’s	priority	position	is	defeated	by	the	intervening	
																																																								170	In	re	Brooker,	36	B.R.	839	(Bankr.M.D.Fla.,	1984),	at	pp.	840-1	171	UCC	§9-201(a),	§9-203(b)	172	UCC	§9-317	173	UCC	§9-322(a)(2)	174	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	The	Law	of	Secured	Transactions	under	the	Uniform	Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	3-3	175	UCC	§9-102(a)(52)	
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claim176.	Unlike	other	security	interests,	a	PMSI	enjoys	a	grace	period	of	20	days	starting	from	the	day	a	debtor	receives	delivery	of	the	collateral	to	be	perfected.	An	unperfected	PMSI	 is	good	against	 the	rights	of	 lien	creditors	at	 the	time	the	latter	arises	if	the	given	financing	statement	is	filed	within	the	abovementioned	grace	period177.	Under	 the	bankruptcy	 law,	 at	 the	 time	 the	petition	of	 the	bankruptcy	 is	 filed,	 a	bankruptcy	 trustee178	is	 given	 the	 rights	 and	 powers	 of	 a	 hypothetical	 person	who	 has	 an	 unsatisfactory	 judicial	 lien	 on	 the	 debtor’s	 property	 under	 the	relevant	non-bankruptcy	 law179.	This	 is	 called	a	 strong-arm	clause.	Thus,	under	Article	 9,	 a	 trustee	 can	 avoid	 any	 unperfected	 security	 interest	 on	 the	 date	 of	petition.	 The	 debtor-in-possession	 who	 is	 a	 business	 debtor	 filing	 Chapter	 11	petition	and	continuing	to	operate	its	business180	also	has	the	rights	and	powers	of	 a	 lien	 creditor	 under	 Article	 9	 to	 avoid	 certain	 unperfected	 security	interests181.	The	policy	for	the	trustee’s	avoiding	power	is	clear.	It	is	said	to	be	a	mirror	 reflecting	 the	 situation	 of	 unperfected	 security	 interests	 at	 the	 time	 a	judicial	 lien	 intervenes	 in	non-bankruptcy	cases182.	 It	 is	seemingly	a	sanction	to	lenders	who	delay	giving	public	notice	of	their	security	interests183.	The	purpose	of	perfection	is	not	only	for	setting	up	priority	against	other	security	interests	in	the	same	collateral,	but	it	also	aims	at	avoiding	the	trustee’s	“strong	arm”	power.	
3.4.3 Purchase-money	secured	creditors	vs.	purchasers	A	 “purchaser”	 is	 defined	 broadly	 as	 a	 person	 “taking	 by	 sale,	 lease,	 discount,	
negotiation,	mortgage,	 pledge,	 lien,	 security	 interest,	 issue	 or	 reissue,	 gift,	 or	 any	
other	 voluntary	 transaction	 creating	an	 interest	 in	property”184.	When	 a	 security																																																									176	UCC	§9-317(a)(2)(A)	177	UCC	§9-317(a)	178	The	trustee	is	appointed	in	bankruptcy	case	filed	under	Chapter	7	of	the	Bankruptcy	Code	“for	the	purpose	of	liquidating	the	property	of	the	estate	and	distributing	the	proceeds	to	creditors”.	See	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	see	n.	87,	at	p.	457	179	11	U.S.C	§544(a)	180 The	bankruptcy	case	is	filed	under	Chapter	11	of	the	Bankruptcy	Code	for	the	purpose	of	reorganization.	Generally,	a	trustee	is	not	appointed.	See	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	see	n.	87,	at	p.	457	181	11	U.S.C	§1107	and	§544(a)	182	UCC	§9-317(a)(2).	See	Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	see	n.	87,	at	p.	466	183 Harris	S	and	Mooney	C,	Jr.,	see	n.	87,	at	p.	467; Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	see	n.	174,	at	p.	6-12	184	UCC	§1-201(29)	and	(30)	
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interest	attaches	to	 the	collateral,	 it	 is	enforceable	against	 third	parties,	namely	other	 secured	 creditors,	 general	 creditors	 and	 purchasers.	 In	 the	 competition	with	 general	 purchasers,	 a	 secured	 party	 has	 a	 shelter	 of	 section	 9-315(a)	providing	for	continuance	of	a	security	interest	in	the	collateral	notwithstanding	sale,	lease,	license,	exchange	or	other	disposition	thereof;	and	the	attachment	of	identifiable	 proceeds.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 the	 collateral	 is	 disposed	 of,	 the	secured	 party	 can	 both	 follow	 the	 collateral	 in	 the	 hand	 of	 a	 third-party	transferee	and	claim	for	the	proceeds,	but	she	may	have	only	one	satisfaction185.			The	 UCC,	 and	 particularly	 Article	 9,	 also	 aim	 at	 promoting	 the	 free	 flow	 of	commerce186.	The	continuance	of	security	interest	in	the	collateral	is	a	matter	of	concern	to	bona	fide	parties	who	acquire	the	collateral	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business.	Bone	fide	purchasers	in	many	cases	take	free	of	security	interest	under	the	 shelter	 of	 other	 provisions	 in	 Article	 9,	 leaving	 the	 secured	 party	 only	 the	security	interest	attaching	to	the	proceeds.	In	brief,	the	general	rule	to	enforce	a	security	 interest	 against	 purchasers	 upon	 attachment	 can	 be	 defeated	 in	 three	circumstances:	- A	buyer	is	a	buyer	of	goods	in	ordinary	course	of	business;	- A	 secured	 creditor	 authorizes	 the	 disposition	of	 the	 collateral	 free	 from	the	security	interest;	- A	buyer	receives	delivery	before	the	security	interest	is	perfected.	





transfer	 in	 bulk	 or	 as	 security	 for	 or	 in	 total	 or	 partial	 satisfaction	 of	 a	 money	
debt”189.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 check	 the	 public	 record	when	 a	buyer	 buys	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 from	 a	 seller	 in	 the	 business	 of	selling	 goods	 of	 that	 kind,	 in	 good	 faith	 and	 without	 knowledge	 that	 the	 sale	violates	a	third-party’s	security	interest,	and	does	not	take	in	bulk,	or	as	security	for,	or	to	satisfy	antecedent	debt.	It	emphasizes	that	 the	buyer	must	buy	 from	the	seller	“in	the	business	of	selling	
goods	of	that	kind”,	that	is	almost	limited	to	the	seller	of	inventory190.	Section	9-320(a)	 dealing	 with	 buyers	 of	 goods	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 primarily	applies	to	inventory	collateral191.	However,	it	indicates	that	the	section	primarily,	other	than	solely,	applies	to	the	inventory	collateral192.	Furthermore,	the	second	sentence	 of	 the	 statutory	 definition	 clarifies	 that	 the	 sale	 to	 the	 buyer	 must	comport	with	“the	usual	or	customary	practices	in	the	kind	of	business	in	which	the	
seller	 engages	 or	with	 the	 seller’s	 own	 usual	 or	 customary	 practices”193.	 A	 buyer	who	buys	a	worn-out	car	from	the	seller	who	is	in	the	business	of	renting	cars	is	not	likely	to	have	a	shelter	of	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	because	the	seller	 is	 not	 engaged	 in	 selling	 cars,	 used	 or	 new.	 However,	 it	 is	 the	 ordinary	course	 of	 business	 if	 selling	 worn-out	 cars	 are	 the	 seller’s	 usual	 practice	constituting	a	course	of	dealings,	or	this	practice	is	proved	to	be	quite	popular	in	the	industry	of	that	kind,	even	though	it	is	not	the	seller’s	primary	business.	The	
Tanbro	 court	 concluded	 that	 despite	 a	 secondary	 business,	 the	 sale	within	 the	industry	norm	could	be	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business194.	
																																																								188	UCC	§1-201(9)	189	ibid	190Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	see	n.	174,	at	p.	3-24	191	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-320,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	906	192	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-320,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	906	193	UCC	§1-201(9)	194	Tanbor	Fabrics	Corp.	v.	Deering	Milliken,	Inc,	350	NE2d	590,	19	UCC	Rep.	(NY	1976),	cited	in	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	see	n.	174,	at	p.	3-24	
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Reading	 together	 the	 foregoing	 statutory	 definition	 and	 the	 provision	 under	section	9-320(a)	with	regard	to	the	buyer’s	knowledge	of	the	security	interest,	it	should	be	interpreted	to	be	a	mere	knowledge	of	a	security	interest	encumbering	the	 goods	 to	meet	 the	 requirement	 of	 a	 buyer	 of	 goods	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	business195.	Thus,	knowledge	of	a	sale	violating	the	terms	of	security	agreement	is	not	qualified.		It	is	required	that	a	sale	must	have	taken	place196.	It	refers	to	Article	2	definition	of	 a	 sale	 as	 “the	passing	of	 title	 from	the	seller	 to	 the	buyer	 for	price”197,	 and	 the	title	 to	 the	goods	 is	not	passed	prior	 to	“their	identification	to	the	contract”198.	 It	depends	 on	 the	 seller’s	 commitment	with	 regard	 to	 delivery	 to	 determine	 the	passing	of	title	or	the	parties’	agreement199.	Payment	of	full	purchase	price	is	not	a	criterion	to	determine	the	passing	of	title.	Any	arrangement	amounting	to	title	retention	 or	 reservation	 has	 an	 effect	 of	 reserving	 a	 security	 interest 200 .	Therefore,	 when	 the	 debtor/dealer	 transfers	 the	 collateral	 to	 a	 buyer	 in	 the	ordinary	course	of	business	subject	to	title	retention,	the	fact	that	the	latter	has	not	yet	paid	 the	purchase	price	 in	 full	does	not	 cut	off	her	 claim	as	a	buyer	 in	ordinary	course	of	business	against	the	dealer’s	secured	party.	A	 buyer	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 cannot	 have	 a	 shelter	 of	 section	9-320(a)	 if	 the	 security	 interest	 is	 not	 created	 by	 her	 immediate	 seller.	 It	 is	 a	scenario	of	 the	so-called	purchase	of	“pre-encumbered”	goods	where	the	goods	are	subject	to	a	security	interest	that	the	immediate	seller	does	not	create201.	 	A	buyer,	 even	 though	 qualifying	 as	 a	 buyer	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	purchasing	from	the	seller	of	this	kind,	cannot	takes	free	of	the		security	interest.	In	practice,	a	buyer	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	buying	from	the	seller	in	the	business	of	 that	kind	 is	not	motivated	 to	 conduct	a	 search	of	public	record	which	is	time-consuming	and	costly.	Investigating	in	the	seller’s	source	of	title	as																																																									195	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-320,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	906	196	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	see	n.	174,	at	p.	3-30	197	UCC	§2-106(1)	198	UCC	§2-401(1)	199	UCC	§2-401	200	UCC	§2-401(1)	201  See	discussion	in	detail	in	Richard	HN,	‘Section	9-320(a)	of	Revised	Article	9	and	the	Buyer	in	Ordinary	Course	of	Pre-Encumbered	Goods:	Something	Old	and	Something	New’	(2000)	38	Brandeis	Law	Journal	9	
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recommended	 by	 the	 Official	 Comment	 to	 avoid	 the	 title	 conflict 202 	is	 not	desirable	 in	 this	 context.	There	 is	no	 clear	explanation	 in	 the	Official	Comment	why	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	from	the	seller	who	created	a	security	interest	 have	 more	 favoured	 protection	 than	 a	 buyer	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	business	 of	 pre-encumbered	 goods.	 Both	 of	 them	 buy	 from	 the	 seller	 in	 the	business	of	that	kind	and	have	no	alert	to	check	the	status	of	the	goods.	
3.4.3.2 Authority	to	make	disposition	Section	9-320(a)	only	applies	when	the	disposition	of	the	collateral	to	a	buyer	in	ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 is	 unauthorized 203 .	 It	 refers	 to	 section	 9-315	providing	 that	 the	 secured	 party	 can	 follow	 the	 collateral	 in	 the	 hand	 of	 third	parties	 unless	 she	 authorizes	 the	 disposition	 free	 and	 clear	 of	 the	 security	interest	at	hand204.	Various	manners	of	authorized	dispositions	brought	to	a	great	number	of	litigations	under	the	former	Article	9	that	was	read	as	follows:	“unless	
the	disposition	was	authorized	by	 the	 secured	party	 in	 the	 security	agreement	or	
otherwise”205.	It	was	clarified	in	the	PEB	Commentary	that	the	secured	party	must	authorize	the	disposition	of	the	collateral	free	and	clear	of	the	security	interest,	and	whether	 it	 is	an	effective,	express	or	implied,	authorization	 is	a	question	of	fact206.	 The	 revised	 Article	 9	 adopts	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 PEB	 stressing	 and	adding	 the	 wording	 that	 the	 disposition	 must	 be	 authorized	 free	 and	 clear	 to	enable	 a	 third	 party	 to	 take	 free.	 Furthermore,	 whether	 a	 conditional	authorization,	 for	 instance,	 the	 consent	 to	 a	 disposition	 conditioned	 upon	 the	secured	 party’s	 receipt	 of	 the	 proceeds,	 constitutes	 an	 effective	 authorization	under	Section	9-315(a)(1)	is	at	the	court’s	discretion207.	Under	 the	 revised	 Article	 9,	 the	 secured	 party’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	 proceeds,	under	 Section	 9-315(a)(2)	 or	 under	 expressed	 terms	 of	 an	 agreement,	 is	 not																																																									202	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-507,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	985	203	Comment	6	to	the	UCC	§9-320,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	907	204	UCC	§9-315	205 Former	UCC	§9-306(2).	See	more	discussion	on	case	law	involving	the	former	UCC	9-306(2)	with	regard	to	express	and	unconditional;	conditional;	and	implied	authorization	in	Thomas	S,	‘The	role	of	Authorization	in	Title	Conflicts	Involving	Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	Some	American	Lessons’	(2014)		Common	Law	World	Review	29,	at	pp.	47-59	206	PEB	Commentary	No.3	Section	9-306(2)	and	9-402(7)	207	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-315,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	893	
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itself	 amounting	 to	an	effective	authorization	of	disposition208.	 In	 the	 context	of	title	 retention	 contractually	 expanding	 to	 the	 proceeds,	 Article	 9	 treats	 it	 as	 a	PMSI	 in	 the	 collateral	 and	 in	 the	 proceeds	 created	 by	 an	 agreement.	 In	 the	absence	of	an	explicit	term	authorizing	the	disposition	of	the	collateral	free	and	clear	of	the	security	interest,	even	in	the	case	of	inventory	collateral,	it	is	not	an	easy	 task	 for	 any	 purchaser	 to	 prove	 an	 effective	 authorization	 of	 disposition.	The	attachment	of	a	PMSI	or	any	general	security	interest	to	the	proceeds,	under	section	 9-315(2)	 or	 an	 agreement,	 does	 not	 manifest	 the	 secured	 party’s	intention	to	authorize	the	disposition	free	and	clear	of	the	security	interest.	It	is	instead	 a	 solution	 to	 cope	with	 the	 problem	of	 ostensible	 ownership.	 Taking	 a	security	 interest	 in	personal	property,	 though	 it	may	 seem	strange,	 is	 to	 follow	the	proceeds209.	To	this	extent,	the	status	of	collateral	as	equipment	or	inventory	is	not	taken	into	consideration.	When	the	collateral	is	inventory,	a	secured	party	assumingly	expects	 the	disposition	of	 the	collateral	 to	generate	the	proceeds	to	discharge	debts.		However,	the	existence	of	proceeds	clause	itself	is	probably	not	more	 than	 the	 authorization	of	 disposition	 subject	 to	 a	 security	 interest,	 and	 a	purchaser	 must	 prove	 more	 to	 constitute	 an	 authorization	 to	 dispose	 of	 the	collateral	free	and	clear.	After	all,	the	authority	to	sell	provision	does	not	have	a	great	 impact	 on	 a	 buyer	 in	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 who	 has	 a	 stronger	shelter	 of	 Article	 9-320(a)	 to	 take	 free	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 created	 by	 an	immediate	seller.	In	other	words,	checking	the	public	record	or	inquiring	into	the	authorization	 to	sell	 is	not	a	burden	 imposed	on	a	buyer	 in	ordinary	 course	of	business210	even	though	they	bear	the	risk	of	buying	from	a	seller	who	does	not	create	a	conflicting	security	interest.	
3.4.3.3 Buyers	receive	delivery	Even	though	a	buyer	is	not	qualified	as	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	or	proof	of	effective	authorization	cannot	be	established,	a	buyer	can	take	free	and	clear	of	a	security	interest	under	section	9-317(b).	Accordingly,	buyers	must	give	value	 and	 receive	 delivery	 of	 the	 collateral	 without	 knowledge	 of	 the	 security																																																									208	ibid	209 Wessman	MB,	see	n.	56,	at	p.	1286;	Scott	RE,	‘A	Relational	Theory	of	Secured	Financing’	(1986)	86	Columbia	Law	Review	90,	at	p.	925	210	Richard	HN,	see	n.	201,	at	p.	37	
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interest	 and	 before	 it	 is	 perfected211.	 	 A	 purchase-money	 secured	 party	 has	 a	grace	period	of	20	days	after	 the	debtor	 receives	delivery	of	 collateral	 to	 file	 a	financing	 statement212.	 Therefore,	 if	 a	 purchase-money	 secured	 party	 files	 a	financing	 statement	 timely	but	after	a	 buyer	 receives	delivery	of	 the	 collateral,	the	former	has	priority	over	the	latter,	but	subject	to	whether	the	latter	is	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	or	not.	
3.4.4 Purchase-money	secured	creditors	vs.	other	secured	creditors	Between	competing	secured	creditors,	Article	9	adopts	“the	first-in-time,	first-in-right”	principles	in	general,	and	it	relies	heavily	on	the	first-to-file-or-perfection	rule.	 A	 PMSI	 is	 an	 exception	 since	 it	may	 gain	 the	 priority	 superior	 to	 earlier	secured	 credits.	 This	 part	 discusses	 the	 general	 priority	 rules	 governing	conflicting	security	interests	first	and	then	proceeds	on	priority	rules	governing	PMSIs.	
3.4.4.1 “First-in-time,	first-in-right”	rule	The	 first-to-file-or-perfect	 rule	 applies	 to	 the	 competition	 between	 perfected	security	 interests.	Whenever	 two	conflicting	 security	 interests	are	unperfected,	the	 order	 of	 attachment	 governs	 the	 priority	 between	 them213.	 In	 Pet	 Food	
Experts214,	 the	 court	 found	 that	not	only	 two	competing	 security	 interests	were	not	perfected,	they	also	attached	to	the	collateral	simultaneously.	Because	Article	9	 fails	 to	govern	the	case,	 the	given	court	relied	on	equity	 to	give	 judgment	 for	the	creditor	having	after-acquired	property	clause.	The	Pet	Food	Experts’	ruling	is	that	the	priority	should	be	given	to	the	party	that	carried	the	most	diligence.		It	is	in	line	with	the	Article	9	first-to-file-or-perfect	rule	that	favours	the	diligent	party	who	 conducted	 a	 search	of	 other	 possible	 creditors	 and	 duly	 filed	 the	 security	interest215.		
																																																								211	UCC	§9-317(b)	212	UCC	§9-317(e)	213	UCC	§9-322(a)(3)	214	Pet	Food	Experts,	Inc.	v.	Alpha	Nutrition,	Inc.	(R.I.	Super,	2016)	215	ibid,	at	p.	18	and	footnote	13	
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With	respect	to	conflicting	perfected	security	interests	in	the	same	collateral,	the	first-to-file-or-perfection	rule	is	applied	and	interpreted	to	serve	the	purpose	of	the	notice	filing	system.		Section	9-322	provides	that	among	perfected	conflicting	security	 interests,	 the	 first-to-file	 one	 takes	 priority.	 The	 above	 priority	 rules	look	simple	at	first	glance,	but	it	raises	critical	questions	when	it	is	implemented	within	the	scheme	of	a	notice	filing	system.	In	a	simple	scenario	with	two	loans	from	two	creditors,	 the	 first-to-file	 loan	takes	priority.	 It	 is	not	always	the	case	when	 the	 first-to-file	 creditor	 makes	 future	 advances,	 or	 subsequently	 enters	new	 security	 agreements	 covering	 the	 collateral	 described	 in	 the	 pre-existing	financing	statement,	or	in	all	foregoing	situations,	the	debtor	paid	off	the	original	loan.	 	 A	 financing	 statement	may	 be	 filed	 initially	 to	 perfect	 a	 specific	 security	agreement.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 specific	 security	 agreement	 initiates	 a	 financing	statement	 to	 perfect	 the	 concerned	 security	 interest.	 However,	 a	 financing	statement	does	not	contain	much	information	except	for	the	debtor’s	name,	the	secured	party’s	name	and	 the	 indication	of	 the	 collateral.	The	 collateral	 can	be	described	 by	 categories	 or	 simply	 referred	 to	 “all	 asset”	 or	 “all	 personal	property”	that	does	not	reveal	any	specific	information.	It	does	not	indicate	any	security	agreement.	 In	 Interbusiness	Bank	v.	First	Nat.	Bank	of	Mifflin.,	the	 court	asserted	 that	 a	 financing	 statement	 did	 not	 necessarily	 refer	 to	 or	 have	 a	connection	with	any	specific	security	agreement;	 instead,	 it	covered	the	certain	collateral	that	was	possibly	subject	to	a	claim216.	In	In	re	Gilchrist	Company	and	In	
re	Comprehensive	Review	Technology,	Inc.,	the	courts	granted	judgment	for	future	advances	 and	 new	 security	 agreements	 covered	 by	 an	 earlier-filed	 financing	statement217.	 In	 In	re	Gilchrist	Company	and	 In	re	Oak	Rock	Fin.	case,	subsequent	security	agreements	covered	by	earlier-filed	 financing	statements	were	granted	first	priority	even	when	the	debtor	paid	off	the	original	loans218.	It	has	been	long	confirmed	that	a	financing	statement	and	a	security	agreement	are	not	 interrelated.	A	 financing	 statement	does	not	 cover	a	particular	security	agreement	but	 certain	 types	of	 collateral.	 For	this	policy,	 a	 financing	statement																																																									216	318	F.Supp	2nd	230	(M.D.	Pa,	2004),	at	pp.	240-1			217	403	F.Supp.	(197	E.D.Pa.,	1975);	and	138	B.R.	195	(Bankr.	S.D.Ohio,	1992)	respectively	218	See	In	re	Gilchrist	Company,	403	F.Supp.	(197	E.D.Pa.,	1975),	In	re	Oak	Rock	Fin.,	LLC,	527	B.R.	105	(Bankr.	E.D.N.Y.,	2015),	at	pp.	119-121	
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can	be	filed	under	the	authorization	of	a	debtor	or	a	potential	debtor	prior	to	the	formation	of	a	security	interest	or	the	attachment	of	a	security	interest.	The	filing	date	of	an	initial	financing	statement	is	effective	with	regard	to	multiple	security	agreements,	 both	 previously	 and	 subsequently	 executed,	 so	 long	 as	 succeeding	continuation	 statements	 are	 duly	 filed	 to	 continue	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 initial	financing	 statement.	 A	 financing	 statement	 is	 effective	 for	 five	 years	 after	 the	date	 of	 filing.	 It	 will	 lapse	 on	 the	 expiration	 of	 the	 effective	 period	 unless	 a	continuation	statement	is	filed	within	six	months	before	the	end	of	this	period219.	Filing	 a	 separate	 financing	 statement	 is	 not	 required	 for	 every	 transaction,	provided	 that	 a	 transaction	 is	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 pre-existing	 financing	statement;	otherwise	prescribed,	it	would	nullify	the	purpose	of	notice	filing220.	Although	filing	is	a	method	of	perfection,	thanks	to	pre-filing,	it	separately	set	up	a	priority	date	 for	 the	concerned	security	 interest	 that	 is	not	dependent	on	the	date	 of	 perfection.	 When	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 filed	 before	 it	 attaches	 to	 the	collateral,	the	given	security	interest	is	perfected	at	the	time	of	attachment,	but	it	enjoys	 the	 priority	 according	 to	 the	 time	 of	 filing.	 The	 first-priority	 security	interest	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 future	 advance	 or	 after-acquired	 property	 can	 be	maintained	 even	 though	 at	 the	 time	 of	 filing,	 both	 parties	 did	 not	 have	 any	agreement	or	any	intention	to	include	a	subsequent	security	agreement	or	after-acquired	 property	 or	 future	 advance 221 .	 In	 brief,	 the	 notice	 filing	 system	accompanied	by	 the	 limited	 requirement	of	 information	and	pre-filing	 capacity	enable	 a	 financing	 statement	 to	 cover	multiple	 security	 agreements	 having	 the	collateral	as	described.	Under	 a	 notice	 filing	 system,	 a	 financing	 statement	 is	 floated	 to	 cover	 all	 the	assets	 or	 personal	 properties	 of	 the	 debtor	 in	 order	 to	 perfect	 any	 security	agreement	bearing	 the	 same	debtor,	 creditor	and	collateral	within	 the	 scope	of	the	statement,	and	sets	up	the	date	of	priority	for	the	security	interest	at	hand.	In	combination	with	 the	 recognition	 of	 floating	 lien	 under	 the	 provision	 of	 after-acquired	property,	a	floating	financing	statement	empowers	the	secured	creditor																																																									219	UCC	§9-515(b)	and	(c).	220	Comment	2	 to	 the	UCC	§9-322,	 see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	910;	See	 In	re	Gilchrist	Company,	403	F.Supp.	(197	E.D.Pa.,	1975),	at	p.	202	221	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-502,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	973	
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a	 great	 advantage	 over	 other	 creditors.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 leave	nothing	 for	 the	 debtor	 to	 create	 the	 first	 security	 interest	 in	 favour	 of	subsequently	filed	creditors.	
3.4.4.2 Priority	rule	of	purchase-money	security	interest	To	have	the	 first	priority,	a	PMSI	must	satisfy	the	requirement	of	section	9-324	that	is	classified	according	to	the	types	of	collateral,	namely	(1)	general	or	non-inventory	purchase-money	priority,	 (2)	 inventory	purchase-money	priority,	 (3)	livestock	purchase-money	priority	and	(4)	software	purchase-money	priority.	The	 priority	 rule	 with	 regard	 to	 general	 purchase-money	 and	 inventory	purchase-money	priority	will	be	discussed	 in	detail.	Livestock	and	software	are	special	collateral	in	the	context	of	the	USA	that	can	be	left	out	of	the	discussion	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis.	a. Non-inventory	purchase	money	security	interest	The	 general	 rule	 for	 purchase-money	 priority	 provided	 in	 the	 sub-section	 9-324(a)	applies	to	all	collateral	except	for	inventory,	farm	products	livestock	and	software.	Inventory	are	goods,	other	than	farm	products,	which	“are	leased	by	a	
person	 as	 a	 lessor”,	 or	 “are	 held	 by	 a	 person	 for	 sale	 or	 lease	 or	 to	 be	 furnished	
under	 a	 contract	 of	 service”,	 or	 “are	 furnished	 by	 a	 person	 under	 a	 contract	 of	
service”,	 or	 “consist	 of	 raw	 materials,	 work	 in	 process,	 or	 materials	 used	 or	
consumed	in	a	business”222.	The	 implied	 criterion	of	 the	 term	 “inventory”	 is	 that	the	sales	or	leases	are	or	will	be	in	the	debtor’s	ordinary	course	of	business223.	The	 creditor	 may	 lose	 an	 incentive	 to	 perfect	 her	 interest	 early	 because	 the	purchase-money	priority	is	non-temporal.	Thus,	to	take	priority	over	an	earlier-perfected	 conflicting	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 same	 collateral,	 a	 PMSI	 must	 be	perfected	when	the	debtor	receives	possession	of	the	collateral	or	within	twenty	days	 after	 that224.	 The	 purchase-money	 creditor’s	 knowledge	 of	 pre-existing	
																																																								222	UCC	§9-102(a)(48)	223	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-102,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	817	224	UCC	§9-324(a)	
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conflicting	 security	 interest	 or	 that	 other	 creditor	 has	 filed	 against	 the	 same	collateral	does	not	disqualify	the	purchase-money	status225.	Timely	 perfection	 is	 necessary	 to	 protect	 potential	 creditors	 who	 rely	 on	 the	debtor’s	possession	and	the	accuracy	of	the	public	record	to	deal	with	the	debtor.	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 filing	 system	 does	 not	 call	 for	 labeling	 the	 security	interest	as	a	purchase-money	one.	Searchers	do	not	have	information	about	the	status	 of	 collateral.	 To	 potential	 creditors	who	may	 have	 a	 later-in-time	 filing,	purchase-money	or	non-purchase-money	collateral	is	meaningless	in	any	dealing	with	the	debtor.	Nonetheless,	without	the	requirement	of	timely	perfected	PMSI,	potential	 creditors	would	 have	 been	misled	 by	 the	 debtor	 in	 possession	 if	 the	purchase-money	 creditor	 had	 delayed	 her	 filing.	 It	 would	 have	 resulted	 in	relatively	 serious	 consequence	 because	 a	 later-in-time	 filed	 PMSI	 has	 the	 first	priority.	 The	 twenty-day	 grace	 period	 allowed	 for	 non-inventory	 purchase-money	priority	may	place	the	PMSI	in	secret	temporarily.	The	grace	period	bonus	is	 justified	on	 the	ground	 that	 it	 is	 the	business	practice	of	 filing	after	delivery	regarding	 non-inventory	 purchase-money	 collateral226.	 To	 earlier-in-time	 filed	creditors	with	after-acquired	property	clause,	the	public	record	does	not	reveal	much	 information	about	an	 intervening	security	 interest,	 that	 is	whether	 it	 is	a	PMSI	that	makes	pre-existing	 interests	 to	be	subordinate.	Again,	before	making	additional	 advances	 against	 the	 debtor’s	 new	 property,	 it	 is	 strategic	 to	make	further	inquiries.		The	question	about	when	the	debtor	“receives	possession”	of	the	collateral	is	also	in	 dispute	 since	 Article	 9	 does	 not	 define	 the	 term	 “possession”.	 It	 is	 worth	mentioning	 that	 the	 term	 “receives	 possession”	 is	 interpreted	 correspondingly	with	 respect	 to	 the	 trigger	 date	 running	 the	 grace	 period	 for	 non-inventory	collateral	 and	 the	 time	 of	 giving	 notification	 for	 inventory	 purchase-money	priority227.	 Possession	 in	Article	 9	 is	mentioned	 in	 two	 contexts:	 (1)	within	 the	scheme	 of	 notice	 filing	where	 the	 debtor	 possesses	 the	 collateral,	 and	 (2)	 as	 a																																																									225	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	919	226	Comment	to	the	former	UCC	§9-312,	cited	in	Gilmore	G,	‘The	Purchase	Money	Priority’	(1963)	76	Harvard	Law	Review	1333,	at	p.	1387	227	See	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	920,	and	Gilmore	G,	see	n.	15	,	at	p.	799	
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method	 of	 perfection 228 .	 Court	 decisions	 show	 the	 split	 of	 authority	 in	interpreting	 the	 term	 “possession”:	 a	 line	 of	 cases	 employed	 the	 obligation	standard,	while	the	other	applied	the	physical	control	standard229.	Although	constructive	possession	is	treated	as	analogous	to	actual	possession	in	some	 circumstances,	 the	 draftsman	 of	 the	 original	UCC,	 Gilmore	 in	 his	 treatise	
Security	 Interests	 in	 Personal	 Property	 interprets	 possession	 as	 the	 debtor’s	physical	 possession	 at	 her	 place	 of	 business.	 The	 Kunkel	 court230 	relied	 on	Gilmore’s	interpretation	to	give	judgment	for	the	purchase-money	creditor	since	the	debtor	had	never	obtained	possession	of	the	collateral	to	trigger	the	date	of	giving	 notice	 as	 a	 condition	 to	 perfect	 an	 inventory	 PMSI231.	 In	 In	re	Automatic	
Bookbinding	Service,	Inc.232,	 it	was	held	that	possession	was	received	at	 the	time	all	the	installments	were	delivered	at	the	place	of	the	debtor/buyer	rather	than	the	later	time	when	the	goods	were	fully	installed	to	complete	tender	of	delivery	terms.	 The	 given	 court	 cited	 Gilmore	 to	 highlight	 physical	 possession	 and	clarified	 the	meaning	 of	 possession	 under	 the	 notion	 of	 ostensible	 ownership.	The	 commentary	 to	 the	 section	 9-324	 also	 indicates	 that	 the	 debtor	 receives	possession	of	collateral	in	this	context	when	component	parts	of	the	goods	are	in	possession	 of	 the	 debtor.	 This	 situation	 is	 sufficient	 to	 impress	other	 potential	lenders	that	the	debtor	acquires	interests	in	the	goods	as	a	whole233.	The	 situation	 where	 the	 debtor	 receives	 possession	 under	 a	 non-Article	 9	transaction	and	later	buys	the	goods	subject	to	the	secured	credit	is	complicated	due	to	the	competition	between	the	physical	control	standard	and	the	obligation	standard.		It	is	better	to	discuss	the	obligation	standard	with	respect	to	the	given	issue	before	moving	to	the	physical	standard	since	the	leading	case	Brodie	Hotel	
Supply,	Inc.	v.	United	States	234	set	up	a	cornerstone	for	the	obligation	standard	but	then	 were	 mentioned	 or	 distinguished	 in	 many	 cases	 adopting	 the	 physical																																																									228	ibid,	at	p.	522	229 Citizens	Bank	v.	FED.	Financial	Services,	509	S.E.2d	339,	235	Ga.	App.	482	(Ga.	App.,	1998),	at	p.	340	230	Kunkel	v.	Sprague	National	Bank,	128	F.3d	636	(C.A.8	(Minn.),	1997)	231	See	UCC	§9-324(b)(3)	for	the	requirement	of	inventory	purchase-money	priority	that	will	be	discussed	latter.		232	471	F.2d,	546,	11	U.C.C.	Rep.Serv.	897	(4th	Cir.,	1972)	233	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	919	234	431	F.2d	1316	(9th	Cir.,	1970)	
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control	 approach.	 In	 Brodie,	 Lyon	 (the	 debtor)	 “took	 possession”	 of	 the	restaurant	including	equipment	from	Brodie	several	months	before	he	entered	a	bill	 of	 sale	executed	a	 chattel	mortgage	with	Brodie,	 and	a	 financing	 statement	was	 filed	 to	 secure	 the	 unpaid	 purchase	 price	 of	 the	 equipment235.	 The	Brodie	court	held	that	the	trigger	date	for	ten-day	grace	period236	is	when	Lyon	became	a	debtor	 for	 purposes	 of	 Article	 9	 irrespective	 of	 the	 debtor	 had	 possessed	 the	equipment	 long	 before.	 The	 given	 court	 relied	 on	 the	 definition	 in	 Article	 9	describing	a	debtor	as	 “a	person	who	owes	payment	or	other	performance	of	the	
obligation	 secured” 237 	to	 argue	 that	 Lyon	 did	 not	 owe	 performance	 of	 the	obligation	 secured	 by	 the	 collateral	 until	 the	 time	 of	 the	 bill	 of	 sale238.	 	 Thus,	Brodie	timely	perfected	its	PMSI	to	prevail	over	the	earlier-filed	security	interest.		Disputes	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 a	 sale	 on	 approval239	and	 a	 lease-purchase	transaction240	are	 common	situations	where	a	purchase-money	creditor	did	not	perfect	 a	 PMSI	 at	 the	 time	 a	 debtor	 physically	 possess	 the	 goods	 under	 the	bailment	 and	 the	 lease	 respectively.	 That	 the	 debtor	 physically	 possessed	property	 before	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 security	 agreement	 may	 raise	 the	 question	whether	 this	 security	 interest	 qualifies	 for	 the	 purchase-money	 status.	 As	discussed	elsewhere	in	this	chapter,	the	later	passing	of	the	title	and	the	“closely	




However,	 in	 James	 Talcott,	 Inc.	 v.	 Associates	 Capital	 Company,	 Inc	242,	 the	 lease-option	agreement	bound	the	debtor	retroactively	as	of	the	delivery	date,	and	the	leasee/buyer	possessed	the	equipment	as	a	“debtor”	at	the	date	of	delivery243.		In	
In	 Re	Micheals244,	 the	 court	 found	 that,	 unlike	 Brodie,	 the	 eventual	 debtor	 was	obligated	to	purchase	the	equipment	since	he	signed	purchase	orders	that	 took	place	before	delivery245.	The	In	Re	Michaels	court	went	further	by	acknowledging	the	physical	control	standard	as	a	better	approach	and	criticizing	the	obligation	standard246.	 The	 physical	 control	 standard	 is	 considered	 to	 reduce	 “the	 risk	 of	
mistaken	 reliance	 by	 potential	 or	 existing	 creditors	 on	 the	 debtor's	 apparent	
ownership	 of	 assets”	 and	 promote	 “the	 underlying	 policies	 of	 the	 Uniform	
Commercial	Code	in	affording	certainty,	predictability	for	commercial	transactions,	
and	 public	 disclosure” 247 .	 Meanwhile,	 the	 obligation	 standard	 “provides	 an	
opportunity	 for	 mischief	 and	 transforms	 the	 20-day	 grace	 period	 into	 an	 open-
ended	 time	 for	perfection”	 and	 discourages	 early	 filing	 and	 the	 policy	 of	 timely	perfection	with	 respect	 to	purchase-money	priority	248.	 Furthermore,	 it	neglects	the	 ostensible	 ownership	 problem	 arising	 from	 the	 time	 the	 debtor	 physically	possesses	the	collateral249.	 It	allows	the	purchase-money	priority	 to	be	effective	by	subsequent	events,	such	as	signing	the	contract	of	sale	or	execution	of	security	agreement	that	cannot	be	observed	by	third	parties250.	Additionally,	the	meaning	of	the	term	“debtor”	or	“collateral”	in	the	phrase	“the	debtor	receives	possession	of	
the	collateral”	is	inconsistent	with	the	respective	term	“debtor”	or	“collateral”	in	a	financing	statement.	“Debtor”	and	“collateral”	indicated	in	a	financing	statement	are	 not	 factors	 reflecting	 an	 existing	 creditor-debtor	 relationship	 since	 filing	 a	financing	 statement	 can	 precede	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 security	 agreement.	 The	
																																																								242 491	F.2d	879	(6th	Cir.,	1974)	243	ibid,	at	p.	883	244 156	B.R.	584	(Bankr.	E.D.	Wis.,	1993)	245	ibid,	at	p.	590	246	ibid,	at	p.	590-1	247	ibid,	at	p.	590	248	ibid,	 at	 p.	 591.	 See	 Cornman	 J,	 ‘When	 Is	 a	Debtor	 "In	 Possession"	Under	U.C.C.	 §	 9-312(4)?’	(1987)	19	Arizona	State	Law	Journal	261	249	Baird	DG	and	Jackson	TH,	see	n.	8,	at	p.	198	250	ibid,	at	p.	199	
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obligation	standard	is	also	inconsistent	with	the	meaning	of	possession	in	other	disputes	like	Kunkel	or	Automatic	Bookbinding	Services251.		If	 it	 is	 agreed	 that	 filing	 is	 a	 good	 method	 to	 solve	 the	 ostensible	 ownership	problem	 arising	 from	 non-possessory	 secured	 credit252 ,	 Article	 9	 would	 be	applied	 uniformly	 if	 the	 physical	 control	 standard	 rather	 than	 the	 obligation	standard	 were	 adopted	 to	 determining	 the	 grace	 period.	 The	 physical	 control	approach	ensures	predictability	and	certainty	for	commercial	transactions	that	is	the	underlying	policy	and	purposes	of	Article	9	and	the	UCC253.		However,	 there	 is	 the	 criticism	of	 the	 physical	 control	 standard.	 This	 standard	focuses	 on	 disguised	 security	 interests	 and	 ignores	 a	 true	 lease	 or	 a	 true	bailment254.	It	does	not	consider	that	non-Article	9	transactions	do	not	fall	within	the	filing	scheme,	so	it	is	unfair	to	require	given	transactions	to	be	filed	in	order	to	 protect	 the	 eventual	 PMSI255.	 The	 physical	 control	 standard	 also	 ruins	 the	commercial	utility	of	transactions	like	a	sale	on	approval	or	lease	with	purchase	option256.	The	 adoption	 of	 the	 obligation	 standard	 and	 the	 physical	 control	 standard	 in	interpreting	 the	 phrase	 “debtor	 receives	 possession”	 results	 in	 the	 split	 of	authority.	 Nonetheless,	 cases	 like	 Talcott	 and	 In	 re	 Michaels,	 even	 though	categorized	 in	 the	 physical	 control	 line	 of	 cases257,	 still	 looked	 to	 “obligated”	factor.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 grace	 period	 was	 triggered	 at	 the	 time	 of	 actual	possession	because	the	debtor	was	found	to	be	obligated	at	this	time.	In	Citizens	









received,	 believing	 that	 she	 has	 the	 first	 priority	 in	 the	 new	 inventory264 .	However,	 a	 fraudulent	 debtor	may	 grant	 the	 PMSI	 in	 the	 inventory	 to	 another	creditor265.	 When	 the	 inventory	 secured	 creditor	 learns	 about	 the	 up-coming	inventory	encumbered	by	a	super-priority	PMSI,	she	may	consider	not	 to	make	an	advance	 that	 is	 subordinate	 to	another	 interest.	Notification	 is	not	 required	for	 non-inventory	 purchase-money	 priority	 because	 periodic	 advances	 against	up-coming	 goods	 are	 unusual	 in	 financing	 equipment	 and	 consumer	 goods266.	Notification	 must	 be	 authenticated267.	 It	 does	 not	 limit	 to	 written	 form	 but	encompassing	 authentication	 of	 all	 records,	 that	 is	 both	 intangible	 form	 and	tangible	form268.	Parties	to	be	notified	are	creditors	who	have	filed	“a	financing	statement	covering	
the	 same	 types	 of	 inventory	 prior	 to	 the	 date	 of	 filing	 of	 the	 PMSI”269.	 Overall,	 a	purchase-money	 creditor	 is	 only	 required	 to	 send	 a	 notification	 to	 earlier-filed	creditors	who	have	a	security	interest	in	the	same	inventory.	A	purchase-money	creditor	 should	 search	 the	 public	 record	 to	 identify	 earlier-filed	 creditors	 and	send	the	notification	to	the	address	provided	in	the	relevant	financing	statement.	An	earlier-filed	creditor	is	considered	to	receive	notification	when	it	is	delivered	to	this	address270.	The	 notification	 should	 be	 sent	 within	 five	 years	 before	 the	 debtor	 receives	possession	 of	 the	 collateral271.	 It	 does	 not	 matter	 that	 a	 holder	 of	 conflicting	inventory	security	interests	receives	notification	before	or	after	the	PMSI	is	filed,	so	long	as	both	the	perfection	of	PMSI	and	receipt	of	notification	occur	before	a	debtor	receives	possession	of	the	inventory.	In	Kunkel	as	discussed	above,	which	is	 decided	 under	 the	 former	UCC,	 the	 debtor	was	 held	 not	 ever	 to	 possess	 the	inventory	 to	 trigger	 the	 date	 determining	 the	 period	 of	 giving	 notification.	 In	other	words,	since	the	debtor	had	never	possessed	the	inventory,	the	purchase-																																																								264	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	920	265	ibid	266	ibid	267	UCC	§9-324(b)(2)	268	See	UCC	§9-102(a)(7),	(70)	and	Comment	9	to	UCC	§9-102,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.823-4	269	UCC	§9-324(c)(1)	270	Comment	6	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	920	271	UCC	§9-324(b)(3)	
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money	creditor	was	not	required	to	give	notification	to	the	holder	of	conflicting	inventory	security	interests.	The	commentary	to	the	revised	UCC	agrees	with	the	
Kunkel	court’s	ruling	to	recognize	the	super-priority	of	perfected	PMSI	even	if	the	notification	is	not	given	to	the	extent	that	the	debtor	never	receives	possession	of	the	 collateral272 .	 A	 purchase-money	 secured	 party	 is	 not	 required	 to	 send	notification	separately	for	each	time	she	expects	to	acquire	the	PMSI,	that	is,	for	each	 time	 the	 debtor	 receives	 possession	 of	 the	 inventory,	 so	 long	 as	 the	inventory	 described	 in	 the	 notification	 are	 corresponding	 to	 the	 inventory	delivered273.	A	notification	should	state	that	“the	person	sending	the	notification	has	or	expects	
to	acquire	a	PMSI	in	inventory	of	the	debtor”	and	describe	the	inventory274.	Article	9	 and	 relevant	 commentary	 do	 not	 give	 any	 instruction	 on	 how	 detailed	 and	precise	 a	 notification	 should	 be.	 However,	 a	 notification	 should	 function	 as	 a	warning	to	earlier-filed	creditors	holding	conflicting	 inventory	security	 interest	about	 the	 first-priority	 encumbrance	 on	 the	 up-coming	 inventory275.	 Several	cases	under	the	former	UCC	showed	many	situations	that	a	notification	qualified	the	requirement	for	the	super-priority	status	of	a	perfected	PMSI276.	In	Fedders277,	the	 court	held	 that	 the	description	 listing	 a	 line	 of	 inventory	was	 sufficient	 for	purposes	of	inventory	purchase-money	priority	and	rejected	the	contention	that	inventory	 must	 be	 described	 by	 the	 serial	 number278.	 The	 notification	 in	 In	 re	
Daniels279	did	not	 contain	 the	 term	 “purchase-money”,	 rather,	 it	mentioned	 that	concerned	the	bank	“[had]taken,	or	[planned]	to	take	a	security	interest”	in	a	line	of	collateral	including	inventory280.	However,	the	bank	was	held	to	have	a	super-priority	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 prior-filed	 creditor	 could	 not	 be	 misled	 nor	
																																																								272	Comment	5	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.920	273	Fedders	Financial	Corp.	v.	Chiarelli	Bros.,	Inc.,	221	Pa.Super.	224	(Pa.	Super.,	1972),	at	p.	231	274	UCC	§9-324(b)(3)	275	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	920	276	The	former	section	9-312(3)(c)	provides	for	the	description	of	inventory	“by	item	or	type”.	The	phrase	“by	item	or	type”	is	abolished	in	the	revised	section	9-324(b)(4)	277	Fedders	Financial	Corp.,	see	n.	273	278	ibid	279	In	re	Daniels,	35	B.R.	247	(Bankr.W.D.Okla.,	1983)	280	ibid,	at	p.	248	
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confused	 by	 a	 notification	 letter	 that	 only	 a	 purchase-money	 creditor	 was	required	to	send281.	c. Purchase-money	security	interests	in	proceeds	The	priority	in	the	debtor’s	asset	subject	to	a	security	interest	is	extending	to	its	proceeds	irrespective	of	the	security	agreement,	or	the	financing	statement	does	not	 include	 the	 proceeds	 as	 the	 collateral 282 .	 The	 proceeds,	 in	 general,	 is	automatically	 perfected.	 If	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	 collateral	 is	perfected,	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 proceeds	 is	 perfected,	 too283.	 The	 effective	period	of	an	automatically	perfected	security	interest	in	proceeds	is	twenty	days	running	 from	 the	 date	 of	 attachment.	 On	 the	 21st	 day,	 the	 security	 interest	 in	proceeds	becomes	unperfected	unless	 it	has	a	 continuance	of	perfection284.	The	identifiable	 cash	 proceeds	 including	 “money,	 checks,	 deposit	 account	 and	 the	
like”285 	remain	 perfected	 indefinitely	 if	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	collateral	 is	 perfected286.	 However,	 the	 perfection	 of	 cash	 proceeds	 does	 not	depend	 on	 the	 continuance	 of	 perfection	 of	 the	 original	 collateral287.	 Thus,	 the	cash	 proceeds	 receive	 further	 protection	 than	 pure	 cash	 collateral.	 The	 only	methods	to	perfect	deposit	account	or	money	as	original	collateral	are	control	or	possession	respectively288.	For	non-cash	proceeds	that	are	defined	as	“proceeds	other	than	cash	proceeds”289,	perfection	 other	 than	 automatic	 perfection	 should	 be	 done	 timely	 to	 keep	 the	perfection	 runs	 continuously.	 Timely	 perfection	 is	 necessary	 to	 avoid	 a	 gap	 of	unperfected	status	between	the	automatic	perfection	and	the	next	perfection.	A	security	interest	in	proceeds	should	be	perfected	by	a	financing	statement	or	an																																																									281	ibid,	at	p.	251	282	UCC	§9-315(a)(2)	and	§9-203(f)	283	UCC	§9-315(c)	284	UCC	§9-315(d)	and	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-315,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	893	285	UCC	§9-102(a)(9)	286	UCC	§9-315(d)(2)	287	UCC	§9-315(d)(2)	and	Comment	7	to	the	UCC	§9-315,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	894	288	See	UCC	§9-312(b)(1),	(3)	and	Comment	5	to	the	UCC	§9-312,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	885.	Accordingly,	perfection	by	control	arises	from	an	agreement	among	the	secured	party,	debtor	and	bank.	The	bank	complies	with	instructions	of	the	secured	party	with	respect	to	disposition	of	the	funds	on	deposit,	although	the	debtor	retains	the	rights	to	direct	such	disposition.	289	UCC	§9-102(a)(58)	
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amendment	when	 the	 attachment	 of	 the	 proceeds	 occurs	 or	within	 the	 20-day	period	of	 automatic	 perfection290	.	 A	 continuously	 perfected	 security	 interest	 in	proceeds,	thus,	enjoy	the	time	of	filing	or	perfection	as	to	the	security	interest	in	the	 original	 collateral291.	 	 However,	 if	 the	 proceeds	 are	 the	 kind	 of	 collateral	perfected	by	filing	a	financing	statement,	and	it	is	not	obtained	by	cash	proceeds,	it	is	otherwise	perfected292	without	taking	further	steps.		The	 proceeds	 collateral	 can	 be	 perfected	 as	 after-acquired	 property	 to	 achieve	the	 same	result	 if	 the	 financing	 statement	 covers	 the	 type	of	 the	proceeds.	For	instances,	 a	 financing	 statement	 describes	 the	 collateral	 as	 inventory	 and	receivable	account.	The	account,	therefore,	is	both	the	proceeds	of	the	inventory	and	the	after-acquired	collateral.	However,	the	distinction	between	the	proceeds	and	 the	 after-acquired	 property	 is	 particularly	 meaningful	 in	 the	 bankruptcy	context.	The	property	acquired	after	the	commencement	of	the	bankruptcy	case	is	not	subject	to	a	security	interest	created	before	that	time293.	On	the	other	hand,	this	 rule	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	 the	 collateral	 subject	 to	 a	 pre-bankruptcy	security	agreement294.	Basically,	 the	purchase-money	priority	 is	extending	to	the	 identifiable	proceeds	of	 purchase-money	 collateral	 so	 long	 as	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 proceeds	 is	perfected	under	the	general	rules	as	discussed	above295.	However,	the	distinction	between	cash	proceeds	and	non-cash	proceeds	is	additionally	essential	since	the	two	categories	have	different	treatments	with	regard	to	the	inventory	purchase-money	 priority.	 The	 purchase-money	 super-priority	 in	 inventory	 is	 only	extending	to	 identifiable	cash	proceeds	“received	on	or	before	the	delivery	of	the	
inventory	 to	 a	 buyer”296.	 In	 Sony	 Corp.	 of	 America	 v.	 Bank	 One,	 West	 Virginia,	
Huntington	NA	297,	the	issue	before	the	court	is	whether	the	buyer’s	check	dated	one	day	 later	 than	 the	shipment	were	 the	 cash	proceeds	 received	 “on	or	before																																																									290	UCC	§9-315(d)(3)	291	UCC	§9-322(b)(1)	292	UCC	§9-315(d)(1)	293	11	U.S.C	§522	294	ibid	295	UCC	§9-324(a)	and	Comment	8	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.921	296	UCC	§9-324(b)	297	85	F.3d	131	(C.A.4	(W.Va.),	1996)	
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the	 delivery”	 of	 the	 goods298.	 The	 court	 argued	 that	 the	 term	 “on	 or	 before	 the	
delivery”	aimed	at	distinguishing	cash	proceeds	and	account	proceeds299.	In	other	words,	 the	 UCC	 draftsmen	 differentiated	 transactions	 in	 which	 buyers	 pay	 in	cash	 from	 transactions	parties	 set	up	a	 credit	 arrangement300.	The	debtor	Sony	and	 the	 buyer	were	 found	 to	 arrange	 a	 cash	 transaction	 rather	 than	 a	 sale	 on	credit.	It	was	held	that	in	the	modern	business	these	days,	slight	delay	between	unloading	of	goods	and	the	issuance	of	a	check	in	payment	 for	those	goods	had	been	reasonably	expected	and	not	attributed	to	the	extension	credit	to	the	buyer	for	 that	 short	 period	 of	 time301.	 Thus,	 the	 inventory	 purchase-money	 priority	extended	to	the	cash	proceeds	of	inventory.	The	Kunkel	court	followed	Sony	Corp.	and	additionally	explained	that	a	cash	sale	was	a	sale	in	which	the	seller	did	not	expressly	extend	credit	to	the	buyer	regardless	of	delay	in	payment302.		The	 distinction	 between	 the	 purchase-money	 priority	 in	 inventory	 and	 non-inventory	 collateral	 is	 justified	by	differences	 between	 inventory	 financing	and	non-inventory	 financing.	 Account	 or	 receivable	 financers	 seldom	 rely	 on	accounts	 generated	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 equipment,	 whereas	 they	 rely	 on	 account	generated	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 inventory303.	 The	 policy	 on	 its	 face	 seems	 to	 favour	account	 financiers	 and	 put	 inventory	 financiers	 in	 a	 disadvantageous	 position.	Inventory	 financiers	 cannot	 follow	 the	 collateral	 sold	 in	 the	ordinary	 course	of	the	 debtor’s	 business,	 and	 their	 entitlement	 to	 the	 proceeds	 is	 limited	 to	 cash	proceeds.	 However,	 this	 policy	 is	 justified	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 cash	 generated	from	 an	 account	 financier	 is	 used	 for	 paying	 the	 inventory	 financing 304 .	Furthermore,	 the	 cross-collateralization	 is	 solely	 accepted	 with	 regard	 to	inventory	 PMSIs	where	 the	 new	 purchase-money	 inventory	 collateral	 replaces	the	old	one.	
																																																								298	ibid,	at	p.	136	299	ibid	300	ibid,	at	p.	137	301	ibid	302	Kunkel,	at	p.	646	303	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	see	n.	174,	at	3-72;	Comment	8	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.921	304	Comment	8	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.921	
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d. PMSI	in	commingled	goods,	accession,	products	or	mass	The	 collateral	may	 be	 put	 in	processing	 or	manufacturing	 that	 their	 identity	 is	lost.	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	 collateral	 becomes	 commingled	 goods	 which	 are	defined	 as	 “goods	 that	 are	 physically	 united	with	 other	 goods	 in	 such	 a	manner	
that	their	identity	is	lost	in	a	product	or	mass”305.	Article	9	does	not	have	specific	rules	with	regard	to	PMSI	 in	 this	respect.	 In	other	words,	 the	general	rules	will	apply.	 A	 security	 interest	 does	 not	 remain	 in	 the	 original	 collateral	 that	 has	become	 the	 commingled	 goods	 since	 the	 identity	 thereof	 is	 lost	 in	 the	manufacturing	 process306.	 However,	 the	 security	 interest	 attaches	 the	 resulting	product	or	mass307.	 If	 the	original	collateral	 is	perfected,	a	security	 interest	 in	a	product	or	mass	is	perfected	and	enjoys	the	filing	date	of	the	original	collateral	to	establish	priority308.	Although	 the	provision	of	Article	9	 is	 silent,	 the	 respective	official	 comment	 clarifies	 that	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 product	 and	 mass	cannot	 exceed	 the	 value	 of	 the	 debt	 secured	 by	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	commingled	goods309.	When	a	product	or	mass	is	made	from	more	than	one	types	of	commingled	goods	subject	to	many	security	interests	of	different	creditors,	the	security	interests	rank	equally	in	proportion	to	the	value	of	the	collateral	at	the	time	it	became	commingled	goods,	regardless	of	the	purchase-money	status310.		Article	9	distinguishes	accession	from	commingled	goods.	Accession	is	defined	to	be	“goods	physically	united	with	other	goods	in	such	a	manner	that	the	identity	of	
the	 original	 goods	 is	 not	 lost”311.	 Section	 9-335	 governs	 a	 security	 interest	 in	accession	 in	a	minimal	way.	The	 security	 interest	 continues	 in	 the	accession312,	and	 the	 accession	 remains	 perfected	 so	 long	 as	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	original	collateral	is	perfected313.	An	accession	financier	can	remove	an	accession	from	 other	 goods	 if	 she	 has	 priority	 over	 the	 claims	 of	 other	 parties	 in	 the																																																									305	UCC	§9-336(a)	306	UCC	§9-336(b)	and	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-336,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	949	307	UCC	§9-336(c)	308	UCC	§9-336(d),	(e)	309	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-336,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	949	310	UCC	§9-336(f)(2)	and	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-336,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	949	311	UCC	§9-102(a)(1)	312	UCC	§9-335(a)	313	UCC	§9-335(b)	
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whole314.	 However,	 she	 is	 required	 to	 reimburse	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 repair	 of	 any	physical	 injury	 to	 other	 goods	 or	 the	 whole315.	 This	 section	 does	 not	 answer	whether	an	accession	financier	acquires	a	security	interest	in	a	whole;	and	if	yes,	whether	 she	 has	 a	 perfected	 security	 interest	 in	 a	whole316.	 The	 priority	 rules	with	regard	to	an	accession	borrow	from	the	general	rules	of	priority	 including	the	 priority	 of	 a	 PMSI317.	 Having	 a	 good	 financing	 statement	 and	 a	 timely	notification,	 a	purchase-money	 secured	creditor	always	has	priority	over	other	inventory	financiers	as	to	the	items	described	regardless	of	later	filing.	However,	a	security	interest	in	an	accession	is	always	subordinate	to	a	security	interest	in	the	 whole	 that	 is	 perfected	 in	 compliance	 with	 a	 certificate-of-title	 statute	covering	almost	all	 kinds	of	motor	vehicles318.	 It	 can	be	 said	 that	Section	9-335	gives	relatively	clear	and	concise	rules	to	the	area	of	accession	financing319.	
3.5 Concluding	remarks	Under	 the	 unitary	 approach	 and	 functionalism	 adopted	 by	 Article	 9,	 title	retention,	like	other	devices	that	secure	payment	or	performance	of	obligations,	regardless	of	forms,	is	treated	as	a	security	interest.	The	unitary	approach,	which	brings	 together	 requisites	 and	 formalities	 for	 security	 interests	 into	 a	 single	statute,	was	triggered	to	solve	the	segmental	and	complicated	status	of	 the	 law	on	secured	transactions	prior	to	the	publication	of	the	UCC.	It	should	be	stressed	that	 the	 dynamic	 of	 creating	 new	security	 devices	 by	 function,	 the	 adoption	of	functionalism	 in	 pre-Code	 statutes	 corresponding	 to	 new	 devices	 and	 the	federalist	system	in	the	United	States	context	considerably	result	in	demand	for	the	 unitary	 treatment	 of	 security	 interest.	 Functionalism	 strongly	 supports	 the	unitary	 approach	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 restrains	 the	 differentiation	 among	financing	instruments,	the	creation	of	new	security	devices	that	aims	at	evading	the	 requirement	 of	 filing	 or	 perfection,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 enacting	 new	statutes	to	confront	with	new	devices.																																																									314	UCC	§9-335(e)	315	UCC	§9-335(f)	316	Comment	5	to	the	UCC	§9-335,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	948	317	UCC	§9-335(c)	318	UCC	§9-335(d)	319	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	see	n.	174,	at	p.	9-90	
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Title	 retention	or	 conditional	 sale	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 PMSI.	 The	 cover	 of	PMSI	extends	to	loans	advanced	by	third	parties	to	acquire	rights	in	the	collateral	because	 it	 shares	 the	 same	 characteristic	 of	 title	 retention,	 that	 is	 the	contribution	of	new	value	to	the	debtor’s	business.	Both	kinds	of	PMSIs	support	a	relatively	 competitive	 debt	 financing	 market	 that	 cannot	 be	 attained	 if	 it	 is	dominated	or	monopolized	by	a	first-to-file	creditor	with	after-acquired	property	clause	without	the	recognition	of	the	PMSI	and	the	respective	first	priority.	Article	 9	 distinguishes	 types	 of	 collateral	 that	 are	 typically	 categorized	 into	inventory,	 equipment,	 farm	products	 and	 consumer	 goods.	 Inventory,	which	 is	expected	to	be	consumed	or	processed	or	sold	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business,	receives	special	treatments.	In	the	context	of	a	PMSI,	cross-collateralization,	the	first	 priority	 that	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 cash	 proceeds	 and	 the	 requirement	 of	notification	sent	to	earlier-filed	secured	parties	are	particular	rules	with	regard	to	the	inventory	collateral.	A	 filing	 notice	 system	 that	 is	 simple,	 fast	 and	 cost-saving	 is	 also	 a	 core	requirement	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 PMSI.	 Generally	 speaking,	 it	 provides	 a	relatively	accurate,	easily-determined	date	for	priority	purposes	that	is	premised	on	the	 filing	date.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	not	necessary	to	 file	a	 financing	statement	corresponding	 to	 a	 specific	 secured	 transaction.	 This	 advantage	 is	 specifically	practical	when	the	collateral	is	inventory,	even	in	the	case	of	a	PMSI.	However,	a	notice	 filing	 system	 accompanied	 by	 the	 first-to-file	 priority	 rule	 has	 some	weakness	to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 favours	the	 interest	of	a	 first-to-file	creditor.	The	later-in-time	 creditor	 does	 not	 have	 enough	 incentive	 to	 file	 against	 the	 same	collateral	 to	 have	 only	 subordinate	 interest	 irrespective	 of	 the	 order	 that	advances	 are	 made.	 The	 notice	 filing	 system	 does	 also	 not	 reveal	 much	information	 relating	 to	 the	 filed	 security	 interests,	 especially	 the	 amount	 of	secured	obligation.		Although	there	are	some	restraints	on	later-in-time	creditors	and	the	debtor,	it	is	undoubted	that	the	benefit	of	a	filing	notice	system	outweighs	its	cost.	Article	9	is	a	 good	model	 for	 the	 secured	 transaction	 law	in	personal	property	 in	 terms	of	efficiency,	and	for	the	recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	device	in	terms	
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of	promoting	transparency	and	competitive	debt	financing	market.	Transplanting	the	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 Article	 9	 into	 a	 jurisdiction	 is	 certainly	involving	 the	 adoption	 of	 functionalism	 doctrine,	 and	 it	 also	 raises	 questions	about	 the	 transplant	 of	 notice	 filing	 system	 and	 the	 unitary	 approach	 as	 well.
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CHAPTER	4 RETENTION	 OF	 TITLE	 IN	 THE	
AUSTRALIAN	PERSONAL	PROPERTY	SECURITIES	ACT	
2009	
4.1 Overview	Prior	to	the	enactment	of	the	Personal	Property	Securities	Act	2009	(hereinafter	“PPSA”),	 the	 Australian	 law	 on	 secured	 transactions	 and	 the	 treatment	 of	 title	retention	were	based	mainly	on	the	English	common	law1.	There	were	four	types	of	 secured	 transactions	 recognized	 at	 common	 law	 and	 in	 equity,	 namely	mortgage,	charge,	pledge,	and	lien2,	all	of	which	were	interests	created	or	granted	by	the	debtor	over	her	existing	or	future	asset.	Title	retention	does	not	amount	to	a	registrable	charge	 irrespective	of	 the	goods	subject	matter	of	 this	 transaction	were	appropriated	to	secure	the	buyer’s	obligation	of	payment.	It	did	not	fall	into	the	scheme	of	company	charges	registration	because	the	seller/creditor	retained	the	 title	 to	 the	 goods	 supplied.	 Because	 the	 title	 to	 the	 goods	 belonged	 to	 the	unpaid	seller,	she	 could	 reclaim	 the	goods	 in	 the	buyer’s	 insolvency	or	prevent	them	from	falling	into	the	scope	of	floating	charge	created	by	the	buyer/debtor3.	If	 title	 retention	 was	 contractually	 extended	 to	 the	 proceeds	 or	 products	manufactured	or	assembled	from	the	original	goods,	the	unpaid	seller’s	interests	in	the	proceeds	or	end	products	were	likely	to	be	construed	as	being	created	by	way	of	charge	and	subject	 to	registration	under	the	Corporation	Act	 to	be	valid	against	third	parties.4.	Concerning	the	proceeds,	Australian	law	slightly	departed	from	English	law	to	the	extent	that	courts	of	the	former	jurisdiction	were	willing	to	enforce	the	trust	clause5.	In	Associated	Alloy6,	the	Australian	High	Court	upheld																																																									1	Stumbles	JGJ,	‘The	PPSA:	The	Extended	Reach	of	the	Definition	of	the	PPSA	Security	Interest’	(2011)	34	University	of	New	South	Wales	Law	Journal	448,	at	p.	449;	Brown	D,	‘Australian	Secured	Transaction	Law	Reform’	in	Gullifer	L	and	Akseli	O	(eds),	Secured	Transactions	Law	
Reform	Principle,	Policies,	and	Practice	(Hart	Publishing	2016),	at	p.	145	2	Whittaker	B,	‘Review	of	the	Personal	Property	Security	Act	2009:	Final	Report,’	(Commonwealth	of	Australia,	2015)	www.ag.gov.au,	at	p.	11	3	Duggan	A,	‘Romalpa	Agreements	Post-	PPSA’	(2011)	33	Sydney	Law	Review	645,	at	pp.	646-7	4	ibid,	at	p.	647	5 See	more	discussion	on	the	relevance	of	Associate	Alloy	case	to	English	law	in	de	Lacy	J,	‘Corporate	Insolvency	and	Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	Developments	in	Australia’	(2001)	2	Insolvency	Lawyer	64	
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Personal	Property	Securities	Law	(2nd	ed.	edn,	LexisNexis	Butterworths	2016),	at	pp.	18-24	10	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	Australian	Personal	Property	Securities	Law	(2nd	ed.	edn,	LexisNexis	Butterworths	2016), at p. 23; Barns-Graham	V	and	Gullifer	L,	‘The	Australian	PPS	Reforms:	What	will	the	New	System	Look	Like?’	(2010)	4	Law	and	Financial	Markets	Review	394,	at	p.	394	11	Walsh	C,	‘Transplanting	Article	9:	The	Canadian	PPSA	Experience’	in	Gullifer	L	and	Akseli	O	(eds),	Secured	Transactions	Law	Reform	Principles,	Policies	and	Practice	(Hart	Publishing	2016),	at	p.	49	(footnote	5)	12	Gedye	M,	‘The	New	Zealand	Perspective’	in	Gullifer	L	and	Akseli	O	(eds),	Secured	Transactions	
Law	Reform	Principles,	Policies	and	Practice	(Hart	Publishing	2016),	at	p.	115	13	Walsh	C,	see	n.	11,	at	p.	49;	Gedye	M,	see	n.	12,	at	p.	115	
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The	Australian	PPSA	has	a	PPSA	style	and	 learns	the	 lesson	from	New	Zealand,	Canadian,	and	United	States	legislation14.	The	works	of	UNCITRAL	and	UNIDROIT	also	have	some	impacts15.	Since	the	implementation	of	the	PPSA	2009,	Australian	lawyers	and	relating	parties	have	got	acquainted	with	new	vocabulary	in	the	law	on	secured	transactions.	A	security	interest	from	the	present	time	has	a	statutory	definition,	 and	 the	 meaning	 is	 broader	 than	 ever	 before16.	 The	 parties	 to	 a	security	 interest	 are	 called	 the	 secured	 party	 and	 the	 grantor.	 The	 grantor,	 in	general,	is	the	one	having	the	interest	in	the	collateral	to	which	a	security	interest	is	 attached17.	 The	 term	 “grantor”	 instead	 of	 the	 term	 “debtor”	 as	 in	Article	 9	 is	used	to	acknowledge	that	the	grantor	may	not	be	the	one	who	owes	payment	or	performance	of	an	obligation	secured	by	a	security	interest18.	The	secured	asset	is	called	as	the	collateral	that	is	defined	as	“personal	property	to	which	a	security	
interest	 is	 attached”19 .	 Other	 terms	 are	 also	 imported	 as	 “attachment”	 and	“perfection”.	
4.2 Concept	of	purchase-money	security	interest	
4.2.1 Security	interests:	Functional	approach	The	PPSA	sets	up	a	unitary	regime	for	secured	transactions	in	personal	property.	All	the	security	devices	with	regard	to	personal	property	are	brought	under	the	ambit	of	a	single	law.	The	functional	approach	broadens	the	scope	of	application	to	 embrace	many	 transactions	 that	 have	 been	 traditionally	 regarded	 as	 quasi-security	 interests	 like	title	retention.	 It	also	establishes	a	unified	set	of	rules	 to	govern	attachment,	perfection,	priority	and	enforcement,	and	a	single	electronic	registration	 system	 for	 all	 types	 of	 security	 interests.	 Under	 the	 unitary	
																																																								14 	Parliament	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	 of	 Australia	 HR,	 Personal	 Property	 Securities	 Bill	 2009	
Explanatory	Memorandum	(2008-2009),	at	p.	10	15	ibid	16	Barns-Graham	V	and	Gullifer	L,	‘The	Australian	PPS	Reforms:	What	will	the	New	System	Look	Like?’	(2010)	4	Law	and	Financial	Markets	Review	394,	at	p.	394	17	PPSA	2009	s	10	18	ibid	19	ibid	
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approach,	 the	 PPSA	 replaces	 over	 70	 Commonwealth,	 State,	 Territory	 statutes,	common	law	and	equity	rules	governing	personal	property	security	interests20.	The	 reform	of	personal	property	securities	 law	 in	Australia	 is	 a	 reform	of	 legal	thinking	 to	 be	 in	 line	 with	 what	 has	 implemented	 in	 other	 common	 law	jurisdictions	 like	 the	 United	 States,	 Canada,	 and	 New	 Zealand21.	 The	 functional	approach	is	employed,	and	all	security	devices	are	treated	under	a	single	concept	“security	interest”.	Security	interest	for	the	first	time	is	statutorily	defined	as:	“an	 interest	 in	personal	property	provided	 for	by	a	transaction	that,	 in	substance,	
secures	payment	or	performance	of	an	obligation	 (without	 regard	 to	 the	 form	of	
the	transaction	or	the	identity	of	the	person	who	has	title	to	the	property).”22	This	definition	is	similar	to	Canadian	and	New	Zealand	PPSAs	and	is	not	far	from	the	UCC	definition.	Courts	will	look	at	the	substance	of	a	transaction	rather	than	the	 form	 to	 find	 out	whether	 it	 creates	 a	 security	 interest.	 A	 slight	 difference	between	 the	 American	 and	 Australian	 definition	 is	 that	 the	 Australian	 texts	emphasize	 the	 irrelevance	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 person	 having	 title	 to	 the	property.		The	 PPSA	 provides	 a	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 transactions	 securing	 payment	 or	performance	of	an	obligation	as	examples	of	security	interests23.	They	are	a	fixed	charge,	a	floating	charge,	a	chattel	mortgage,	a	conditional	sale	agreement,	a	hire	purchase	agreement,	a	pledge,	a	trust	receipt,	a	consignment,	a	lease	of	good,	an	assignment,	a	transfer	of	title,	and	a	flawed	asset	of	arrangement.	This	list	gives	examples	 of	 transactions	 falling	 within	 the	 PPSA’s	 scope	 due	 to	 the	 security	function	 thereof	 rather	 than	 limiting	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 to	 the	listed	 transactions24.	 Fixed	charge,	 floating	 charge,	 chattel	mortgage,	pledge	are	conventional	secured	transactions	long	accepted	in	Australia	whereas	others	are	security	interests	in	substance	recognized	from	the	enactment	of	PPSA.	
																																																								20	ibid	21	Barns-Graham	V	and	Gullifer	L,	see	n.16,	at	p.	395	22	PPSA	2009	s	12(1)	23	PPSA	2009	s	12(2)	24	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	45	
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The	PPSA	adopts	the	ostensible	ownership	as	the	primary	principle,	recognizing	it	 as	 a	material	 concern	 that	 could	 be	 solved	 by	 the	 requirement	 of	 perfection	including	registering	a	financing	statement;	otherwise,	the	given	security	interest	could	 not	 prevail	 over	 competing	 interests	 in	 the	 same	 collateral	 in	 some	instances25.	 The	 PPSA	 has	 a	 scope	 of	 application	 beyond	 security	 interests	 in	substance	to	cover	three	kinds	of	transaction	called	"deemed"	security	interests,	namely	the	interest	of	(1)	a	transferee	under	a	transfer	of	an	account	or	chattel	paper,	 (2)	 a	 consignor	who	delivers	 goods	 to	 a	 consignee	 under	 a	 commercial	consignment,	 (3)	 a	 lessor	 or	 bailor	 of	 good	 under	 a	 PPS	 lease 26 .	 These	transactions	are	 treated	as	 security	 interests	 irrespective	of	 they	do	not	secure	payment	or	performance	of	an	obligation.	Transactions	of	those	kind	also	create	the	 problem	 of	 ostensible	 ownership	 like	 a	 non-possessory	 security	 interest.	Therefore,	the	extension	of	the	PPSA	to	those	given	transactions	is	for	perfection	and	priority	ranking,	but	not	for	applying	enforcement	rules.		The	 Australian	 PPSA	 provides	 a	 good	 lesson	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 ostensible	ownership	problem	arising	from	true	lease	and	bailment,	which	does	not	secure	payment	or	performance	of	an	obligation.	Unlike	Article	9,	PPSA-style	legislations	include	lease	and	bailment	into	their	scheme	of	perfection	and	priority	but	limit	the	scope	of	application	to	certain	types	of	lease	and	bailment	called	a	PPS	lease.	In	the	Australian	PPSA,	a	PPS	lease	generally	embraces	any	lease	or	bailment	of	goods	that	have	a	particular	 long	term,	 for	 instances	 for	more	than	one	year	or	more	 than	 90	 days	 concerning	 serial-numbered	 property27,	and	 the	 lessor	 or	bailor	 must	 regularly	 engage	 in	 the	 business	 of	 leasing	 or	 bailing	 goods	respectively28.	In	Albarran	and	Others	v	Queensland	Excavation	Services	Pty	Ltd,	it	is	 argued	 that	 the	 lessee	 has	 rights	 not	 limited	 to	 possessory	 rights,	 but	 also	proprietary	rights	to	attach	a	security	interest	to	the	concerned	item29.	The	court	relied	on	 the	policy	addressed	 in	 the	New	Zealand	Commission’s	 report	on	 the																																																									25	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	39-41	26	PPSA	2009	s	12(3)	27	PPSA	 2009	 s	 13(1).	 The	 lease	 or	 bailment	 term	 may	 have	 more	 than	 one-year	 term,	 or	indefinite	term,	or	a	term	of	up	to	one	year	that	is	automatically	renewable	or	renewable	at	the	option	of	one	party.	28	PPSA	2009	s	13(2)	29	[2013]	NSWSC	852,	at	para.	26	
	 129	
PPSA	to	treat	 the	commercial	 lease	similar	 to	chattel	mortgages	and	charges	as	well	 as	 title-based	 securities	 because	 it	 raises	 the	 same	 degree	 of	 apparent	ownership30.	 It	 is	 understandable	 that	 a	 long-term	 lease	 can	 raise	 a	 relatively	severe	ostensible	ownership	problem.	However,	without	an	explanation,	it	is	not	clear	 why	 a	 lessee	 or	 a	 bailor	 must	 be	 engaged	 in	 the	 business	 of	 leasing	 or	bailing	goods	 respectively.	Bailment	 is	worth	a	 few	words	of	discussion	 in	 this	respect.	Basically,	two	types	of	bailment	are	subject	to	the	PPSA,	one	of	which	in	substance	 secures	 payment	 or	 performance	 of	 an	 obligation	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	security	 interest31.	 The	 other	 is	 deemed	 security	 interest	 that	must	 have	 three	conditions,	 two	of	which	are	mentioned	above,	namely	 (1)	more	 than	one-year	term	 in	 general,	 (2)	 the	 bailor	 is	 regularly	 engaging	 in	 the	 business	 of	 bailing	goods,	and	(3)	“the	bailee	provides	value”32.		In	Re	Arcabi	Pty	Ltd,	to	find	that	the	bailor	was	not	to	engage	in	the	business	of	bailing	 goods,	 the	 court	 relied	 on	 New	 Zealand	 Court	 of	 Appeal’s	 argument	 in	
Rabobank33.	The	Rabobank	court	interpreted	the	word	“in	the	business	of	[bailing]	
goods”	as	that	the	owner	actually	intended	to	gain	profit	from	the	bailment	and	excluded	 bailment	 where	 the	 bailor	 did	 not	 receive	 payment,	 and	 it	 is	 the	business	of	the	bailee34.		With	regard	to	the	condition	requiring	the	bailee	to	provide	value,	the	Re	Arcabi	
Pty	Ltd	court	avoided	answering	the	given	question	that	was	considered	difficult.	Otherwise,	 it	 provided	 two	 alternative	 interpretations 35 .	 One	 was	 the	requirement	 that	 the	 bailee	 provided	 consideration	 at	 large	 that	 included	services	 the	 bailee	 provided	 the	 bailor,	 and	 bailment	 was	 incidental	 to	 such	
																																																								30	ibid,	at	para.	31	31	[2014]	WASC	310,	at	para.	19	32	PPSA	2009	s	13(3)	33	Re	Arcabi	Pty	Ltd,	see	n.	31	at	para.	24	34	Rabobank	v	McAnulty,	[2011]	NZCA	212,	at	para.	40.	The	New	Zealand	PPSA	has	the	equivalent	provision	that	treats	a	lease	for	more	than	one	year	as	a	security	interest	even	though	it	does	not	meet	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 security	 interest	 definition.	 This	 provision	 mentions	 “lease	 and	
bailment	 of	 goods”	 to	 embrace	 into	 a	 lease	 for	more	 than	 one	 year,	 but	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	provision	refers	only	 lease.	The	Rabobank	court	 came	 to	conclusion	 that	 the	 reference	 to	 lease	should	be	considered	as	shorthand	references	back	to	the	phrase	“lease	and	bailment	of	goods”.	
Ibid,	at	para.	27.	35	Re	Arcabi	Pty	Ltd,	see	n.	31,	at	para.	26	
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performance.		A	warehouse	agreement	and	car	repair	in	a	garage	were	examples	in	this	sense.	The	other	was	the	specific	consideration	that	the	bailee	gave	for	the	bailment.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 latter	 alternative	 was	 preferable	 since	 it	 was	aiming	 at	 limiting	 the	 application	 of	 PPS	 lease	 on	 bailments36.	 The	 former	alternative	may	 include	all	bailments	 into	the	concept	of	PPS	 lease	because	the	bailee	always	provides	consideration	by	performing	a	service37.		The	 provisions	 for	 PPS	 lease	 do	 not	 probably	 take	 into	 account	 of	 Article	 9	experiences	 concerning	 bailment	 for	 processing	 where	 the	 bailee	 use	 the	material	supplied	by	the	bailor	and	return	products	in	exchange	for	the	fee38.	The	bailment	of	this	kind	is	likely	not	at	the	common	knowledge	that	the	bailee	does	not	 own	 the	 goods	 like	wheat	 in	 a	 grain	warehouse,	 or	 cars	 in	 the	 garage	 for	repair,	particularly	when	the	bailee	also	manufactures	its	own	goods	to	sell.	The	material	in	possession	of	the	bailee	raises	serious	ostensible	ownership	problem	since	the	bailee	can	misinterpret	her	interest	in	the	goods	to	third	parties.	Bailment	for	processing	is	also	a	good	illustration	that	the	Australian	PPSA	policy	dealing	 with	 ostensible	 ownership	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 gap	 if	 it	 excludes	 the	bailment	of	this	kind	from	the	scope	of	the	PPS	lease.	The	bailor	is	doubted	to	be	“regularly	engaged	in	the	business	of	bailing	good”.	It	can	be	primarily	argued	that	the	 bailor	 in	 the	 given	 transaction	 is	 regularly	 engaging	 in	 the	 business	 of	bailment	 because	 the	 profit	 gained	 is	 the	 value	 added	 when	 the	 bailee	 return	processed	 or	 manufactured	 goods.	 However,	 in	 this	 transaction,	 the	 bailee	receives	service	 fee	other	than	making	payment	 for	using	the	materials.	 It	does	not	meet	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 bailee	 provides	 value	 if	 a	 relatively	 narrow	interpretation	is	accepted.	Although	Australia	and	the	United	States	belong	to	the	common	law	tradition,	the	context	 in	 Australia	 is	 not	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 United	 States,	 which	 had	 long	adopted	functionalism	in	many	statutes	to	 treat,	 for	 instances,	conditional	sales	and	 trust	 receipts	 as	 registrable	 security	 devices	 prior	 the	 publication	 of	 the																																																									36	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	Australian	Personal	Property	Securities	Law	 (2nd	ed.	edn,	LexisNexis	Butterworths	2016),	at	p.	81	37	ibid	38	See	discussion	in	part	3.2.1.1	of	this	thesis	
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UCC39.	Formalism,	which	strictly	stresses	the	legal	form	of	property	transfer	and	the	 grant	 theory	 in	 which	 a	 debtor	 must	 own	 the	 asset	 to	 create	 a	 security	interest,	 has	 a	 deep	 root	 in	 the	 Australian-Anglo	 common	 law	 thinking40.	 The	focus	 on	 the	 question	who	 owns	 the	 property	 from	 the	 formalism	perspective	surprisingly	 complements	 the	 operation	 of	 functionalism.	 In	 Albarran,	 it	 was	correctly	asserted	that	 the	concept	of	ownership	was	not	 irrelevant	even	 in	the	case	 of	 PPSA	 priority	 framework41 .	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 defendant	 leased	 and	transferred	 possession	 of	 caterpillars	 to	 the	 company	 M.	 M	 was	 periodically	invoiced	and	paid	to	the	defendant	the	amount	corresponding	to	finance	charges	payable	by	the	defendant	to	its	secured	creditors	who	financed	the	defendant	to	acquire	 the	 caterpillars.	M	 then	 created	 security	 interests	 in	 favour	 of	 F	 in	 the	caterpillars.	 	F	 through	its	receivers	claimed	possession	of	 the	caterpillars.	 	The	
Albarran	 court	 tried	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 who	 was	 the	 true	 owner	 of	 the	vehicles	and	found	that	M	owned	one	and	the	defendant	owned	the	two	others42.	M	had	paid	out	all	expenses	incurred	for	the	defendant	to	acquire	one	caterpillar,	and	 after	 that,	 the	 defendant	 did	 not	 render	 any	 invoice	 relating	 to	 this	caterpillar.	 Concerning	 two	 caterpillars	 belonged	 to	 the	 defendant,	 the	 court	found	that	M	possessed	under	a	lease	accompanied	by	an	agreement	to	transfer	title	upon	 the	discharge	of	 the	 finance43.	The	 lease	was	qualified	as	a	PPS	 lease	that	required	registration.		It	 is	worth	noticing	that	 the	surrounding	circumstances	relating	to	 three	motor	vehicles	were	similar	except	that	M	did	not	pay	out	the	finance	charges	relating	to	 the	 concerned	 two	 caterpillars.	 This	 fact	 was	 apparently	 invisible	 to	 third	parties	who	were	 likely	 to	 take	 security	 interests	 in	 the	 caterpillars	due	 to	M’s	possession	and	possibly	a	clear	concerned	public	record	showing	that	they	were	unencumbered.	 The	Albarran	court	was	 correct	 to	 distinguish	 ownership	 from	“rights	in	the	collateral”	that	M	had	to	attach	a	security	interest	to	the	caterpillars.	M’s	 full	 ownership	 acquired	 by	 the	 discharge	 of	 the	 finance	 cut	 off	 any																																																									39	See	discussion	on	part	3.2.1.1	of	this	thesis.	40	Gullifer	L	 (ed),	Goode	on	Legal	Problems	of	Credit	and	Security	 (4th	 edn,	 first	 published	2008,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2012)	at	p.	11	41	Albarran	and	Others	v	Queensland	Excavation	Services	Pty	Ltd	[2013]	NSWSC	852,	at	para.	11	42	ibid,	at	para.	11-9	43	ibid,	at	para.	17	
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proprietary	rights	of	the	defendant	in	the	concerned	item.	In	contrast,	the	rights	of	 defendant	 in	 the	 other	 items	 remained	 and	 lack	 of	 registration	 resulted	 in	subordination	to	the	claim	of	other	secured	creditors	with	respect	to	those	items.	The	 United	 States	 case	 law	 demonstrates	 confusion	 and	 uncertainty	 when	 it	deals	 with	 ostensible	 ownership	 problem	 arising	 from	 commercial	 lease	 and	bailment44.	 	The	Australian	ruling	 in	Albarran	proves	that	 it	 is	not	 the	 failure	of	functionalism	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ownership	 and	 security	 as	 different	concepts,	but	the	uncertainty	in	American	law	in	this	respect	is	a	result	of	failing	to	bring	true	or	commercial	lease	and	bailment	into	the	ambit	of	Article	9.	 	The	PPSA	 treatment	 of	 PPS	 lease	 is	 valuable	 for	 any	 jurisdiction,	 even	 the	 United	States,	 that	 considers	bringing	 lease	and	bailment	 into	 the	 scope	of	 the	 law	on	secured	transactions	in	personal	property	for	perfection	and	priority.	
4.2.2 Purchase-money	security	interest	A	conditional	sale	 is	 among	 the	 list	of	 security	 interests.	The	 term	 “conditional	sale”,	 which	 is	 under	 common	 understanding	 in	 the	 American	 and	 Canadian	context	 amounting	 to	 title	 retention,	 is	 imported	 into	 the	 PPSA.	 However,	 a	conditional	 sale	 in	 the	 Australian	 context	 is	 broader	 than	 title	 retention.	 In	business	common	sense,	it	is	an	agreement	subject	to	any	condition	not	limited	to	 title	 retention	 to	be	 satisfied	 to	 complete	a	 sale	 transaction45.	 It	 is	suggested	that	the	term	“conditional	sale”	should	be	removed	and	the	arrangement	would	be	 referred	 as	 “an	 agreement	 to	 sell	 subject	 to	 retention	 of	 title”	 to	 avoid	 any	ambiguity	and	uncertainty46.	Since	 title	 retention	 is	 subject	 to	 an	 in-substance	 security	 interest	 under	 the	PPSA,	a	title-retaining	seller	can	protect	her	interest	under	the	PMSI	framework	to	 gain	 the	 super-priority	 position.	 Title	 retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 in	substance	 from	 now	 on	 does	 not	 degrade	 the	 priority	 claim	 over	 the	 goods	supplied	so	long	as	the	seller/secured	party	complies	with	the	requirement	of	a	
																																																								44	See	discussion	on	sub-section	3.2.1.1	of	this	thesis	45	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	a	p.	46	46	ibid,	at	p.	47	
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PMSI.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 regime	 of	 PMSI	 has	 drastically	 changed	 the	 nature	 of	relationships	arising	from	Romalpa	agreements.		A	purchase-money	 security	 interest	 (“PMSI”)47	is	defined	 in	 section	14(1)	PPSA	2009:	
(a) a	security	interest	taken	in	collateral,	to	the	extent	that	it	secures	all	or	part	
of	its	purchase	price;	
(b) a	 security	 interest	 taken	 in	 collateral	 by	 a	 person	who	 gives	 value	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 enabling	 the	 grantor	 to	 acquire	 rights	 in	 the	 collateral,	 to	 the	
extent	that	the	value	is	applied	to	acquire	those	rights;	
(c) the	interest	of	a	lessor	or	bailor	of	goods	under	a	PPS	lease	
(d) the	 interest	 of	 a	 consignor	 who	 delivers	 goods	 to	 a	 consignee	 under	 a	
commercial	consignment.	Although	this	definition	does	not	refer	to	the	related	concept	of	purchase-money	collateral	and	purchase-money	obligation,	 it	has	a	similar	effect	 to	 the	Article	9	definition.	Specifically,	it	is	similar	to	the	definition	under	the	former	UCC	except	that	the	former	UCC	stipulated	that	a	seller	PMSI	is	the	one	“taken	or	retained	by	
the	seller”48.	The	word	“retained”	does	not	appear	in	the	Australian	version.	Thus,	it	is	questionable	that	the	PPSA	impliedly	considers	title	retention	as	the	passing	of	 property	 to	 a	 buyer	 together	 with	 the	 grant-back	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 in	favour	 of	 a	 seller.	 The	 PPSA	 lacks	 provisions	 corresponding	 to	 the	 UCC	 that	expressly	considers	title	retention	limited	to	a	reservation	of	a	security	interest49,	and	“title	passes	to	the	buyer...	despite	any	reservation	of	security	interest”50.		The	 concept	 of	 PMSI	 is	 classified	 as	 a	 seller	 and	 a	 lender	 PMSI.	 From	 the	American	experience	of	the	application	of	this	concept,	determination	of	a	PMSI	should	 respond	 to	 many	 issues.	 Among	 them	 is	 the	 scope	 of	 purchase-money	obligation	 concerning	 “purchase	 price”	 and	 “value	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 enabling”	with	regard	to	a	seller	and	a	lender	PMSI	respectively.	The	PPSA	expressly	states																																																									47	The	exact	term	in	the	PPSA	2009	is	without	hyphen:	purchase	money	security	interest,	while	the	term	in	Article	9	has	hyphen:	purchase-money.	48	Former	UCC	§9-107	49	UCC	§1-201(35)	and	2-401(1)	50	UCC	§2-401(2)	
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that	purchase	price	or	value	“includes…	credit	charges	and	interest	payable	for	the	
purchase	 or	 loan	 credit” 51 	that	 is	 narrow	 relative	 to	 the	 corresponding	interpretation	 under	 Article	 9	 that	 generally	 covers	 “expenses	 incurred	 in	
connection	with	acquiring	rights	in	the	collateral”52.	The	PPSA	has	the	same	solution	to	Article	9	dealing	with	situations	called	mixed	security	 interests	 where	 the	 purchase-money	 collateral	 secures	 other	obligations,	or	another	collateral	secures	the	purchase-money	obligation53.	They	are	 called	 mixed	 securities	 under	 Australian	 law.	 The	 purchase-money	 status	remains,	 but	 the	 PMSI	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 purchase-money	 obligation	 or	 the	purchase-money	collateral54.		It	 changed	 the	 legal	 consequence	 of	 all	monies	 title	 retention	 clause	 under	 the	leading	Amour	v	Thyssen	Edelstahlwerke	AG	case55,	as	illustrated	in	the	following	example56.	Example:	All	monies	retention	of	title	clause	pre-PPSA	and	post-PPSA	D	 grants	 a	 security	 interest	 to	 SP1	 in	 all	 present	 and	 after-acquired	 property.	Later,	SP2	sells	an	item	of	equipment	to	D.	The	title	retention	clause	states	that	SP2	 retains	 ownership	 of	 the	 goods	 until	 all	 debts	 owing	 to	 SP2	 including	 the	purchase	price	are	paid	in	full.		The	all	monies	 retention	of	 title	 clause	 is	upheld	 in	pre-PPSA	under	 the	sale	of	goods	 law	 and	 the	 Amour	 case.	 Generally,	 SP2	 has	 priority	 over	 SP1	 in	 the	equipment	even	though	the	purchase	price	of	the	equipment	is	paid	in	full.	Under	the	PPSA	s	14(3),	title	retention	is	treated	as	a	PMSI	and	debts	other	than	the	purchase	price	of	the	equipment	are	not	a	purchase-money	obligation.	If	SP1																																																									51	PPSA	2009	s	14(8)	52	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-103,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	830	53	UCC	§9-103(f)	allows	the	purchase-money	collateral	to	secure	non-purchase-money	obligation	and	 the	 non-purchase-money	collateral	 to	 secure	 purchase-money	 obligation	 in	 non-consumer	goods	transactions.	54 	PPSA	 2009	 s	 14(3),	 (4).	 Unlike	 Article	 9,	 the	 PPSA	 2009	 only	 defines	 purchase-money	obligation	corresponding	to	its	definition	of	PMSI.	55	[1991]	2	AC	339;	[1990]	3	WLR	810	56	This	example	and	its	following	discussion	are	adapted	from	Duggan	A,	see	n.	3,	at	pp.	656-7	
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and	SP2	perfect	their	security	interest	properly,	SP2	has	priority	over	SP1	in	the	equipment	to	enforce	the	payment	of	it.	With	regard	to	other	debts,	the	priority	between	 SP1	 and	 SP2’s	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 equipment	 depends	 on	 who	perfects	the	concerned	security	interest	first.		The	 PPSA	 PMSI	 embraces	 a	 PPS	 lease	 and	 a	 commercial	 consignment	 in	 the	ambit.	 This	 treatment	 of	 PPS	 lease	 as	 a	 PMSI	 is	 not	 found	 in	 Article	 9,	 but	 it	expressly	 considers	 the	 consignor’s	 interest	 in	 goods	 as	 a	 PMSI	 in	 inventory.	Generally,	 a	 lease	 can	 be	 categorized	 into	 two	 types:	 one	 in	 substance	 secures	payment	 or	 performance	 of	 an	 obligation,	 and	 the	 other	 is	 not	 in	 substance	 a	security	interest	but	qualifies	to	be	a	PPS	lease57.	A	PPS	lease	has	a	term	of	more	than	 one	 year,	 and	 the	 lessor	 or	 bailor	 engages	 in	 the	 business	 of	 leasing	 or	bailing	goods	respectively.	It	should	be	noticed	that	a	sale	and	lease	back	to	the	seller	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 PMSI.	 If	 a	 PPS	 lease	which	 is	 a	 deemed	security	 interest	 for	 the	purpose	of	 the	PPSA	had	not	been	treated	as	a	PMSI,	it	would	have	given	rise	to	an	undesirable	outcome58.	Suppose	that	a	lessor	leases	an	item	of	equipment	under	a	two-year	operation	lease	that	may	fall	within	the	scope	 of	 after-acquired	 property	 subject	 to	 an	 earlier-filed	 security	 interest	granted	to	another	creditor59.	It	is	unexpected	that	a	PPS	lease	in	the	given	case	was	 subordinate	 to	 the	 earlier-filed	 after-acquired	 property	 security	 interest	with	regard	to	the	item	of	equipment	at	hand.	However,	 a	 security	 lease	 cannot	be	 itself	 a	PMSI	under	 the	PPSA.	 It	 raises	 the	question	 whether	 the	 like	 undesirable	 outcome	 occurs	 if	 the	 secured	party/lessor	does	not	have	the	 first	priority60.	The	point	 is	 that	a	security	 lease	should	meet	all	conditions	of	a	PMSI	to	have	a	purchase-money	status.	With	regard	to	commercial	consignments,	the	scope	excludes	any	transaction	in	which	a	consignee	is	an	auctioneer	or	in	the	business	of	selling	or	leasing	goods	of	other61.	The	exclusion	demonstrates	that	the	ostensible	ownership	problem	is																																																									57	PPSA	2009	s	13	58	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	246	59	ibid	60	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	pp.	316-7	61	PPSA	s	10	
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not	 serious	 to	 be	 solved,	 and	 registration	 is	 unnecessary	 if	 third	 parties	 has	general	knowledge	of	it.		
4.3 Establishment	of	purchase-money	security	interest		A	 PMSI	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 general	 rule	 governing	 security	 interests	 to	 be	effective	against	the	grantor	and	third	parties.	Attachment	and	perfection	are	two	imported	 concepts	 referring	 to	 the	 enforceability	 and	 priority	 ranking	respectively.		
4.3.1 Attachment	In	 general,	 “a	 security	 interest	attaches	 to	 collateral”	 to	 be	 effective	 against	 the	grantor	when	(1)	the	grantor	“has	rights	in	the	collateral,	or	the	power	to	transfer	
rights	in	the	collateral	to	the	secured	party”,	and	(2)	“value	is	given	for	the	security	
interest”62.	A	security	agreement	 is	 implicitly	required	since	the	PPSA	applies	 to	consensual	security	interests63.	Attachment	and	a	written	security	agreement	with	a	description	of	the	collateral	are	required	for	a	security	interest	to	be	enforceable	against	third	parties	64.		The	slight	difference	from	Article	9	is	that	attachment	under	the	PPSA	is	not	sufficient	to	 enforce	 a	 security	 interest	 against	 third	 parties,	 and	 it	 does	 not	 require	 an	authenticated	security	agreement	with	a	description	of	the	collateral.	The	given	requirement	is	separately	provided	for	enforceability	against	third	parties.		Enforceability	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 under	 the	 PPSA	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 two	levels:	 (1)	 against	 the	 grantor,	 in	 other	 words,	 when	 “the	 security	 interest	 has	
attached	 to	 the	 collateral”,	 and	 (2)	 against	 third	 parties.	 Despite	 the	 foregoing	difference,	 the	enforceability	 against	 third	parties	under	 the	PPSA	corresponds	well	to	Article	9.	The	absolute	property	is	more	than	sufficient	to	grant	a	security	interest,	but	it	is	uncertain	 when	 the	 grantor	 is	 not	 an	 owner	 but	 having	 possession	 of	 the																																																									62	PPSA	s	19(1),	(2)	63	Duggan	A	and	Brown	B,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	106	64 	PPSA	 s	 20(1),	 (2).	 Alternatives	 for	 a	 written	 security	 agreement	 is	 the	 secured	 party’s	possession	of	collateral,	or	perfection	by	control.	
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collateral.	 It	 expressly	 states	 that	 “when	 the	 grantor	 obtains	 possession	 of	 the	
goods”	under	a	conditional	sale	including	arrangement	subject	to	title	retention,	as	well	as	under	a	PPS	lease,	she	has	“rights	in	the	collateral”65.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	merely	a	possessory	right	but	amounting	to	the	proprietary	right	to	grant	a	security	interest66.		The	 formalities	 requirement,	 for	 instance,	 a	 written	 security	 agreement,	 is	strictly	 essential	 to	 enforce	 a	 security	 interest	 against	 third	 parties	 and	constitutes	a	condition	for	the	perfection	purpose.	Possession	and	perfection	by	control	 are	 also	 alternatives	 to	meet	 the	 formalities	 requirement67.	 In	 the	 title	retention	context,	these	alternatives	are	not	suitable	because	the	goods	subject	to	title	retention	are	expected	to	be	released	to	the	buyer/grantor.	The	formalities	requirement	can	be	expressed	as	follows:	(1) A	security	agreement	is	evidenced	in	writing;	(2) The	writing	is	signed	by	the	grantor	or	adopted	or	accepted	by	the	grantor	by	her	conduct	showing	her	intention	to	adopt	or	accept	the	writing;	(3) The	writing	contains	a	description	of	the	collateral68.	Writing	is	defined	broadly	to	include	any	record	of	word	or	data69,	and	method	of	signing	 includes	both	hand-writing	and	encrypted	signature70.	The	requirement	of	the	signed	writing	by	a	grantor	evidenced	a	security	agreement	is	considered	to	facilitate	the	practice	of	sale	and	purchase	transactions	that	possibly	involves	the	 correspondence	 exchange	 between	 parties,	 and	 a	 buyer/grantor	 may	 sign	only	a	piece	of	correspondence	or	accept	by	her	conduct71.	Like	 American	 courts,	 Australian	 courts	 have	 adopted	 the	 collage	 doctrine	 to	decide	 that	 a	 combination	 of	 writings	 with	 adequate	 references	 showing	 a	description	 of	 the	 collateral	 and	 the	 grantor’s	 signature	 or	 other	 conduct	 of	
																																																								65	PPSA	s	19(5)	66	Albarran	and	Others	v	Queensland	Excavation	Services	Pty	Ltd	[2013]	NSWSC	852,	at	para.	26	67	PPSA	s	20(1)(b)	68 PPSA	s	20(2). See Carrafa	v	Doka	Formwork	Pty	Ltd,	[2014]	VSC	570	(2014),	at	para.	43	69	PPSA	s	10	70	PPSA	s	20(3)	71	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	123;	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	117	
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acceptance	 can	 fulfil	 the	 formalities	 requirement72.	 The	 writing	 evidencing	 a	security	agreement	must	contain	a	description	of	the	collateral.	The	writing	can	describe	the	collateral	as	the	grantor’s	all	present	or	after-acquired	property	or	all	 present	 or	 after-acquired	 property	 except	 specified	 items	 or	 classes	 of	personal	property.	Article	9	does	not	allow	a	similar	description	for	the	purpose	of	attachment,	but	it	is	acceptable	for	a	description	of	the	collateral	in	a	financing	statement.	 Except	 for	 this,	 the	 PPSA	 adopts	 the	 Article	 9’s	 approach	 that	 only	requires	 a	 description	 sufficient	 to	 “make	 possible	 the	 identification	 of	 the	
collateral	described”	 rather	 than	an	 “exact	and	detailed”	one73.	With	 regard	 to	a	PMSI,	 the	 collateral	must	 be	 carefully	 identified.	 The	 priority	 status	 is	 granted	only	 to	 a	 security	 interest	 securing	 the	 purchase	 price	 of	 the	 collateral	 or	 the	value	enabling	a	grantor	to	acquire	rights	in	the	collateral.	In	sale	and	purchase	transactions	 subject	 to	 title	 retention,	 it	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 cause	 the	 problem	 of	description	because	the	goods	subject-matter	of	the	sale	agreement	are	also	the	collateral	 subject	 to	 the	 relevant	 PMSI,	 and	 they	 must	 be	 identified	 to	 fulfil	requirements	of	the	sale	of	goods	law.	
4.3.2 Perfection	Perfection,	 like	 attachment,	 is	 a	 freshly-imported	 term	 introduced	 into	 the	Australian	legal	system.	It	refers	to	the	validation	of	a	security	interest	in	light	of	priority	 against	 other	 creditors	 and	 other	 third	 parties.	 Basically,	 a	 security	interest	fulfilling	the	formalities	requirement	is	effective	against	third	parties	as	in	the	foregoing	discussion,	but	it	is	not	a	condition	to	set	up	priority	over	other	competing	 claims	 in	 the	 same	 collateral.	 However,	 perfection	 does	 not	 mean	absolute	priority	enjoyed	by	a	security	interest	over	other	interests	since	there	is	usually	a	scenario	of	 two	or	more	competing	perfected	security	 interests	in	 the	same	collateral74.	It	is	also	not	essential	to	have	a	perfected	security	interest	to	be	superior	to	other	interests,	for	example,	is	the	case	of	two	competing	unperfected	security	interests75.	
																																																								72	Carrafa	v	Doka	Formwork	Pty	Ltd,	[2014]	VSC	570	(2014),	at	para.	45-50,		73	Comment	2	to	the	UCC	§9-108,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	837	74	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	pp.	132-3	75	ibid	
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In	general,	under	the	PPSA,	perfection	can	be	classified	into	three	modes,	namely	registration,	 possession	 and	 control,	 all	 of	 which	 carry	 the	 function	 of	 giving	public	 notice	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 security	 interest76 .	 There	 are	 also	additional	 modes	 of	 temporary	 or	 automatic	 perfection	 where	 the	 concerned	security	interest	is	not	revealed	to	the	public	during	the	time	of	perfection77.	Registration,	which	 is	a	 term	used	 in	Australian	 jurisdiction	 instead	of	 the	term	“filing”	in	Article	9,	is	apparently	the	main	method	of	perfection,	and	in	the	title	retention	 context,	 it	 is	 the	 most	 suitable	 one	 since	 the	 goods/collateral	 are	expected	to	be	in	a	grantor’s	possession.	Prior	to	the	PPSA,	the	Australian	registration	law	provided	different	regimes	for	different	types	of	collateral	or	types	of	security	interests	or	types	of	debtors,	for	instances	are	the	bill	of	sale	register,	the	motor	vehicles	securities	register,	or	the	register	of	company	charges78.	Under	the	functional	approach,	security	interests	by	function	are	subjected	to	the	same	treatment	including	a	unique	registration	system.	 The	Australian	 PPSA	 adopts	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 notice	 filing	 register	 that	covers	 almost	 all	 security	 interests,	 but	 it	 also	 has	 its	 own	 developments	 and	achievements.	 The	 Australian	 registration	 is	 centralized,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	registration	is	at	the	federal	level	and	subject	to	federal	statutes.	Registration	is	governed	 not	 only	 by	 the	 PPSA	 but	 also	 the	 Personal	 Property	 Securities	Regulations	(hereinafter	“PPSR”)	supplementing	the	PPSA.	The	personal	security	interest	 law	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Canada	 is	 state-based;	 therefore,	registration	or	filing	is	subject	to	different	state-based	systems.	The	 content	 of	 a	 financing	 statement	 under	 the	 Australian	 law	 reveals	 more	information	than	of	Article	9,	which	requires	only	details	of	the	secured	party,	of	the	grantor	and	a	description	of	the	collateral79.	Searchers	can	learn	from	a	PPSA	
																																																								76	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	127	77	ibid	78	See	more	discussion	on	the	Australian	pre-PPSA	registration	in	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	pp.	161-4	79	PPSA	s	153(1),	Item	1,	2,	and	4	of	the	table	
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financing	statement	the	end	time	of	registration,	whether	the	security	interest	is	subordinate	to	any	other	security	interests,	whether	it	is	a	PMSI80.	A	security	interest	is	registered	against	the	grantor’s	name,	or	the	serial	number	of	 collateral	 if	 it	 is	 consumer	property81.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 it	 is	not	 required	 to	include	 the	grantor’s	details	 into	a	 financing	 statement82.	 Searchers	 rely	on	 the	grantor’s	name	or	serial	number	to	discover	any	possible	security	interests	upon	their	concerned	collateral.	Any	mistake	in	registering	the	grantor’s	name	or	serial	number	 that	 leads	 the	 search	 against	 the	 grantor’s	 name	 or	 serial	 number	respectively	 to	 an	 undisclosed	 security	 interest	 will	 invalidate	 the	 financing	statement83,	thus	making	the	security	interest	unperfected	unless	it	is	perfected	by	other	modes.	Article	9	does	not	 combine	 the	grantor’s	name	search	and	 the	serial	number	search	in	the	notice	filing	system.	Serial	numbered	property	may	be	subject	to	non-UCC	filing	systems	like	a	state	certification-of-title	one	where,	for	example,	an	automobile	is	the	collateral.	A	description	of	the	collateral	is	supposed	to	be	one	of	the	most	crucial	parts	of	a	financing	 statement.	 It	 provides	 details	 of	 which	 asset	 of	 the	 grantor	 is	encumbered.	Despite	its	expected	function,	the	idea	of	a	notice	filing	system	is	to	provide	limited	information	that	demands	further	inquiries.	The	study	on	Article	9	financing	statement	demonstrates	that	searchers	will	be	given	notice	about	the	possibility	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 upon	 the	 debtor’s	 asset,	 which	 is	 usually	 all	existing	 or	 after-acquired	 property	 or	 some	 categories	 of	 property.	 Except	 for	involving	 serial-numbered	consumer	property,	 a	 financing	statement	under	 the	PPSA	does	not	deviate	much	from	its	Article	9	counterpart,	even	though	it	calls	for	 relatively	 comprehensive	 data.	 A	 description	 must	 meet	 all	 the	 following	requirements84:	- Indicating	the	collateral	as	commercial	property	or	consumer	property;																																																									80	PPSA	s	153(1),	Item	5,	6,	and	7	of	the	table	81	Serial-numbered	property	is	identified	as,	aircrafts,	motor	vehicles,	watercraft,	some	intangible	property	 like	 a	 design,	 a	 patent,	 a	 plant	 breeder’s	 right,	 a	 trade	 mark	 or	 a	 license	 over	 any	intangible	property.	See	PPSR	Schedule	1	Clause	2.2.	82	PPSA	s	153(1),	Item	2	of	the	table	83	PPSA	s	164(1)(b),	165(a),	(b)	84	PPSA	s	153(1),	Item	4	of	the	table
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- Indicating	 the	 serial	 number	 in	 case	 it	 is	 consumer	 property.	 Indicating	the	serial	number	of	commercial	property	is	optional;	- Indicating	 a	 single	 class	 prescribed	 by	 the	 PPSR,	 namely	 agriculture;	aircraft;	 all	 present	 and	 after-acquired	 property;	 all	 present	 and	 after-acquired	property,	except;	financial	property;	intangible	property;	motor	vehicles;	other	goods;	watercraft85;	- Proceeds	must	be	described	in	compliance	with	the	PPSR,	that	is	to	say,	it	must	 be	 described	 as	 the	 present	 and	 after-acquired	 property,	 or	identified	 particular	 property	 by	 item,	 or	 by	 the	 class	 of	 personal	property86.	If	 there	are	two	or	more	different	classes	of	 the	collateral,	 the	security	 interest	must	be	 registered	separately87.	 For	 instance,	 a	 car	dealer	may	grant	a	 security	interest	 in	 cars,	 tool	 and	 equipment,	 parts	 and	 accessories	 to	 seek	 financing	assistance.	The	secured	party	must	register	a	financing	statement	describing	the	collateral	 as	 “commercial	 property,	 motor	 vehicle”,	 and	 another	 financing	statement	describing	the	collateral	as	“commercial	property,	other	goods”.	Uncertainty	 occurs	 by	 the	 compulsory	 indication	 of	 commercial	 or	 consumer	property,	and	a	single	class	prescribed	by	the	PPSR.	For	example,	a	secured	party	must	distinguish	between	motor	vehicle,	aircraft,	watercraft,	and	other	goods,	or	between	 financial	property	and	 intangible	property.	A	 financing	 statement	also	has	a	free	text	field	so	that	a	secured	party	can	give	a	more	specific	description	of	collateral	 than	 foregoing	 compulsory	 identification.	 	 It	 is	 worth	 repeating	 that	Article	9	does	not	require	any	compulsory	indication	of	category	or	class	of	the	collateral	 although	 it	 does	 define	 categories	 of	 goods,	 for	 example,	 equipment,	inventory,	or	chattel	paper.	In	the	Article	9	financing	statement,	the	filer	is	at	his	discretion	to	describe	the	collateral	at	hand	by	filling	in	a	free	text	field.	It	cannot	conclude	that	an	Article	9	or	a	PPSA	financing	statement	can	give	more	information	 of	 the	 collateral	 to	 prospective	 secured	 parties	 or	 lenders.	 The	following	illustration	may	shed	light	on	this	point.	Assuming	that	a	secured	party																																																									85	PPSR	Schedule	1	Clause	2.3	86	PPSR	Schedule	1	Clause	2.4	87	PPSA	s	153(1),	Item	4	of	the	table	
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supplies	 credit	 to	 a	 car	 dealer	 by	 taking	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 cars,	 trucks	 and	other	motor	vehicles,	accessory	and	parts,	tool	and	equipment	to	operate	the	car	dealer’s	service.	In	an	Article	9	financing	statement,	collateral	described	in	a	free	text	field	as	“all	and	after-acquired	inventory	and	equipment”	sufficiently	covers	types	of	assets	within	the	parties’	 intention	with	regard	to	collateral.	 In	a	PPSA	financing	statement,	the	secured	party	must	indicate	the	collateral	as	commercial	property	 and	 a	 single	 class	 of	 collateral	 that	 requires	 at	 least	 two	 financing	statements	 to	 indicate	 “motor	 vehicles”	 and	 “other	 goods”	 separately.	 Both	 of	financing	statements	may	or	may	not	need	a	description	in	a	free	text	field	like	an	“all	 and	 after-acquired”	 term,	 or	 details	 like	 accessory	 and	 parts,	 tool	 and	equipment.	 	In	a	context	that	a	grantor	is	a	car	dealer,	it	is	expected	that	motor	vehicles	 on	 sale,	 accessory	 and	 parts,	 tool	 and	 equipment	 for	 the	 service	 are	collateral	 despite	 that	 they	 are	 described	 as	 inventory	 and	 equipment	 under	Article	9	or	motor	vehicles	and	other	goods	under	the	PPSA	financing	statement.	However,	the	filer	under	the	PPSA	and	PPSR	scheme	has	more	burden	to	provide	compulsory	 information	 that	 may	 not	 satisfy	 the	 searcher’s	 demand	 for	information.	 In	 fact,	 a	 searcher	who	proposes	a	 secured	 loan	 is	 in	a	 strategy	 to	ask	 for	 further	 information,	 for	 instance,	 specific	 security	 agreements,	 after	looking	at	the	registration	in	both	jurisdictions.	The	 registered	security	 interest	must	be	 indicated	as	a	purchase-money	one	 to	enjoy	 the	 super-priority	 ranking.	 However,	 it	 is	 ambiguous	 about	 the	 legal	consequence	 of	 failing	 to	 tick	 the	 PMSI	 box.	 If	 it	makes	 a	 seriously	misleading	defect,	 the	registration	 is	 ineffective,	and	as	a	result,	 the	security	 interest	 is	not	perfected88.	 The	 PPSA	does	 not	 define	 a	 “seriously	misleading	defect”.	 In	Future	
Revelation	 Ltd	 v	 Medica	 Radiology	 &	 Nuclear	Medicine	 Pty	 Ltd,	 the	 New	 South	Wales	 Supreme	 Court	 relied	 on	 Canadian	 case	 law	 to	 find	 that	 a	 defect	 is	seriously	misleading	if	a	search	does	not	disclose	a	concerned	security	interest89.	In	 other	 words,	 the	 purpose	 of	 registration	 is	 to	 reveal	 a	 possible	 security	interest	 granted	 by	 a	 grantor	 upon	 the	 collateral,	 so	 a	 defect	 that	 makes	 this	purpose	 impossible	must	 be	 seriously	misleading.	 Failing	 to	 tick	 the	 PMSI	 box	
																																																								88	PPSA	s	164(1)(a	),	s	21	89	[2013]	NSWSC	1741 
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does	not	lead	to	an	undisclosed	security	interest	until	and	unless	the	reference	to	the	 collateral	 or	 the	 grantor	 is	 correct.	 The	 undisclosed	 information	 is	 the	expected	 purchase-money	 status.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 satisfactory	 to	 keep	 the	 financing	statement	 effective,	 but	 the	 secured	 party	 cannot	 claim	 the	 super-priority	ranking.	On	 the	 other	hand,	 the	wrong	 indication	of	 a	 PMSI	 in	 the	 collateral	 is	 a	 defect	causing	 an	 ineffective	 registration 90 .	 The	 security	 interest	 is,	 therefore,	unperfected.	The	validity	of	a	security	interest	against	third	parties	is	challenged	not	only	regarding	the	super-priority	ranking	but	also	a	general	security	interest	as	a	whole.	Article	 9	 does	 not	 require	 a	 PMSI	 notice	 in	 a	 financing	 statement.	However,	 to	enforce	 a	 PMSI	 in	 inventory,	 the	 purchase-money	 secured	 party	 is	 expected	 to	send	 a	 notification	 to	 earlier	 secured	 parties	 holding	 a	 conflicting	 security	interest	 in	 the	 same	 collateral.	 Notification	 via	 a	 public	 registration	 is	 the	 best	way	of	 giving	notice	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 constructively	 informs	 the	 rest	of	 the	world	about	 the	existence	of	 a	PMSI	 in	 the	 collateral.	 Surprisingly,	 an	Article	9	financing	statement	does	not	carry	this	 function.	This	policy	 is	explained	that	a	PMSI	 only	 has	 a	 severe	 impact	 on	 earlier	 after-acquired	 property	 security	interests,	 and	 the	 purchase-money	 status	 is	 meaningless	 to	 later	 security	interests.	Generally,	an	earlier-filed	creditor	does	not	have	any	respond	against	the	 interference	 of	 a	 PMSI,	 except	 for	 inventory	 financing.	 If	 an	 inventory	financier	knows	about	a	PMSI	filed	against	the	same	collateral,	she	will	consider	not	 to	 make	 the	 further	 advance	 to	 the	 debtor	 to	 finance	 the	 up-coming	inventory.	This	is	the	reason	why	Article	9	is	only	concerned	with	a	compulsory	notification	 to	 earlier-filed	 creditors	 with	 regard	 to	 inventory	 collateral.	 The	Article	 9	 solution	 is	 likely	 efficient	 since	 the	 notice	 is	 sent	 directly	 to	 all	concerned	creditors,	whereas,	under	the	PPSA,	 the	concerned	creditors	need	to	search	the	record	whenever	making	an	advance	for	any	intervening	PMSI.	The	 indication	 of	 a	 PMSI	 does	 not	 bring	 much	 benefit	 to	 both	 existing	 and	potential	 creditors	 other	 than	 earlier-filed	 inventory	 financier	who	may	 prefer																																																									90	PPSA	s	164(1)(b),	s	165(c)	
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private	notification	about	a	PMSI	as	demonstrated	in	the	Article	9	policy.	Under	the	PPSA,	 the	secured	party,	particularly	a	purchase-money	 lender	even	 loses	a	perfected	security	 interest	when	 it	 is	 turning	out	a	non-purchase-money	one.	 It	is,	 therefore,	 recommended	 to	 abolish	 the	 requirement	 of	 purchase-money	indication	in	a	financing	statement91.		In	 brief,	 description	 of	 collateral	 under	 Article	 9	 is	 at	 the	 filer’s	 discretion	 to	optimize	the	secured	party’s	interests	whereas	under	the	PPSA,	it	is	compulsory	to	give	relatively	discrete	information	that	causes	burden	rather	than	the	benefit	to	the	secured	party.	The	philosophy	of	the	notice	filing	system	initiated	by	Article	9	is	a	simple	notice	saying	that	a	security	interest	possibly	encumbers	some	or	all	the	debtor's	assets.	Follow-up	 inquiry	 with	 the	 debtor	 will	 give	 more	 information	 about	 any	outstanding	 security	 agreement	 covering	 the	 collateral.	 The	 PPSA	 notice	 filing	system	does	not	fully	satisfy	with	this	policy.	It	expresses	the	concern	about	the	likeness	 of	 “inappropriate	 or	 overreaching	 registration”	 where	 the	 grantor’s	asset	 appears	more	heavily	encumbered	 than	 in	 fact	 it	 is92.	 It	 requires	 to	 some	degree	 a	 belief	 about	 a	 security	 interest.	 To	 register	 a	 financing	 statement,	 a	person	must	believe	“on	reasonable	grounds”	that	the	secured	party	described	in	a	 financing	 statement	 “is,	 or	 will	 become,	 a	 secured	 party	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
collateral”,	otherwise	a	civil	penalty	will	apply93.	The	requirement	of	belief	aims	at	preventing	unnecessary	or	harassing	registration94.		Unlike	 Article	 9,	 the	 PPSA	 does	 not	 ask	 for	 the	 grantor’s	 consent	 when	 the	secured	party	registers	a	financing	statement	before	a	security	agreement	comes	into	existence.	The	grantor’s	consent	is	argued	to	cause	an	administrative	burden	for	 advance	 registration95.	 However,	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 grantor’s	 consent	discourages	annoying	or	inappropriate	registration.	It	is	also	easier	to	ascertain	the	grantor’s	 consent	 than	 the	 secured	party’s	belief.	The	PPSA	also	 requires	a																																																									91	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	213	92	See	detailed	discussion	in	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	pp.	214-221	93	PPSA	s	151(1)	94	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	215	95	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	216	
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financing	 change	 statement	 to	 end	 the	 registration	 when	 a	 secured	 party	mentioned	in	a	financing	statement	has	never	been	a	secured	party	in	relation	to	the	 collateral	 or	 no	 reasonable	 grounds	 exists	 to	 believe	 in	 a	 future	 security	agreement96.	 In	general,	 the	 foregoing	 statement	must	be	 submitted	within	 five	business	days	after	the	day	of	registration	if	there	is	no	security	agreement	or	no	reasonable	grounds97.	However,	a	secured	party	does	not	have	any	obligation	to	remove	a	valid	financing	statement	when	all	secured	obligations	are	discharged,	and	there	is	no	commitment	of	future	advance,	or	when	the	particular	collateral	is	 free	 from	the	security	 interest	until	and	unless	a	person	who	has	 interests	 in	the	 collateral	 sends	 a	 written	 amendment	 demand 98 .	 The	 secured	 party’s	obligation	to	remove	a	financing	statement	when	the	negotiation	is	failed	under	the	PPSA	does	not	 strengthen	 the	 certainty	of	outstanding	 security	 interests	 in	the	 collateral	 covered	 by	 a	 financing	 statement.	 Any	 prospective	 secured	 party	when	 discovering	 an	 effective	 financing	 statement	 is	 in	 a	 strategy	 to	 ask	 for	follow-up	information,	for	example,	whether	there	is	no	collateral	described	in	a	financing	statement	secured	any	obligation	owed	by	a	prospective	grantor.	If	it	is	the	case,	a	grantor	should	demand	a	financing	amendment	statement	to	remove	an	 existing	 financing	 statement,	 thus	 ensuring	 that	 a	 prospective	 creditor	 will	have	the	first	priority	by	registration.	Advance	 filing	 or	 registration	 is	 a	 unique	 advantage	 of	 a	 notice	 filing	 system	whereas	it	is	impossible	in	the	transaction-based	registration.	It	allows	not	only	a	candidate	 secured	 party	 to	 set	 up	 a	 date	 for	 priority	 purpose	 by	 registering	 a	financing	 statement	 before	 a	 security	 agreement	 comes	 into	 being	 but	 also	facilitates	 the	 possibility	 of	 one	 registration	 covering	 multiple	 continuing	security	 agreements	 that	 enjoy	 the	 same	 priority	 date.	 The	 PPSA	 places	 a	relatively	 heavy	 burden	 on	 a	 registrant	 at	 the	 applying	 stage,	 the	 underlying	policy	 of	 which	 is	 probably	 to	 avoid	 several	 unnecessary	 and	 annoying	registrations.	 Advance	 registration,	 therefore,	 should	 be	 applied	 in	 the	 light	 of	careful	 consideration.	 The	 PPSA	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 fully	 adopt	 the	 philosophy	 of	
																																																								96	PPSA	s	151(2)	97	PPSA	s	151(3)	98	PPSA	s	178(1)	
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Article	 9’s	 notice	 filing	 system,	 that	 is	 a	 simple	 notice	 of	 possibility,	 not	 a	certainty	of	a	security	interest.		
4.4 Purchase-money	security	interest	priority	The	 priority	 regime	 imported	 from	 the	 Article	 9	 model	 is	 one	 of	 the	 novel	features	of	the	PPSA.	Basically,	the	first-to-file	rule	takes	the	place	of	the	previous	long-standing	priority	rule	relying	on	the	order	of	security	interest	creation.	The	first	 priority	 of	 PMSI	 is	 recognized,	 constituting	 a	 turning	 point	 change	 in	 the	treatment	of	Romalpa	clause.	
4.4.1 Purchase-money	secured	creditor	vs.	unsecured	creditor	Generally,	a	security	interest	is	enforceable	against	the	grantor	and	third	parties	when	 it	 attaches	 to	 the	 collateral	 and	 the	 formalities	 requirement	 is	 met.	Registration	as	a	mode	of	perfection	is	not	required	to	validate	a	security	interest	against	 third	 parties.	 Perfection	 is,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 a	 concept	 dealing	 with	priority	 matters.	 This	 default	 rule	 is	 corresponding	 to	 the	 Article	 9	 principle.	Likewise,	 in	 the	 bankruptcy	 or	 winding	 up	 context,	 an	 unperfected	 security	interest	is	nevertheless	challenged.	When	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 unperfected	 at	 the	 time	 some	 insolvent	 events	commence,	 this	unperfected	security	 interest	“vests	in	the	grantor”	 immediately	before	 these	 events	 occur99 .	 These	 challenging	 circumstances	 are	 listed	 as	follows:	 (1)	 “an	order	 is	made,	 or	a	 resolution	 is	passed,	 for	 the	winding	up	of	a	
company	 or	 a	 body	 corporate”,	 (2)	 “an	 administrator	 of	 a	 company	 or	 a	 body	
corporate	is	appointed”,	 (3)	“a	company	or	a	body	corporation	executes	a	deed	of	
company	arrangement”,	(4)	“a	sequestration	order	is	made	against	a	person”,	and	(5)	a	person	becomes	a	bankrupt	by	a	voluntary	 filing	 for	bankruptcy100.	Other	insolvency-related	 events	 like	 debts	 agreements,	 personal	 insolvency	agreements	or	receivership	are	excluded101.	
																																																								99	PPSA	s	267(1),	(2)	100	PPSA	s	267(1)(a)	101	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	pp.	406-7	
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The	term	“vests	in	the	grantor”	is	debatable	since	other	terms	like	an	“ineffective”	in	 the	 Canadian	 versions	 of	 PPSA	 or	 “void”	 under	 the	 previous	 Australian	Corporation	Act	are	relatively	conventional	and	understandable102.	However,	the	Australian	PPSA,	the	Canadian	versions,	and	even	Article	9	reach	the	same	legal	consequence	in	this	context,	that	is	the	grantor	has	all	rights	and	interests	in	the	collateral	free	from	any	security	interest	for	the	benefit	of	general	creditors	when	a	security	interest	is	not	perfected	at	the	insolvent	event.		The	Corporation	Act	complements	the	PPSA	by	providing	that	even	if	the	security	interest	 is	perfected	at	 the	time	of	 insolvent	event,	 it	still	vests	 in	 the	company	grantor	 if	 it	 is	 registered	 after	 20	 business	 days	 of	 the	 date	 the	 security	agreement	 came	 into	 force	 or	 within	 six	 months	 before	 the	 trigger	 of	 the	insolvency	 proceeding103.	 In	 other	 words,	 any	 secured	 transaction	 between	 a	secured	 creditor	 and	 a	 company	 debtor	 is	 registered	 six	 months	 before	 the	commencement	 of	 the	 insolvency	 proceeding	 must	 be	 registered	 within	 20	business	days	running	from	the	date	when	the	security	agreement	takes	effect	to	be	effective	against	the	liquidator	or	administrator.	This	period	can	be	extended	by	the	court’s	order	relying	on	three	grounds,	that	is	the	delayed	registered	was	due	 to	 inadvertence,	 or	 “was	not	of	 such	a	nature	 to	prejudice	other	position	of	
creditors	 or	 shareholders”,	 or	 that	 “on	 other	 grounds	 it	 is	 just	 and	 equitable	 to	
grant	 a	 relief”104.	 Terms	 and	 conditions	 to	 make	 the	 extension	 are	 also	 at	 the	court’s	discretion105.		Section	 558FL	 of	 the	 Corporation	Act	 to	 some	 extent	 spoils	 the	 policy	 of	unity	that	the	PPSA	is	carrying.	The	above-mentioned	requirement	uniquely	applies	to	security	 interests	 granted	 by	 a	 company	 and	 perfected	 by	 registration.	 The	similar	provisions	 can	be	 found	 in	 section	266	of	 the	previous	Corporation	Act	dealing	with	company	charges.	This	section	possibly	aims	at	encouraging	quick	registration	of	 a	 company	charge,	but	 it	 is	 argued	 that	section	267	of	 the	PPSA	vesting	 in	 the	 grantor	of	 the	 unperfected	 security	 interest	 at	 the	 time	 of	 some	
																																																								102	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	407;	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	407	103	Corporation	Act	s	588FL	104	Corporation	Act	s	588FM(1),	(2)	105	Corporation	Act	s	588FM(3)	
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insolvency	 events	 sufficiently	 carries	 out	 this	 function 106 .	 The	 policy	 is	unsatisfactory	because	it	does	not	apply	to	all	grantors107.	Section	588FL	is	a	good	demonstration	 of	 the	 enormous	 influence	 of	 the	 company	 law	 in	 the	 law	 of	security	interest	in	Australia.	The	above	discussion	is	relevant	to	all	security	interests	including	PMSIs.	In	brief,	an	 unperfected	 PMSI	 when	 attached	 and	 enforceable	 is	 effective	 against	unsecured	 creditors.	 It	 is	 only	 attacked	 in	 some	 insolvency	 events	 provided	 in	section	 267	 of	 the	 PPSA	 and	 possibly	 section	 588FL	 of	 the	 Corporation	 Act.	 A	PMSI	 in	 the	 Australian	 law	 does	 not	 enjoy	 a	 grace	 period	 as	 in	 Article	 9.	 The	Article	9	purchase-money	creditor	has	20	days	running	from	the	date	the	debtor	receives	 delivery	 of	 the	 collateral	 to	 file	 a	 financing	 statement	 which	 is	 good	against	the	lien	creditor’s	right	even	though	the	later	arises	before	the	perfection	of	the	PMSI.	
4.4.2 Purchase-money	secured	creditor	vs.	buyers	The	PPSA	has	a	set	of	rules	called	the	taking	free	rules	applying	to	the	competing	interests	between	a	secured	party	and	a	transferee.	Transferees	in	the	taking	free	rules	are	mostly	the	buyer	or	the	lessee	of	the	collateral	under	a	contract	of	sale	or	a	lease	respectively	(called	collectively	“buyer”	hereinafter)108.		Like	 Article	 9,	 a	 security	 interest	 continues	 in	 the	 collateral	 even	 when	 the	collateral	 gives	 rise	 to	 proceeds109.	 In	 other	words,	 a	 buyer	 takes	 the	 collateral	subject	to	the	security	interest.	However,	the	PPSA	certainly	has	a	concern	about	the	 free	 flow	of	 commerce,	 so	 that	bona	 fide	 buyers	have	a	 chance	 to	prevail	 a	secured	party	and	obtain	a	clear	title	to	the	collateral,	leaving	the	secured	party	a	claim	for	the	proceeds	but	not	a	second	bite	of	the	collateral.	
																																																								106	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	pp.	438-9	107	ibid	108 “Buyer”	is	not	a	defined	term,	but	it	can	be	in	common	sense	the	one	who	acquires	personal	property	under	a	contract	of	sale.	See	Gedye	M,	‘A	Hoary	Chestnut	Resurrected:	The	Meaning	of	“Ordinary	Course	of	Business”	in	Secured	Transactions	Law’	(2013)	37	Melbourne	University	Law	Review	1,	at	p.	6	109	PPSA	s	32(1)(a)	
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The	taking	free	rules	in	the	Australian	PPSA	are	relatively	complicated.	The	PPSA	has	 taking	 free	 rules	 governing	 an	 unperfected	 security	 interest,	 buyers	 in	 the	ordinary	 course	 of	 business,	 authorization	 of	 sale	 free	 and	 clear	 of	 a	 security	interest	slightly	that	is	corresponding	to	similar	provisions	in	Article	9.	It	also	has	rules	 for	 particular	 cases	 like	 serial-numbered	 collateral,	 purchasing	 motor	vehicles	from	a	dealer,	and	low-value	consumer	goods	for	personal	use	which	are	not	discussed	in	this	thesis.	
4.4.2.1 Unperfected	security	interest	Sub	section	43(1)	governing	competing	interests	between	a	buyer	and	a	secured	party	who	does	not	perfect	the	concerned	security	interest	has	simple	wordings.	A	buyer	of	personal	property	“takes	the	personal	property	free	of	an	unperfected	
security	 interest	 in	 the	 property”110.	 	 Article	 9	 does	 not	 have	 a	 corresponding	provision	although	it	does	have	a	provision	giving	the	same	consequence	when	it	applies	to	a	security	interest	that	has	never	been	perfected.	The	vision	of	Article	9	 drafters	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	 time	 between	 the	 attachment	 and	 perfection	 of	 a	security	 interest	 at	which	 a	 claim,	 for	 instance,	 a	 claim	 of	 a	 buyer,	 intervenes,	defeating	 the	 security	 interest	 at	 hand.	 A	 buyer	 giving	 value	 and	 receiving	delivery	before	a	security	interest	is	perfected	takes	clear	title	to	the	concerned	collateral111.	 It	 is	suggested	that	 the	PPSA	provides	 for	a	buyer	to	 take	 free	 if	at	the	 time	 “the	buyer	becomes	a	buyer”	112	or	 “on	the	date	of	the	sale”113,	 a	 security	interest	is	unperfected.	The	Explanatory	Memorandum	clarifies	that	it	is	personal	property	subject	 to	an	unperfected	security	 interest,	and	the	example	given	for	the	 conflicting	 interest	of	 this	kind	sets	up	 the	 fact	 that	 the	secured	party	does	not	 register	 the	 collateral	 on	 the	 PPS	 Register	 or	 perfect	 it	 by	 using	 other	perfection	methods114.	It	can	be	inferred	that	the	taking	free	rule	applies	at	least	when	the	security	interest	is	eventually	unperfected.	Even	though	it	is	silent	on	the	 situation	where	 the	 security	 interest	 is	perfected	at	 any	 time	after	 the	 sale	
																																																								110	PPSA	s	43(1)	111	UCC	§9-317(b)	112 Gedye	M,	‘A	Hoary	Chestnut	Resurrected:	The	Meaning	of	“Ordinary	Course	of	Business”	in	Secured	Transactions	Law’	(2013)	37	Melbourne	University	Law	Review	1,	at	p.	5	113	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,		at	p.	278	114	Personal	Property	Securities	Bill	2009	Explanatory	Memorandum,	see	n.	14,	at	p.	27	
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occurs,	it	is	good	to	infer	that	perfection	of	the	security	interest	does	not	change	the	 consequence	 since	 the	 buyer	 has	 already	 taken	 a	 clear	 title 115 .	 This	consequence	is	satisfactory	since	a	prudent	buyer	other	than	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	 of	 business	 strategically	 check	 the	 PPS	 Register	 before	 entering	 to	 a	contract	of	sale.	The	subsequent	event	of	perfection,	therefore,	cannot	put	her	in	a	 disadvantageous	 position.	 However,	 subsection	 43(1)	 is	 ambiguous	 about	which	 event	 of	 the	 sale	 occurs	 before	 the	 perfection	 of	 the	 concerned	 security	interest	 so	 that	 a	buyer	 can	 take	a	 clear	 title.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 the	 time	when	a	contract	 of	 sale	 is	 created,	 or	 a	 sale	 takes	 place,	 or,	 corresponding	 to	Article	 9	when	 the	 buyer	 both	 gives	 value	 and	 receives	 delivery	 before	 the	 security	interest	is	perfected.	It	should	be	noticed	that	sub	section	43(1)	does	not	require	“without	knowledge	of	the	security	interest”	condition,	but	Article	9	does.	
4.4.2.2 Authority	to	sell	A	buyer	can	inquire	into	the	authorization	to	sell	or	whether	the	dealing	will	cut	off	 the	 security	 interest	 to	 take	a	 clear	 title	 to	 the	goods	 subject	 to	a	perfected	security	interest.	Under	Section	32(1)(a),	in	the	event	of	dealings	or	dispositions	giving	rise	to	the	proceeds,	a	security	interest	continues	in	the	collateral.	On	the	other	 hand,	 it	 discontinues	when	 the	 secured	 party	 expressly	 or	 impliedly	 (1)		authorises	the	disposition	or	(2)	agrees	that	the	concerned	dealing	extinguishes	the	 security	 interest	 on	 the	 other116.	 At	 first,	 not	 all	 dispositions	 except	 for	dispositions	giving	rise	to	the	proceeds	are	within	the	scope	of	section	32(1)(a).	A	disposition	as	a	gift	or	 to	discharge	a	pre-existing	debt	even	authorized	by	a	secured	party	does	not	cut	off	a	security	interest117.	When	two	events	generating	the	discontinuance	of	a	security	interest	are	read	together,	it	can	be	inferred	that	the	 PPSA	 does	 not	 insist	 that	 the	 authority	 to	 sale	 must	 indicated	 that	 the	disposition	is	free	and	clear	of	the	security	interest.	Otherwise,	section	32(1)(a)	did	 not	 include	 the	 event	 of	 an	 agreement	 on	 the	 dealing	 giving	 rise	 to	 the	proceeds	 that	 extinguishes	 a	 security	 interest.	 The	 corresponding	 provision	 is	not	found	in	Article	9.		Therefore,	when	the	authorization	is	silent	on	whether	the																																																									115	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	278	116	PPSA	s	32(1)(a)	117	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	269	
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sale	 is	 still	 subject	 to	 a	 security	 interest,	 the	 secured	 party	 is	 considered	 to	authorize	 the	 disposition	 free	 of	 a	 security	 interest.	 In	 Lewis	 v	 LG	 Electronics	
Australia	 Pty	 Ltd	118,	 a	 retailer	 contracted	 with	 different	 suppliers	 on	 different	title	 retention	 terms	 that	 did	 not	mention	whether	 buyers	 take	 a	 clear	 title	 or	whether	 the	 disposition	 was	 subject	 to	 the	 supplier’s	 security	 interest	 or	 title	retention119.	 In	 different	 title	 retention	 terms,	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 authority	 to	dispose	of	 the	goods	varies,	 including	 the	disposition	 in	 the	ordinary	 course	of	business,	and/or	selling	as	an	agent	or	bailee	of	the	supplier,	and/or	holding	the	proceeds	in	a	separate	account	for	the	supplier.	The	Lewis	court	concluded	that	when	the	secured	party	authorized	the	sale	of	inventory	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	 under	 section	 32(1),	 the	 authorization	 made	 the	 concerned	 PMSIs	equivalent	to	a	floating	charge	where	the	chargor	could	sell	the	inventory	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	free	of	a	charge	until	crystallization120.	This	argument	produces	an	understanding	that	section	32(1)(a)	does	not	allow	a	secured	party	to	give	a	consent	for	the	grantor	to	dispose	of	the	collateral	subject	to	a	security	interest121.	Also,	the	authority	to	sell	in	a	supply	agreement	itself	is	sufficient	for	sub-buyers	to	gain	a	clear	title	to	the	goods	but	they	must	satisfy	the	requirement	of	 buyers	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business122.	 However,	 a	 secured	 party	 can	expressly	forbid	the	grantor	to	dispose	of	the	collateral	until	full	payment.	In	this	respect,	a	secured	party	does	not	authorize	a	disposition,	and	the	buyer	takes	the	goods	subject	to	the	security	interest123.		The	 Lewis	 case	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 requirement	 of	 a	 buyer	 in	 the	 ordinary	course	 of	 business	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 PPSA’s	 taking	 free	 rules.	 This	requirement	is	substantially	relevant	to	section	32(1)	governing	authorization	to	sale	and	section	46	governing	a	transaction	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business.	It	is	interesting	that	section	46	does	not	limit	to	unauthorized	transactions.	Rather,	it	supplements	the	condition	of	a	transaction	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business																																																									118	[2014]	VSC	644	(2014) 119	ibid,	at	para.	10	and	11	120	ibid,	at	para.	39	121	Mr.	Whittaker	does	not	refer	the	Lewis	case	but	has	the	same	understanding.	See	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	269	122	Lewis	v	LG	Electronics	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	see	n.	118,	at	para.	70	and	71	123	ibid,	at	para.	109	
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to	the	taking	free	rule	under	section	32(2).	The	Lewis	court	applied	both	sections	to	 conclude	 that	 the	 suppliers	under	 title	 retention	 terms	cut	off	 their	 security	interests	in	the	disputed	collateral	when	they	were	sold	to	purchasers124.	In	other	words,	it	seems	that	a	buyer	relying	on	the	authority	to	sell	to	claim	a	clear	title	should	additionally	prove	that	the	sale	is	on	the	ordinary	course	of	business.	To	some	 extent,	 the	 requirement	 of	 selling	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	undermines	the	strength	of	section	32(1)	that	should	have	applied	regardless	of	this	requirement.	It	imposed	a	relatively	onerous	burden	of	proof	on	buyers	who	claim	the	clear	title	to	the	disputed	goods.	
4.4.2.3 Buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	Section	46	of	the	PPSA	is	the	taking	free	rule	applying	to	sale	in	ordinary	course	of	business.	The	requirements	are	summarized	as	follows:	- The	sale	has	taken	place;	- In	the	ordinary	course	of	the	seller’s	business	of	selling	personal	property	of	that	kind;	- A	security	interest	is	given	by	the	seller;	- The	buyer	buys	personal	property	without	actual	knowledge	that	the	sale	constitutes	a	breach	of	the	security	agreement.	It	 is	 required	 that	 the	 sale	 between	 the	 grantor	 and	 the	 buyer	must	 be	 taken	place.	The	wording	of	section	46	makes	it	clear	that	the	goods	must	be	“sold”	in	the	ordinary	course	of	the	seller’s	business	of	selling	of	personal	property	of	that	kind.	The	terms	“buyer”,	“sold”	or	“sale”	are	not	defined	in	the	PPSA	but	are	long	understood	under	the	sale	of	goods	 law.	The	Lewis	 court	applied	the	Goods	Act	1958	 to	 clarify	 the	meaning	of	 relevant	 concepts125.	Accordingly,	 there	 is	 a	 sale	when	the	property	in	the	goods	is	transferred	from	the	seller	to	the	buyer126.	The	property	in	the	goods	is	passed	not	earlier	than	when	the	goods	are	ascertained,	and	at	such	the	time	the	parties	 intend127.	 In	Lewis,	buyers	who	bought	under	a																																																									124	In	 Lewis,	 some	 suppliers	 require	 the	 sale	 to	 purchasers	 to	 be	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	business,	but	some	do	not.	125	Lewis	v	LG	Electronics	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	see	n.	118,	at	para.	47,	64	and	73	126	Goods	Act	1958	s	6,	cited	in	Lewis	v	LG	Electronics	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	at	para.	48	127	Goods	Act	1958	s	21,	22,	cited	in	Lewis	v	LG	Electronics	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	see	n.	118,	at	para.	48	
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layby	 contract	 of	 sale	 bearing	 a	 reservation	 of	 ownership	 clause	 and	 did	 not	make	full	payment	could	not	take	free	of	the	security	interests.	The	learned	court	concluded	 that	 there	 was	 no	 sale	 because	 the	 property	 in	 the	 goods	 was	 not	transferred	 until	 and	 unless	 payment	 was	 made	 in	 full128.	 	 This	 approach	 was	supported	by	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	Canadian	case	law	and	commentary.	It	demonstrates	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 sale	 employed	 in	 the	 PPSA	 is	 determined	 in	light	 of	 the	 sale	 of	 goods	 law,	 and	 the	 PPSA	does	 not	 displace	 the	 existing	 law	relating	 to	 the	 sale	of	goods129.	This	 approach	 seems	correct	 at	 first	glance,	but	not	persuasive	when	applying	to	the	conditional	sale	or	title	retention	which	are	now	 a	 security	 interest	 under	 the	 PPSA.	 Coming	 back	 to	 the	 Lewis	 case,	 non-payment	 in	 full	 and	 the	 reservation	 of	 ownership	 clause	 were	 wrongfully	combined	to	determine	whether	the	sale	was	taken	place,	or	at	least	the	court’s	argument	 was	 not	 fully	 supported	 by	 a	 thorough	 discussion	 on	 the	 interface	between	the	PPSA	and	the	sale	of	good	act	with	regard	to	conditional	sales.		The	Re	Highway	Foods	 case	 in	English	 law	raises	 the	problem	with	 regard	 to	a	chain	of	transactions130.	The	facts	in	Re	Highway	Foods	are	to	some	extent	similar	to	transactions	in	Lewis	to	the	extent	that	the	suppliers	had	a	PMSI	in	the	goods,	and	the	buyer	did	not	pay	in	full	to	the	grantor	under	a	layby	contract	bearing	a	reservation	 of	 ownership	 clause.	 Both	 cases	 have	 the	 same	 outcome	 that	 the	buyer	could	not	have	a	clear	title	to	the	goods	despite	the	different	treatments	of	title	retention	in	the	two	jurisdictions		Although	 the	 Australian	 law	 of	 secured	 transactions	 has	 changed	 dramatically	from	English	law	model	to	Article	9	model,	it	does	not	give	a	satisfactory	answer	to	the	matter	discussed	above.	The	long-standing	law	on	the	sale	of	goods	has	not	been	renovated	so	far	to	catch	up	with	the	PPSA	but	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	PPSA	operation.	The	Australian	approach	is	entirely	different	from	Article	9.	First,	under	Article	9,	 the	authorization	should	be	the	authorization	of	sale	 free	and	clear	of	 the	 security	 interest	 for	 the	purpose	of	 taking	 free;	otherwise,	 the	disposition	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 concerned	 security	 interest.	 Second,	 to	 invoke	 the																																																									128	Lewis	v	LG	Electronics	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	see	n.	118,	at	para.	60	129	ibid,	at	para.	65-72	130	See	sub-section	2.2.3.1	of	this	thesis	discussing	buyers	in	possession	and	the	authority	to	sell	
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authority	 to	sell	granted	by	a	secured	party	to	a	debtor	to	gain	the	clear	 title,	a	buyer	 is	 not	 required	 to	 be	 a	 buyer	 in	 ordinary	 course	of	 business.	 It	 is	worth	mentioning	that	the	pre-code	secured	transaction	law	in	the	United	States	did	not	accept	the	concept	of	floating	charge.	Furthermore,	Article	2	on	the	sales	of	goods	was	 drafted	 compatible	 with	 Article	 9	 concerning	 conditional	 sales	 and	 title	retention.	Article	2	and	Article	1	definition	of	security	interest	expressly	provide	that	title	retention	has	a	limited	effect	of	reservation	of	security	interest131.	Section	46	is	corresponding	to	the	equivalent	provision	of	Article	9	at	least	on	its	face.	However,	like	determining	what	the	sale	is	as	discussed	above,	“the	ordinary	
course	of	business”	may	 have	 a	meaning	 somewhat	 deviating	 from	 the	 original	model.	The	Explanatory	Memorandum	clarifies	that	the	buyer	can	only	have	the	shelter	if	the	interest	is	acquired	in	the	ordinary	course	of	the	seller’s	business	of	selling	property	of	that	kind132.	In	other	words,	selling	property	of	that	kind	must	be	 the	 seller’s	 business	 to	 satisfy	 the	 requirement	 of	 “in	 the	ordinary	 course	of	
business”.		Under	Article	9,	the	meaning	of	ordinary	course	of	business	is	not	limited	to	the	seller’s	business	of	 selling	goods	of	 that	kind	as	 the	Australian	PPSA	seemingly	adopts.	The	sale	also	“comports	with	the	usual	or	customary	practices	in	the	kind	
of	 business	 in	 which	 the	 seller	 is	 engaged	 or	 with	 the	 seller’s	 own	 usual	 or	
customary	practices”133.	 It	 further	 clarifies	 that	 the	 section	 applies	 primarily	 to	inventory	collateral134.	Nothing	suggests	 that	section	9-320	has	the	scope	of	 the	application	solely	to	inventory	collateral	or	narrowly	inventory	for	sale.	The	sale	of	superseded	equipment	or	the	goods	as	secondary	business	has	a	chance	to	be	in	the	ordinary	course	of	the	seller’s	business	if	it	is	an	industry	norm135	or	done	on	a	regular	basis.	
																																																								131	UCC	§2-401(1)	and	§1-201(35)	132	Personal	Property	Securities	Bill	2009	Explanatory	Memorandum,	see	n.	14,	at	p.	31	133	UCC	§1-201(9)	134	Comment	3	to	the	UCC	§9-320,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	906	135	Tanbor	Fabrics	Corp.	v.	Deering	Milliken,	Inc,	350	NE2d	590,	19	UCC	Rep.	(NY	1976),	cited	in	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	The	Law	of	Secured	Transactions	under	the	Uniform	Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	p.	3-24	
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The	Australian	PPSA	does	not	have	provision	excluding	some	transactions	from	the	ordinary	course	of	the	seller’s	business,	like	a	transfer	in	bulk,	or	as	security	for,	 or	 in	 the	 total	or	partial	discharge	of	 a	pre-existing	debt	 like	Article	9.	The	phrase	“ordinary	course	of	business”	is	familiar	in	the	insolvency	law	concerning	voidable	transactions	and	the	former	floating	charge	law.	It	is	recommended	that	not	 only	 Australian	 precedents	 are	 relevant,	 but	 also	 the	 PPSA	 experiences	 in	other	 jurisdictions	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration 136 .	 The	 Explanatory	Memorandum	expressly	considers	that	the	taking	free	rule	does	not	apply	when	the	 sale	 is	 made	 at	 the	 time	 of	 financial	 stress	 and	 for	 the	 sellers’	 financial	stress137.	The	taking	free	rule	concerning	the	ordinary	course	of	business	applies	solely	to	the	 case	 where	 a	 buyer	 purchases	 from	 the	 seller	 who	 creates	 the	 security	interest.	This	requirement	corresponds	precisely	 to	 the	Article	9.	However,	 in	a	relatively	advantageous	position,	 a	buyer	of	pre-encumbered	goods	 can	 invoke	other	provision	in	the	PPSA	to	protect	her	interest	against	the	secured	party.	The	following	example	demonstrates	this	point138.			Example	1:	SP1	has	a	perfected	security	interest	in	D’s	manufacturing	equipment.	D,	a	manufacturer,	then	sells	the	equipment	to	Dealer,	who	is	in	the	business	of	selling	 and	 purchasing	 used	 manufacturing	 equipment.	 Buyer	 buys	 the	equipment	at	hand	from	Dealer.	Like	 Article	 9,	 the	 taking	 free	 rule	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 transaction	 between	Dealer	and	Buyer	because	the	Dealer	did	not	create	the	security	interest.		Despite	that	the	security	interest	continues	in	the	collateral	after	the	disposition	under	 the	 ambit	 of	 section	 32,	 it	 is	 temporarily	 perfected	 within	 24	 months	starting	 from	 the	 time	 of	 transfer	 or	 by	 the	 end	 time	 for	 the	 registration,	whichever	comes	earlier139.	Section	52(1)	provides	that	 the	buyer	 for	value	can	take	 the	 goods	 free	 of	 the	 security	 interest	 perfected	 temporarily	 immediately																																																									136	See	detailed	discussion	in	Gedye	M,	see	n.	112,	at	pp.	19-30	137	Personal	Property	Securities	Bill	2009	Explanatory	Memorandum,	see	n.	14,	at	p.	31	138	This	 example	 is	 adapted	 from	 the	 example	 given	 in	 part	 2.90	 in	 the	 Personal	 Property	Securities	Bill	2009	Explanatory	Memorandum,	see	n.	14,	at	p.	31	139	PPSA	s	34(1)	
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before	 the	 time	 of	 the	 sale	 unless	 otherwise	 perfected,	 and	 subject	 to	 an	exception	 that	 the	buyer	has	actual	knowledge	at	 the	 time	of	 sale	 that	 the	 sale	constitutes	 a	 breach	 of	 a	 security	 agreement.	 Thus,	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	continuously	 perfected	 security	 interest	 against	 Dealer,	 SP1	 must	 perfect,	 for	instance	by	registration,	the	security	interest	against	Dealer	within	the	foregoing	grace	period,	but	to	prevail	Buyer,	the	registration	must	be	done	before	the	sale	has	 taken	 place.	 SP1	 strategically	 registers	 against	 Dealer	 as	 soon	 as	 she	discovers	 the	 unexpected	 transfer	 of	 the	 collateral	 to	 avoid	 the	 effect	 of	temporary	perfection.	Under	 Article	 9,	 a	 secured	 party,	 regardless	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 collateral,	 has	 a	continuous	perfection	 rather	 than	a	 temporary	one.	Buyers	of	pre-encumbered	goods	only	have	a	chance	when	they	are	located	in	a	state	other	than	the	seller’s	state,	and	the	transfer	is	taken	place	beyond	the	grace	period	of	one	year	for	the	secured	 party	 to	 perfect	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 this	 state.	 Comparatively,	Australian	 law	 is	 a	 good	 shelter	 for	 buyers	 of	 pre-encumbered	 goods	 in	 the	ordinary	course	of	business.	Section	52(1)	is	likely	to	have	an	underlying	policy	preferring	buyers	in	ordinary	course	of	business	who	are	not	able	to	discover	the	security	interest	by	searching	the	public	record,	and	secured	parties	who	lose	the	security	 interest	 because	 of	 a	 transfer	 without	 their	 consent	 have	 a	disadvantagous	 position.	 However,	 the	 provision	 is	 less	 favourable	 to	 secured	parties	since	the	mode	of	temporary	perfection	is	less	favourable.	In	the	context	of	 buyers	 of	 pre-encumbered	 goods,	 both	 secured	 parties	 and	 buyers	 of	 pre-encumbered	 goods	 are	 innocent	 and	 meriting	 a	 shelter.	 An	 original	 debtor	transfers	the	collateral	without	a	secured	party’s	consent,	and	the	transaction	is	usually	 invisible	 to	 the	secured	party’s	eyes.	 It	 is	persuasive	to	place	a	security	interest	 in	 the	collateral	 transferred	without	consent	 in	 the	mode	of	 temporary	perfection.	 It	 encourages	 the	 secured	 party	 to	 register	 the	 security	 interest	against	 a	 new	 debtor	 for	 public	 notice,	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 urges	 the	 secured	party	 to	 watch	 the	 collateral	 in	 the	 debtor’s	 hand	 actively.	 Nevertheless,	 the	secured	 party	 deserves	 a	 grace	 period	 to	 uncover	 the	 unexpected	 out-of-sight	transfer	of	 collateral.	During	 this	period,	 a	 security	 interest	 should	be	effective	against	third	parties	including	buyers	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business.	
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4.4.3 Purchase-money	secured	creditor	vs.	other	secured	creditors	Basically,	the	PPSA	adopts	the	first	–	to	–	file	(or	register,	according	to	Australian	term)	 rule	 and	 has	 some	 variants	 to	 determine	 priority	 between	 conflicting	perfected	security	interests.	
4.4.3.1 Default	priority	rule	Section	55	provides	for	the	default	priority	rule	between	security	interests	in	the	same	 collateral	 applying	 when	 there	 is	 no	 other	 rule	 determining	 priority140.	Priorities	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 subordination	 agreement	 that	 may	 arrange	 an	earlier-registered	 to	 be	 subordinate	 to	 a	 latter-registered	 competing	 security	interest141.	The	default	priority	rule	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	- Between	unperfected	security	 interests	 in	 the	same	collateral,	priority	 is	determined	by	order	of	attachment142;	- Between	 a	 perfected	 and	 an	 unperfected	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 same	collateral,	the	former	takes	priority	over	the	latter143;	- Between	many	perfected	security	interests	in	the	same	collateral,	priority	is	 determined	 by	 order	 of	 priority	 time144,	 that	 is	 the	 earliest	 time	 of	registration	 time,	 the	 time	 the	 secured	 party	 “first	 perfects	 the	 security	
interest	by	taking	possession	or	control	of	the	collateral”,	and	“the	time	the	
security	interest	is	temporarily	perfected”145.	Basically,	 the	PPSA	default	 rule	 seemingly	 corresponds	 to	 the	Article	9	priority	rule.	 The	 first	 perfection	 day	 is	 the	 priority	 time	 in	 the	 case	 of	 continuous	perfection146,	 covering	 all	 advances	 including	 future	 advances	 secured	 by	 this	agreement147.																																																										140	PPSA	s	55(a)	141	PPSA	s	61	142	PPSA	s	55(2)	143	PPSA	s	55(3)	144	PPSA	s	55(4)	145	PPSA	s	55(5)	146	PPSA	s	55(6)	and	s	56	
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4.4.3.2 Priority	rule	of	purchase-money	security	interest	a. PMSI	in	the	original	collateral	Recognition	 of	 PMSI	 and	 its	 first	 rank	 in	 the	Australian	 PPSA	has	 changed	 the	status	 of	Romalpa	 agreements	 considerably.	 Registration	 of	 a	 PMSI	 is	 a	 public	notification	 about	 the	 first	 priority	 on	 the	 collateral	 indicated.	 Before	 the	enforcement	of	 the	PPSA,	a	 title-retaining	seller’s	claim	did	not	compete	with	a	secured	party’s	claim	in	the	goods	supplied	because	the	goods	can	be	recovered	under	 the	 title	 retention	 arrangement	 that	 prevents	 the	 goods	 at	 hand	 from	joining	 the	 buyer’s	 assets.	 The	 recognition	 of	 the	 PMSI	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 a	considerable	change	in	the	outcome,	but	the	owner	status	is	shifted	to	the	status	of	 a	 secured	 creditor	 that	 requires	 a	 good	 registration	 to	 establish	 the	 first	priority	against	other	creditors.	The	 PPSA	 registration	 system	 requires	 timely	 registration148	and	 an	 express	notice	 of	 a	 PMSI	 in	 the	 financing	 statement 149 .	 The	 requirement	 of	 PMSI	indication	 in	 the	 financing	 statement	 is	 uniquely	 Australian	 approach	 as	discussed	elsewhere	in	the	thesis150.	The	PPSA	does	not	oblige	a	purchase-money	secured	party	to	send	notification	about	 the	PMSI	 in	 time	to	competing	earlier-registered	secured	parties.	A	secured	party	 in	Australian	 jurisdiction,	 therefore,	whenever	 makes	 an	 advance	 against	 the	 coming	 inventory	 as	 the	 collateral	earlier	registered,	strategically	check	the	public	record	for	any	intervening	PMSI	in	the	same	collateral.	Although	 there	 are	 separate	 priority	 rules	 governing	 inventory	 PMSI	 and	 non-inventory	 PMSI151,	 the	 only	 difference	 is	 the	 timeframe	 for	 the	 requirement	 of	timely	registration.	For	inventory	PMSI,	the	rule	for	timely	registration	generally	provides	for	two	kinds	of	collateral,	namely	goods	and	other	kinds	of	collateral.	Goods	are	defined	as	 “personal	property	that	 is	 tangible	property”	not	 including	
																																																																																																																																																															147	PPSA	s	58	148	PPSA	s	62(2)(b)	and	(3)(b)	149	PPSA	s	62(2)(c)	and	(3)(c)	150	See	discussion	in	section	4.3.2	of	this	thesis	151	PPSA	s	62(2)	and	(3)	
	 159	
financial	property	or	an	 intermediated	security152.	Accordingly,	 the	PMSI	should	be	 perfected	 by	 registration	 at	 the	 time	 “the	grantor,	 or	 another	 person	 at	 the	
request	of	 the	grantor,	 obtains	possession	 of	 the	 inventory”	 for	 inventory	 that	 is	goods,	 and	 when	 “the	 PMSI	 attaches	 to	 the	 inventory	 for	 inventory	 of	 other	kind”153.	For	non-inventory	PMSI,	the	secured	creditor	enjoys	the	grace	period	of	15	business	days	triggering	by	the	event	 that	 the	grantor,	or	another	person	at	the	request	of	 the	grantor,	obtains	possession	of	 the	collateral	 for	 the	collateral	that	 is	 goods,	 and	when	 the	PMSI	attaches	 to	 the	 collateral	 for	 the	 collateral	of	other	kinds154.	Article	9	does	not	have	the	separate	rule	for	collateral	that	is	goods	and	that	is	of	other	kinds.	It	expressly	defines	purchase-money	collateral	limiting	to	goods	and	software	that	can	be	physically	possessed.	Article	9	also	grants	the	grace	period	for	 filing	a	 financing	 statement	 covering	non-inventory	PMSI,	 and	 the	20	–	day	length	 of	 time	 is	 slightly	 different	 from	 the	 PPSA	 corresponding	 provision.	However,	 Article	 9	 case	 law	 is	 split	 in	 determining	when	 and	 how	 the	 debtor	takes	 possession	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 PMSI	 priority155.	 The	 Australian	 PPSA,	 like	Article	9,	does	not	give	the	meaning	of	possession,	even	though	it	deals	with	the	concept	of	possession	in	some	situations	that	cannot	apply	to	the	context	of	PMSI	priority	rules156.	It	is	recommended	that	the	PMSI	priority	rule	should	clarify	that	the	grantor	obtaining	possession	refers	to	the	time	when	the	grantor	obtains	that	possession	“in	its	capacity	as	grantor”157.	Thus,	it	would	eliminate	debates	arising	from	 the	 situation	 where	 the	 grantor	 physically	 obtains	 possession	 of	 the	collateral	before	the	attachment	of	respective	security	interest.	b. PMSI	in	proceeds	The	priority	ranking	for	a	PMSI	in	proceeds	is	governed	by	general	rules	applying	for	the	attachment	and	perfection	of	the	proceeds	and	specific	rules	with	regard	
																																																								152	PPSA	s	10	153	PPSA	s	62(2)(b)	154	PPSA	s	62(3)(b)	155	See	discussion	in	sub-section	3.4.4.2	of	this	thesis	156	PPSA	s	24	157	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	pp.	325-6	
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to	 a	 PMSI.	 The	 general	 priority	 rules	 for	 the	 proceeds	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	follows:	- A	 security	 interest	 attaches	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	 the	 collateral	 unless	otherwise	agreed158;	- The	time	of	registration	or	perfection	of	the	original	collateral	is	the	time	of	 registration	 or	 perfection	 of	 the	 proceeds	 relating	 the	 original	collateral159;	- A	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 can	 be	 perfected	 by	 reference	 to	 the	perfection	 of	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	 collateral	 or	 temporarily	perfected160.	The	 priority	 rule	 of	 PMSI	 applies	 to	 both	 the	 original	 collateral	 and	 its	proceeds161.	In	this	respect,	a	purchase-money	secured	party	has	the	first	priority	in	 the	proceeds	of	 the	original	 collateral	 if	 she	has	good	 registration	of	 a	PMSI	against	the	collateral	as	discussed	above.	This	rule	does	not	apply	to	account	as	proceeds	of	inventory162.	However,	a	secured	party	should	take	perfection	steps	to	 enforce	 the	 first	 priority	 in	 the	 proceeds	 against	 other	 creditors.	 It	 is	worth	repeating	that	the	PPSA	expressly	recognize	the	attachment	of	a	security	interest	to	 the	 proceeds	 unless	 otherwise	 provided	 by	 the	 security	 agreement163.	 As	discussed	 later,	 the	perfection	of	 the	original	 collateral	 to	a	great	 extent	makes	the	 proceeds	 thereof	 perfected.	 Secured	 party’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	 proceeds	 is	crucial	 in	 any	 legislation	 following	 the	 Article	 9	 model.	 Nothing	 restrains	 a	grantor	 from	 transferring	 the	 collateral	 to	 third	 parties.	 The	 existence	 of	authorization	to	transfer	is	one	of	the	factors	to	determine	whether	she	still	has	the	 first	 priority	 in	 the	 collateral	 possessed	 by	 a	 third	 party.	 Without	 the	attachment	of	 the	proceeds	 to	a	 security	 interest,	 it	 is	probably	meaningless	 to	hold	a	security	interest	in	personal	property,	particularly	inventory.	
																																																								158	PPSA	s	32(1)(b)	159	PPSA	s	32(5)	160	PPSA	s	33	161	PPSA	s	62(2),	(3)	162	PPSA	s	64	163	PPSA	32	(1)(b)	
	 161	
The	 following	 examples	 illustrate	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 priority	 of	 a	 Romalpa	agreement	 relating	 to	 the	 proceeds	 under	 the	 pre-PPSA	 and	 post-PPSA	 law	 of	security	interest	in	personal	property164.	Example	1:	SP1	sell	to	D	a	printer	subject	to	a	simple	title	retention	clause.	D	does	not	pay	the	purchase	price	in	full	but	sell	the	printer	to	another	purchaser	on	90-day	credit	 term.	D	also	grant	a	security	 interest	 to	SP2	 in	all	and	after-acquired	receivable	account.	Both	SP1	and	SP2	claim	the	account	arising	from	the	sale	of	the	printer.			The	pre-PPSA	 law	enforced	the	right	of	SP1	 in	the	printer	as	an	owner	without	any	 requirement	 of	 registration,	 but	 SP1	 could	 not	 claim	 the	 account	 as	 the	proceed	of	the	original	goods.	The	title	retention	arrangement	did	not	include	an	extension	to	the	sale	proceeds.	The	PPSA	treats	the	title	retention	clause	as	a	purchase	security	interest	that	also	attaches	 to	 the	 proceeds	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 security	 agreement	 includes	 the	proceeds.	 However,	 a	 PMSI	 should	 be	 registered	 in	 time,	 and	 a	 financing	statement	 should	 indicate	 that	 it	 is	 a	 PMSI.	 Also,	 the	 proceeds	 should	 be	perfected.	If	all	the	requirements	of	priority	and	perfection	are	fulfilled,	SP1	has	the	priority	in	the	proceeds	over	SP2	without	a	prior	agreement.	Example	 2:	 All	 facts	 are	 the	 same	 as	 facts	 in	Example	 1,	 except	 that	 SP1	 has	 a	proceeds	title	retention	clause.			Pre-PPSA	Australian	case	 law	was	somewhat	split	 in	recognition	of	 the	right	of	SP1	 in	 the	 proceeds.	 Following	 English	 law,	 some	 cases	 treated	 the	 proceeds	clause	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 registrable	 charge,	 accordingly	 void	 against	 other	creditors	if	it	was	not	registered,	assuming	that	SP1	is	a	company165.	In	contrast,	the	 Associated	 Alloy	 court	 upheld	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 title	 retention	 trust	clause	 over	 the	 proceeds	 and	 denied	 construing	 the	 clause	 at	 hand	 as	 a	
																																																								164	Example	1	and	Example	2	is	adapted	from	Example	1	given	in	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	231	165	Duggan	A,	see	n.	3,	at	p.	647;	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	336	
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registrable	charge166.	Thus,	if	the	proceeds	title	retention	clause	was	drafted	to	in	the	form	of	trust	as	in	the	Associated	Alloy	case,	SP1	was	likely	to	have	a	claim	in	the	proceeds	over	SP2	without	a	registration.	According	to	the	PPSA,	SP1	has	the	same	consequence	of	first	priority	as	it	may	have	in	Example	1.	In	brief,	the	PPSA	creates	a	statutory	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	to	replace	an	equitable	charge	or	a	 fiduciary	relationship	established	by	the	agreement	or	the	title	retention	clause.										As	mentioned	above,	 the	attachment	of	a	security	 interest	 to	 the	proceeds	does	not	amount	to	all-time	automatic	perfection.	The	proceed	 is	perfected	either	by	reference	 to	 the	perfection	of	 security	 interest	 in	 the	original	 collateral167	or	by	temporary	perfection168.	In	all	cases,	a	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	can	enjoy	the	 time	 of	 registration	 or	 perfection	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	collateral	 as	 the	 priority	 time	 so	 long	 as	 it	 is	 continuously	 perfected169.	 With	regard	 to	perfection	by	 reference	 to	 the	perfection	of	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	original	collateral,	a	financing	statement	can	describe	the	proceeds	for	perfection	by	 a	 click	 on	 the	 proceeds	 option170.	 The	 register	 can	 choose	 to	 describe	 the	proceeds	as	all	present	and	after-acquired	property,	or	by	item,	or	by	a	class	of	personal	property171.	The	 first	choice	 is	default	whenever	the	register	clicks	the	“proceeds”	option172.	The	proceeds	option	and	the	technical	support	by	just	one-click	 are	 really	 at	 a	 secured	 party’s	 convenience.	 It	 seemingly	 encourages	 and	reminds	a	secured	party	to	include	the	proceeds	in	a	financing	statement.		
																																																								166	Associated	Alloy,	see	n.	6,	at	pp.	603-611;	See	more	discussion	in	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	pp.	336-7	167	PPSA	s	33(1)	168	PPSA	s	33(2)	169	PPSA	s	33(5)	170	PPSA	s	33(1)(a)	171	PPSA	s	153(1),	PPSR	s.	5.5	and	Schedule	1,	cl.	2.4	172	Duggan	A,	see	n.	3,	at	p.673	
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If	 the	 financing	statement	does	not	mention	the	proceeds,	but	 the	proceeds	are	the	 kind	 of	 the	 collateral	 described,	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 is	perfected	by	registration173.		If	 the	 proceeds	 are	 currency,	 cheque,	 or	 deposit	 account,	 or	 a	 right	 to	 the	insurance	payment	or	other	payments	as	indemnity	or	compensation	for	loss	or	damage	 to	 the	 collateral	 or	 proceeds,	 and	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	collateral	 is	 perfected,	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 is	 automatically	perfected 174 .	 It	 is	 corresponding	 to	 Article	 9	 that	 provided	 for	 automatic	perfection	of	cash	proceeds.	Temporary	perfection	is	applied	when	the	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	is	not	perfected	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 perfection	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	collateral	 as	 described	 above.	 The	 time	 length	 of	 temporary	 perfection	 is	 five	business	days	starting	from	the	day	the	security	interest	in	the	original	collateral	attaches	to	 the	proceeds175.	A	secured	creditor	can	perfect	a	security	 interest	 in	the	proceeds	within	the	period	of	temporary	perfection	to	keep	the	perfection	to	run	continuously176.	The	period	of	temporary	perfection	in	the	PPSA	is	relatively	short	in	comparison	with	the	like	period	in	Article	9	that	is	of	20	days.	A	secured	party	 in	 Australian	 should	 response	 promptly	 against	 the	 attachment	 of	 the	proceeds,	but	 it	depends	much	on	the	grantor	who	knows	precisely	 the	time	of	attachment.	Thus,	 it	 is	 strategic	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 “proceeds”	option	 in	 the	 financing	statement	against	the	original	collateral.		Article	9	similarly	has	the	underlying	policy	to	encourage	an	explicit	description	of	 the	 proceeds	 in	 a	 financing	 statement.	 The	 “proceeds”	 one-click	 option	 is	absent	in	the	form	of	an	Article	9	financing	statement.	Article	9	merely	provided	that	if	the	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	is	perfected	other	than	by	temporary	perfection	at	 the	 time	 the	 security	 interest	 attaches	 to	 the	proceeds	 regardless	how	it	is	perfected,	it	is	not	subject	the	20-day	period	of	temporary	perfection177.																																																									173	PPSA	s	33(1)b)	174	PPSA	s	33(1)(c)	175	PPSA	s	33(2)	176	PPSA	s	33(3)				177	UCC	§9-315(d)(3)	
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The	purchase-money	priority	of	the	proceeds	is	not	always	good	even	though	the	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	is	continuously	perfected.	It	is	the	case	that	the	PMSI	 in	accounts	as	 the	proceeds	of	 inventory	 is	 subordinate	 to	a	non-PMSI	 in	accounts	(the	PPSA	calls	 the	 latter	as	“priority	interest”)178.	The	priority	 interest	must	be	granted	for	new	value179,	and	the	account	collateral	must	be	the	original	collateral180.	 	The	 registration	 time	of	 the	priority	 interest	must	be	earlier	 than	the	 time	 of	 registration	 or	 perfection	 of	 the	 PMSI	 in	 inventory181.	 Otherwise,	 a	timely	 notification	 should	 be	 sent	 to	 a	 purchase-money	 secured	 party182.	 The	PPSA	provision	is	corresponding	to	Article	9	to	some	extent	but	has	a	substantial	number	of	derivations.		The	 PPSA	 and	 Article	 9	 carry	 out	 the	 similar	 underlying	 policy	 protecting	 an	account	financier	against	a	purchase-money	inventory	financier183.	Nevertheless,	the	two	provisions	in	the	PPSA	and	Article	9	are	drafted	in	different	approaches.	The	 PPSA	 has	 a	 separate	 provision	 directly	 and	 expressly	 figuring	 out	 the	competing	 interest,	 that	 is	 the	 non-PMSI	 in	 accounts	 and	 limiting	 this	 priority	interest	 into	 the	 security	 interest	 granted	 for	new	value	and	 in	accounts	as	 the	original	 collateral 184 .	 The	 priority	 interest	 is	 protected	 even	 though	 it	 is	registered	 later	 than	 the	 inventory	 PMSI,	 so	 long	 as	 a	 timely	 prescribed	notification	is	sent	to	the	holder	of	the	PMSI.	On	the	other	hand,	Article	9	simply	lists	the	kind	of	collateral	subject	to	the	first	priority	of	 a	PMSI	 in	 inventory,	namely	 the	 inventory	as	 the	original	 collateral,	chattel	 paper	 or	 an	 instrument	 constituting	 proceeds	 of	 the	 inventory	 and	proceeds	of	 the	 chattel	paper,	 identifiable	 cash	proceeds	 received	on	or	before	the	delivery	of	the	inventory	to	the	buyer185.	It	can	be	inferred	that	the	non-cash	proceeds	other	than	chattel	paper	are	excluded	from	the	first	priority.	It	can	also																																																									178	PPSA	s	64	179	New	value	 is	 defined	 as	 “value	other	 than	provided	 to	reduce	or	discharge	an	earlier	debt	or	
liability	owed	to	the	person	providing	the	value”.	PPSA	s	10.	180	PPSA	64(1)	181	PPSA	s	64	(1)(a)	182	PPSA	s	64(1)(b)	183	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	330;	Comment	8	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	921	184	PPSA	s	64	185	UCC	§9-324(b)	
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be	 inferred	 that	 the	 priority	 of	 an	 inventory	 PMSI	 in	 the	 non-cash	 proceeds	would	follow	the	general	rule	of	priority.	The	following	examples	illustrate	the	different	approaches	to	competing	security	interests	in	accounts	in	the	two	jurisdictions186.	Example	3:	D	grants	a	security	 interest	 to	SP1	 in	all	present	and	after-acquired	inventory,	and	the	security	interest	is	registered	on	Day	1	against	inventory.	On	Day	3,	D	purchases	 from	SP2	a	certain	type	of	 inventory	subject	 to	a	PMSI,	and	SP2	filed	a	financing	statement	on	the	same	day	indicating	the	PMSI	in	inventory.	Later,	D	sells	the	inventory	at	hand	producing	an	account.	D	defaults	to	both	SP1	and	 SP2	 who	 claim	 the	 accounts.	 Assuming	 that	 both	 SP1	 and	 SP2’s	 security	interest	 in	 the	 disputed	 accounts	 remain	 perfected,	 and	 the	 accounts	 are	 not	outstanding.	Under	 the	PPSA,	 SP1	has	a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	accounts	as	 the	proceeds	of	inventory,	 in	other	words,	 it	 is	not	 the	original	 collateral.	Therefore,	 section	64	protecting	non-PMSI	 in	accounts	discussed	above	does	not	apply.	SP2’s	PMSI	 in	accounts	as	proceeds	of	inventory	has	priority	over	SP1’s	security	interest	in	the	same	accounts.	Under	 Article	 9,	 the	 accounts	 at	 hand	 are	 non-cash	 proceeds	 of	 the	 inventory	collateral.	 SP2	does	not	have	a	PMSI	priority	over	SP1	 in	 the	 same	accounts	as	proceeds	 of	 inventory.	 The	 general	 rule	 of	 priority	 applies	 to	 determine	 the	competition	between	the	two	security	interests.	SP1’s	and	SP2’s	security	interest	in	 the	 account	 proceeds	 is	 perfected	 at	 the	 perfection	 time	 of	 the	 respective	security	interest	in	the	original	collateral.	Therefore,	SP1	has	priority	over	SP2	as	to	the	accounts.	Example	4:	All	 facts	 are	 the	 same	as	Example	3,	 except	 that	SP1	has	a	 security	interest	and	a	relating	financing	statement	against	D’s	present	and	after-acquired	inventory	and	accounts	on	Day	1.	
																																																								186	The	 following	 Example	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 are	 created	 upon	 and	 adapted	 from	 examples	 given	 in	Comment	9	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment,	at	p.	921-2			
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The	PPSA	section	64	applies,	so	SP1	has	priority	over	SP2	as	to	the	accounts	on	the	ground	that	the	accounts	are	registered	as	the	original	collateral.	The	legal	consequence	remains	in	Example	3	under	Article	9.	The	two	examples	demonstrate	that	Article	9	does	not	recognize	the	purchase-money	 priority	 of	 the	 non-cash	 proceeds	 concerning	 the	 inventory	 PMSI	 and	does	not	distinguish	the	account	collateral	of	the	competing	security	interest	as	the	 original	 collateral	 or	 the	 proceeds.	 Although	 the	 UCC	 Official	 Comment	addresses	the	policy	to	protect	an	account	financier	from	the	first	priority	of	an	inventory	 purchase-money	 financier,	 it	 seems	 that	 a	 non-purchase-money	inventory	 financier	 can	also	benefit.	Meanwhile,	 the	PPSA	strictly	 requires	 that	only	account	financiers	have	priority	over	purchase-money	inventory	financiers	with	regard	to	the	proceeds	generating	from	the	sale	of	inventory.	American	 law	 recognizes	 the	 characteristic	 of	 inventory	 in	 business	 operation.	Inventory	 is	 shifting	 assets	 that	 a	 rapidly	 and	 frequently	 put	 in	 the	 ordinary	course	of	business;	therefore,	a	PMSI	in	inventory	in	practice	does	not	last	for	a	long	 time.	 A	 secured	 creditor	 cannot	 follow	 the	 inventory	 collateral	 that	 is	transferred	to	third	parties	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	to	ensure	the	flow	of	 commerce.	The	purchase-money	priority	does	not	extend	 to	 the	proceeds	of	inventory	 collateral	 that	 is	not	 identifiable	 cash	proceeds	 “received	on	or	before	
the	delivery	of	the	inventory	to	a	buyer”	to	protect	other	account	and	receivables	financiers187.	 Australian	 law	has	 similar	 limitations	 to	 inventory	 PMSI	 but	 does	not	recognize	PMSI	cross-collateralization	in	inventory	like	Article	9.	Therefore,	taking	a	PMSI	in	inventory	is	not	appealing	and	desirable	under	the	PPSA.		c. PMSI	in	product	or	mass	and	accession	The	collateral	as	raw	materials	can	be	put	into	a	manufacturing	process;	thus,	the	original	 identity	 is	 lost,	 and	 new	 end	 products	 are	 coming	 into	 existence.	 The	collateral	 can	 also	 be	 processed,	 assembled	 or	 attached	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	original	identity	remains,	or	they	are	capable	of	being	reconverted.	
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The	Pre-PPSA	 title	 retention	 clause	 faced	 the	 same	problem	when	 the	 original	goods	are	assembled,	attached,	processed	or	manufactured.	The	English	common	law	has	dealt	with	many	situations:	for	instances,	like	steel	sheet	cut	from	steel	strip	in	Armour	v	Thyssen	Edelstahlwerke	AG	188,	engines	assembled	in	generators	in	 Hendy	 Lennox	 (Industrial	 Engines)	 Ltd	 v	 Grahame	 Puttick	 Ltd 189 ,	 leather	processed	into	handbags	in	Re	Peachdart	Ltd190,	or	resin	manufactured	into	wood	boards	 in	 Borden	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 Scottish	 Timber	 Products	 Ltd191.	 The	 very	 first	question	is	whether	the	title	of	the	original	goods	is	disappeared,	or	whether	they	are	 capable	 of	 being	 reconverted	 into	 the	 original	 state	 when	 they	 are	transformed	into	newly	manufactured	products	of	 the	different	 identity.	 In	 this	respect,	 simple	 title	 retention	 sufficiently	 covers	 the	 first	 two	 foregoing	 cases,	and	the	title-retaining	seller	is	entitled	to	the	goods,	for	instances,	steel	sheet	or	engines.	The	PPSA	distinguishes	the	product	or	mass	from	accession.	When	the	collateral	is	manufactured,	processed,	assembled	or	commingled	that	the	original	identity	is	 lost	 in	 the	product	or	mass,	or	become	unidentifiable	parts	of	 the	product	or	mass,	the	question	would	be	whether	the	secured	party	has	a	continuing	security	interest	in	the	product	or	mass192.	When	the	collateral	is	installed	in,	or	affixed	to,	the	other	goods,	they	become	an	accession	to	other	goods193	if	their	identity	is	not	lost	 in	 other	 goods194.	 The	 question	 in	 this	 situation	 would	 be	 whether	 the	security	interest	in	the	original	collateral	remains	in	the	accession.	The	 PPSA	 has	 made	 considerable	 changes	 to	 recognize	 a	 continuing	 security	interest	 in	 the	 product	 or	mass	 producing	 from	 the	 collateral,	 whether	 or	 not	they	are	subject	to	title	retention.	It	is	noticeable	that	the	priority	rule	for	general	collateral	 and	 purchase-money	 collateral	 are	 separated	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the																																																									188[1991]	2	A.C.	339;	[1990]	3	W.L.R.	810	189	[1984]	1	W.L.R.	485	190	[1984]	Ch.	131	191	[1981]	Ch.	25	192	PPSA	introductory	section	of	part	3.4	193	PPSA	s	10	194	It	is	recommended	that	accession	should	be	defined	to	the	extent	that	their	identity	is	not	lost	to	 avoid	 the	 overlap	 between	 the	 product	 and	 mass,	 and	 the	 accession	 priority	 rules.	 See	Whittaker	B,	see	n.	2,	at	p.	346	
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former	 does	 not	 supplement	 the	 latter	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 continuing	 security	interest	in	proceeds.	The	perfection	and	priority	rules	applying	 to	a	PMSI	with	 regard	 to	product	or	mass	 commingled,	 processed,	 or	manufactured	 from	 the	 original	 goods	 can	 be	summarized	as	follows:	- Generally,	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 goods	 continues	 to	mass	 or	 product	 so	long	as	the	identity	of	the	goods	is	lost195	in	the	product	or	mass196;	- The	security	 interest	continuing	 in	 the	product	or	mass	 is	“limited	to	the	
value	of	the	goods	on	the	day	on	which	they	became	part	of	the	product	or	
mass”197;	- A	 perfected	 PMSI	 in	 the	 goods	 continuing	 in	 the	 product	 or	mass	 takes	priority	 over	 a	 non-PMSI	 in	 the	 goods	 continuing	 in	 the	 product	 or	mass198;	- A	 perfected	 PMSI	 in	 the	 goods	 continuing	 in	 the	 product	 or	mass	 takes	priority	 over	 a	 non-PMSI	 in	 the	 product	 or	 mass	 given	 by	 the	 same	grantor199.	The	 following	 examples	 illustrate	 how	 the	 PPSA	 changes	 title	 retention	 with	regard	to	the	new	product	or	mass200.	Example	 1:	 SP1	 supplies	 leather	 to	 D,	 a	 company	 manufacturing	 handbags	subject	to	a	title	retention	clause.	D	also	grants	a	security	interest	in	present	and	after-acquired	accounts	and	stock	to	SP2	which	is	duly	registered.	D	defaults	to	both	SP1	and	SP2	who	claim	the	handbags	made	from	leather	supplied	by	SP1.			The	 Pre-PPSA	 case	 law	 relying	 upon	 English	 law	 did	 not	 extend	 a	 simple	 title	retention	clause	to	the	new	product.	For	the	manufactured	title	retention	clause,	it	was	considered	to	create	a	registrable	charge	upon	the	new	product;	 thus,	 in																																																									195	The	identity	is	lost	in	a	product	or	mass	if	“it	is	not	commercially	practical	to	restore	the	goods	
to	their	original	state”.	PPSA	s	99(2)	196	PPSA	s	99(1)	197	PPSA	s	100	198	PPSA	s	103(a)	199	PPSA	s	103(b)	200	This	example	is	created	upon	the	fact	of	the	Re	Peachdart	Ltd	case	
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most	cases,	the	title-retaining	seller	had	a	void	charge	against	third	parties	due	to	lack	of	registration201.	SP1,	whether	or	not	having	a	manufactured	title	retention	clause,	 could	 not	 assert	 the	 first	 priority	 over	 SP2	 with	 regard	 to	 all	 the	handbags.	The	PPSA	does	not	require	an	arrangement	 to	extend	a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	goods	to	the	product	and	mass	comingled,	processed	or	manufactured	from	the	goods.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	 goods	 continues	automatically	in	the	product	and	mass.	Therefore,	SP1	has	a	security	interest	in	the	product	or	mass	 if	 SP1	has	a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	original	 goods.	 In	 this	example,	 if	 SP1	 has	 a	 perfected	 PMSI	 in	 leather,	 SP1	 has	 priority	 over	 SP2’	 s	security	interest	in	the	handbags.	Under	the	PPSA,	an	automatically	continuous	security	interest	in	the	product	and	mass	 is	 unquestionable,	 and	 the	 priority	 thereof	 depends	 on	 nature	 and	perfection	status	of	the	security	interest	in	the	original	goods.	The	 PPSA	 provides	 a	 relatively	 desirable	 outcome	 for	 the	 purchase-money	inventory	 financier	concerning	the	product	and	mass.	The	English	common	law	governing	 manufactured	 title	 retention	 clause	 probably	 contributes	 valued	experiences	and	lessons	to	the	PPSA	in	this	respect.	In	comparison	to	Article	9202,	the	PPSA	has	created	an	achievement.	With	regard	to	the	accession,	the	PPSA	makes	substantial	progress	in	comparison	with	the	pre-PPSA	common	law203.	It	defines	accession204.	It	provides	for	a	set	of	rules	to	establish	priority	between	a	security	interest	in	the	accession	and	other	interests	 not	 limiting	 to	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 other	 goods	 in	 the	whole205.	Furthermore,	it	has	rules	governing	how	to	remove	the	accession	to	enforce	the	
																																																								201	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	p.	265-6	202	See	more	 discussion	 on	Article	 9	 dealing	with	 commingled	 goods,	 the	 product	 and	mass	 in	sub-section	4.4.3.2	of	this	thesis	203	Duggan	A,	see	n.	3,	at	p.	682	204	PPSA	s	10	205	PPSA	s	89-91	
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security	interest	in	the	accession206.	It	is	noticeable	that	the	PPSA	does	not	have	separate	rules	for	PMSI	in	this	respect.	The	security	interest	in	the	original	collateral	“continues	in”	the	accession207.	The	PPSA	anticipates	that	at	 the	time	of	accession	coming	 into	existing,	 the	security	interest	may	or	may	 not	 attach	 to	 the	 original	 collateral.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 the	security	interest	in	the	accession	is	subordinate	to	any	interest	in	the	other	goods	at	the	time	the	collateral	becomes	an	accession,	unless	the	holder	of	an	interest	in	the	 other	 goods	 has	 consented	 or	 disclaimed	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	accession	or	agreed	 to	 the	 removal	of	 the	accession208.	 	 For	 instance,	 SP1	has	a	security	 interest	 in	D’s	 car.	 SP2	 has	 a	 security	 interest	 in	D’s	 tyres	which	 have	already	been	fixed	in	cars.	SP2,	therefore,	has	the	priority	subordinate	to	SP1.	The	 fact	 that	a	security	 interest	attaches	to	 the	original	collateral	at	 the	time	of	becoming	 the	accession	 is	 likely	 to	happen	occasionally,	 at	 least	with	 regard	 to	title	retention	case.	To	this	extent,	a	security	interest	in	an	accession	has	priority	over	any	interest	hold	by	a	person	with	interest	in	the	goods	as	a	whole209.	This	default	 rule	 does	 not	mention	 perfection	 against	 two	 competing	 interests	 as	 a	requirement.	Attachment	of	security	 interest	at	 the	time	the	collateral	becomes	an	accession	may	suffice.	Example	2:	 SP	1	has	a	 security	 interest	 in	D’s	generators.	 SP2	 sells	D	a	kind	of	engine	usually	installed	in	generators	subject	to	title	retention.	D	later	installs	the	engines	supplied	by	SP2	in	generators.	D	defaults	against	SP1	and	SP2,	and	both	claim	engine210.				Under	the	Hendy	Lennox	 in	the	English	common	law,	SP2	can	assert	the	right	of	title	 retention	 in	 engines	 installed	 in	 generators.	 Under	 the	 PPSA,	 SP2	 has	 a	security	 interest	 in	 engines	preceding	 SP1’s	 claim	 in	 the	 same	 collateral	under	the	 default	 rule	 other	 than	 a	 purchase-money	 security	 status,	 and	 without	considering	whether	SP2	perfects	its	security	interest	or	not.																																																									206	PPSA	s	92-97	207	PPSA	s	88	208	PPSA	s	91	209	PPSA	s	89	210	This	example	is	created	upon	the	facts	of	the	Hendy	Lennox	case	
	 171	
In	 this	 respect,	with	 regard	 particularly	 to	 title	 retention,	 English	 common	 law	and	the	PPSA	has	almost	the	same	consequence,	that	is	SP2	has	the	first	priority	in	 the	 accession	 even	 without	 registration.	 The	 position	 of	 SP2	 is	 akin	 to	 a	purchase-money	 secured	 party,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 requirement	 of	 perfection.	 The	right	 to	accession	 is	somewhat	a	secret	lien,	and	to	some	extent,	 the	PPSA	does	not	solve	the	problem	of	the	pre-PPSA	law.	As	 a	 default	 rule,	 it	 has	 some	 exceptions	 that	 require	 perfection	 of	 security	interest	 in	 the	 accession.	 Those	 exceptions	 grant	 the	 first	 priority	 to	 other	secured	 party	 making	 advance	 after	 the	 accession	 is	 coming	 into	 existence,	execution	 creditor	 or	 bona	 fide	 purchaser	 whose	 interest	 arises	 after	 the	accession,	but	before	the	security	interest	is	accession	is	perfected211.	It	is	argued	that	 those	 rules	 give	 the	 foregoing	 competing	 interest	 holders	 a	 chance	 to	discover	 the	 interest	 of	 an	 accession	 financier.	 To	 be	 exact,	 they	 establish	 a	counterweight	to	a	secret	lien	created	by	the	default	rule.	It	 is	 a	 surprise	 that	 the	 PPSA	 rule	 of	 accession	 corresponds	 to	 old	 rather	 than	revised	 Article	 9	 promulgated	 in	 1998.	 	 The	 revised	 Article	 9	 amends	considerably	the	rule	of	a	security	interest	in	the	accession	to	avoid	a	secret	lien	and	the	conflict	with	the	certificate-of-title	statute.	The	general	rules	of	priority	apply	 to	 solve	 the	 conflict	 relating	 to	 accession.	 Therefore,	 if	 the	 accession	financier	has	a	PMSI	in	the	accession,	she	has	the	first	priority	so	long	as	she	has	a	good	perfection	against	the	security	interest	at	hand	regardless	of	whether	she	files	a	 financing	 statement	earlier	or	 later	 than	 the	perfection	of	other	 security	interest	 in	 the	whole.	Article	9	successfully	clarifies	 the	 law	of	accession	 in	this	sense212.	
4.5 Concluding	remark		The	Article	9	model	is	an	appealing	offer	of	a	package	deal	to	any	jurisdiction	to	reform	the	law	on	secured	transactions	in	personal	property.	Broadly	speaking,	the	 Australian	 PPSA	 adopts	 the	 functional	 approach,	 unitary	 treatment	 and																																																									211	PPSA	s	90.	See	more	discussion	in	Duggan	A	and	Brown	D,	see	n.	36,	at	pp.	259-262	212	Clark	B	and	Clark	B,	The	Law	of	Secured	Transactions	under	the	Uniform	Code,	vol	I	(A.S.	Pratt	and	Sons	2010),	at	pp.	9-90	
	 172	
notice	filing	system,	all	of	which	are	the	main	idea	of	Article	9	although	it	follows	the	Saskatchewan	PPSA	format.	The	Article	9	and	PPSA-typed	models	provide	a	relatively	coherent,	consistent	and	cost-saving	system	of	secured	transaction	law.	In	comparison	with	Article	9,	the	Australian	PPSA	has	a	significant	achievement	that	 is	 a	 uniform	 secured	 transaction	 law	 and	 a	 unified	 registration	 system	including	serial-numbered	property	registration.	The	requirement	of	attachment	and	 perfection	 for	 priority	 purpose	 is	 established	 for	 all	 security	 interests	 by	function	 and	 further	 embraces	 other	 transactions	 called	 deemed	 security	interests	 that	 do	 not	 secure	 the	 performance	 of	 obligation	 but	 creates	 the	ostensible	ownership	problem.	With	regard	to	title	retention	treatment,	the	PPSA	has	made	a	significant	change	turning	 a	 contractual	 arrangement	 of	 title	 transfer	 condition	 into	 a	 statutory	security	 interest.	 A	 relatively	 simple,	 fast,	 and	 cost-saving	 notice	 filing	 system	support	the	registration	of	a	PMSI.	The	burden	of	filing	is	generally	compensated	by	the	first	priority	in	the	original	collateral	extending	to	the	proceeds,	accession	and	 the	 product	 and	 mass	 produced	 from	 the	 original	 collateral	 without	 an	agreement.	 The	 Australian	 notice	 filing	 system	 slightly	 departs	 from	 Article	 9	scheme	to	the	extent	that	it	requires	a	public	notice	about	the	nature	of	a	security	interest	by	a	compulsory	indication	of	a	PMSI	rather	than	being	a	pure	means	of	setting	 up	 priority	 against	 other	 competing	 security	 interests	 in	 the	 same	collateral.	 However,	 the	 information	 of	 this	 kind	 does	 not	 benefit	 much	 both	earlier-filed	 creditors,	 who	 prefer	 an	 individual	 notification	 to	 checking	 the	public	 record	whenever	making	 an	 advance,	 and	 later-filed	 creditors,	 who	 are	not	 interested	 in	 a	 purchase-money	 status	 of	 an	 earlier-filed	 security	 interest.	Therefore,	it	does	not	outweigh	the	cost	of	the	wrong	indication	of	a	PMSI	where	a	secured	party	loses	an	effective	financing	statement	against	the	collateral	as	a	whole.		The	 first	priority	of	a	PMSI	 is	 justified	under	some	strongly	supportive	theories	like	 the	 “new	 money”	 or	 “situational	 monopoly”.	 It	 does	 not	 raise	 serious	problems	when	the	collateral	is	equipment	or	fixed	assets.	However,	in	practice,	it	is	a	policy	question	on	the	benefit	of	account	or	receivable	financiers	who	are	
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CHAPTER	5 RETENTION	 OF	 TITLE	 IN	 VIETNAMESE	
LAW:	A	LIMBO	STATUS	




Security	 interests	 are	 categorized	 into	 nine	 types:	 pledge,	 charge,	 deposit,	security	collateral,	escrow	account,	title	retention,	guarantee,	pledge	of	trust,	and	retention	of	property3.	Although	 the	drafters	understand	 that	 security	 interests	can	 be	 categorized	 into	 personal	 and	 real	 securities,	 or	 security	 interests	 in	movables	 and	 immovables	 as	 in	 the	 French	 Civil	 Code,	 the	 distinction	of	 those	kinds	 is	 not	 clear	 since	 the	 Code	 simply	 provides	 a	 list	 of	 security	 interests	without	identifying	their	nature.	The	law	requires	a	security	interest	to	be	created	upon	assets	owned	by	a	debtor,	but	 it	 expressly	 acknowledges	 that	 title	 retention	 is	 an	 exception	 to	 the	formalism	 approach4.	 Furthermore,	 title	 retention	 is	 recognized	 as	 a	 security	interest	for	the	first	time.	Vietnamese	 law	adopts	 the	 concept	of	perfection	under	 the	Vietnamese	phrase	translated	 as	 “enforceability	 against	 third	 parties”,	 but	 it	 does	 not	mention	 the	concept	 of	 attachment5.	 It	 lacks	 provisions	 for	 the	 enforceability	 against	 the	debtor	when	a	security	interest	attaches	to	the	collateral.	Therefore,	the	general	contract	 rules	 apply	 to	 determine	 the	 enforceability	 between	 the	 two	 parties	subject	 to	 specific	 formalities	 requirement.	 Registration	 is	 the	 only	method	 of	perfection	under	 the	 former	Code,	but	 from	now	on	perfection	 can	be	done	by	registration	and	possession6.	There	are	four	systems	of	registration	based	on	the	category	 of	 the	 collateral:	 aircrafts;	 vessels;	 land-use	 right	 and	 fixtures;	 and	personal	property	and	others7.	It	can	be	said	that	Vietnam	has	a	unitary	system	of	registration	 for	 security	 interests	 in	 personal	 property.	 The	 law	 of	 secured	transactions	 reaches	 the	 landmark	 when	 registration	 is	 recognized	 to	 be	 a	condition	 of	 enforceability	 against	 third	 parties	 and	 for	 the	 priority	 purpose.	Under	the	former	Civil	Code,	registration	is	a	formalities	requirement	to	validate	a	security	agreement.	
																																																								3	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	292	4	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	295.1	5	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	297.1	6	ibid	7	Decree	102/2017/NĐ-CP	on	Registration	of	Secured	Transactions		
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The	 Civil	 Code	 also	 maintains	 the	 general	 rules	 with	 regard	 to	 priority	 and	enforcement	for	all	kinds	of	security	interests	that	in	practice	apply	to	a	pledge	or	a	charge	primarily.	The	 first-to-file-or-perfection	 is	the	main	rule	of	priority:	the	first	perfected	security	interest	has	the	first	priority,	and	a	perfected	security	interest	 has	 priority	 over	 an	 unperfected	 security	 interest 8 .	 Between	 two	unperfected	security	interests,	priority	is	determined	by	order	of	creation9.	It	is	corresponding	to	the	general	rule	of	priority	in	Article	9.	The	law	of	secured	transactions,	particularly	in	personal	property,	however,	has	some	 significant	 shortcomings.	 The	 Civil	 Code	 fails	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	ostensible	 ownership	 creating	 by	 a	 secured	 transaction	 in	 personal	 property.	Although	 it	has	a	provision	that	 the	proceeds	take	the	place	of	 the	 inventory	as	collateral	when	 the	 inventory	 collateral	 is	 sub-sold,	 it	 does	 not	 have	 a	 general	rule	 for	 attachment	 of	 a	 security	 interest	 to	 the	 proceeds	 and	 its	 perfection.	 It	lacks	the	priority	rule	to	solve	the	conflict	between	a	secured	party	and	a	buyer	in	the	same	asset,	even	though	there	is	a	provision	allowing	the	debtor	transfers	the	 non-inventory	 collateral	 to	 a	 third	 party	 under	 the	 secured	 party’s	authorization.	 The	 Civil	 Code	 has	 a	 provision	 to	 replace	 the	 consumable	inventory	collateral	by	the	inventory	of	the	same	kind	and	quantity,	but	it	lacks	provisions	 for	 workable	 or	 raw	 material	 inventory.	 The	 question	 remains	whether	a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	original	 collateral	 is	 extinguished	when	 they	are	put	into	the	manufacturing	process.		
5.2 Retention	of	title	as	a	security	interest	The	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	2015	is	closely	tied	to	the	Japanese	and	German	Civil	Code	 rather	 than	 a	 Romanistic	 spirit	 of	 the	 French	 Civil	 Code10.	 However,	 it	surprisingly	adopts	the	French	treatment	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest,	which	does	not	exist	in	 the	German	Civil	Code.	 It	 is	worth	a	brief	discussion	on	title	retention	in	French	law	before	proceeding	on	the	current	Vietnamese	law	in	the	same	area.																																																									8	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	308.1	9	ibid	10	Vietnam	received	the	legal	technical	assistant	from	Japan	for	the	Civil	Code	drafting	project	for	the	Civil	Code	2005	and	2015.	
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5.2.1 Title	retention	in	French	law	The	French	law	of	security	interests	has	been	codified	in	the	Civil	Code	to	cover	almost	 all	 kinds	 of	 security	 interests.	 This	 area	 underwent	 a	 reform	 in	 2006	having	the	objective	of	modernization	and	economic	efficiency11.	Title	retention	as	a	security	interest	is	an	important	outcome	of	the	2006	reform.	Under	 the	 Civil	 Code,	 security	 interests	 are	 categorized	 into	 personal	 and	 real	security,	 and	 the	 real	 security	 is	 sub-categorized	 into	 security	 interests	 in	movables	 and	 immovables.	 With	 regard	 to	 security	 interests	 in	 movable	property,	 French	 law	 does	 not	 adopt	 a	 unitary	 approach	 that	 has	 the	 same	treatment	 and	 priority	 rules	 for	 all	 security	 devices.	 In	 other	 words,	 security	devices	 are	 distinguished	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 each	 security	 device	 has	 its	 own	rules.	 Therefore,	 it	 lacks	 the	 interaction	 between	 different	 security	 devices	particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 priority	 conflicts	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 bears	inconsistency12 .	 A	 gage	 is	 probably	 the	 most	 important	 security	 device	 in	personal	property	which	 is	 defined	 as	 an	 agreement	 in	which	 a	 debtor	 gives	 a	creditor	a	priority	 to	be	paid	over	other	creditors	out	of	 the	 former’s	moveable	assets,	current	or	future13.	A	gage	can	be	possessory	or	non-possessory.	The	legal	regime	 for	 a	 gage	 is	 considered	 to	 achieve,	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 simplification,	clarification	 and	 economic	 efficacy	 since	 it	 adopts	 the	 first-to-file-or-perfection	rule	 and	 a	 unique	 system	 of	 enforcement	 for	 both	 possessory	 and	 non-possessory	 gage14 .	 This	 approach	 is	 possibly	 shifted	 closer	 to	 the	 unitary	approach	 of	 Article	 9	 model.	 However,	 the	 scope	 of	 gage	 excludes	 a	 security	interest	 in	 incorporeal	 movables	 (nantisssement)	 and	 title	 retention,	 both	 of	which	have	their	own	rules.	Title	 retention	 treatment	was	 codified	 and	 recognized	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 in	movables	 in	 the	 French	 Civil	 Code	 and	 Commercial	 Code	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in																																																									11	See	detailed	discussion	on	Renaudin	M,	‘The	Modernisation	of	French	Secured	Credit	Law:	Law	As	a	Competitive	Tool	in	Global	Markets’	(2013)	11	International	Company	and	Commercial	Law	Review	385	12	Haimo	SH,	‘A	Practical	Guide	to	Secured	Transactions	in	France’	(1984)	58	Tulane	Law	Review	1163,	at	p.	1165	13	French	Civil	Code	Article	2333	14 Renaudin	M,	‘The	Modernisation	of	French	Secured	Credit	Law:	Law	as	a	Competitive	Tool	in	Global	Markets’	(2013)	11	International	Company	and	Commercial	Law	Review	385,	at	p.	387	
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2006,	but	 this	 concept	has	been	accepted	 since	1980	within	 the	 scheme	of	 the	insolvency	proceeding15.	The	security	interest	of	this	kind	is	called	as	“retention	of	title	as	a	security”	(la	retenue	à	titre	de	garantie).	There	are	only	six	relatively	concise	articles	for	retention	of	title	as	a	security.	It	cannot	classify	correctly	the	French	 law	 of	 secured	 transactions	 on	 personal	 property	 into	 formalism	 or	functionalism	from	the	Anglo-American	perspective.	Title	retention	treatment	as	a	security	interest	could	be	a	good	illustration	for	this	point.	Under	the	Civil	Code,	the	 title	 retention	 clause	 which	 postpones	 the	 transfer	 effect	 arising	 from	 a	contract	 of	 sale	 until	 full	 payment	 of	 purchase	 price	 creates	 a	 guarantee	 by	retaining	the	ownership	of	a	thing16.	By	default,	the	buyer	acquires	the	ownership	when	 the	 parties	 agree	 upon	 the	 thing	 and	 the	 price	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	thing	has	not	yet	been	delivered	or	 the	price	has	not	paid17.	On	the	other	hand,	ownership	may	 be	 retained	 to	 secure	 payment	 of	 purchase	 price.	 The	 security	interest	of	this	kind	is	not	created	by	a	debtor	upon	the	items	she	owned,	but	by	a	creditor	retaining	title	 to	the	goods	to	secure	payment	under	a	contract	of	sale.	This	notion	sounds	unfamiliar	and	undesirable	under	the	formalism	perspective.	It	is	slightly	close	to	the	functional	approach	since	the	Civil	Code	recognizes	title	retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 by	 its	 function.	 However,	 title	 retention	 is	exceptional	 since	 other	 devices	 like	 the	 assignment	 of	 book	 debts	 or	 hire-purchase	agreement	are	not	classified	as	a	security	interest	by	its	function.	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 only	 a	 seller	 can	 be	 a	 title-retaining	 creditor.	 The	 Civil	Code	sets	up	the	link	between	a	sale	and	purchase	transaction	with	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	by	stressing	on	a	title	retention	clause	in	a	sale	contract	as	a	source	of	security	interest	of	this	kind.	A	lender	who	advances	money	to	acquire	the	property	cannot	have	a	 title	retention	as	a	security	interest	as	she	does	not	have	the	original	title	to	the	concerned	property18.		
																																																								15	Dorst	A	and	Gagnier	AD,	‘France’	in	Willems	M	and	International	Bar	Association	ib	(eds),	
Retention	of	Title	In	and	Out	of	Insolvency	(Globe	Law	and	Business	2015),	at	p.	125	16	French	Civil	Code	Article	2367	17	French	Civil	Code	Article	1583	18	In	 practice,	 the	 sale	 of	 cars	 on	 credit	 is	 secured	 by	 title	 retention	 that	 is	 transferred	 to	 a	professional	 lender	by	way	of	subrogation	under	an	auto	loan	agreement.	In	2016,	the	Court	of	Cassation	gave	an	opinion	considering	 the	subrogation	of	 this	kind	may	be	an	unfair	 term,	and	unenforceable.	 Consequently,	 the	 auto	 loan	 secured	 by	 title	 retention	 becomes	 unsecured.	 See	
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It	 is	 clear	 that	 an	unpaid	 seller	 can	enforce	 the	 recovery	of	 the	property	under	the	title	retention	clause	as	 long	as	 the	property	remains	 in	kind	 in	the	buyer’s	possession.	However,	when	a	buyer	creates	a	possessory	gage	on	the	concerned	goods	 in	 favour	of	 a	 third	 party,	 the	 latter	 is	not	obliged	 to	 check	whether	 the	property	is	subject	to	a	title	retention29.	Therefore,	a	third	party	with	possessory	rights	 has	 priority	 over	 a	 title-retaining	 creditor30.	 The	 priority	 of	 possessory	
gage	over	title	retention	does	not	mirror	the	subordinate	ranking	of	the	former	security	device	in	a	competition	with	an	earlier	registered	non-possessory	gage.	The	 law	 of	 gage	 adopts	 the	 first-to-file-or-perfection	 rule,	 whereas,	 it	 can	 be	assumed	 that	 the	 subordinate	 priority	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 competition	 with	 a	possessory	 gage	 is	 justified	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 registration	 with	 regard	 to	 title	retention	and	the	fact	that	the	holder	of	possessory	gage	possesses	the	property.	In	 competition	 with	 a	 secured	 party	 having	 a	 turning	 gage	 with	 substitution	goods	 (gage	 tournant	 avec	 substitution	 de	 merchandise),	 that	 is	 a	 cross-collateralization,	 a	 title	 retention	 claim	 has	 priority	 subordinate	 to	 the	 given	secured	party	if	a	turning	gage	has	been	agreed	upon	before	the	delivery	of	the	property31.	The	Court	of	Cassation	was	 likely	not	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	nature	 of	 purchase-money	 credit	 and	 the	 new	money	 theory	 to	 grant	 the	 first	priority	to	the	title-retaining	seller.	The	law	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	does	not	have	priority	rules	with	regard	to	the	conflict	between	a	title-retaining	creditor	and	a	sub-purchaser.	The	French	Civil	Code	has	two	important	rules	concerning	personal	property	in	this	sense.	Article	1599	invalidates	a	sale	of	a	thing	belonging	to	another,	and	Article	2276	 provides	 that	 possession	 is	 amounting	 to	 a	 title.	 Under	 the	 French	 law	perspective,	 although	 title	 retention	 is	 recognized	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 in	personal	property,	 title	remains	with	the	seller	until	and	unless	 the	buyer	pays	the	full	purchase	price.	Despite	Article	1599,	Article	2276	as	an	exception	allows	a	 transfer	of	 good	 title	 to	a	 sub-purchaser	who	 relies	on	 the	 initial	purchaser’s																																																									29	Court	of	Cassation,	September	11,	2012	11-22.240	cited	in	Dorst	A	and	Gagnier	AD,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	131	30	Dorst	A	and	Gagnier	AD,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	131	31	Court	of	Cassation,	May	26	21010,	09-65-812	cited	in	Dorst	A	and	Gagnier	AD,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	131	
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possession	in	good	faith32.	The	outcome	is	desirable	to	the	extent	that	French	law	does	not	require	a	registration	to	validate	title	retention	against	third	parties.	Title	 retention	 is	 not	 statutorily	 recognized	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 the	 proceeds	 of	sub-sale	 and	 manufactured/combined	 goods,	 even	 though	 the	 parties	 agreed	upon.	However,	 there	are	some	exceptions.	When	the	property	is	sold	to	a	sub-purchaser,	without	consensual	agreement,	an	unpaid	seller	has	a	personal	action	for	the	purchase	price	against	a	sub-purchaser	only	if	the	latter	has	not	yet	paid	her	 own	seller33.	When	 the	 subject	 of	 title	 retention	 is	 the	 fungible	 goods,	 title	retention	 attaches	 to	 property	 of	 the	 same	 kind	 and	 quality	 in	 the	 debtor’s	possession	up	to	the	amount	of	the	debt	remaining	due34.	When	the	goods	subject	to	title	retention	are	incorporated	into	other	goods	but	remain	in	kind	and	can	be	recovered	without	 causing	 damage	 to	 other	 goods,	 the	 incorporation	 does	 not	extinguish	title	retention35.	French	 law	recognizes	 title	 retention	as	a	 security	 interest,	but	 it	has	a	 limited	scope.	It	does	not	fully	anticipate	and	give	solutions	for	extinguishment	disputes	when	the	concerned	property	 is	sub-sold	or	undergone	manufacturing	process.	In	 other	 words,	 even	 though	 title	 retention	 has	 a	 close	 nexus	 with	 personal	property	that	substantially	includes	shifting	or	circulating	assets,	the	French	law	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	only	facilitates	the	fixed	status	of	the	asset.	Furthermore,	 the	 treatment	of	 title	 retention	does	not	manifest	 the	nature	and	the	content	of	a	security	interest.	Rather,	it	is	similar	to	the	treatment	of	absolute	property	rights	conferred	upon	a	true	owner.	The	subject	of	a	security	interest	of	this	 kind	 is	 the	 title	 to	 the	 goods	 or	 ownership	 rights,	 rather	 than	 the	 goods	themselves	as	 the	 collateral.	The	only	method	 to	enforce	 title	 retention,	 that	 is	the	 recovery	 of	 the	 property,	 shows	 the	 super-priority	 of	 title	 retention	 on	 its	face	but	 the	underlying	policy	 is	 the	enforcement	of	ownership	right	 instead	of	the	“new	money”	and	“situational	monopoly”	theory	relating	the	concept	of	PMSI.		It	 can	 be	 said	 that	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 French	 law	does	 not	adopt	the	concept	of	PMSI.																																																									32	Dorst	A	and	Gagnier	AD,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	128	33	Dorst	A	and	Gagnier	AD,	see	n.	15,	at	p.	130;	French	Civil	Code	Article	2372	34	French	Civil	Code	Article	2369	35	French	Civil	Code	Article	2370	
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5.2.2 Title	retention	in	Vietnamese	law	Title	 retention	 is	 categorized	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	2015.	 	 It	mirrors	 the	French	Civil	Code	approach	to	title	retention	with	some	significant	variants.	Corresponding	to	the	French	treatment	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest,	the	title	to	the	goods	is	the	subject	of	the	security	 interest	 of	 this	 kind.	 The	 only	method	 of	 enforcement	 is	 the	 recovery	claim	so	that	an	unpaid	seller	repossesses	the	property	in	kind36.	The	Vietnamese	law	 treats	 the	 seller	 as	 an	 owner	more	 strictly	 in	 comparison	with	 the	 French	law.	In	this	sense,	an	unpaid	seller	does	not	owe	the	balance	to	a	debtor	when	the	value	 of	 property	 exceeds	 the	 amount	 of	 unpaid	 debt.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	former	 does	 not	 have	 an	 unsecured	 debt	 when	 the	 value	 of	 the	 property	 is	diminishing	 below	 the	 amount	 of	 unpaid	 debt.	 A	 seller	 must	 refund	 a	 debtor	subject	to	any	depreciation	caused	by	the	exploitation	of	the	goods	in	the	normal	course	of	business	 if	 the	 latter	pays	 the	purchase	price	partly37.	A	 seller	 is	 also	entitled	to	damages	when	the	property	is	lost	or	damaged38.	It	is	corresponding	to	 the	 provision	 that	 the	 risk	 is	 transferred	 to	 the	 buyer	 notwithstanding	 title	retention,	unless	otherwise	agreed39.	Furthermore,	the	wording	emphasizes	that	even	 though	 the	 law	 of	 title	 retention	 is	 located	 in	 the	 part	 of	 secured	transactions	in	the	Civil	Code,	a	title	retention	transaction	is	described	under	sale	and	 purchase	 terms.	 “Buyer”	 and	 “seller”	 are	 used	 instead	 of	 other	 terms	referring	 to	 a	 secured	 transaction,	 such	 as	 secured	 party/debtor,	pledger/pledgee,	or	chargor/chargee.	Under	the	Civil	Code,	a	buyer	has	rights	to	use,	enjoy	fruits	and	profits	generating	from	the	property40.	However,	it	does	not	mention	solutions	for	extinguishment	disputes	when	the	property	 is	resold,	consumed,	or	put	 into	the	manufacturing	process.	
																																																								36	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	332	37	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	332	38	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	332	39	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	333.2	40	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	333.1	
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The	title	retention	arrangement	must	be	 in	writing.	 It	can	be	established	 in	the	sale	 contract	 or	 separately.	 The	 Vietnamese	 Civil	 Code	 has	 a	 unique	 provision	with	regard	to	a	sale	on	credit.	Accordingly,	title	retention	is	an	implied	term	in	a	contract	 of	 sale	 on	 credit41.	 Parties	 can	 expressly	 agree	 otherwise	 to	 avoid	 a	default	title	retention	arrangement42.	A	contract	of	sale	on	credit	is	required	to	be	in	writing43.	 It	 can	 be	 inferred	 that	without	a	 title	 retention	clause,	 a	 seller	 can	enjoy	the	benefit	of	 title	retention	as	a	security	 interest	under	the	Civil	Code	as	long	as	she	has	a	written	contract	of	sale	on	credit	and	registers	it44.	It	is	argued	that	 this	 provision	 aims	 at	 protecting	 a	 seller	 engaging	 in	 a	 sale	 on	 credit	transaction	against	 the	risk	of	non-payment.	However,	although	the	parties	can	contract	out,	the	provision	of	implied	title	retention	violently	interferes	with	the	rights	of	buyers	buying	on	credit.	Without	an	agreement	on	transfer	of	property,	property	 is	 transferred	 at	 the	 time	 of	 delivery45.	 However,	 a	 sale	 on	 credit	extinguishes	 this	 implied	 term	 and	 replaces	 it	 by	 another	 implied	 term	of	 title	retention.	If	the	seller	selling	on	credit	makes	use	of	title	retention	as	an	implied	term	to	register	it	against	not	only	the	buyer	but	also	other	creditors,	it	will	lead	to	unexpected	outcomes	with	regard	to	the	debt	 financing	market.	 Institutional	financiers	may	raise	the	interest	of	secured	credit	or	depend	on	real	property	as	the	 collateral	 to	 advance	 credit	 because	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 compete	 with	 title-retaining	sellers	with	regard	to	personal	property.	The	above	discussion	is	only	a	presumption	 mainly	 relying	 on	 the	 Civil	 Code	 provisions.	 In	 practice,	 title	retention	has	never	been	a	serious	threat	 to	 institutional	 financiers	in	Vietnam.	Sellers	 do	 not	 probably	 have	 any	 idea	 of	 security	 function	 arising	 from	 title	retention	arrangement.	It	is	witnessed	that	title	retention	arrangement	exists	in	a	sale	contract	for	a	long	time,	particular	in	sales	between	Vietnamese	and	foreign	party,	 but	 disputes	 relating	 to	 or	 arising	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 this	 kind	 are	 rarely	reported.	 It	 is	remarkable	that	although	the	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	recognizes	a	security	 interest	 created	 upon	 after-acquired	 property,	 but	 it	 requires	
																																																								41	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	453.1	42	ibid	43	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	453.2	44	Do VAT, 'Seller’s Title Retention to the Goods Under the Civil Code 2005' (2016) 9 State and Law 
18 (Vietnamese), at p. 22	45	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	161	
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registration	 of	 amendment	 whenever	 after-acquired	 property	 comes	 into	existence	except	for	after-acquired	inventory	collateral.	Thus,	a	blanket	lien	can	be	created	on	inventory	but	not	on	non-inventory	collateral.	Recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	is	not	a	demand	of	setting	up	a	counter-weight	to	a	blanket	lien	or	avoiding	a	situational	monopoly	creating	by	a	blanket	lien.	The	 significant	point	making	 the	 treatment	of	 title	 retention	 in	 the	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	departing	from	the	French	approach	is	the	requirement	of	registration	for	the	purpose	of	enforcement	against	third	parties46.	The	registration	system	in	Vietnam	 is	 a	 transaction	 –	 based	 one	 where	 an	 agreement	 creating	 a	 security	interest	 must	 be	 submitted	 for	 registration.	 Before	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Civil	Code	 2015,	 without	 formal	 recognition	 of	 title	 retention	 as	 security	 interest,	registration	was	required	to	enforce	the	title	retention	clause	to	the	extent	that	a	title-retaining	seller	has	priority	over	other	secured	creditors	if	the	registration	was	made	within	fifteen	days	starting	at	the	date	of	creation	of	the	sale	contract47.	This	rule	was	corresponding	to	the	Article	9	requirement	of	timely	perfection	for	the	 first	 priority	 of	 a	 PMSI	 in	 non-inventory	 collateral.	 However,	 timely	registration	 as	 in	 the	 previous	 law	 discontinues	 in	 the	 new	 Civil	 Code.	 It	 is	ambiguous	about	the	relationship	between	the	priority	rule	of	title	retention	and	registration.	 The	general	 priority	 rule	 is	 the	 first-to-file	 one	with	 regard	 to	 the	conflict	 between	many	 registered	 security	 interests	 in	 the	 same	 collateral.	 The	Civil	Code	lacks	a	separate	priority	rule	for	title	retention.	It	can	be	inferred	from	four	extremely	brief	articles	with	regard	to	title	retention	that	a	title	-	retaining	seller	has	the	first	priority	under	the	right	to	recover	the	property	as	long	as	she	fulfils	 the	 requirement	 of	 registration.	 The	 order	 of	 registration	 and	 timely	registration	 do	 not	 play	 any	 role	 in	 setting	 up	 the	 priority	 of	 title	 retention	against	other	security	interests.	There	is	no	priority	rule	for	the	competition	between	a	title-retaining	seller	and	a	buyer,	 but	 a	 true	 owner	 of	 the	 goods	 has	 a	 shelter	 against	 a	 third	 party	 who	possesses	 the	 goods	 in	 good	 faith	 to	 recover	 to	 the	 goods,	 except	 that	 a	 third	party	 in	 good	 faith	 gives	 value	 and	 receives	 the	 delivery	 from	 a	 person	 who																																																									46	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	331.3	47	Decree	163/2006/NĐ-CP	On	Secured	Transaction	Article	13.2	
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possesses	 the	 property	 under	 the	 owner’s	 consent48.	 It	 is	 problematic	 that	 the	law	of	 title	 retention	has	a	blurred	distinction	between	a	 secured	party	and	an	owner	 to	 determine	 the	 status	 of	 a	 title-retaining	 seller	 when	 it	 accepts	 title	retention	as	a	security	interest.	The	 same	 problem	 occurs	 when	 the	 original	 goods	 undergo	 a	 manufacturing	process.	The	Civil	Code	lacks	provisions	for	attachment,	perfection,	priority	and	enforcement	 in	 this	 context	 for	 all	 kind	 of	 security	 interests	 including	 title	retention.	Without	a	title	retention	agreement	extending	to	newly-manufactured	products,	 the	 question	 is	whether	 a	 title-retaining	 seller	 is	 still	 qualified	 as	 an	owner	of	the	original	goods	to	set	up	co-ownership	in	the	products49.	Before	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 2015,	 title	 retention	was	 enforced	 as	 a	contractual	arrangement	in	a	contract	of	sale	on	credit50.	The	parties	could	agree	upon	 the	 condition	 of	 transferring	 the	 title	 to	 the	 goods51,	 including	 that	 the	property	was	not	transferred	until	and	unless	the	full	purchase	price	was	paid.	A	seller	as	an	owner	of	the	goods	could	reclaim	the	goods	when	a	buyer	 failed	to	make	 payment	 under	 an	 agreement	 or	 in	 the	absence	 of	 agreement,	 under	 the	statutory	right	to	recover	the	goods.	In	this	sense,	the	goods	were	not	subject	to	the	buyer’s	asset	upon	which	the	buyer	could	create	a	security	interest	in	favour	of	other	creditors.		As	discussed	above,	without	recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest,	an	unpaid	title-retaining	seller	can	invoke	provisions	protecting	a	 true	 owner	 against	 third	 parties	 who	 possesses	 the	 goods	 in	 good	 faith	 or	claiming	co-ownership	in	case	of	mixing,	incorporating	or	processing	the	original	goods	to	form	new	products.	The	 new	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 registrable	 security	 interest	 has	 an	unsatisfactory	 legal	 consequence	 to	 a	 seller	 selling	 on	 credit.	 To	 enforce	 title	retention	against	third	parties,	a	seller	must	conduct	a	registration.	The	implied	term	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 a	 sale	 on	 credit	 does	 not	 support	 much	 a	 seller	 in																																																									48	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	Article	167	49	If	the	goods	are	mixed,	incorporated	or	processed	with	other	goods	to	produce	new	products,	all	owners	of	original	goods	co-own	the	new	products.	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	2005	Article	236,	237,	238.	50	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	2005	Article	461	51	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	2005	Article	439.1	
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practice	 because	 its	 enforceability	 against	 third	 parties	 still	 depends	 on	registration.	Before	the	Code	2015,	an	unpaid	seller	subject	to	title	retention	can	claim	for	the	recovery	of	the	goods	as	an	owner	without	want	of	registration.	To	some	 extent,	 registration	has	 a	 function	 of	 giving	 public	 notice	 that	 provides	 a	proof	 for	 the	 latter	 recovery	 claim	 if	 any,	 particularly	 in	 an	 insolvency	proceeding.	 The	 Insolvency	 Law	 enacted	 in	 2014	does	 not	 have	 any	 particular	provision	 for	 title	 retention,	 but	 the	 enforceability	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 2015	 has	changed	 the	 position	 of	 a	 title-retaining	 seller	 significantly.	 Having	 registered	title	 retention,	 the	seller	of	 this	kind	 is	 treated	as	a	 secured	creditor.	However,	the	rule	enforcing	a	security	interest	under	the	Insolvency	Law	does	not	support	the	enforcement	of	title	retention	claim.	Under	the	Insolvency	Law,	the	collateral	is	realized	to	discharge	the	secured	debt.	The	 surplus	between	the	value	of	 the	collateral	and	the	amount	of	debt	will	join	the	debtor’s	asset;	on	the	other	hand,	the	deficiency	thereof	will	make	the	secured	creditor	at	hand	to	be	an	unsecured	creditor	with	regard	the	unpaid	amount	of	debt52.	The	Civil	Code	2015	does	not	treat	the	goods,	but	title	retention	as	the	collateral,	and	the	enforcement	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	is	simply	the	recovery	of	the	goods.	The	 law	of	 title	retention	undoubtedly	 imports	 the	French	approach	with	some	modifications,	especially	the	requirement	of	registration.	However,	the	Civil	Code	2015	 does	 not	 make	 any	 improvement	 in	 this	 area	 except	 for	 the	 formal	acceptance	of	a	security	interest	by	its	function.	
5.3 Title	 retention	 treatment	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 legal	
transplant:	The	case	of	Vietnam	Globalization	 has	 urged	 nations	 to	have	 harmonized	 and	 uniform	 standards	 to	promote	 the	 international	 trade.	 For	 a	 developing	 country	 having	 a	 transition	economy	 like	Vietnam,	 legal	 transplant	 is	 a	 convenient,	 fast	 and	 to	 some	 lesser	extent	 effective	means	 to	 have	 a	 legal	 framework	 facilitating	 the	 international	economic	integration.	Legal	transplant	could	be	caused	by	imposition,	prestige	or	economic	performance53.	The	 imposition	occurs	as	a	result	of	military	conquest																																																									52	Insolvency	Law	2014	Article	53.3	53	Graziadei	 M,	 ‘Comparative	 Law	 as	 the	 Study	 of	 Mixed	 Legal	 System’	 in	 Reimann	 M	 and	Zimmermann	R	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Comparative	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2008),	
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or	colonization.	Meanwhile,	a	foreign	system	of	rules	can	be	voluntarily	received	because	it	has	proved	to	be	a	good	model.	The	demand	of	economic	performance	in	the	era	of	globalization,	international	integration	and	economic	transition	has	furthermore	 initiated	 the	 legal	 reform	 in	 many	 countries.	 Many	 international	organizations	or	institutions	like	the	World	Bank,	UNIDROIT	or	UNCITRAL,	have	actively	 engaged	 and	 supported	 this	 process	 by	 recommending	model	 laws	 or	funding	 law	 reform	 projects.	 These	 actions	 involve	 to	 some	 extent	 legal	transplant	and	reception	in	many	recipient	countries.	The	UNCITRAL	Legislative	Guide	on	Secured	Transactions	is	an	example	that	provides	recommendations	to	any	 country	 that	 needs	 a	 reform	 for	 the	 law	 of	 secured	 transactions.	 This	document	analyses	and	suggests	multiple	choices	for	title	retention	treatment.	Vietnam	has	witnessed	all	causes	of	 legal	 transplant	 into	the	 legal	system	since	the	 ancient	 time.	 Due	 to	 the	 close	 and	 sensitive	 relationship	 between	 Vietnam	and	China	before	the	conquest	of	the	French	colonizer	in	the	nineteenth	century,	Vietnamese	 formal	 law	 and	 order	 were	 borrowed	 from	 feudal	 China,	 whereas	some	local	customary	law	remained54.	In	the	French	colonial	period,	French	civil	and	 commercial	 law	 were	 imported	 and	 received,	 but	 their	 application	 was	limited	 to	French	citizens	and	European	or	 to	 the	 relationship	between	French	and	indigenous	Vietnamese.		In	the	north	(Tonkin)	and	central	Vietnam	(Annam),	two	 separate	 civil	 codes,	 along	 with	 the	 criminal	 procedure	 codes	 and	 penal	codes	were	 enacted,	 all	 of	 which	were	 drafted	 by	 French	 lawyers55.	 	 Although	being	 received	 cautiously	 and	 even	 hostilely	 at	 first,	 French	 concepts	 and	ideology	have	played	a	vital	role	in	the	Vietnamese	modern	legal	system,	at	least	that	 Vietnam	 today	 insists	 on	 code	 –	 formulated	 law.	 Noticeably,	 Vietnam	belonged	to	the	family	of	socialist	law	after	it	gained	independence	from	France.	Today,	 Vietnamese	 law	 has	 changed	 much	 to	 meet	 the	 demand	 of	 economic	transition	and	international	integration,	but	the	socialist	idea	which	has	a	strong																																																																																																																																																																at	pp.	455-461	54	Hooker	MB,	A	Concise	Legal	History	of	South-East	Asia	(Clarendon	Press	1978),	at	pp.	93-4	55	Vietnam	 in	 French	 colonial	 period	 did	 not	 have	 a	 single	 legal	 system	 due	 to	 the	 French	administration.	The	South	Vietnam	(Cochin-China)	 is	a	French	colony	directly	administered	by	French	 civil	 service.	 The	 North	 (Tonkin)	 and	 Central	 Vietnam	 (Annam)	 are	 two	 French	protectorates	that	French	made	some	concession	to	the	native	autonomy.	See	more	discussion	in	Hooker	MB,	A	Concise	Legal	History	of	South-East	Asia	(Clarendon	Press	1978),	at	pp.	153-166 	
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resistance	against	judge-made	law	can	be	traced.	In	recent	years,	the	Vietnamese	Supreme	Court	has	published	reports	of	its	selected	decisions	that	has	an	effect	of	case	law	within	the	scheme	of	the	judicial	reform.		To	have	a	legal	framework	for	a	market	economy,	Vietnam	has	transplanted	and	received	many	foreign	laws	or	model	laws.	There	are	two	typical	examples:	rules	on	 publicly-held	 corporation	 are	 drafted	 following	 the	 United	 Stated	 unitary	board	 model	 and	 arbitration	 law	 incorporates	 the	 UNCITRAL	 Model	 Law	 on	International	Commercial	Arbitration.	The	Civil	Code	 is	 also	a	good	example	of	legal	transplant	in	Vietnam.	The	first	Civil	Code	enacted	in	1995	was	drafted	after	the	Russian	Civil	Code,	and	accidentally	adopted	the	Germanic	scheme	instead	of	Romanistic	 spirit	 of	 the	 French	 Civil	 Code.	 However,	 the	 treatment	 of	 title	retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 the	 product	of	 legal	 transplant	 of	 the	 French	approach.	
5.3.1 Import	of	the	French	approach	The	French	approach	to	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	is	flawed.	It	fails	to	conceptualize	 a	 new	 statutory	 security	 device	 and	 get	 stuck.	 It	 does	 not	successfully	 and	 effectively	 figure	 out	what	 kind	 of	 rights	 the	 seller	 has	 in	 the	goods:	an	absolute	ownership	or	an	accessory	security	right.	A	current	report	of	The	Court	of	Cassation’s	opinion	shows	the	undesirable	status	of	 title	retention	as	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 French	 law	 that	 treats	 the	 title	 to	 the	 goods	 as	 the	collateral56.	The	Court	of	Cassation	viewed	the	subrogation	clause	that	transfers	the	seller’s	title	retention	rights	to	a	professional	financier	as	an	unfair	term,	and	thus	unenforceable57.	The	French	law	fails	to	look	at	the	concept	of	title	retention	to	 have	 a	 link	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 PMSI,	 which	 considers	 the	 seller’s	 title	retention	is	equivalent	to	the	security	right	in	the	goods	arising	from	advancing	the	fund	for	the	buyer	to	acquire	the	goods	at	hand.	The	title	to	the	goods,	not	the	goods	themselves,	are	the	collateral	under	the	French	approach.	Therefore,	that	a	financier	subrogates	a	title-retaining	seller	to	title	retention	rights,	not	the	title	to	the	goods,	is	a	justification	for	treating	the	subrogate	clause	as	an	unfair	term.	As																																																									56	Press	Release:	S&PGR:	Title	Retention	Opinion	Could	Affect	French	ABS.	(2017,	March	30).	Dow	
Jones	Institutional	News,	p.	Dow	Jones	Institutional	News,	Mar	30,	2017	57	ibid	
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a	result,	it	turns	a	secured	debt	into	an	unsecured	one.	In	practice,	the	purchase	of	 cars	 in	 France	 is	 usually	 funded	 by	 professional	 financiers	 under	 the	subrogation	 arrangement	 in	 order	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 title	 retention	 as	 a	security	interest58.	The	Court	of	Cassation’s	opinion	has	a	negative	impact	on	the	debt	financing	market	with	regard	to	consumer	loan	transactions59.	The	opinion	does	 not	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 law	 of	 title	 retention	 in	comparison	 with	 the	 same	 court’s	 ruling	 in	 the	 past.	 In	 1988,	 the	 Court	 of	Cassation	reversed	 the	Court	of	Appeal	 ruling,	 considering	 title	 retention	 is	 the	accessory	right	to	the	claim	for	the	purchase	price.	Therefore,	when	the	vendor	endorsed	the	bill	of	exchange	in	favour	of	the	bank,	the	vendor	conveyed	both	the	receivables	against	the	buyer	and	the	right	ancillary	to	it60.	Considering	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 unique	 security	 device	 accessible	 to	 a	 seller,	French	and	Vietnamese	law	does	not	take	into	account	the	idea	of	asset-acquiring	financing	 proposed	 under	 the	 concept	 of	 PMSI.	 It	 is	 a	 transaction	 in	 which	 a	person	claims	a	property	 right	 in	 the	goods	 to	 secure	 the	buyer’s	obligation	 to	pay	the	purchase	price61.	Not	only	a	seller	but	also	a	lender	could	provide	credit	to	 a	 buyer	 to	 acquire	 assets.	 In	 practice,	 sellers	 in	 general	 possibly	 have	 a	demand	 for	 cash	and	are	not	professional	 financiers	who	are	willing	 to	extend	the	credit	term.	The	theory	of	“new	money”	supporting	the	first	priority	of	PMSIs	suggests	that	asset-acquiring	financing	can	be	done	by	both	a	seller	and	a	lender	as	long	as	the	fund	is	provided	to	acquire	new	assets.	In	other	words,	a	purchase-money	 loan	 is	secured	by	 the	asset	 that	 is	not	previously	owned	by	 the	debtor	before,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 does	 not	 touch	 or	 shrink	 the	 debtor’s	 pool	 of	 assets	reserved	 to	 secure	 other	 creditors’	 loans.	 In	 many	 jurisdictions	 like	 Vietnam,	where	the	blanket	lien	is	recognized,	at	least	with	regard	to	inventory	or	shifting	asset,	 the	 first	 priority	 of	 asset-acquiring	 financing	 is	meaningful	 to	 break	 the	situational	monopoly	that	restrains	the	debtor	 from	obtaining	secured	credit	at																																																									58	ibid	59	ibid	60	Court	the	Cassation,	11	July	1988,	D	1988,	IR,	240,	cited	in	Erp	JHMv	and	Akkermans	B,	Cases,	
Materials	 and	 Text	 on	 National,	 Supranational	 and	 International	 Property	 Law	 (Oxford:	 Hart	2012),	at	pp.	477-8	61	UNCITRAL,	Legislative	Guide	on	Secured	Transactions,	United	Nations	Publication	Sales	No.	E.	09.	 V.	 12	 (2010)	 (hereinafter	 Legislative	 Guide),	 at	 p.	 320.	 The	 Legislative	 Guide	 calls	 it	 an	acquisition	financing	transaction.	
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competitive	 terms	 from	 other	 creditors.	 Under	 Article	 9,	 a	 PMSI	 is	 defined	 to	cover	title	retention	in	sale	contracts	and	lending	transactions	in	which	the	value	is	 given	 to	 acquire	 the	 collateral.	 	 A	 title	 retention	 sale	 is	 considered	 to	 be	equivalent	 to	 a	 loan	 advancing	 for	 this	 purpose.	 Both	 are	 PMSIs	 because	 they	share	the	same	core	characteristic,	namely	the	credit	extended	and	secured	not	by	 the	 pre-existing	 but	 new	 collateral.	 It	 is	 a	 good	 justification	 for	 the	 super-priority	 ranking	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 purchase-money	 creditor	 and	 that	 a	 PMSI	 is	limited	 to	 the	purchase	price	of	 the	 collateral.	Title	 retention,	 in	 the	name	of	 a	PMSI,	 should	 comply	 with	 the	 law	 of	 secured	 credit	 in	 order	 to	 grant	 the	seller/creditor	 a	 favoured	 treatment	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 creditors	including	secured	creditors	and	even	debtors	in	the	personal	bankruptcy	context.	The	PMSI	approach	is	considered	to	be	a	fully	integrated	concept	where	there	is	no	 distinction	 between	 secured	 credit	 supplied	 by	 the	 seller	 and	 the	 lender	 to	purchase	 the	 asset,	 and	 a	 PMSI	 is	 at	 first	 a	 security	 interest	 to	 comply	 with	general	rules	of	the	law	on	secured	transactions62.	The	seller-based	approach	and	the	owner-based	enforcement	method	involving	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	also	prevent	the	debtor	from	granting	lower-ranking	security	interest	to	other	creditors.	French	law	does	not	have	the	priority	rule	 for	 the	competition	between	title	retention	and	other	security	devices,	but	having	 a	 provision	 requiring	 a	 seller	 accountable	 for	 the	 surplus	 between	 the	value	of	the	property	and	the	amount	of	outstanding	debt	to	the	buyer.	In	other	words,	 the	 surplus	 will	 join	 the	 buyer’s	 assets	 for	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 general	creditors	 rather	 than	 any	 secured	 creditor.	 Under	 Vietnamese	 law,	 a	 title-retaining	seller	takes	the	goods	all	irrespective	of	whether	there	is	deficiency	or	surplus	between	the	present	value	of	 the	concerned	goods	and	the	outstanding	debt.	 Therefore,	 the	 goods	 subject	 to	 title	 retention	 cannot	 be	 realized	 for	 the	benefit	of	the	buyer’s	unsecured	creditors.		Under	 the	Article	 9	model,	 a	 PMSI	 is	 at	 first	 a	 security	 interest	 that	 follow	 the	general	priority	rules.	In	this	respect,	it	is	the	competition	among	several	secured	creditors	 in	 which	 a	 purchase-money	 creditor	 has	 the	 first	 priority.	 In	 other	
																																																								62	ibid,	at	p.	332	
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words,	treating	title	retention	as	a	true	security	interest	gives	a	debtor	a	chance	to	create	lower-ranking	security	interests	in	favour	of	other	creditors.	Therefore,	it	 does	 not	 prevent	 a	 debtor	 from	 accessing	 secured	 loan	 bidden	 by	 other	creditors	when	a	PMSI	is	created	upon	the	same	assets.	In	 comparison	with	English	 law,	 the	French	 law	of	 title	 retention	 results	 in	 the	same	 legal	 consequences	with	 regard	 to	 simple	 title	 retention	 despite	 the	 fact	that	both	jurisdictions	employ	different	concepts.	In	both	jurisdictions,	an	unpaid	seller	 is	 entitled	 to	 recover	 the	 goods	 that	 is	 still	 identified	 in	 the	 debtor’s	possession	in	and	out	of	the	insolvency	proceedings	without	want	of	registration.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 proceeds	 and	 new	 products,	 other	 creditors	 who	 has	 a	security	 interest	 in	accounts	and	after-acquired	property	respectively	generally	have	the	first	priority.	It	should	be	noticed	that	in	English	law,	a	seller	is	found	in	practice	 to	 have	 a	 void	 charge	 in	 the	 proceeds	 or	 new	products	due	 to	 lack	 of	registration.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 English	 and	 French	 law	may	 reach	 the	same	legal	consequences,	the	English	logic	is	satisfactory	because	it	recommends	a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 two	 different	 kinds	 of	 property	 rights,	 namely	 the	ownership	right	and	the	real	security	right.	Vietnamese	 law	unfortunately	 imports	 the	French	approach	 to	build	the	 law	of	title	 retention	 with	 some	 modifications	 that	 does	 not	 contribute	 any	improvement	to	the	approach	of	this	kind.	The	requirement	of	registration	may,	on	 its	 face,	bring	the	treatment	of	 title	retention	as	a	security	 interest	closer	 to	the	concept	of	a	security	right	in	personal	property.	However,	the	requirement	of	registration	 under	 the	 security	 interest	 treatment	 is	 not	 compensated	 by	 the	priority	extended	to	the	proceeds	and	new	products.		During	 the	 process	 of	 drafting	 the	 Civil	 Code	 2015,	 drafters	 addressed	 the	problem	of	 title	 retention	 by	 conducting	many	 researches	 on	 the	 treatment	 of	title	retention	in	many	jurisdictions.	Although	the	Civil	Code	imports	the	scheme	of	 German	 Civil	 Code	 which	 does	 not	 recognize	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 security	interest,	 it	 insists	 on	 treating	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest.	 In	 practice,	before	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 2015,	 title	 retention	 is	 introduced	 in	Vietnam	through	international	sale	contracts	that	is	usually	drafted	by	a	foreign	
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party	or	terms	and	conditions	offered	by	a	foreign	party.	This	thesis	was	in	fact	initiated	by	 an	 inquiry	 from	a	domestic	 company	who	 received	 a	 request	 from	oversea	 company	 asking	 it	 not	 to	 take	 delivery	 of	 a	 consignment	 that	 was	allegedly	 subject	 to	 the	 title	 reserved	 by	 the	 original	 seller.	 Title	 retention	 is	widely	 known	 in	 Vietnam	 in	 the	 simple	 form.	 However,	 disputes	 over	 title	retention	 are	 rarely	 brought	 to	 court.	 It	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	 law	 of	 title	retention	was	not	under	a	pressure	to	have	a	reform.	The	Civil	Code	has	a	role	to	introduce	a	new	security	device	to	 the	secured	credit	market.	Accordingly,	 title	retention	 is	 a	 security	 device	 uniquely	 reserved	 for	 a	 seller	 whereas	 other	financiers	who	are	willing	to	bid	for	loan	cannot	deploy	it.	From	the	viewpoint	of	a	seller,	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	in	the	Civil	Code	is	not	desirable	and	appealing	 since	 it	 requires	 registration	 but	 does	 not	 protect	 a	 title-retaining	seller	 in	extinguishment	disputes	where	 the	goods	are	 sub-sold	or	put	 into	the	manufacturing	process.	The	 law	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 particular	 and	 secured	 transactions	 in	 general	 in	Vietnam	does	not	learn	a	lesson	from	Article	9.	A	minor	influence	of	this	model	could	be	 traced	 in	 the	pre-Code	2015	requirement	of	 timely	 registration.	 Some	versions	of	the	Civil	Code	2015	draft	kept	the	timely	registration	as	a	condition	to	grant	 the	 first	 priority	 to	 an	 unpaid	 title-retaining	 seller.	 The	 draft	 also	 had	 a	priority	rule	for	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	which	cannot	be	seen	in	the	French	Civil	Code	and	the	Civil	Code	2015.	Treating	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	in	Vietnam	today	is	unquestionable	or	debatable	even	though	it	was	received	slowly	and	doubtfully	both	in	practice	and	 theory.	 The	 further	 question	 should	 be	 which	 approach	 is	 suitable	 and	economically	effective	in	the	Vietnamese	context.	The	Vietnamese	legal	system	is	a	civil	 law	one	where	the	Civil	Code	 is	considered	a	cornerstone	of	private	 law,	and	 the	 diversity	 of	 security	 devices	 accompanied	 by	 respective	 different	treatments	 has	 a	 deep	 root	 that	 places	 a	 strong	 barrier	 to	 the	 import	 of	 the	unitary	approach.	
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5.3.2 Transplanting	PMSI	concept	into	the	scheme	of	Civil	Code	The	discussion	above	reveals	an	effort	to	transplant	some	provisions	of	Article	9	into	 the	 law	of	 title	 retention.	 It	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 be	 a	 project	 to	 reform	 the	whole	law	of	secured	transactions,	changing	it	from	a	multi-device	system	into	a	unitary	one	by	adopting	 the	 functionalism	approach.	Article	9	 is	 a	 combination	and	 interaction	of	 functionalism,	a	unitary	approach	and	a	notice	 filing	system.	The	Vietnamese	 law	of	 secured	 transactions	 in	 personal	property	 law	 lacks	 all	above	 features	but	has	a	desire	 to	 treat	 title	 retention	as	a	 security	 interest	by	function.	The	French	approach	is	proved	that	the	new	title-based	security	device	does	 not	 accommodate	 the	 credit	 availability	 from	 both	 the	 financier	 and	 the	buyer’s	 side.	 However,	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 the	 concept	 of	 PMSI	 can	survive	in	the	body	of	the	multi-device-based	law	of	secured	transactions	within	the	massive	scheme	of	a	Civil	Code.	The	unitary	approach	 is	not	amounting	 to	an	absolute	 concept	 that	 rejects	any	distinction.	 The	 Article	 9	 and	 the	 PPSA	 model	 do	 not	 maintain	 a	 diversity	 of	security	 devices,	 but	 it	 classifies	 the	 types	 of	 collateral	 and	 provides	 different	treatments.	More	importantly,	although	a	PMSI	is	subject	to	the	general	rules,	it	has	 its	 own	 label	 and	 a	 separate	 status	 from	 general	 security	 interests.	 The	UNCITRAL	 recommends	 that	 asset-acquiring	 financing	 can	 be	 governed	 under	the	 scheme	 of	 unitary	 approach	 or	 non-unitary	 approach	 to	 achieave	equivalently	functional	outcomes,	even	though	the	former	is	a	better	solution63.	The	crucial	point	is	that	the	law	of	PMSIs	should	be	built	upon	the	interaction	and	dependence	 with	 the	 general	 law	 of	 security	 interests.	 Under	 the	 Vietnamese	Civil	Code,	a	consensual	security	interest	in	personal	property	may	have	the	form	of	 a	 pledge,	 a	 charge	 or	 title	 retention.	 Although	 the	 law	 of	 secured	 credit	basically	 does	 not	 adopt	 the	 unitary	 approach,	 a	 pledge	 and	 a	 charge	 share	 a	great	number	of	general	rules	offering	the	unique	treatment	with	regard	to	the	collateral,	 the	 enforceability	 against	 third	 parties	 (perfection),	 the	 priority	 and	the	 enforcement.	 Vietnam	 also	 has	 a	 unique	 registration	 system	 for	 security																																																									63	See	Legislative	Guide,	at	pp.	377-381	for	Recommendations	187-202	with	regard	to	the	non-unitary	approach	
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interests	in	personal	property	for	secured	parties	of	all	kinds.	The	import	of	the	whole	concept	of	PMSI	as	a	separate	security	device	is	possible	in	this	context.	A	PMSI	would	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 general	 rules	 subject	 to	 some	 exceptions.	 The	advantage	of	a	PMSI	is	that	general	lenders,	not	only	sellers,	can	use	this	device	to	 advance	 secured	 credit	 to	 a	 buyer	 who	 needs	 fund	 to	 acquire	 new	 assets.	Subject	 to	 the	 general	 rules	 of	 security	 interest	 in	 personal	 property,	 the	purchase-money	 collateral	 which	 is	 usually	 the	 goods	 in	 a	 sale	 contract	 is	available	for	the	buyer	to	create	other	lower-ranking	security	interest	in	favour	of	other	creditors.	It	can	be	said	that	the	scheme	of	a	civil	code	is	an	advantage	to	import	the	concept	of	PMSI	without	the	need	to	reform	the	whole	law	of	secured	transactions	 in	 personal	 property	 to	 formally	 accept	 the	 unitary	 approach.	 In	contrast,	the	English	law	of	secured	transactions	where	different	security	devices	accompanied	by	different	logic	and	treatments	contained	in	different	legal	texts	or	 in	common	law	is	under	the	pressure	of	reform,	and	the	question	of	unitary	approach	should	be	considered	thoroughly	and	seriously	 to	achieve	a	desirable	outcome.	The	context	of	English	law	in	this	area	is	close	to	the	pre-Code	situation	in	the	United	States	and	obviously	the	same	as	in	other	common	law	jurisdictions	like	Canada,	New	Zealand	and	Australia.	The	diversity	of	security	devices	 is	not	only	due	to	the	form	of	transaction	but	also	the	kind	of	debtor.	Therefore,	the	law	of	 PMSI	 would	 contribute	 to	 the	 fragment	 and	 complication	 with	 regard	 to	secured	transactions	in	personal	property.	However,	 it	 cannot	 be	 said	 that	 the	 law	 of	 secured	 transactions	 in	 civil	 law	jurisdictions,	particularly	in	personal	property	is	not	urgent	to	be	reformed.	The	shortcoming	 of	 Vietnamese	 law	 in	 this	 area	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 look	 personal	property	in	its	active	status,	namely	in	the	form	of	shifting	or	circulating	assets,	or	under	the	possibility	to	be	transferred	when	it	becomes	obsolete.	It	does	not	take	into	account	the	ostensible	ownership	problem	created	by	the	characteristic	of	 personal	 property	 where	 possession	 manifests	 ownership	 on	 its	 face.	Therefore,	 it	does	not	deal	with	extinguishment	disputes	when	 the	 collateral	 is	sub-sold	or	put	into	the	manufacturing	process.	The	legal	transplant	of	PMSI	will	not	 be	 satisfactory	 if	 the	 Civil	 Code	 does	 not	 provide	 rules	 relating	 to	 the	proceeds	or	new	products	deriving	from	the	original	collateral.	
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A	notice	 filing	system	is	not	a	pre-requisite	 to	introduce	and	operate	the	law	of	PMSIs.	Registration	does	not	determine	 the	nature	of	 a	PMSI.	Rather,	 it	 carries	the	 function	 of	 giving	 public	 notice	 about	 the	 possible	 existence	 of	 a	 security	interest	in	particular	items	or	class	of	assets	that	is	meaningful	to	any	potential	secured	 creditors,	 or	 an	 earlier-registered	 secured	 party	 who	 is	 holding	 a	security	 interest	 in	 the	 after-acquired	 inventory	 collateral	 when	 the	 debtor	applies	 for	 credit	 to	 acquire	 inventory.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 first-to-file-or-perfect	rule	is	essential	for	a	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	and	a	new	product	in	extinguishment	disputes	 in	which	the	given	priority	 is	antedated	back	to	the	time	when	 the	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 original	 collateral	 is	 registered.	 Priority	ranking	relying	on	the	order	of	creation	possibly	results	in	the	debate	on	the	time	when	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 proceeds	 or	 in	 new	 products	 is	 created.	 For	example,	it	would	be	the	day	when	the	original	agreement	is	concluded	or	when	the	proceeds	or	new	products	come	into	existence.	 In	any	case,	 it	 is	apparently	more	difficult	 to	determine	than	 the	day	of	 filing	or	 registration.	A	notice	 filing	system	and	the	first-to-file-or-perfect	rule	is	also	a	good	combination	to	enhance	a	prompt	notification	of	a	security	interest	for	the	purpose	of	priority	ranking.	Priority	 ranking	 in	Vietnamese	 law	 is	based	on	 the	order	of	 registration	 rather	than	creation.	In	this	respect,	it	is	crucial	to	register	a	security	interest	as	soon	as	possible	when	 the	 security	 agreement	 is	 formed	 to	 gain	 the	 expected	 priority.	Although	a	secured	party	cannot	pre-register	a	prospective	security	interest	as	in	a	jurisdiction	fully	adopting	the	Article	9	model,	the	first-to-register	rule	is	a	good	condition	to	build	the	rules	for	the	proceeds	and	new	products	in	extinguishment	disputes.	It	allows	the	security	interest	in	the	proceeds	and	new	products	to	have	the	priority	day	of	the	original	collateral	subject	to	continuance	of	perfection.	It	 is	unquestionable	that	a	notice	 filing	system	facilitates	 the	market	of	secured	credit	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 convenient,	 fast,	 easily-determined	 and	 cost-saving	system.	 Even	 though	 Vietnam	 has	 a	 unique	 registration	 system	 for	 security	interests	 in	 personal	 property	 and	 maintains	 electronic	 registration,	 it	 is	 a	transaction-based	one.	 Registration	 is	 burdensome	 and	 costly	 to	 any	 inventory	financiers	 including	 purchase-money	 secured	 creditors	 because	 registration	 is	required	 routinely	 and	 regularly	 whenever	 credit	 is	 advanced.	 In	 brief,	 the	
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reform	question	 to	 replace	a	 transaction-based	 system	by	a	notice	 filing	one	 is	usually	 considered	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 economically	 effective	 secured	transaction	law.		Functionalism	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 to	 adopt	 the	 concept	 of	 PMSI.	 The	 French	approach	does	recognize	 the	 function	of	 title	retention	arrangement	 that	 is	not	limited	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 title	 but	 also	 provide	 a	 device	 to	 secure	 payment	 of	purchase	 price.	 However,	 functionalism	 has	 the	 broader	 scope	 to	 cover	 any	device	carrying	the	same	security	 function,	such	as	a	hire-purchase	transaction.	The	 import	 of	 PMSI	 in	 the	 scheme	 of	 a	 civil	 code	 is	 the	 acceptance	 of	functionalism	in	specific	cases	rather	than	taking	it	as	a	backbone	of	the	secured	transaction	 law.	 Again,	 the	 question	 of	 functionalism	 is	 particularly	 important	beyond	the	ambit	of	a	PMSI.	Functionalism	is	a	significant	condition	to	build	the	secured	 transaction	 law	 under	 the	 unitary	 approach	 in	which	 any	 transaction	functioning	 as	 to	 secure	 the	 payment	 or	 performance	 of	 other	 obligations	 is	treated	 unitarily	 without	 distinction	 of	 forms	 and	 types	 of	 secured	 creditors.	However,	 resist	 against	 adoption	of	 functionalism	as	a	whole	package	does	not	restrain	the	legal	transplant	of	PMSI	into	a	system	of	multiple	security	devices.	A	civil	code	plays	a	vital	role	and	manifests	a	proud	achievement	of	legislation	in	any	 civil	 law	 jurisdiction.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 a	 code-formulated	 system	 is	 an	obstruction	to	adopt	a	good	law	of	secured	transactions	like	Article	9	in	modern	times64.	 The	 developement	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 relationships	 today	 makes	them	more	complicated	than	they	were	at	the	time	of	the	first	enactment	of	the	Napoleon	Code	where	the	economy	was	mainly	based	on	agriculture.	An	all-in-one	 code	 covering	 from	 the	 law	 of	 persons,	 property,	 torts	 to	 contracts	 and	obligations	 is	 unfit	 for	 an	 everyday	 growing-up	 body.	 This	 argument	 seems	persuasive	since	a	comprehensive	and	massive	legal	text	like	a	civil	code	must	be	built	 upon	 a	 logic	 or	 a	 legal	 science	 that	 connects	 all	 parts	 together.	 The	Vietnamese	 Civil	 Code	 is	 a	 good	 example	 in	 law-making	 demonstrating	 a	confused	and	doubtful	choice	between	the	model	of	the	French	Civil	Code	and	the	German	Bugerliches	Gesetzbuch.	Furthermore,	the	debate	on	the	position	of	the	
																																																								64	Nguyen	X-T	and	Nguyen	BT,	see	n.	1,	at	p.	21	
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law	on	secured	transactions	 in	a	civil	code	 is	on-going	since	the	relationship	of	this	 kind	 is	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 personal	 and	 property	 rights.	 The	recommendation	to	place	the	law	of	secured	transactions	in	a	separate	part	and	at	 the	 same	 level	 with	 the	 law	 of	 contracts	 and	 obligations	 and	 tort	 law	 as	demonstrated	in	the	French	Civil	Code	has	not	received	full	support	until	now.	In	the	 Vietnamese	 context,	 it	 is	 an	 obstacle	 to	 update	 the	 law	 of	 secured	transactions	 to	 respond	 to	 a	 dynamic	 secured	 credit	 market	 in	 a	 developing	economy	 because	 the	 revision	 or	 reform	 of	 this	 area	 must	 be	 put	 within	 the	whole	project,	namely	the	revision	of	the	civil	code	or	at	least	the	law	of	contracts	and	 obligations.	 It	 is	 recommended	 to	 have	 separate	 legal	 texts	 rather	 than	 a	massive	 code	 like	 a	 civil	 code	 to	 avoid	 the	 rigid	 status	 and	make	 it	 flexible	 to	change	the	 law.	However,	 the	recommendation	of	 this	kind	attacks	the	heart	of	the	 civil	 law	 tradition	 in	 which	 a	 civil	 code	 is	 considered	 as	 a	 constitution	 in	private	 law65.	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 civil	 code	 in	 a	 civil	 law	 jurisdiction	 has	 been	never	 questioned	 or	 doubted	 in	 the	 perspective	 of	 civil	 law	 lawyers.	 From	 the	present	author’s	viewpoint,	 the	demand	for	a	good	 law	on	secured	transactions	in	 general	 and	 title	 retention	 in	 particular	 even	 though	 it	 is	 parallel	 with	 the	demand	 for	 a	 good	 law	 in	many	other	 areas	 is	 not	 a	 pre-requisite	 to	 replace	 a	civil	 code	by	many	separate	 legal	 texts.	This	question	mainly	 involves	 the	 law-making	 technique.	 Vietnam,	 like	 other	 civil	 law	 jurisdictions,	 must	 change	 the	legislative	practice	of	initiating	a	big	project	for	the	revision	of	the	civil	code	as	a	whole.	A	civil	code	can	be	divided	into	many	books	or	chapters	or	sections	that	can	be	 revised	or	 changed	 in	an	 independent	project.	 It	 is	possible	 to	keep	 the	law	of	 secured	 transactions	within	 the	 scheme	of	 a	 civil	 code,	 and	 in	 the	other	hand	import	the	Article	9	approach.	Vietnam	can	learn	the	lesson	of	the	French	Civil	Code	to	take	the	law	of	secured	transactions	out	of	the	part	“Contracts	and	Obligations”	 and	 divide	 it	 into	 sub-categories	 for	 real	 property	 and	 personal	property.	 	 In	 a	 long-term	project	 of	 reform,	 the	 law	of	 secured	 transactions	 in	personal	property	can	adopt	the	unitary	approach,	functionalism	and	the	notice	filing	system.																																																									65	See	the	discussion	on	the	important	role	of	the	civil	law	and	the	need	to	reform	the	civil	code	at	modern	 times	 when	 commercial	 law,	 labour	 law	 and	 administrative	 law	 have	 increasingly	developed	in	Renaudin	M,	see	n.	14.	
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However,	if	the	unitary	approach	cannot	be	adopted,	the	concept	of	PMSI	can	be	transplanted	 into	 the	 body	 of	 the	 secured	 transaction	 law	 that	 maintains	 the	diversity	of	security	devices	as	the	current	status	of	Vietnamese	law.	It	serves	as	a	 security	 device	 next	 to	 other	 devices	 like	 a	 pledge	 or	 a	 charge	 that	 can	 be	granted	upon	personal	property.	It	is	necessary	to	expand	the	first	priority	to	any	secured	credit	advanced	to	acquire	the	new	asset	regardless	of	who	supplies	the	fund,	 a	 seller	 or	 a	 lender.	 Treating	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 and	adoption	of	 the	PMSI	must	be	accompanied	by	 the	 requirement	of	registration.	The	current	Vietnamese	experience	demonstrates	an	undesirable	 law	when	the	requirement	 of	 registration	 is	 not	 amounting	 to	 expanding	 the	 first	 priority	 of	title	 retention	 to	 the	 proceeds	 and	 new	 products.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 legal	transplant	of	PMSI	concept	must	be	done	with	the	legal	transplant	of	the	priority	rules	 to	cover	the	situation	where	the	original	collateral	 is	sub-sold	or	put	 into	manufacturing	process.	Adopting	the	PMSI	without	adopting	the	whole	package	of	 unitary	 approach,	 functionalism	 and	 notice	 filing	 system	 is	 not	 the	 best	alternative,	but	in	the	Vietnamese	context	where	the	function	of	title	retention	is	still	unfamiliar,	it	offers	a	new	security	device	to	the	secured	credit	market	that	is	on	increasing	demand	of	credit	for	trading	and	manufacturing.	Furthermore,	the	legal	 transplant	of	 the	PMSI	 is	a	good	 introduction	of	 functionalism	and	a	good	preparation	 for	 the	 unitary	 approach	 in	 a	 bigger	 project	 to	 reform	 the	 law	 of	secured	transactions	as	a	whole.	The	 Australian	 experience	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 PPSA	demonstrates	that	despite	the	law	of	secured	transaction	in	personal	property	is	contained	in	a	legal	text,	other	relating	law,	particular	the	law	of	sale	should	be	correspondingly	revised	to	have	a	desirable	outcome.	The	cross	examination	or	review	between	different	laws	with	regard	to	the	reform	of	a	specific	area	of	law	is	necessary	in	any	jurisdiction.	Vietnamese	 law	 demonstrates	 some	 interactions	 between	 the	 law	 of	 title	retention	and	the	sale	of	goods	law.	The	latter	treats	a	sale	on	credit	as	implying	a	title	retention	agreement.	However,	this	provision	is	not	satisfactory	as	discussed	in	detail	above	and	should	be	abolished	completely.		
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The	Bunkers	ruling	in	English	law	is	worth	a	throughout	consideration	because	it	proves	 an	 unexpected	 impact	 of	 title	 retention	 on	 the	 sale	 of	 goods	 law.	 The	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	defines	a	contract	of	sale	as	an	agreement	in	which	a	seller	transfers	the	property	in	the	goods	to	a	buyer,	and	the	buyer	makes	payment	to	the	 seller.	 The	 property	 in	 the	 goods	 is	 possibly	 not	 transferred	 to	 the	 buyer	when	the	goods	are	destroyed	due	to	the	consumption	or	manufacturing	process	during	 the	 effective	 period	 of	 title	 retention.	 Vietnamese	 law	would	 encounter	the	 same	problem	 as	 experienced	 in	 English	 law	 if	 the	Bunkers	 ruling	 is	 learnt	and	imported.	The	 English	 law	 experience	 in	Re	Highway	Foods	 also	 shows	 that	 in	 a	 chain	 of	transactions,	 each	 of	which	 contains	 title	 retention,	 a	 bona	 fide	 sub-purchaser	may	lose	the	right	to	take	the	goods	free	and	clear	because	she	has	not	paid	the	full	 purchase	 price.	 The	 legal	 consequence	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 this	 context	attacks	 the	 free	 flow	 of	 commerce	 and	 raises	 the	 substantial	 cost	 due	 to	 the	recovery	of	the	goods.	The	Vietnamese	law	with	regard	to	taking	free	requires	a	bona	 fide	purchaser	to	have	a	 contract	 in	which	 she	gives	value	 in	exchange	of	the	possession	of	the	goods.	It	remains	silent	on	whether	a	bona	fide	purchaser	has	paid	for	the	goods	or	all	she	needs	is	a	contract	of	this	kind.	Vietnamese	law	does	not	have	a	distinction	between	a	sale	and	an	agreement	to	sale.	However,	when	title	retention	is	treated	a	method	to	reserve	the	title	until	and	unless	the	full	purchase	price	is	made,	a	bona	fide	purchaser	subject	to	title	retention	may	lose	the	right	to	take	the	goods	free	and	clear.	The	French	approach	cannot	give	a	desirable	answer	for	the	problems	discussed	above	regardless	of	the	recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest.	Title	retention	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 is	 severely	 based	 on	 the	 ownership	 right	 to	establish	the	priority	and	enforcement.	In	other	words,	the	title	still	remains	with	a	seller	until	and	unless	the	purchase	price	is	paid	in	full.	It	prevents	the	transfer	of	property	to	a	buyer	after	the	consumable	or	workable	goods	are	extinguished	in	the	buyer’s	ordinary	course	of	business.	This	point,	again,	proves	the	need	to	treat	title	retention	as	a	normal	security	interest	at	first	with	the	full	meaning	like	the	Article	9	model’s	recommendation.	Therefore,	 it	 is	critical	 to	 transplant	 the	provision	in	Article	2	of	the	UCC	complementing	the	definition	of	a	sale	contract.	
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Accordingly,	 title	 retention	must	have	 the	 effect	 limited	 to	 reserving	 a	 security	interest	 in	 the	 goods	 supplied,	 and	 the	 law	 should	 violently	 provide	 that	 the	transfer	of	property	 follows	the	default	rule	rather	than	the	parties’	 agreement	on	 title	 retention.	 This	 treatment,	 even	 though	 interfering	 and	 ignoring	 party’s	autonomy	to	a	certain	extent,	would	avoid	the	possibility	of	rethinking	the	sale	of	goods	 law	 in	 terms	 of	 title	 retention	 with	 regard	 to	 consumable	 or	 workable	goods.	
5.4 Concluding	remark	The	 code-formulated	 legal	 system	 as	 of	 France	 and	 Vietnam	 has	 shown	 a	willingness	to	adopt	functionalism	through	the	recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	 device.	 However,	 the	 law	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 these	 jurisdictions	 is	unsatisfactory.	The	approach	to	title	retention	as	a	security	 interest	 is	different	from	 the	 concept	 of	 PMSI	 initiated	under	Article	 9.	 It	 is	 a	 seller-based	 security	interest	 that	 excludes	 the	participation	of	other	 lenders	 into	providing	 secured	credit	 to	 acquire	 new	 assets	 relying	 on	 the	 first	 priority.	 Title	 retention	 as	 a	security	 device	 is	 depending	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 ownership	 rights	 to	 build	 the	priority	status	and	the	method	of	enforcement.	In	this	respect,	it	does	not	share	much	similarities	with	other	security	devices	in	the	sense	of	accessory	property	rights.	Recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	in	the	Vietnamese	and	French	jurisdiction,	therefore,	does	not	facilitate	the	availability	of	secured	credit	to	acquire	new	assets.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 PMSI	 can	 be	 brought	 into	 a	 system	 of	 multiple	 security	devices	 like	 the	 Vietnamese	 or	 French	 law	of	 secured	 transactions	 in	 personal	property.	Under	Article	9	and	other	laws	following	the	unitary	approach,	a	PMSI	has	 its	own	name	and	 its	own	treatment	with	regard	to	perfection	and	priority	because	it	is	an	exception	to	general	security	interests.	The	crucial	point	to	make	a	good	law	in	this	respect	is	to	build	comprehensive	priority	rules	which	govern	not	 only	 the	 conflict	 interests	 between	 secured	 creditors	 including	 purchase-money	creditors	but	also	the	conflict	between	a	purchase-money	creditor	and	a	buyer,	the	conflict	arising	when	the	original	collateral	is	put	into	manufacturing	process.	
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Furthermore,	 it	 is	 critical	 to	 change	 the	 sale	of	 goods	 law	corresponding	to	 the	introduction	 of	 PMSI	 into	 the	 law	 of	 secured	 transactions.	 As	 a	 result,	 title	retention	 is	 treated	 consistently	 among	 various	 areas	 of	 law	 to	 avoid	 an	unexpected	outcome	of	the	Bunkers	ruling	as	learnt	from	English	law.		
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CHAPTER	6 CONCLUSION	
6.1 Treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 Vietnam	 and	 compared	
jurisdictions:	 England,	 the	 United	 States,	 Australia	 and	
France	Title	retention	has	the	function	that	is	not	limited	to	a	contractual	arrangement	to	 transfer	 the	 title	 in	 the	 goods	 in	 a	 contract	 of	 sale,	 but	 importantly	 it	 is	 a	security	device	to	save	the	first	priority	in	the	goods	supplied	to	an	unpaid	seller	in	the	insolvency	proceeding	or	the	extinguishment	dispute	where	the	goods	are	sub-sold	or	put	into	the	manufacturing	process.	However,	 the	treatment	of	 title	retention	is	diverse	among	jurisdictions.	Formalism,	bearing	on	the	sharp	distinction	between	the	ownership	right	and	the	possession	right	 is	 the	dominant	approach	 in	England	that	does	not	accept	 that	title	retention	 is	a	 full	but	rather	a	quasi-security	 interest66.	The	general	rule	of	property	rights	and	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act	1979	are	to	protect	an	unpaid	seller	as	the	owner	of	the	goods	so	that	other	creditors	cannot	claim	the	concerned	goods	to	discharge	debts	owed	by	the	buyer.	The	obstacle	to	recognizing	title	retention	as	a	security	 interest	 is	 that	 this	arrangement	is	created	under	the	 form	of	sale	and	purchase	transaction	where	the	seller	still	has	absolute	ownership	pending	full	 payment	 of	 purchase	 price.	 The	 formalism	 approach	 strictly	 requires	 the	collateral	to	be	the	debtor’s	asset67.	The	super-ranking	of	title	retention,	speaking	in	terms	of	priority,	with	regard	to	the	original	goods	without	registration	could	be	justified	by	the	underlying	policy	to	encourage	sale	on	credit	and	small-scaled	credit	market	 or	 to	 dilute	 the	monopoly	 of	 blanket	 security	 or	 the	 new	money	theory68.	However,	when	title	retention	in	the	goods	supplied	covers	not	only	the	purchase	 price	 but	 also	 all	 indebtedness	 owed	 to	 the	 seller,	 the	 new	 money	theory	 is	 failed	 to	 justify	 the	 Amour69	ruling	 that	 upheld	 the	 current	 super-ranking	 with	 regard	 to	 other	 debts.	 However,	 the	 super-ranking	 of	 the	 title-																																																								66	Gullifer	L	 (ed),	Goode	on	Legal	Problems	of	Credit	and	Security	 (4th	 edn,	 first	 published	2008,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2012)	at	p.	3	67	ibid,	at	p.	11	68 Gullifer	L,	‘Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	A	Question	of	Balance’	in	Burrows	AS	and	Peel	E	(eds),	
Contract	Terms	(Oxford	University	Press	2007),	at	pp.	287-9	69	Armour	v	Thyssen	Edelstahlwerke	AG	[1991]	2	AC	339	
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retention	does	not	in	practice	cause	a	serious	threat	to	other	secured	creditors	as	it	is	supposed	to	be,	both	previously	and	subsequently	taking	a	security	interest	in	 the	same	asset,	particularly	when	the	goods	are	 inventory,	which	remains	 in	the	buyer’s	possession	 for	a	short	 time.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 super-ranking	does	not	automatically	expand	to	derivative	assets	as	the	products	or	proceeds	of	the	original	goods,	and	the	proceed	or	manufacturing	title	retention	clause	is	held	to	create	a	registrable	charge70.	Under	the	Article	9	and	the	Australian	PPSA	scheme	of	a	PMSI,	a	 title-retaining	seller	has	the	priority	over	other	creditors	 including	ones	who	filed	a	 financing	statement	covering	the	same	collateral	earlier.	Functionalism	initiated	by	Article	9	and	followed	by	many	PPSA	jurisdictions	aims	at	promoting	the	availability	of	secured	credits	through	the	competition	among	various	credit	providers71.	Under	this	 approach,	 regardless	 of	 form,	 an	 arrangement	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 secured	transaction	 if	 it	 has	 the	 function	 to	 secure	 payment	 or	 performance	 of	 other	obligations.	 Title	 retention	 is	 an	 arrangement	 of	 this	 kind.	 Article	 9	 and	 the	Australian	PPSA	introduce	a	new	concept	of	PMSI	that	has	the	nature	of	an	asset-acquiring	security	device.	Inspired	by	the	idea	of	title	retention,	a	PMSI	preserves	the	first	priority	in	the	collateral	to	the	secured	party	despite	the	order	of	filing	or	perfection.	A	PMSI	does	not	uniquely	serve	the	seller	but	also	any	lender	who	advances	money	to	the	debtor	to	acquire	new	assets.		A	PMSI	is	a	counterweight	to	a	blanket	lien	which	is	supposed	to	establish	a	monopoly	situation	preventing	the	debtor	from	accessing	credit	from	other	sources72.	The	 French	 and	 the	 Vietnamese	 jurisdictions	 recognize	 title	 retention	 as	 a	security	interest	relying	on	the	seller’s	right	to	reserve	the	title	to	the	goods	until	and	unless	the	purchase	price	is	paid	in	full.	The	security	interest	of	this	kind	is																																																									70	Re	Andrabell	 [1984]	BCLC	 522;	Hendy	Lennox	 (Industrial	Engines)	Ltd	v	Grahame	Puttick	Ltd	[1984]	1	WLR	485E;	Pfeiffer	Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf	GmbH	&	Co	v	Arbuthnot	Factors	Ltd	[1988]	1	WLR	 150;	Tatung	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 Galex	 Telesure	 Ltd	 (1989)	 5	 BCC	 325;	Compaq	Computer	Ltd	 v	
Abercorn	Group	Ltd	&	Ors	[1991]	BCC	484;	Borden	(UK)	Ltd	v	Scottish	Timber	Products	Ltd	[1981]	Ch	25;	Re	Peachdart	Ltd	[1984]	Ch	131	71	UNCITRAL,	Legislative	Guide	on	Secured	Transactions,	United	Nations	Publication	Sales	No.	E.	09.	V.	12	(2010)	(hereinafter	Legislative	Guide),	at	p.	334	72	Jackson	TH	 and	Kronman	AT,	 ‘Secured	 Financing	 and	Priorities	 among	Creditors’	 (1979)	 88	The	Yale	Law	Journal	1143,	at	p.	1172		
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far	from	the	concept	of	a	PMSI	to	the	extent	that	it	cannot	be	granted	to	a	general	lender.	 	 Instead	 of	 relying	 on	 the	 “new	 money”	 theory,	 the	 first	 priority	 is	supported	 by	 the	 absolute	 ownership	 right	 which	 remains	 with	 the	 seller.	 In	other	words,	the	collateral	subject	to	the	security	interest	of	this	kind	is	the	title	to	the	goods.	The	enforcement	is	heavily	based	on	the	enforcement	of	ownership	rights	rather	than	the	general	rules	applied	to	a	security	interest.	This	approach	is	debatable	and	undesirable	from	both	theoretical	and	practical	viewpoints.	Title	retention	as	a	 security	 interest	 in	French	 law	and	Vietnamese	 law	 is	 a	 security	interest	on	its	face,	but	the	nature	of	ownership	right	has	never	changed,	even	in	the	 Vietnamese	 context,	 title	 retention	 must	 be	 registered	 to	 validate	 against	third	parties.	The	position	of	title-retaining	sellers	is	not	improved	in	comparison	with	 what	 they	 used	 to	 be	 in	 the	 past	 where	 title	 retention	 was	 merely	 a	contractual	 arrangement	 to	 transfer	 property	 in	 a	 sale	 contract.	 A	 lender	who	subrogates	the	seller	to	title	retention	may	lose	not	only	the	first	priority	but	also	a	security	interest	as	a	whole	according	to	the	recent	French	court	of	cassation’s	opinion73.	Personal	 property,	 which	 is	 the	 primary	 subject	 matter	 of	 title	 retention	 or	 a	PMSI,	is	rapidly	and	frequently	changed	its	status	through	the	ordinary	course	of	business	 conducted	 by	 the	 person	 who	 possesses	 them.	 They	 can	 be	 the	consumable	or	workable	goods,	raw	materials	or	merchandise	that	should	be	put	into	consumption	or	the	process	of	manufacturing	or	sub-sold	to	generate	money	for	discharge	of	indebtedness.	In	this	respect,	title	retention	or	the	first	priority	to	 the	 original	 goods	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 secure	 the	 payment	 if	 they	 are	extinguished	or	 sub-sold.	 Both	 English	 law	 and	Article	 9	 recommend	 solutions	for	extinguishment	disputes.	In	 England,	 lawyers	 have	 made	 a	 great	 effort	 to	 draft	 various	 types	 of	 title	retention	clause	to	extend	title	retention	to	the	proceeds	of	sale	or	new	products	manufactured	from	or	incorporated	in	the	supplied	goods.	The	super-ranking	in	this	context,	unlike	title	retention	to	the	original	goods,	is	a	matter	of	concern	to	other	 creditors,	 particularly	 institutional	 financiers	 who	 have	 blanket	 security																																																									73	Press	Release:	S&PGR:	Title	Retention	Opinion	Could	Affect	French	ABS.	(2017,	March	30).	Dow	
Jones	Institutional	News,	p.	Dow	Jones	Institutional	News,	Mar	30,	2017	
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interests	and	other	receivable	financiers.		The	common	law	treats	title	retention	to	the	proceeds	of	sale	and	newly	manufactured	products	as	a	registrable	charge.	The	existing	registration	system	and	the	priority	rules	in	England	do	not	support	the	registration	of	title	retention.	Extended	title	retention	has	usually	been	held	to	 be	 void	 against	 liquidators,	 administrators	 and	 creditors	 due	 to	 lack	 of	registration74.	This	situation	is	satisfactory	from	the	standpoint	of	long-term	and	receivable	financiers,	and	to	some	extent	providing	a	counterweight	to	the	super-ranking	of	the	title-retaining	seller	with	regard	to	the	original	goods.	However,	 the	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 concerning	 the	 proceeds	 is	 not	consistent.	The	Romalpa	case	remains	an	authority	that	can	reverse	the	position	of	a	 title-retaining	seller	 from	a	charge	holder	to	an	absolute	beneficiary	under	the	 fiduciary	 doctrine.	 The	 lesson	 of	wording	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role,	 and	 a	 well-prepared	 drafter	 does	 not	 hesitate	 to	 include	 terms	 indicating	 a	 fiduciary	relationship	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 proceeds	 to	 seek	 the	 first	 priority	 and	 escape	from	 the	 requirement	 of	 registration.	 The	 super-ranking	 of	 the	 title-retaining	seller	 under	 the	 fiduciary	 relationship,	 furthermore,	 does	 not	 have	 a	 sound	underlying	 policy.	 First,	 it	 demonstrates	 an	 invasion	 of	 equitable	 doctrine	 into	commercial	 transactions	that	 insist	on	mutual	interests	or	win-win	relationship	rather	 than	 the	 demand	 for	 loyalty.	 Second,	 it	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 third	parties	due	to	lack	of	transparency,	and	finally,	it	attacks	the	balance	of	interest	between	title	retention	sellers	and	other	secured	creditors	in	the	sense	that	the	former	is	relatively	advantageous	with	regard	to	the	original	goods.		Although	the	security	approach	has	been	dominant	in	almost	all	disputes	dealing	with	 the	 proceeds	 clause,	 the	 recent	 case	Caterpillar	 and	 the	 Irish	 law	on	 title	retention	are	good	illustrations	that	there	is	a	competition	between	the	fiduciary	approach	 established	 by	Romalpa	 and	 the	 security	 approach.	 Title	 retention	 to	the	 proceeds	 can	 be	 treated	 differently	 under	 the	 two	 approaches	 irrespective	that	 they	 serve	 the	 same	 function.	 English	 law	 on	 this	 matter	 is	 inconsistent,	unpredictable	and	therefore	unsatisfactory.																																																										74	Pfeiffer	 Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf	 GmbH	 &	 Co	 v	 Arbuthnot	 Factors	 Ltd	 [1988]	 1	 WLR	 150;	
Tatung	(UK)	Ltd	v	Galex	Telesure	Ltd	(1989)	5	BCC	325;	Compaq	Computer	Ltd	v	Abercorn	Group	
Ltd	 &	 Ors	 [1991]	 BCC	 484;	 Borden	 (UK)	 Ltd	 v	 Scottish	 Timber	 Products	 Ltd	 [1981]	 Ch	 25;	 Re	
Peachdart	Ltd	[1984]	Ch	131	
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Under	 Article	 9	 and	 the	 Australian	 PPSA	 where	 title	 retention	 is	 treated	 as	 a	PMSI,	a	question	is	raised	whether	the	first	priority	remains	when	the	collateral	is	replaced	by	the	proceeds	or	new	products.	A	security	agreement	and	financing	statement	may	expressly	identify	the	collateral	to	include	the	proceeds.	However,	a	security	interest	including	a	PMSI	is	statutorily	extended	to	cover	the	proceeds.	Without	 an	 agreement,	 the	 secured	 party	 still	 has	 rights	 to	 “any	 identifiable	
proceeds	 of	 the	 collateral”	 irrespective	 of	 the	 secured	 party	 authorizes	 the	disposition	of	the	collateral	free	of	the	security	interest75.	However,	with	regard	to	 an	 inventory	 PMSI,	 the	 purchase-money	 priority	 is	 only	 extending	 to	 cash	proceeds	 including	 checks,	 money	 and	 deposit	 accounts76.	 Non-cash	 proceeds	including	receivable	accounts	and	chattel	papers	are	also	the	collateral	subject	to	the	 claim	 of	 receivables	 financiers.	 The	 provision	with	 regard	 to	 the	 proceeds	generating	 from	 the	 inventory	 collateral	 manifests	 the	 policy	 to	 balance	 the	interests	 between	 inventory	 PMSI	 financiers	 and	 receivables	 or	 account	financiers	who	may	supply	cash	to	pay	the	purchase	of	inventory77.		The	 Australian	 PPSA	 follows	 and	 supports	 the	 policy	 as	 mentioned	 earlier.	Account	 financing	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 the	 debt	 financing	 market,	 and	 it	 also	provides	 the	 fund	 for	 the	purchase	of	 inventory.	An	 inventory	purchase-money	secured	 party	 can	 maintain	 the	 first	 priority	 in	 the	 cash	 proceeds,	 but	 the	security	 interest	 in	 the	account	that	 is	generated	 from	the	sale	of	the	 inventory	collateral	is	subordinate	to	a	non-purchase-money	security	interest	in	accounts.	It	 is	 seemingly	at	 first	 glance	an	 improvement	 for	any	 inventory	 financier	who	used	 to	be	a	 title-retaining	 seller	and	 subordinate	 to	 the	 claim	of	 a	 receivables	financier	under	the	application	of	the	Dearle	v	Hall	rule.	However,	it	is	not	easy	to	oblige	 the	grantor	 to	sell	 the	 inventory	 in	 terms	of	 cash	on	delivery.	 Inventory	financiers	cannot	take	advantage	of	the	all-monies	clause	because	the	PPSA	does	not	 allow	 inventory	 cross-collateralization.	 It	 can	 be	 said	 that	 a	 PMSI	 in	merchandise	 inventory	 does	 not	 bring	 many	 benefits	 to	 a	 secured	 creditor	because	 naturally,	 the	 inventory	 of	 this	 kind	 is	 turning	 over	 rapidly	 in	 the	
																																																								75	UCC	§9-315(a)(2)	76	UCC	§9-324(b)	77	Comment	8	to	the	UCC	§9-324,	see	Official	Comment	at	p.	921	
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ordinary	course	of	business.	It	is	desirable	to	accept	cross-collateralization	in	the	inventory	as	in	Article	9,	or	at	least	inventory	of	the	same	kind.	Concerning	 processing	 and	 manufacturing,	 Article	 9	 and	 the	 Australian	 PPSA	does	not	require	an	arrangement	to	extend	a	security	 interest	 to	new	products.	Without	an	agreement,	a	purchase-money	secured	creditor	can	claim	the	right	to	the	accession	or	the	product	or	mass.	Article	9	distinguishes	between	accession	and	commingled	goods.	Accession	 is	“goods	that	are	physically	united	with	other	
goods	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 that	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 original	 goods	 is	 not	 lost”78.	Commingled	goods	are	“goods	that	are	physically	united	with	other	goods	in	such	
a	manner	that	their	identity	is	lost	in	a	product	or	mass”79.	Basically,	 the	security	interest	 and	 the	 status	 of	 perfection	 is	 extended	 to	 accession	 or	 a	 product	 or	mass	incorporating	the	original	collateral	without	an	agreement.	The	difference	between	 accession	 and	 commingled	 goods	 is	 that	 a	 purchase-money	 status	cannot	exist	in	the	latter,	even	though	the	security	interest	remains	in	a	product	or	mass	resulting	from	processing	or	manufacturing	commingled	goods80.		The	 Australian	 PPSA	 has	 similar	 rules	 applying	 for	 comingled	 goods	 and	accession.	 It	 provides	 a	 desirable	 solution	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 a	 purchase-money	 inventory	 financier	 in	 comparison	with	 Article	 9	 and	 English	 law	with	regard	to	comingled	goods	that	lost	the	identity	into	the	product	or	mass	through	the	process	of	manufacturing.	The	first	priority	remains	in	the	competition	with	any	 secured	 creditor	who	 has	 a	 non-PMSI	 security	 interest	 in	 other	 comingled	goods	continuing	in	the	product	and	mass	or	the	product	and	mass	themselves.	However,	 the	 treatment	 of	 accession	 in	 the	 PPSA	 departs	 from	 Article	 9	 and	remain	close	to	the	legal	consequence	under	the	English	common	law.	Basically,	the	security	interest	continues	in	the	accession	that	allows	the	relevant	secured	creditor	has	the	priority	over	other	secured	creditors	who	claim	the	accession	as	a	whole	without	the	requirement	of	perfection	of	the	purchase-money	status.	In	this	respect,	Article	9	successfully	clarifies	the	law	of	accession	by	imposing	the	general	rules	of	priority	including	the	exceptions	with	regard	to	a	PMSI.																																																									78	UCC	§9-102(a)(1)	79	UCC	§9-336(a)	80	UCC	§9-336(f)	and	Comment	4	to	the	UCC	§9-336,	see	Official	Comments	at	p.	949	
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Functionalism	 that	brings	 title	 retention	 into	 the	ambit	of	 a	 security	 interest	 in	substance	or	by	its	function	does	not	only	serve	the	purpose	of	transparency,	but	it	also	enhances	the	availability	of	the	secured	credit.	Looking	at	title	retention	as	only	a	consensual	arrangement	to	pass	the	title	to	the	goods	and	stressing	on	the	absolute	property	rights	remained	with	the	seller	until	the	full	purchase	price	is	paid	prevent	a	buyer/debtor	 from	granting	a	 lower-ranking	security	 interest	 in	favour	of	other	creditors	as	demonstrated	in	the	English,	French	and	Vietnamese	approach.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 buyer	 cannot	 obtain	 credits	 from	 other	 secured	creditors	by	using	the	goods	subject	to	title	retention	as	the	collateral.	Can	we	consider	English	law	and	Article	9	as	two	competing	models	in	treating	the	matter	 of	 title	 retention?	 Both	 jurisdictions	manifest	 the	 two	mainstreams	underlying	 the	 law	 of	 secured	 transactions:	 that	 is	 to	 say	 formalism	 and	functionalism.	 The	 Article	 9	 has	 gained	 some	 glory	 since	 many	 common	 law	jurisdictions	like	Australia	have	shifted	from	the	English	law	model	to	the	Article	9.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 although	 English	 law	 illustrates	 confusion	 between	 the	fiduciary	or	the	security	approach	in	treating	the	proceeds	title	retention	clause,	it	achieves	the	balance	of	 interests	among	relating	parties	 that	make	the	 law	of	title	retention	not	to	be	in	the	urgent	need	of	reform81.	The	current	English	law	of	title	retention	recommends	a	model	in	which	registration	of	title	retention	is	not	necessary	 to	enforce	 the	 super-ranking	and	absolute	 right	of	 the	 title-retaining	seller	 in	 the	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 Registration	 will	 be	 a	 burden	 to	 title	retention	if	the	registration	system	itself	is	not	reformed	into	a	relatively	simple,	fast	and	cost-saving	filing-notice	system.	In	contrast,	other	creditors	may	have	a	concern	that	the	expense	of	registration	incurred	to	title-retaining	sellers	may	be	compensated	 by	 some	 more	 benefits	 like	 extending	 the	 first	 priority	 to	 the	proceeds	and	new	products,	even	though	it	may	be	subject	to	some	limitations.	In	other	words,	the	existing	balance	of	interests	under	the	existing	English	common	law	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 broken.	 In	 this	 respect,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 blanket	 and	receivable	 financiers,	 the	 requirement	 of	 registration	 of	 title	 retention	 is	 not	appealing.	
																																																								81	See	discussion	in	Gullifer	L,	‘Retention	of	Title	Clauses:	A	Question	of	Balance’	in	Burrows	AS	and	Peel	E	(eds),	Contract	Terms	(Oxford	University	Press	2007)	
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Today,	it	is	surprising	that	the	reform	of	English	law	in	this	area	is	desperate	for	the	survival	of	the	law	on	sale	of	goods	concerning	raw	materials	or	consumables	goods	after	the	Bunkers	ruling82.	Title	retention	threatens	the	seller’s	right	to	sue	for	 a	 price	 as	 demonstrating	 in	 the	 Caterpillar	 case83.	 The	 Re	 Highway	 Foods	ruling84	also	 intervenes	 in	 the	submission	of	a	bona	 fide	purchaser	to	keeps	the	goods	by	relying	on	the	rule	of	a	buyer	in	possession	because	she	also	buys	under	title	 retention	 arrangement,	 and	 the	 purchase	 price	 is	 not	 paid	 in	 full.	 The	widespread	use	of	title	retention,	therefore,	breaks	the	chain	of	transactions	and	restrains	the	flow	of	commerce	unexpectedly.	It	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 the	 treatment	 of	 title	 retention	 in	 English	 law	 is	favourable	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 formalism.	 Vietnamese	 scholars	 who	 are	likely	 to	 emphasize	 on	 title	 retention	 as	 a	 contractual	 arrangement	 can	 find	 a	good	justification	to	oppose	the	treatment	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest.	The	 French	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 clear	 and	 satisfactory	 treatment	because	 title	 retention	 is	 just	 labeled	 as	 a	 security	 interest	 but	 an	 absolute	property	right	in	substance.	However,	the	side	effect	of	title	retention	on	the	sale	of	goods	law	is	a	serious	threat	as	in	the	English	model.	Treating	 title	 retention	as	a	PMSI	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 solution	 that	 the	English,	French	and	Vietnamese	approach	cannot	offer.	A	PMSI	at	first	is	an	in-substance	security	 interest,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 under	 the	 unitary	 treatment	 of	 the	 Article	 9	model,	it	should	comply	with	the	general	rules	of	attachment,	perfection,	priority	and	enforcement.	The	most	considerable	achievement	of	Article	9	and	the	PPSAs	is	the	comprehensive	system	of	priority	rules	that	govern	the	conflict	in	the	same	assets	 between	 a	 secured	 creditor	 and	 unsecured	 creditors	 including	 a	 lien	holder	 and	 a	 trustee	 in	 the	 insolvency	 proceeding,	 secured	 creditor	 and	 sub-purchasers,	a	secured	creditors	and	other	secured	creditors.	It	also	supplies	the	priority	rule	to	govern	the	situation	where	the	original	collateral	is	put	into	the	manufacturing	 process.	 The	 first	 priority	 rooted	 in	 the	 status	 of	 original																																																									82	PST	Energy	7	Shipping	LLC	v	OW	Bunker	Malta	Ltd	[2015]	 EWCA	Civ	 1058;	 [2016]	UKSC	23;	[2016]	AC	1034	83 FG	Wilson	(Engineering)	Ltd	v	John	Holt	&	Co	(Liverpool)	Ltd	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	1232,	[2014]	1	WLR	2365 84	Re	Highway	Foods	International	Ltd	(In	Administrative	Receivership)	[1995]	BCC	271	
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purchase-money	 collateral	 is	 considered	 to	 extend	 to	 the	 proceeds	 or	 the	 new	product	subject	 to	 the	policy	 that	 takes	 into	account	other	benefits	rather	 than	only	enhancing	the	secured	credit	market	in	general	or	asset-acquiring	financing	in	 particular.	 The	 free	 flow	 of	 commerce	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 account	 or	receivable	financing	are	among	the	consideration.	The	unitary	approach	does	not	mean	 that	 the	 Article	 9	 model	 does	 not	 have	 any	 distinction.	 It	 severely	distinguishes	different	types	of	collateral	and	recognizes	that	each	type,	namely	inventory,	 farm	 products,	 equipment,	 customer	 goods,	 and	 serial-number	property,	bears	special	characteristics	and	receives	some	particular	treatment.	
6.2 What	should	the	 law	of	 title	retention	 in	Vietnam	look	 like	
when	title	retention	is	accepted	as	a	security	interest?		The	 current	 title	 retention	 law	 in	 Vietnam	 imports	 the	 French	 approach.	 As	discussed	above,	the	approach	of	this	kind	is	not	satisfactory;	thus,	it	is	raised	the	question	of	reform,	and	the	Article	9	model	is	suggested	to	be	the	good	law	in	this	area.	However,	it	is	debatable	that	Article	9	and	the	PMSI	concept	are	the	solely	good	 solution	 to	 the	 title	 retention	 issue.	 	 The	 Article	 9	model	 is	 undoubtedly	relatively	desirable	since	it	provides	a	robust	and	transparent	security	device	as	a	 counter-balance	 to	 a	 blanket	 lien,	 the	 all-inclusive	 shopping	 for	 all	 matters	arising	 from	a	 secured	 transaction	 in	personal	property,	 and	a	 fast,	 convenient	and	cost-saving	unitary	approach	 including	a	notice	 filing	 system.	 Importing	or	transplanting	a	law	even	it	is	proved	to	be	a	good	one	in	the	parent	country	is	not	an	easy	task	since	it	encounters	the	resist	from	the	angle	of	legal	culture	and	legal	practice.		This	 research	 has	 discussed	 the	 problem	 of	 legal	 transplant	 in	 compared	jurisdictions	 as	 a	 good	 lesson	 to	 the	 law-making	 in	 Vietnam.	 Legal	 transplant	increasingly	 occurs	 due	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 globalization	 that	 demands	 the	harmonization	 among	 jurisdictions	 at	 least	 in	 commercial	 law.	 In	 England,	 the	Article	 9	 recommendation	 is	 not	 favourable	 because	 it	 conflicts	 with	 the	fundamental	principle	of	secured	transaction	law,	that	is	the	formalism	approach.	Among	the	package	of	functionalism,	a	notice	filing	system	and	unitary	approach,	the	 last	one	 is	possibly	 tough	 to	 change	 in	England	where	 the	whole	system	of	diverse	security	devices	 is	operated	well	and	steadily	 in	overall.	The	 familiarity	
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with	the	current	system	and	the	balance	of	 interests	concerning	the	 law	of	 title	retention	are	also	the	strong	reluctance	to	shift	to	the	new	approach.	Meanwhile,	the	Australian	PPSA	is	a	good	illustration	that	a	previous	English-like	system	in	the	concerned	area	of	law	can	adopt	the	Article	9	model	as	a	whole	package.		French	 law	is	another	valuable	solution	to	the	extent	 that	nothing	restrains	the	adoption	of	 a	PMSI	or	 title	 retention	as	a	 security	 interest	 alone,	 the	 former	of	which	is	entirely	preferable.	The	approach	of	this	kind	cannot	exploit	the	benefit	of	 an	 all-inclusive	 package,	 but	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 it	 can	 solve	 many	 urgent	problems,	namely	the	unexpected	outcome	of	title	retention	on	the	sale	of	goods	law,	 the	uncertain	 treatment	of	 the	proceeds	generating	 from	selling	 the	goods	subject	to	title	retention	as	a	charge	or	a	trust.		Within	the	scope	of	the	present	thesis	focusing	on	the	law	of	title	retention,	some	good	lessons	can	be	learnt	from	Article	9	and	the	PPSA	as	a	product	of	Article	9	transplant	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 law	 of	 title	 retention.	 The	 legal	 transplant	 as	demonstrated	 in	 Australia,	 which	 is	 a	 jurisdiction	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 legal	tradition	 with	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 common	 law	 system,	 has	 raised	 some	valuable	 lessons	 for	 the	 Vietnamese	 jurisdiction.	 In	 this	 sense,	 even	 though	Vietnam	 is	 not	 a	 common	 law	 country,	 it	 would	 share	 achievements	 and	 face	problems	similar	to	Australia	that	has	imported	the	Article	9	approach.	First,	 title	 retention	 should	 be	 treated	 within	 the	 concept	 of	 purchase-money	security	interest	rather	than	a	security	interest	under	the	French	approach.	The	goods	supplied,	 therefore,	has	a	 status	of	 the	collateral	 that	 is	 able	 to	attach	 to	lower-ranking	 security	 interests.	 It	 also	 allows	 other	 financiers	 rather	 than	 a	seller	who	 are	willing	 to	 bid	 for	 a	 loan	 to	 acquire	 new	 asset	 can	have	 the	 first	priority	in	the	newly-acquired	collateral.	Second,	the	distinction	at	least	between	inventory	and	non-inventory	collateral	is	crucial	in	the	treatment	of	a	purchase-money	security	interest.	Although	Article	9	insists	on	the	same	treatment	 for	all	 types	of	security	 interests,	 it	distinguishes	the	 types	of	 collateral	 that	 are	 typically	 categorized	 into	 inventory,	 equipment,	farm	products	and	consumer	goods.	Inventory	(or	stock),	which	is	expected	to	be	consumed	 or	 processed	 or	 sold	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business,	 receives	
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special	 treatments.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 a	 PMSI,	 the	 item	 of	 inventory	 collateral	secures	not	only	their	purchase	price	but	also	other	PMSIs	incurred	by	the	other	items	of	inventory	collateral,	which	is	known	as	cross-collateralization	of	PMSIs	in	 inventory.	 Furthermore,	 an	 inventory	 PMSI	 has	 separate	 priority	 rules	particularly	 requiring	 notification	 sent	 to	 earlier-filed	 secured	 parties.	 The	relatively	 burdensome	 requirement	 aims	 at	 preventing	 earlier-filed	 secured	parties	 from	 advancing	 credit	 to	 the	 debtor	 to	 acquire	 new	 assets.	 Fraudulent	debtors	 may	 apply	 for	 advances	 under	 a	 future	 advance	 and	 after-acquired	property	 clause	 without	 revealing	 the	 intervening	 super-priority	 security	interest.	The	 categorization	of	 collateral	 and	 the	 special	 treatment	of	 inventory	PMSI	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 functionalism	 scheme	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 PMSI.	However,	 the	Australian	 law	has	 slightly	 departed	 from	 the	Article	 9	model	 in	this	 respect.	 Under	 the	 PPSA,	 the	 indication	 of	 purchase-money	 status	 in	registration	 is	 required	 instead	 of	 giving	 notice	 to	 earlier-registered	 creditors	who	 have	 a	 security	 interest	 in	 the	 same	 collateral.	 Therefore,	 an	 earlier-registered	 secured	 creditor	who	 has	 an	 after-acquired	 security	 interest	 should	strategically	 check	 the	 public	 record	 for	 the	 intervening	 PMSI	whenever	 she	 is	going	 to	 advance	 credit.	 	 It	 does	 also	 not	 accept	 cross-collateralization	concerning	 an	 inventory	 PMSI.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 does	 not	 acknowledge	 the	importance	of	the	distinction	between	inventory	and	non-inventory	collateral.		Thirdly,	 the	 law	of	purchase-money	 security	 interest	must	have	 the	 taking	 free	rule	to	solve	the	conflict	between	a	purchase-money	secured	creditor	and	a	sub-purchaser	 underlying	 the	 policy	 of	 balance	 between	 the	 enhancement	 of	 the	secured	lending	market	and	the	free	flow	of	commerce.	The	title-retaining	seller	is	 no	 longer	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 goods	 supplied	 under	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 PMSI.	Therefore,	she	cannot	invoke	the	provisions	that	protect	a	true	owner	against	a	third	 party	 who	 at	 present	 possesses	 the	 goods	 without	 the	 original	 seller’s	consent.	In	 this	 respect,	 Article	 9	 has	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 a	 buyer	 in	 ordinary	course	 of	 business	 and	 a	 buyer	 relying	 on	 the	 authority	 to	 sell,	 both	 of	whom	claim	the	taking	free	in	the	competition	with	a	purchase-money	secured	creditor.	In	the	new	era	of	the	Article	9	or	PPSA	model,	the	taking	free	rule	concerning	a	
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buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	is	primarily	relevant	to	the	sale	of	inventory	in	 which	 selling	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 is	 firmly	 required.	 On	 the	other	hand,	selling	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	is	supposed	to	be	irrelevant	when	a	buyer	relies	on	the	seller's	authority	to	sell.		The	Australian	PPSA	does	not	have	a	satisfactory	distinction	between	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	and	a	buyer	relying	on	the	seller’s	authority	to	sell	to	set	 up	 the	 priority	 against	 a	 secured	 creditor.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 rules	 with	regard	 to	 the	 two	 abovementioned	 cases	 are	 overlapped.	 The	 requirement	 of	selling	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 should	 not	 apply	 in	 the	 context	 of	authority	to	sell.	The	seller	can	transfer	a	title	free	and	clear	of	a	security	interest	if	 the	 secured	 party	 authorizes	 a	 disposition	 free	 and	 clear	 irrespective	 of	whether	the	sale	is	in	the	seller’s	ordinary	course	of	business.	Furthermore,	the	wording	of	taking	free	rule	under	the	authority	to	sell	does	not	have	the	phrase	“free	of	 the	 security	 interest”	 that	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 old	 version	 of	 Article	 9.	 The	concept	 of	 floating	 charge	 is	 employed	 to	 interpret	 that	 any	 security	 interest	accompanied	 by	 an	 authority	 to	 sell	 the	 collateral	 is	 equivalent	 to	 a	 floating	charge	 so	 that	 the	 transferee	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business	 can	 take	 free.	Again,	 the	 requirement	 of	 “in	 the	ordinary	course	of	business”	 is	 stressed	 in	 the	context	 of	 authority	 to	 sell.	 Interpretation	 of	 taking	 free	 rule	 in	 light	 of	 the	floating	 charge	 concept	possibly	avoids	a	 line	of	disputes	as	witnessed	 to	arise	under	 the	 former	Article	9,	but	 it	 is	not	desirable.	The	PPSA	has	put	an	end	 to	floating	 charges	 since	 it	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 grantor	 from	 exploiting	 the	collateral	 for	 business	 purposes.	 Under	 the	 unitary	 approach,	 the	 PPSA	recognizes	 that	 any	 security	 interest	 automatically	 attaches	 to	 the	 proceeds,	accession,	 the	 product	 or	 mass	 generating	 from	 selling	 or	 manufacturing	 the	collateral	respectively	in	the	absence	of	an	agreement	of	this	kind.	However,	the	secured	 party	 basically	 has	 the	 right	 to	 follow	 the	 collateral	 disposed	 to	 third	parties	 without	 an	 effective	 authorization.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 PPSA	 has	corresponded	 well	 to	 Article	 9,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 strictly	 follow	 Article	 9	 policy	concerning	 the	priority	 rules	applying	 to	a	dispute	between	a	 secured	creditor	and	a	 third-party	buyer.	Accordingly,	 a	buyer	 in	ordinary	 course	of	business	 is	
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not	 required	 to	 check	 the	public	 record	 to	 find	out	whether	a	 security	 interest	encumbers	the	goods	or	investigate	the	seller’s	authority	to	sell.		In	contrast,	without	a	position	of	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business,	inquiries	into	any	encumbrance	and	 the	authority	 to	 sell	 is	 a	 strategy	 to	avoid	a	 conflict	with	 any	 secured	 creditor.	 The	 PPSA	 does	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 of	 this	policy,	 and	 the	 Lewis	 court	 confirms	 the	 approach85.	 Therefore,	 the	 taking	 free	rule	 under	 the	 authority	 to	 sell	 narrows	 its	 scope	 of	 application	 and	 overlaps	with	the	taking	free	rule	of	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business.	The	 priority	 between	 a	 secured	 creditor	 and	 a	 third-party	 buyer	 is	 a	 good	illustration	 of	 legal	 transplant	where	 the	 original	 rules	 have	 been	 transformed	under	 the	 legal	 system	of	 the	 host	 country.	 Although	 Australia	 and	 the	 United	States	are	 in	 the	same	 legal	 tradition,	 they	departed	each	other	considerably	 in	the	 area	 of	 secured	 transaction	 law,	 at	 least	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 acceptance	 of	floating	 charge.	 In	 an	Anglo-Australian	 jurisdiction,	 the	 floating	 charge	 concept	has	 long	 rooted	 and	 played	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 granting	 security	 interests	 in	 the	circulating	pool	of	assets.	The	category	of	floating	charge	is	reluctantly	abolished	by	a	uniform	concept	of	a	security	interest	does	not	mean	that	it	does	not	leave	any	trace	in	the	new	system.	The	Vietnamese	jurisdiction	may	not	encounter	the	same	problem	of	floating	charge	since	this	concept	is	not	officially	mentioned	in	the	law	and	scholarship.	However,	it	is	crucial	to	draft	the	taking	free	rules	with	a	clear	distinction	between	a	buyer	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	and	a	buyer	relying	on	the	authority	 to	sell	with	a	 thorough	consideration	of	 the	underlying	policy	as	recommended	under	Article	9.	Fourthly,	the	reform	of	the	secured	transaction	law	in	personal	property	must	be	done	 concurrently	 with	 the	 review	 and	 modification	 of	 related	 laws.	 The	American	 jurisdiction	 has	 an	 advantage	 that	 Article	 9	 was	 drafted	 within	 the	scheme	 of	 the	 uniform	 commercial	 law	 which	 involves	 sales,	 negotiable	instruments,	 secured	 transactions…,	 whereas	 the	 PPSA	 enactment	 is	 an	independent	 project.	 With	 regard	 to	 PMSIs,	 the	 law	 on	 sale	 of	 goods	 may	substantially	interfere	with	the	application	of	the	PPSA	as	witnessed	in	Australia.																																																									85	Lewis	v	LG	Electronics	Australia	Pty	Ltd,	[2014]	VSC	644		
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 from	 the	 English	 law	 experience,	 the	 PPSA	 regulations	 on	PMSIs	 are	 likely	 not	 to	 neutralize	 unexpected	 outcome	 of	 title	 retention	arrangement	on	the	survival	of	the	sale	of	goods	law	in	some	cases.	It	is	strictly	required	to	insert	a	rule	considering	title	retention	to	have	an	effect	of	a	security	interest	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 sale	 of	 goods	 law	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 secured	transaction	 law	 in	 personal	 property	 that	 now	has	 a	 functional	 approach.	 This	rule	will	restrain	title	retention	from	being	an	arrangement	to	transfer	title	in	the	goods	so	that	it	does	not	play	any	role	in	interpreting	what	a	sale	is.	The	concept	of	sale	is	critical	to	solve	the	conflict	between	a	purchase-money	secured	creditor	and	 a	 buyer	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of	 business.	 The	 English	 case	Re	Highway	
Foods	demonstrates	the	possibility	of	a	buyer	in	ordinary	course	of	business	who	is	 also	 subject	 to	 title	 retention	 to	 lose	 the	 title	 to	 the	 original	 title-retaining	seller.	The	Australian	PPSA	does	not	improve	the	position	of	a	buyer	in	this	sense	because	the	sale	of	goods	law	is	not	adjusted	to	comply	with	the	new	concept	of	security	 interest.	 Furthermore,	 to	 avoid	 that	 an	 unexpected	 outcome	 of	 the	English	Bunkers	case,	the	unified	treatment	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	will	redo	treating	the	transfer	of	raw	material	and	consumable	goods	as	the	sale	of	goods.	Fifthly,	a	notice	filing	system	instead	of	a	transaction-based	one	would	facilitate	the	adoption	of	a	PMSI	to	gain	a	more	considerable	extent	of	efficiency.	A	filing-notice	system	that	 is	simple,	 fast	and	cost-saving	 is	also	a	core	requirement	 for	the	 operation	 of	 PMSIs.	 Generally	 speaking,	 it	 provides	 a	 relatively	 accurate,	easily-determined	date	for	priority	purposes	that	is	premised	on	the	filing	date.	Ranking	priority	according	to	the	time	a	security	interest	is	created	or	executed	is	undoubtedly	not	an	easy	task	that	may	result	 in	 the	debate	whether	 it	 is	 the	date	of	a	security	agreement	or	the	date	of	delivery.	Furthermore,	a	filing-notice	system	 allows	 a	 financing	 statement	 to	 be	 filed	 preceding	 the	 creation	 of	 a	security	agreement	and	the	extension	of	credit	to	the	debtor	and	covers	multiple	security	 agreements.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 file	 a	 financing	statement	 corresponding	 to	 a	 specific	 secured	 transaction.	 This	 advantage	 is	specifically	practical	when	the	collateral	is	inventory,	even	in	the	case	of	a	PMSI.	The	 purchase-money	 secured	 party	 is	 not	 required	 to	 file	 for	 every	 up-coming	
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inventory	 item.	 It	 cannot	 be	 said	 that	 the	 recognition	 of	 PMSI	 cannot	 combine	with	the	transactional	filing	system.	The	problem	is	that	it	is	far	from	workable	and	efficient,	at	least	in	case	of	inventory	financing	because	it	is	time-consuming,	inconvenient,	and	costly	for	registration	every	time	a	transaction	is	executed.	However,	a	notice	filing	system	accompanied	by	the	first-to-file	priority	rule	has	some	weakness	to	the	extent	that	it	favours	the	interest	of	a	first-to-file	creditor.	The	 underlying	 policy	 is	 to	 encourage	 early	 and	 timely	 filing	 to	 solve	 the	ostensible	ownership	 problem.	 The	 later-in-time	 creditor	 does	 not	have	 strong	incentive	 to	 file	 against	 the	 same	 collateral	 to	 have	 only	 subordinate	 interest	irrespective	of	the	order	that	advances	are	made.	Furthermore,	the	notice	filing	system	does	not	reveal	much	information	relating	to	the	filed	security	interests,	especially	 the	 amount	 of	 secured	 obligation.	 Potential	 creditors	 only	 learn	whether	 the	 specific	 collateral	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 their	 concern	 is	 possibly	encumbered.	They	should	make	further	inquiries	to	the	debtor	as	to,	for	example,	the	attachment	of	the	security	interest	or	the	amount	of	the	secured	obligation	or	whether	 the	 loan	 is	 fully	 paid	 off.	 Again,	 inventory	 financier	 before	 making	further	 advance	 may	 inquire	 the	 debtor	 for	 more	 information	 regarding	 the	intervening	 PMSI	 in	 inventory.	 From	 the	 debtor’s	 perspective,	whereas	 it	 does	not	 incur	 transaction	 cost	 to	 deal	with	 the	 same	 secured	 creditor	 for	 series	 of	loans	 especially	 against	 inventory	 or	 receivables,	 the	 notice	 filing	 system	 does	not	 support	 the	 debtor	 who	 would	 like	 to	 take	 out	 loans	 against	 the	 same	collateral,	 mainly	 equipment	 collateral,	 from	 different	 lenders.	 Furthermore,	notice	 filing	 is	 a	 name-based	 system;	 thus,	 searchers	 must	 enter	 the	 debtor’s	name	 precisely	 to	 uncover	 the	 collateral	 in	 question.	 It	 depends	 much	 on	 the	searching	skill	and	the	convenience	and	accuracy	of	the	search	engine.	Although	there	 are	 some	 above-mentioned	 restrains	 on	 later-in-time	 creditor	 and	 the	debtor,	the	benefit	of	a	filing-notice	system	outweighs	its	cost.		Above	all,	legal	transplant	of	a	PMSI	in	Vietnam	has	confronted	more	challenges	than	 any	 common	 law	 jurisdictions.	 The	 first	 and	 foremost	 is	 the	 under-developed	 status	 of	 secured	 transaction	 law	 and	 the	 unfamiliarity	 with	 the	technique	 and	 function	 of	 title	 retention.	 Title	 retention	 is	 recognized	 as	 a	security	 interest,	 but	 the	 treatment	 relies	heavily	 on	 the	 French	 approach	 that	
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appraises	the	seller-based	approach	and	the	owner-based	enforcement	method.	Introducing	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	in	the	Civil	Code	is	the	first-step	offer	of	a	new	security	device	to	the	debt	financing	market	rather	than	initiated	by	 a	 high	 demand	 of	 satisfactory	 comprehensive	 rules	 for	 this	 transaction	 in	practice.		A	code-formulated	system	is	a	feature	that	is	at	the	outset	an	important	obstacle	to	import	a	PMSI	concept.	A	civil	code	is	considered	as	a	proud	achievement	and	a	heart	of	a	civil	 law	 jurisdiction,	but	an	all-in-one	code	 is	not	suitable	 to	cover	the	rapidly-changing	and	complicating	relationships	in	modern	times86.	However,	this	 problem	 is	 relating	 much	 to	 legal	 technique	 and	 legislative	 practice.	 It	 is	possible	to	transform	a	civil	code	into	several	interrelated	books,	one	of	which	is	the	 book	 on	 secured	 transaction	 law	 so	 that	 the	 amendment	 or	 reform	 can	 be	done	without	the	need	to	revise	the	whole	code.		The	 unitary	 approach	 is	 one	 of	many	 reasons	 leading	 to	 the	 hesitation	 to	 the	Article	9	model	occurred	in	England	as	well	as	Vietnam.	In	England,	shifting	from	formalism	to	functionalism	is	urgent	today	because	of	the	potential	threat	of	title	retention	 to	 the	most	popular	 law,	 that	 is	 the	 sale	 of	 goods	 law.	 This	 situation	should	be	handled	in	this	way,	and	therefore,	the	abolishment	of	the	fundamental	formalism	principle	 is	 compensated	by	 the	survival	of	 the	sale	of	 goods	 law.	 In	Vietnam,	the	adoption	of	functionalism	through	the	recognition	of	title	retention	as	a	security	interest	is	relatively	smooth.	It	is	not	necessary	to	adopt	the	unitary	approach	where	the	well-accustomed	security	devices	 like	a	pledge	or	a	charge	are	 likely	 to	 change	 into	 a	uniform	 concept	of	 security	 interest.	 A	 PMSI	 can	 be	survived	in	a	system	where	the	diversity	of	security	devices	is	maintained	even	though	 it	 cannot	 achieve	 a	 desirable	 efficiency	 that	 it	 would	 have	 in	 a	 unitary	system	like	Article	9.	The	Vietnamese	Civil	Code	underwent	a	significant	revision,	and	a	new	code	was	enacted	in	2015.	It	lost	a	chance	to	transplant	the	concept	of	PMSI	because	of	the	opt	for	the	French	approach.	It	takes	a	considerable	length	of	time	 to	 have	 a	 second	 chance	 to	 reform	 the	 law	of	 title	 retention	when	 a	 next	project	 to	 revise	 the	 code	 is	 initiated	 again.	 At	 that	 time,	 the	 law	 of	 secured																																																									86	Nguyen	X-T	and	Nguyen	BT,	Transplanting	Secured	Transactions	Law:	Trapped	in	the	Civil	Code	
for	Emerging	Economy	Countries	(2014),	at	p.21	
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